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The Foundation of Evaluation and Volition on Cognition: a New Contribution to the Debate over Husserl’s Account of Objectifying and Non-Objectifying Acts 认知评价与意志的基础:对胡塞尔对象化与非对象化行为论述争论的新贡献
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2302
N. Spano
{"title":"The Foundation of Evaluation and Volition on Cognition: a New Contribution to the Debate over Husserl’s Account of Objectifying and Non-Objectifying Acts","authors":"N. Spano","doi":"10.17454/pam-2302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2302","url":null,"abstract":"In the present article I aim to make a new contribution to our phenomenological understanding of the foundation between intentional experiences. In order to accomplish this goal, I discuss Husserl’s effort to avoid the conflation of the class of non-objectifying acts, i.e., evaluations and volitions, with the class of objectifying acts, i.e., cognitions. Through the analysis of the transition from his early to his mature account, I explore how Husserl, by readdressing the idea of foundation in relation to the shift from the practical-evaluative to the theoretical attitude, clarifies how evaluations and volitions can exert their intentionality only on the basis of a foundation on cognitions without thereby being reduced to a mere special case of founded representations.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81730998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Things, Goods, and Values: The Operative Function of Husserl’s Unitary Foundation in Scheler’s Axiology 物、商品与价值:胡塞尔单一性基础在舍勒价值论中的作用
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2305
Emanuele Caminada
{"title":"Things, Goods, and Values: The Operative Function of Husserl’s Unitary Foundation in Scheler’s Axiology","authors":"Emanuele Caminada","doi":"10.17454/pam-2305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2305","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I contend that the core intuition that resides at the basis of Scheler’s metaethics is expressed through the formal axiological distinction between things, goods, and values. I pursue a twofold aim: 1) to show that Scheler implicitly operates within Husserl’s concept of ‘unitary foundation’ when describing how values inhere within goods; 2) to compare Scheler’s metaethical argument concerning the independence of a world of goods with Hare’s ‘indiscernibility argument’. Scheler’s reversal of Hare’s argument confronts us with the formal-ontological difference between the analytic account of supervenience and the phenomenological account of unitary foundation. My argument is based on the formalization of the second type of unitary foundation that Husserl outlines in his Third Logical Investigation. The second type of unitary foundation is usually conflated with the first type of unitary foundation, as a result of the gross mistakes found in Findlay’s English","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"77 4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87889042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Emotions and Sentiments: Two Distinct Forms of Affective Intentionality 情绪和情绪:情感意向性的两种不同形式
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2301
Íngrid Vendrell Ferran
{"title":"Emotions and Sentiments: Two Distinct Forms of Affective Intentionality","authors":"Íngrid Vendrell Ferran","doi":"10.17454/pam-2301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2301","url":null,"abstract":"How to distinguish emotions such as envy, disgust, and shame from sentiments such as love, hate, and adoration? While the standard approach argues that emotions and sentiments differ in terms of their temporal structures (e.g., Ben-ze’ev, 2000; Deonna & Teroni, 2012), this paper sketches an alternative approach according to which each of these states exhibits a distinctive intentional structure. More precisely, this paper argues that emotions and sentiments exhibit distinct forms of affective intentionality. The paper begins by examining the temporal criteria of duration, etiology, and phenomenology widely employed to distinguish between both states. It demonstrates that none of them provides a clear-cut distinction between emotions and sentiments. Next, it presents the intentional approach as an alternative. To this end, it discusses what I call the axiological account (De Monticelli’s 2006; 2020), before introducing my version of the intentional approach according to which emotions and sentiments exhibit different forms of affective intentionality. The main findings are summarized in the conclusion.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87013673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Axiology of Dietrich von Hildebrand. From Phenomenology to Metaphysics 希尔德布兰德的价值论。从现象学到形而上学
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2307
Paola Premoli de Marchi
{"title":"The Axiology of Dietrich von Hildebrand. From Phenomenology to Metaphysics","authors":"Paola Premoli de Marchi","doi":"10.17454/pam-2307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2307","url":null,"abstract":"In what follows, I would like to trace Dietrich von Hildebrand’s thinking on the nature of axiological properties. Hildebrand begins his analysis from the phenomenology of what we experience as important and distinguishes three categories of importance: the subjectively satisfying, the value and the objective good of the person. He then moves on to metaphysical analysis to clarify whether the categories describe properties of objects and concludes that the foundation of all importance is value, the intrinsic preciousness. He also examines the families of values and the relations between being and value. This analysis has an important completion in the investigation of the types of oughtness, which allow us to understand the foundation of norms. Hildebrand’s value theory makes it possible to address some crucial metaphysical problems, in particular the question of whether good ultimately triumphs. The epistemological premise of Hildebrand’s perspective, however, is the thesis that man experiences not only facts, but also values.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"148 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88465181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Husserl and Non-Formal Ethics 胡塞尔与非正式伦理学
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2304
V. Venier
{"title":"Husserl and Non-Formal Ethics","authors":"V. Venier","doi":"10.17454/pam-2304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2304","url":null,"abstract":"From its very beginnings, Husserl’s philosophical life was characterised by the interweaving between ethical reflection and logical-argumentative rigour. It is not just a matter of the constant efforts that were put into a theoretical formulation that was always aimed at constant formal coherence, but also and above all, of the progressive association of a rigorous ethics with the value of the individual-personal dimension. The phenomenological analysis of the values – intertwined with those of perceptive-intellective experiences, feeling and volition – gradually find a common denominator that progressively takes shape in the ethical-non-formal theme of personal motivation.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75725050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
„Schatten Der Irresponsivität“: Pathos ohne Response /Response ohne Pathos. Trauma, Widerstand und Schelers Begriff der seelischen Kausalität "障碍物的影子"心灵创伤，阻力和顽疾的精神因果关系
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2308
Roberta Guccinelli
{"title":"„Schatten Der Irresponsivität“: Pathos ohne Response /Response ohne Pathos. Trauma, Widerstand und Schelers Begriff der seelischen Kausalität","authors":"Roberta Guccinelli","doi":"10.17454/pam-2308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2308","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses possible forms of loss or weakness of the ability to interact with others and the ways in which this arises. In particular, in the context of socio-affective knowledge and related failures, it focuses on certain deficits that primarily involve the body. The article aims to show that the “destiny” of our inner drives and our lives—the specific solutions to which they are forced in their vicissitudes—is less “blind” than it appears, leaving (albeit minimal) margins of escape, also because it has a relational connotation. Starting from Bernhard Waldenfels’s recent work on the relationship between phenomenology and psychoanalysis, in which this question is addressed from a phenomenological-responsive point of view, this article reflects on the problem by establishing a comparison between Waldenfels’s philosophy and Max Scheler’s phenomenology of values. Beyond the differences that their approaches to the problem of relational deficits present, Waldenfels and Scheler can be put in fruitful dialogue with each other, starting from their common interest in Freudian psychoanalysis. Within this framework, it is possible to evaluate, adopting Scheler’s point of view, both a methodological aspect and a psychological presupposition of Freud’s ontogenesis of sympathy and love: associationism. From this perspective, Freud reveals himself in part as an heir to British empiricism. I will argue that, with and beyond Freud, the human being is not reducible to a mere sum of blind sensations or blind drives and that for both at least certain forms of inability to interact with others are derivative—deformations of normal responsivity and aberrations of normal pulsional-(relational) life—rather than originary phenomena.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88312051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Are Emotions Valueceptions or Responses to Values? Husserl’s Phenomenology of Affectivity Reconsidered 情绪是价值观的接受还是对价值观的回应?重新思考胡塞尔的《情感现象学》
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2303
Alexis Delamare
{"title":"Are Emotions Valueceptions or Responses to Values? Husserl’s Phenomenology of Affectivity Reconsidered","authors":"Alexis Delamare","doi":"10.17454/pam-2303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2303","url":null,"abstract":"How are we able to experience values? Two sides are competing in contemporary literature: ‘Meinongians’ (represented notably by Christine Tappolet) claim that axiological properties are apprehended in emotions, while ‘Hildebrandians’ (represented in particular by Ingrid Vendrell Ferran) assert that such experiences of value (or valueceptions) are accomplished in special ‘value feelings’, and that emotions are only responses to these felt values. In this paper, I study the Husserlian viewpoint on this issue. I reveal that, contrary to what almost all scholars have assumed so far, Husserl’s position is not reducible to Meinong’s and must on the contrary be regarded as an innovative and stimulating approach that helps unifying the two standard frameworks. It indeed recognizes (with Hildebrandians) the existence of non-emotional value feelings, while maintaining (with Meinongians) that originary axiological experiences are necessarily emotional.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"2004 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82747862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Experience of Value. The Influence of Scheler on Sartre’s Early Ethics 价值体验。论舍勒对萨特早期伦理学的影响
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2306
Cristiano Vidali
{"title":"The Experience of Value. The Influence of Scheler on Sartre’s Early Ethics","authors":"Cristiano Vidali","doi":"10.17454/pam-2306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2306","url":null,"abstract":"Jean-Paul Sartre is often portrayed as a philosopher whose ethics would inevitably have subjectivist or relativist outcomes. Yet, even in Sartre’s early works there are several stances that blatantly belie this image, relying rather on an objectivist conception of value that he notably draws from Max Scheler. The aim of this paper is thus to investigate the influence of Scheler’s moral reflection on Sartre, arguing how it can represent an original and fruitful starting point to approach Sartrean ethics. To this aim, we will first report on and discuss some passages from Sartre’s early works where this debt is most noticeable. Then, we will provide an overview of the Schelerean legacy, arguing how it represents for Sartre the very opening of the ethical issue addressable in phenomenological terms, avoiding the dead end of Hume’s and Kant’s more classical positions, while at the same time being consistent with other peculiar themes of Sartrean philosophy, namely existence and historicity.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83199269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Review of Roberta de Monticelli’s Towards a Phenomenological Axiology 罗伯塔·德·蒙蒂切利《走向现象学价值论》述评
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2309
Eugene Kelly
{"title":"Review of Roberta de Monticelli’s Towards a Phenomenological Axiology","authors":"Eugene Kelly","doi":"10.17454/pam-2309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2309","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Roberta de Monticelli’s Towards a Phenomenological Axiology","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78020206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Life Is What You Fill your Attention with – The War for Attention and the Role of Digital Technology in the Work of Bernard Stiegler 生活就是你用注意力填满的东西——注意力之战和数字技术在伯纳德·斯蒂格勒作品中的作用
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/PAM-2009
H. Preester
{"title":"Life Is What You Fill your Attention with – The War for Attention and the Role of Digital Technology in the Work of Bernard Stiegler","authors":"H. Preester","doi":"10.17454/PAM-2009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/PAM-2009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"66 1","pages":"102"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77761518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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