ERN: Procurement (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"National Project Budgeting in Conditions of Their Low Cash Execution","authors":"G. Idrisov, Yury Pleskachev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3499536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3499536","url":null,"abstract":"An analysis of changes in the structure and volume of budget expenditure earmarked for implementation of national projects in the framework of the draft Federal Law on the Federal Budget for 2020 and the 2021 and 2022 Planning Period has revealed some positive trends that point to an increase in the corresponding federal budget expenditure targets. At the same time, in connection with the insufficient cash execution of the budget expenditure allocated in 2019 to the implementation of some of the ongoing national projects, a number of questions have arisen. The first one is that the increased amount of budget expenditure allocated in 2019 to national projects with a low level of budget expenditure implementation gives rise to some increased risks associated with formal approached to implementing the measures planned for the next years. The second one has to do with a lack of proper balance in the distribution of budget expenditure: the amount of expenditure allocated to some of the ongoing national projects appears to be insufficient, if we give consideration to their importance. The third one is that growth of expenditure earmarked for some national projects occurs alongside a corresponding shrinkage of allocations to the other projects, and this happens in absence of proper coordination of long-term funding priorities by means of project- and program-based instruments.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"306 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123049689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Procurement in Short Supply Chains: Lessons Learned from the Tourism Industry","authors":"M. Argyropoulou, R. Argyropoulou, D. Folinas, Fotios Misopoulos, Suela Najacaj","doi":"10.25103/ijbesar.122.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25103/ijbesar.122.06","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose: This paper explores the procurement management strategies adopted in 100 five-star hotels operating in a highly touristic area in South Greece. The study identifies and discusses the benefits and the challenges of managing short supply chains in the selected region. Design/methodology/approach: Quantitative data were gathered by using a questionnaire with 16 closed-ended and 3 open-ended questions. The sample included the Managing Directors and some Administrators. The questionnaire was filled in between April 2017 and June of the same year. Findings: The majority of the respondents prefer to do business with local suppliers for a variety of reasons, the most important being the boost of local economy and immediate delivery which improves response time. High prices of local products and the availability of sufficient quantities were found the main concerns for the smooth running of operations. Research limitations/implications: The research uses data from two prefectures of Crete; a wider sample including other prefectures in Greece and in South Europe would provide a more holistic view on the effectiveness of short food supply chains. Originality/value: This paper makes a contribution by examining how short supply chains can be developed in local economies. This paper explores the procurement management strategies adopted in 100 five-star hotels operating in a highly touristic area in South Greece. The study identifies and discusses the benefits and the challenges of managing short supply chains in the selected region. The majority of the respondents prefer to do business with local suppliers for a variety of reasons, the most important being the boost of local economy and immediate delivery which improves response time. High prices of local products and the availability of sufficient quantities were found the main concerns for the smooth running of operations. Supplier selection criteria are also discussed.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125541972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lobbying for Government Appropriations","authors":"Christian Cox","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3203661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3203661","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates the effect of lobbying on government contract allocation. I consider how lobbying can affect both total contract spending and the distribution of contracts between firms. I solve a novel contest model which incorporates these two effects, and then structurally estimate it using a panel of federal contractors. The results suggest that lobbying increases contract spending by $8.7 billion (3.2%) per year. However, its effects on the observed contract distribution and firm revenues are relatively small.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133475171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Local Cost Synergies in Reverse Auctions: An Application to Road Salt Procurement","authors":"D. Gupta, Matt Schmitt, I. Stamatopoulos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3435185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3435185","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a structural model of firms' bidding behavior in simultaneous first-price auctions with linkages across items, and apply the model to procurement auctions held by Minnesota's Department of Transportation (MnDOT). Each year, MnDOT holds simultaneous first-price auctions to procure road salt for each of its depots (storage facilities) located throughout the state. We find strong evidence for economies of scope: large firms' bids reflect a preference for winning co-located depots. Counterfactual simulations indicate that, on average, large firms' bids are 6 to 8 percent lower than they would have been absent the estimated economies of scope. While these lower bids are beneficial to the state, they also reduce the competitiveness of small firms – for which we do not detect economies of scope. MnDOT therefore faces a tradeoff when taking actions that may either enhance or diminish economies of scope.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122932464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Procuring Infrastructure for International Sporting Events: Mapping the Field for IPACS and Beyond","authors":"S. Arrowsmith, Ruth Bayley, Anna Górczyńska, Joshua. Idoku, S. Kay, Jorge Faria Lopes, Carlos Sebastian Barreto Cifuentes, G. Quinot, Ke. Ren, Ashraf-Ul-Bari. Nobel, Astghik. Solomanyan, Izabella. Sobieraj, G. Soós, Alexander Thurston","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3912776","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3912776","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents the results of a study of infrastructure procurement for international sporting events. The objective was to map both the institutional frameworks and the procedures and governance mechanisms. We were concerned only with the acquisition process and not with prior decisions on whether to host events, what to procure (such as the number and siting of stadiums) or subsequent maintenance. The aim was to provide information relevant to studying the implementation of procurement objectives and the risks to attaining those objectives and to lay the foundations for further work. The study originated in work by the authors in collaboration with the OECD to assist the International Partnership Against Corruption in Sport (IPACS) in managing integrity risks, but also provides a map that can facilitate future study of other issues, such as sustainability. \u0000 \u0000The study sought to map procurement for key sport-specific infrastructure (such as stadiums and swimming pools) and a sample of other infrastructure (sport-specific, sport-related – such as athlete accommodation – and/or other infrastructure procured for the event (such as transport facilities) for 14 international events. It covered events of various sizes and types in the ten-year period to 2018, using public sources. \u0000 \u0000Study data from the first ten projects above was used as the basis for the 2019 IPACS report on procurement standards and risk management in procuring infrastructure for sporting events (IPACS report). That report analysed the aggregate data to identify and analyse integrity risks and make concrete proposals for mitigating them. This article supplements the IPACS report by giving more information on the methodology; providing data from four additional projects, which offer further evidence and insights; and presenting the key information through a project-based, as well as aggregate, approach, to place it in context.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126555308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Government Procurement Contract Design with Unobservable Productivity and Moral Hazard","authors":"Taichi Kimura, Takahiro Morimitsu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3264603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3264603","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the optimal incentive structure for a government procurement contract in the field of defense. Optimality implies that the government achieves efficient and cost-effective procurement through incentives that encourage the contracting firm to reduce costs in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection. To investigate the optimal contract scheme when moral hazard and adverse selection occur simultaneously, we employ a hybrid model of moral hazard and adverse selection. Our analysis shows that a low--powered incentive is optimal when the firm's productivity is unobservable and that the incentive rate is lower in the hybrid case than in the pure moral hazard case. This is because the government must pay informational rent to the firm to ensure that the firm is honest. We also find that the optimal incentive rate increases as the degree of information asymmetry decrease.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"126 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128050693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Anatomy of Public Procurement","authors":"Jan Jääskeläinen, Janne Tukiainen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3372135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3372135","url":null,"abstract":"We provide novel stylized facts about competition, bidding, entry and bidders across a wide spectrum of public procurement auctions using comprehensive and rich Finnish data. Competition for publicly procured contracts is relatively low with a median bidder count of two (three conditional on receiving any bids). Bidders typically are very heterogeneous in size, which likely limits competition further. Competition seems to work roughly as expected as on average (standardized) bids mainly decrease with the number of actual and potential bidders. Using information on registrations as a good proxy for potential bidders, we show that the ratio of actual to potential bidders increases with the number of actual bidders. We also show that being present in the contracting authority's municipality or province correlates positively with registering, entry (bidding) and winning, but other firm characteristics matter less. While attracting more competition by means of contract and auction rule design is a desirable policy goal and we show suggestive evidence that the use of scoring rule can be an entry barrier, increasing competition may be in practice difficult. Therefore, reservation prices may be a more useful policy tool to alleviate issues associated with the lack of competition.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124961872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids","authors":"Sylvain Chassang, Keiichi Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi, Juan Ortner","doi":"10.3386/W25654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W25654","url":null,"abstract":"We document a novel bidding pattern observed in procurement auctions from Japan: winning bids tend to be isolated. There is a missing mass of close losing bids. This pattern is suspicious in the following sense: it is inconsistent with competitive behavior under arbitrary information structures. Building on this observation, we develop a theory of data-driven regulation based on “safe tests,” i.e. tests that are passed with probability one by competitive bidders, but need not be passed by non-competitive ones. We provide a general class of safe tests exploiting weak equilibrium conditions, and show that such tests reduce the set of equilibrium strategies that cartels can use to sustain collusion. We provide an empirical exploration of various safe tests in our data, as well as discuss collusive rationales for missing bids.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126920293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Effect of the National Food Reserve Agency on Maize Market Prices in Tanzania","authors":"Guillaume Pierre, K. Pauw, Emiliano Magrini","doi":"10.1111/rode.12374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12374","url":null,"abstract":"Tanzania's National Food Reserve Agency has a mandate to ensure food security through procuring, reserving and recycling grain (primarily maize) in a cost†effective manner. This mandate excludes a price stabilization role. Procurement prices, based on production costs, are often set above market prices to encourage production. Several disbursements channels exist: grain provided free or at a discount to targeted vulnerable households; subsidized sales to millers; and sales to prisons or nongovernmental aid programs, typically at market†related prices. Given the perception that these activities are distortive, we use time†series econometrics to model maize price dynamics in select wholesale markets to capture the Agency's market impact. We find that its pricing strategy had an insignificant impact on prices during 2010/11–2014/15 despite a fairly significant presence in at least some regional markets. We recommend that the Agency reconsiders offering a price premium on procured maize or selling maize at discount to millers, as limited market spill†over effects imply the benefits are captured by only a few, even though its practice of providing subsidized or free maize to vulnerable people is not in question. Furthermore, current storage capacity expansion plans are not required and inconsistent with its food security mandate.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132903280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Precontractual Investment and Modes of Procurement","authors":"Alessandro De Chiara","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3118522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3118522","url":null,"abstract":"Consider a repeated game in which a buyer must decide whether to procure goods whose design may prove defective through auctions or negotiations. To reduce the likelihood of failure, the buyer must motivate the potential suppliers to make a precontractual investment. Because the noisy signal of the supplier's investment is non-verifiable the buyer can induce the suppliers to invest only through relational contracts. I find that auctions may not enable the buyer to implement a surplus-increasing relational contract even when the players are very patient. Therefore, negotiations may be adopted, since they are more effective in stimulating the supplier's investment.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125396870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}