{"title":"Modes of presentation and ways of appearing: a critical revision of Evans’s account*","authors":"E. Sacchi","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-23669","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-23669","url":null,"abstract":"There are many ways in which a subject can think about an object. One of these occurs when the subject can perceive the object: perceiving an object makes it possible to think about it in a very direct and straightforward way. This is so because perception of the object makes a subject aware of the object itself. But what is it to be (perceptually) aware of something? Moreover, how does such an awareness have to be accounted for? According to a very influential proposal leading back to Gareth Evans (1982), the kind of awareness that can home a subject’s thought on an object has to be cashed out in terms of singular object-dependent modes of presentation understood as ways of having discriminating (albeit non-descriptive) knowledge of the object. Contra Evans I shall claim that modes of presentation thus characterized do not account for perceptual awareness, but rather presuppose it.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"47 1","pages":"188-202"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90557632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"God, Eternal Truths and the Rationality of the World in Descartes","authors":"E. Rocha","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-24979","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-24979","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I examine Descartes’s thesis of the free creation of eternal truths in conjunction with what he claims to be the divine attributes known by us. Considering the Cartesian claims of God’s simplicity and that eternal truths freely created by God include logical principles as the structure of finite minds, I argue that the Cartesian thesis of the free creation of eternal truths involves: a) God necessarily establishes (and thus creates) within/as himself all essences and truths, including those that to the finite intellect seem impossible; b) While establishing essences and truths, God instantiates (and thus creates) some of what to the finite intellect seems to be non-contradictory essences and truths as innate ideas in actual finite minds, and instantiates at least some of what seems to be non-contradictory essences and truths in the actual physical world and c) While establishing essences and truths, God may have instantiated in the actual world many (or all) of the essences and truths that the finite mind perceives to be contradictory, that is, those whose existence cannot be clearly and distinctly conceived by the finite mind and seem, therefore, impossible.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"13 1","pages":"162-175"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89774252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Idea of a ‘Method’ in Moral Philosophy","authors":"M. Reichlin","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-24972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-24972","url":null,"abstract":"The paper discusses the two meanings that ‘method’ is often assumed to have in moral philosophy: the epistemic meaning, according to which a method is a procedure to reach moral knowledge, and the normative meaning, according to which it is a criterion of right and wrong in actions. The origin of these two, clearly connected meanings can be traced to Sidgwick’s work The Methods of Ethics . It is argued that Sidgwick’s seminal idea of a “reflective equilibrium” is a valuable and lasting contribution to the debate on moral epistemology; however, Sidgwick’s characterisation of the different normative options is biased against non consequentialist approaches by its concentration on “methods”, rather than on theories and “ultimate reasons”. This consequentialist bias still lingers in contemporary ethics.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"43 1","pages":"60-69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86933612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Nature of Pictorial Representations","authors":"G. Ferretti","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-23631","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-23631","url":null,"abstract":"A crucial question in the study of picture perception asks about whether, when perceiving an object in a picture, we see only the depicted scene or, rather, we simultaneously see both the depicted scene and the surface. Two different views have fueled the debate since a long time. According to Wollheim, we see both the depicted scene and the picture’s surface simultaneously. Call this the ‘simultaneous account of picture perception’ (SA). SA is in contrast with Gombrich’s view that, during picture perception, we do not simultaneously see both the depicted scene and the surface, but we alternate between these two visual states. Call this the ‘non-simultaneous account of picture perception’ (NA). The debate between these two positions still persists in the contemporary literature on picture perception. In this paper, I first analyze the notion of vision SA and NA are committed to. Then, by discussing empirical evidence from vision science, I offer an argument that supports SA.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"13 1","pages":"136-144"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78175608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Spinoza on Metaphysical Doubt and the “Cartesian Circle”","authors":"M. A. Gleizer","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-24980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-24980","url":null,"abstract":"This article offers an analysis and defense of the solution proposed by Spinoza to the “Cartesian circle” problem. Taking into consideration Spinoza’s sound analysis of the epistemic conditions of an authentic doubt, it will try to show, against the interpreters who maintain that Spinoza’s most explicit and consistent solution fails, that his solution offers a perfectly coherent account of the self-justification of the objective value of reason. I will also briefly indicate the intimate connection existing between Spinoza’s solution to the “Cartesian circle” problem and his conception of truth as its own standard","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"3 1","pages":"176-193"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73091489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Visually-based Knowingly Illusory Presence and Picture Display","authors":"A. Voltolini","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-23666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-23666","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I want to show how picture perception is specifically presentational, hence specifically perceptual, by suitably reinterpreting Richard Wollheim’s conception of seeing-in. Picture perception is such for it only ascribes the presence of the picture’s subject in its content, but not in its mode, for the subject is visually known not to be there: thus, it amounts to a knowingly illusory perceptual experience of such a presence. Second, I want to show how this presentational specificity does not prevent the picture itself from being properly presentational of the properties that are ascribed, within its perception, to its subject: the design properties of the picture’s vehicle present the perceivable properties ascribed to the picture’s subject just as the sensory features of a standard perceptual experience present the perceivable properties of its object.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"9 1","pages":"158-168"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78599724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intuizioni linguistiche e filosofia sperimentale: metodi a confronto","authors":"Bianca Cepollaro","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-24970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-24970","url":null,"abstract":"Nell’ultimo decennio si e infittito il dibattito sul ruolo della filosofia sperimentale rispetto alla cosiddetta filosofia ‘in poltrona’ (‘armchair philosophy’). La discussione, che riguarda i metodi della filosofia analitica in generale, ha ricadute di grande interesse per la filosofia del linguaggio in particolare. In questo articolo presento un caso in cui una questione centrale nello studio dei termini espressivi – cioe se il contenuto offensivo delle espressioni denigratorie sopravviva o no nell’interazione con operatori semantici e in particolare con la negazione – e stata affrontata quasi contemporaneamente adottando metodi filosofici differenti: (i) in poltrona, (ii) attraverso l’applicazione di test linguistici e (iii) attraverso metodi sperimentali. I tre metodi – cosi diversi per tradizione e prospettive – offrono risultati convergenti. Casi come questi mostrano come una pluralita metodologica e un atteggiamento piu ecumenico rispetto allo scontro tra filosofia sperimentale e filosofia ‘in poltrona’ non siano da temere ma anzi da perseguire.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"90 1","pages":"36-44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77977021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conceptual semantics as grounded in personal experience","authors":"F. Conca, M. Tettamanti","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-23628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-23628","url":null,"abstract":"Semantic memory for an object encompasses multi-modal knowledge gained through personal experience over the lifetime, and coded in grounded sensory-motor brain systems, independently of the level of subjective awareness. Linguistic access to semantic memories in verbal format relies on the functional coupling between perisylvian language regions and the grounded brain systems implied by our lifetime experience with the concept’s referents. Linguistic structure exerts modulatory influences on this functional coupling, as in the case of sentential negation, which reduces the interactions between perisylvian language regions and the grounded brain systems.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"2 1","pages":"98-116"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85444321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Descartes e il problema della teodicea nella prima modernità","authors":"Alfredo Gatto","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-24981","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-24981","url":null,"abstract":"The article deals with the critical reception of the Cartesian theory of the eternal truths. It aims to analyze the central role played by Descartes’ doctrine in Early Modern Philosophy, with particular regard to the reflections of Leibniz, Malebranche and Spinoza. Indeed, part of their philosophy can be considered as an attempt to criticize the premises of the Cartesian theory in order to avoid their consequences. There are then strong reasons for believing that the importance of the theodicean issues in Early Modern Philosophy is directly related to Descartes’ doctrine of the free creation of the eternal truths.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"15 1","pages":"194-210"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89635528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chomsky on Analytic and Necessary Propositions","authors":"E. Cipriani","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-21111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-21111","url":null,"abstract":"My aim is to critically discuss Chomsky’s position concerning the analytic-synthetic distinction and necessary propositions. To do so, I present Chomsky’s objection to Quine’s criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction, and I point out that Chomsky’s defense of such a distinction can be efficacious only under the assumption of conceptual innateness. I then focus on Chomsky’s analysis of necessary propositions. In particular, I present Chomsky’s objection to Kripke’s essentialism, and Chomsky’s hypothesis that the distinction between necessary and contingent truths is determined by the structure of the conceptual system and its relations with other systems of common-sense understanding. I highlight that this hypothesis is not compatible with Chomsky’s own objection to Kripke.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"56 1","pages":"122-131"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76401536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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