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Phenomenology and Mind最新文献

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Art and Entanglement in Strange Tools 奇怪工具中的艺术和纠缠
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.13128/PHE_MI-23622
Alva Noë
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引用次数: 1
Two Ways of Understanding Persons: A Husserlian Distinction 两种理解人的方式:胡塞尔式的区分
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.13128/PHE_MI-24974
S. Heinämaa
{"title":"Two Ways of Understanding Persons: A Husserlian Distinction","authors":"S. Heinämaa","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-24974","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-24974","url":null,"abstract":"This paper clarifies the distinction that Edmund Husserl makes between two different ways of understanding other persons, their actions and motivations: the experiential or empirical way, on the one hand, and the genuinely or authentically intuitive way, on the other hand. The paper argues that Husserl’s discussion of self-understanding clarifies his concept of the intuitive understanding of others and allows us to explicate what is involved in it: not just the grasping of the other’s actual motivations of action but also the grasping of her motivational possibilities. The paper ends by discussing the dynamic character of the personal subject.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"37 1","pages":"92-102"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82453694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Enactive Aesthetics and Neuroaesthetics 动作美学和神经美学
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.13128/PHE_MI-23627
Joerg Fingerhut
{"title":"Enactive Aesthetics and Neuroaesthetics","authors":"Joerg Fingerhut","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-23627","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-23627","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I review recent enactive approaches to art and aesthetic experience. Radical enactivists (Hutto, 2015) claim that our engagement with art is extensive, in the sense that it is non-contentful and artifact-including. Gallagher (2011) defends an embodied-enactive account of the specific kind of affordances artworks provide. For Noe (2015) art is a reorganizational practice. Each of these accounts claims that empirical (neuro)aesthetics is incapable of capturing the art-related engagement they want to highlight. While I agree on the relational and enactive nature of the mind and see the presented theories as important contributions to our understanding of art and aesthetics, I will argue that their dismissal of empirical aesthetics is misguided on several counts. A more qualified look can reveal relevant empirical research for claims enactive theorists should be interested in. Their criticism is either too general regarding the empirical methods employed or based on philosophical claims that themselves can be subjected to empirical scrutiny.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"82 1","pages":"80-97"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79787542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
The Methods of Ethics 伦理学的方法
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.13128/PHE_MI-24971
R. Crisp
{"title":"The Methods of Ethics","authors":"R. Crisp","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-24971","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-24971","url":null,"abstract":"The paper begins with an account of the intellectual background to Henry Sidgwick’s writing of his  Methods of Ethics  and an analysis of what Sidgwick meant by a ‘method’. His broad distinction between three main ethical theories – egoism, consequentialism, and deontology – is elucidated and accepted. Sidgwick’s different forms of intuitionism are explained, as are his criteria for testing the ‘certainty’ of a potentially self-evident belief. Section 3 discusses dogmatic intuitionism (common-sense morality systematized) and Sidgwick’s own view, in the light of his requirement for precision in ethics. The final section concerns the implications of Sidgwick’s position on disagreement for ethical theory. It is suggested that we have some knowledge in ethics, on which most converge, but not much. The paper concludes with a recommendation for a more eirenic and less dogmatic approach to philosophical ethics.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"90 1","pages":"48-58"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80420559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The “How” and “What” of Aesthetic Experience. Some Reflections Based on Noë’s Strange Tools. Art and Human Nature 审美经验的“如何”和“是什么”。基于Noë奇异工具的一些思考。艺术与人性
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.13128/PHE_MI-23621
F. Forlè
{"title":"The “How” and “What” of Aesthetic Experience. Some Reflections Based on Noë’s Strange Tools. Art and Human Nature","authors":"F. Forlè","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-23621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-23621","url":null,"abstract":"Being a book on art and its nature, Strange Tools deals with aesthetic experience as a crucial object of inquiry. Indeed, it offers several interesting insights into what aesthetic experience is and how we should (or should not) account for it. However, some aspects of Noe’s analysis raise questions, both about the act and about the object of aesthetic experience itself. In this paper, I will discuss these issues highlighting a potential conflict in the author’s analysis of aesthetic experience and providing some hints about the objective correlate of such an experience.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"27 1","pages":"18-28"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86956774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Model-Building as a Philosophical Method 作为一种哲学方法的模型构建
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.13128/PHE_MI-24968
T. Williamson
{"title":"Model-Building as a Philosophical Method","authors":"T. Williamson","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-24968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-24968","url":null,"abstract":"The method of building simplified formal models of phenomena under study is widespread in contemporary natural and social science; much scientific progress consists in the provision of better models. A model-building methodology has also been used with success in analytic philosophy, for example by Carnap in his development of intensional semantics. Arguably, philosophers have overlooked how much progress their discipline has made through their failure to conceive it in model-building terms. By using the method more extensively, they can overcome the fragility to error inherent in the naive falsificationist methodology on which many analytic philosophers rely.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"41 1","pages":"16-22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73072884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Geografia e filosofia. Riflessioni su Pensiero vivente di Roberto Esposito a partire da Spinoza, Cavell e Foucault 地理和哲学。罗伯托·埃斯波西托(Roberto Esposito)从斯宾诺莎(Spinoza)、卡维尔(Cavell)和福柯(Foucault)开始思考自己的想法
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.13128/PHE_MI-24982
R. Ariano
{"title":"Geografia e filosofia. Riflessioni su Pensiero vivente di Roberto Esposito a partire da Spinoza, Cavell e Foucault","authors":"R. Ariano","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-24982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-24982","url":null,"abstract":"The article focuses on the so-called ‘Italian theory’, with special reference to its assessment in Roberto Esposito’s 2010 book Living Thought . The article puts forth three main arguments. First, there is an analogy between the ‘geo-philosophical’ strategy chosen by Esposito to address Italian thought and the strategy pursued by Stanley Cavell when he reflects on Emerson and the specificity of American philosophy. Second, the main traits attributed by Esposito to Italian thought show significant parallels with key concepts in Michel Foucault’s philosophy. Third, interpretations of Spinoza by authors such as Gilles Deleuze and Toni Negri have been instrumental for the flourishing of the philosophical debate that prepared Esposito’s elaboration of a canon of Italian thinkers. The article thus hints that Italian theory could be an interesting case study for the reflection on the relations between geography and philosophy.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"358 1","pages":"212-220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78548592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Twofold pictorial experience, propositional imagining and recognitional concepts: a critique of Walton’s visual make-believe 双重图像体验、命题想象与认知概念:沃尔顿视觉虚构批判
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.13128/PHE_MI-23665
M. Arienti
{"title":"Twofold pictorial experience, propositional imagining and recognitional concepts: a critique of Walton’s visual make-believe","authors":"M. Arienti","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-23665","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-23665","url":null,"abstract":"Kendall Walton has defined pictorial experience as a visual game of make-believe, which consists in imagining our actual seeing the representational prop to be a fictional face to face seeing the represented subject. To maintain a twofold awareness of these two visual aspects while avoiding a phenomenal clash between them, Walton needs to characterise visual make-believe as involving a propositional imagining. Unfortunately, the strategy does not seem to be successful. Whether propositional imagination is taken as a simple descriptive report or as conceptually penetrating our perception, Walton’s account is not able to secure the visual and the twofold character of pictorial recognition.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"47 1","pages":"146-156"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90809153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology 色彩关系论与活动本体
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.13128/PHE_MI-23625
A. Giannotta
{"title":"Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology","authors":"A. Giannotta","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-23625","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-23625","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in order to claim the co-constitution of subject and object in the process of experience. I also extend the enactive and phenomenological account of color to the more general topic of the epistemological and ontological status of sensory qualities (qualia), outlining the fields of enactive phenomenology and enactive ontology.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"73 1","pages":"56-67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86348732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Dove va la filosofia italiana? Riflessioni sull’Italian Thought 意大利哲学走向何方?对意大利思想的反思
Phenomenology and Mind Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.13128/PHE_MI-24983
Corrado Claverini
{"title":"Dove va la filosofia italiana? Riflessioni sull’Italian Thought","authors":"Corrado Claverini","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-24983","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-24983","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, Italian philosophy is having enormous success in the United States, to the point that today we hear more and more of the “New Italian Thought”. The objective of this essay is to analyse this phenomenon from a historical point of view and see how and to what extent interest in Italian thought has grown in the USA, traversing the fundamental stages that have contributed to the acknowledgement of the “New Italian Thought”.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"4 1","pages":"222-228"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86061449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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