{"title":"双重图像体验、命题想象与认知概念:沃尔顿视觉虚构批判","authors":"M. Arienti","doi":"10.13128/PHE_MI-23665","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Kendall Walton has defined pictorial experience as a visual game of make-believe, which consists in imagining our actual seeing the representational prop to be a fictional face to face seeing the represented subject. To maintain a twofold awareness of these two visual aspects while avoiding a phenomenal clash between them, Walton needs to characterise visual make-believe as involving a propositional imagining. Unfortunately, the strategy does not seem to be successful. Whether propositional imagination is taken as a simple descriptive report or as conceptually penetrating our perception, Walton’s account is not able to secure the visual and the twofold character of pictorial recognition.","PeriodicalId":37133,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and Mind","volume":"47 1","pages":"146-156"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Twofold pictorial experience, propositional imagining and recognitional concepts: a critique of Walton’s visual make-believe\",\"authors\":\"M. Arienti\",\"doi\":\"10.13128/PHE_MI-23665\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Kendall Walton has defined pictorial experience as a visual game of make-believe, which consists in imagining our actual seeing the representational prop to be a fictional face to face seeing the represented subject. To maintain a twofold awareness of these two visual aspects while avoiding a phenomenal clash between them, Walton needs to characterise visual make-believe as involving a propositional imagining. Unfortunately, the strategy does not seem to be successful. Whether propositional imagination is taken as a simple descriptive report or as conceptually penetrating our perception, Walton’s account is not able to secure the visual and the twofold character of pictorial recognition.\",\"PeriodicalId\":37133,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Phenomenology and Mind\",\"volume\":\"47 1\",\"pages\":\"146-156\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Phenomenology and Mind\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-23665\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Phenomenology and Mind","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.13128/PHE_MI-23665","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
Twofold pictorial experience, propositional imagining and recognitional concepts: a critique of Walton’s visual make-believe
Kendall Walton has defined pictorial experience as a visual game of make-believe, which consists in imagining our actual seeing the representational prop to be a fictional face to face seeing the represented subject. To maintain a twofold awareness of these two visual aspects while avoiding a phenomenal clash between them, Walton needs to characterise visual make-believe as involving a propositional imagining. Unfortunately, the strategy does not seem to be successful. Whether propositional imagination is taken as a simple descriptive report or as conceptually penetrating our perception, Walton’s account is not able to secure the visual and the twofold character of pictorial recognition.