{"title":"逆向拍卖中的地方成本协同效应:在道路盐采购中的应用","authors":"D. Gupta, Matt Schmitt, I. Stamatopoulos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3435185","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We develop a structural model of firms' bidding behavior in simultaneous first-price auctions with linkages across items, and apply the model to procurement auctions held by Minnesota's Department of Transportation (MnDOT). Each year, MnDOT holds simultaneous first-price auctions to procure road salt for each of its depots (storage facilities) located throughout the state. We find strong evidence for economies of scope: large firms' bids reflect a preference for winning co-located depots. Counterfactual simulations indicate that, on average, large firms' bids are 6 to 8 percent lower than they would have been absent the estimated economies of scope. While these lower bids are beneficial to the state, they also reduce the competitiveness of small firms – for which we do not detect economies of scope. MnDOT therefore faces a tradeoff when taking actions that may either enhance or diminish economies of scope.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Local Cost Synergies in Reverse Auctions: An Application to Road Salt Procurement\",\"authors\":\"D. Gupta, Matt Schmitt, I. Stamatopoulos\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3435185\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We develop a structural model of firms' bidding behavior in simultaneous first-price auctions with linkages across items, and apply the model to procurement auctions held by Minnesota's Department of Transportation (MnDOT). Each year, MnDOT holds simultaneous first-price auctions to procure road salt for each of its depots (storage facilities) located throughout the state. We find strong evidence for economies of scope: large firms' bids reflect a preference for winning co-located depots. Counterfactual simulations indicate that, on average, large firms' bids are 6 to 8 percent lower than they would have been absent the estimated economies of scope. While these lower bids are beneficial to the state, they also reduce the competitiveness of small firms – for which we do not detect economies of scope. MnDOT therefore faces a tradeoff when taking actions that may either enhance or diminish economies of scope.\",\"PeriodicalId\":330590,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Procurement (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"65 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-08-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Procurement (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3435185\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3435185","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Local Cost Synergies in Reverse Auctions: An Application to Road Salt Procurement
We develop a structural model of firms' bidding behavior in simultaneous first-price auctions with linkages across items, and apply the model to procurement auctions held by Minnesota's Department of Transportation (MnDOT). Each year, MnDOT holds simultaneous first-price auctions to procure road salt for each of its depots (storage facilities) located throughout the state. We find strong evidence for economies of scope: large firms' bids reflect a preference for winning co-located depots. Counterfactual simulations indicate that, on average, large firms' bids are 6 to 8 percent lower than they would have been absent the estimated economies of scope. While these lower bids are beneficial to the state, they also reduce the competitiveness of small firms – for which we do not detect economies of scope. MnDOT therefore faces a tradeoff when taking actions that may either enhance or diminish economies of scope.