数据驱动的监管:缺失竞价的理论与应用

Sylvain Chassang, Keiichi Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi, Juan Ortner
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引用次数: 17

摘要

我们记录了在日本采购拍卖中观察到的一种新颖的投标模式:中标往往是孤立的。还有大量接近失败的出价被遗漏。这种模式在以下意义上是可疑的:它与任意信息结构下的竞争行为不一致。在此观察的基础上,我们开发了一种基于“安全测试”的数据驱动监管理论,即有竞争力的投标人有可能通过测试,但非竞争性投标人不必通过测试。我们提供了一类利用弱均衡条件的一般安全测试,并表明这些测试减少了卡特尔可以用来维持勾结的均衡策略集。我们在数据中提供了各种安全测试的经验探索,并讨论了错过投标的串通理由。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids
We document a novel bidding pattern observed in procurement auctions from Japan: winning bids tend to be isolated. There is a missing mass of close losing bids. This pattern is suspicious in the following sense: it is inconsistent with competitive behavior under arbitrary information structures. Building on this observation, we develop a theory of data-driven regulation based on “safe tests,” i.e. tests that are passed with probability one by competitive bidders, but need not be passed by non-competitive ones. We provide a general class of safe tests exploiting weak equilibrium conditions, and show that such tests reduce the set of equilibrium strategies that cartels can use to sustain collusion. We provide an empirical exploration of various safe tests in our data, as well as discuss collusive rationales for missing bids.
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