双重图像体验、命题想象与认知概念:沃尔顿视觉虚构批判

Q2 Arts and Humanities
M. Arienti
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引用次数: 0

摘要

肯德尔·沃尔顿(Kendall Walton)将绘画体验定义为一种假装的视觉游戏,它包括将我们实际看到的代表性道具想象为虚构的面对面看到被代表的主体。为了保持对这两个视觉方面的双重意识,同时避免它们之间的显著冲突,沃尔顿需要将视觉虚构描述为涉及命题想象。不幸的是,这一策略似乎并不成功。无论命题想象是作为一个简单的描述性报告,还是作为概念上穿透我们的感知,沃尔顿的描述都不能保证图像识别的视觉和双重特征。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Twofold pictorial experience, propositional imagining and recognitional concepts: a critique of Walton’s visual make-believe
Kendall Walton has defined pictorial experience as a visual game of make-believe, which consists in imagining our actual seeing the representational prop to be a fictional face to face seeing the represented subject. To maintain a twofold awareness of these two visual aspects while avoiding a phenomenal clash between them, Walton needs to characterise visual make-believe as involving a propositional imagining. Unfortunately, the strategy does not seem to be successful. Whether propositional imagination is taken as a simple descriptive report or as conceptually penetrating our perception, Walton’s account is not able to secure the visual and the twofold character of pictorial recognition.
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来源期刊
Phenomenology and Mind
Phenomenology and Mind Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
16
审稿时长
25 weeks
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