Anatomy of Public Procurement

Jan Jääskeläinen, Janne Tukiainen
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

We provide novel stylized facts about competition, bidding, entry and bidders across a wide spectrum of public procurement auctions using comprehensive and rich Finnish data. Competition for publicly procured contracts is relatively low with a median bidder count of two (three conditional on receiving any bids). Bidders typically are very heterogeneous in size, which likely limits competition further. Competition seems to work roughly as expected as on average (standardized) bids mainly decrease with the number of actual and potential bidders. Using information on registrations as a good proxy for potential bidders, we show that the ratio of actual to potential bidders increases with the number of actual bidders. We also show that being present in the contracting authority's municipality or province correlates positively with registering, entry (bidding) and winning, but other firm characteristics matter less. While attracting more competition by means of contract and auction rule design is a desirable policy goal and we show suggestive evidence that the use of scoring rule can be an entry barrier, increasing competition may be in practice difficult. Therefore, reservation prices may be a more useful policy tool to alleviate issues associated with the lack of competition.
公共采购剖析
我们使用全面和丰富的芬兰数据,提供了关于公共采购拍卖的竞争、投标、进入和投标人的新颖的程式化事实。公开采购合同的竞争相对较低,投标人中位数为两家(三家是收到任何投标的条件)。竞标者通常规模各异,这可能会进一步限制竞争。竞争似乎大致按照预期进行,因为平均(标准化)投标主要随着实际和潜在投标人的数量而减少。使用注册信息作为潜在竞标者的良好代理,我们表明实际与潜在竞标者的比例随着实际竞标者的数量而增加。我们还表明,在承包当局所在的市或省存在与注册、进入(投标)和获胜呈正相关,但其他公司特征的影响较小。虽然通过合同和拍卖规则设计来吸引更多的竞争是一个理想的政策目标,并且我们展示了启发性证据,表明使用评分规则可能是一个进入障碍,但在实践中增加竞争可能是困难的。因此,保留价格可能是一种更有用的政策工具,可以缓解与缺乏竞争有关的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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