Spinoza on Metaphysical Doubt and the “Cartesian Circle”

Q2 Arts and Humanities
M. A. Gleizer
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This article offers an analysis and defense of the solution proposed by Spinoza to the “Cartesian circle” problem. Taking into consideration Spinoza’s sound analysis of the epistemic conditions of an authentic doubt, it will try to show, against the interpreters who maintain that Spinoza’s most explicit and consistent solution fails, that his solution offers a perfectly coherent account of the self-justification of the objective value of reason. I will also briefly indicate the intimate connection existing between Spinoza’s solution to the “Cartesian circle” problem and his conception of truth as its own standard
斯宾诺莎论形而上学的怀疑与“笛卡尔圈”
本文对斯宾诺莎对“笛卡尔圈”问题的解答进行了分析和辩护。考虑到斯宾诺莎对真实怀疑的认识论条件的合理分析,它将试图表明,反对那些认为斯宾诺莎最明确和一致的解决方案失败的诠释者,他的解决方案提供了一个完美的连贯的解释,即理性的客观价值的自我辩护。我还将简要指出斯宾诺莎对“笛卡尔圈”问题的解决方案与他的真理概念作为自己的标准之间存在的密切联系
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Phenomenology and Mind
Phenomenology and Mind Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
16
审稿时长
25 weeks
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