Precontractual Investment and Modes of Procurement

Alessandro De Chiara
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Abstract

Consider a repeated game in which a buyer must decide whether to procure goods whose design may prove defective through auctions or negotiations. To reduce the likelihood of failure, the buyer must motivate the potential suppliers to make a precontractual investment. Because the noisy signal of the supplier's investment is non-verifiable the buyer can induce the suppliers to invest only through relational contracts. I find that auctions may not enable the buyer to implement a surplus-increasing relational contract even when the players are very patient. Therefore, negotiations may be adopted, since they are more effective in stimulating the supplier's investment.
合同前投资与采购方式
考虑一个重复博弈,在这个博弈中,买方必须通过拍卖或谈判决定是否购买设计可能存在缺陷的商品。为了减少失败的可能性,买方必须激励潜在的供应商进行合同前投资。由于供应商投资的噪声信号是不可验证的,买方只能通过关系契约来诱导供应商投资。我发现拍卖可能无法使买方执行盈余增加的关系合同,即使参与者非常有耐心。因此,可以采用谈判的方式,因为谈判更能有效地刺激供应商的投资。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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