逆向拍卖中的地方成本协同效应:在道路盐采购中的应用

D. Gupta, Matt Schmitt, I. Stamatopoulos
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们建立了一个具有跨项目联系的企业在同时首价拍卖中投标行为的结构模型,并将该模型应用于明尼苏达州交通部(MnDOT)举行的采购拍卖。每年,MnDOT都会同时举行首价拍卖,为其遍布全州的每个仓库(储存设施)采购道路盐。我们发现了范围经济的有力证据:大公司的投标反映了对赢得位于同一地点的仓库的偏好。反事实模拟表明,平均而言,大公司的出价比在没有估计的范围经济的情况下低6%到8%。虽然这些较低的出价对国家有利,但它们也降低了小企业的竞争力——对此我们没有发现范围经济。因此,在采取可能增强或减少范围经济的行动时,MnDOT面临权衡。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Local Cost Synergies in Reverse Auctions: An Application to Road Salt Procurement
We develop a structural model of firms' bidding behavior in simultaneous first-price auctions with linkages across items, and apply the model to procurement auctions held by Minnesota's Department of Transportation (MnDOT). Each year, MnDOT holds simultaneous first-price auctions to procure road salt for each of its depots (storage facilities) located throughout the state. We find strong evidence for economies of scope: large firms' bids reflect a preference for winning co-located depots. Counterfactual simulations indicate that, on average, large firms' bids are 6 to 8 percent lower than they would have been absent the estimated economies of scope. While these lower bids are beneficial to the state, they also reduce the competitiveness of small firms – for which we do not detect economies of scope. MnDOT therefore faces a tradeoff when taking actions that may either enhance or diminish economies of scope.
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