ERN: Procurement (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes","authors":"F. Decarolis, Leonardo M. Giuffrida, E. Iossa, Vincenzo Mollisi, G. Spagnolo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3744145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3744145","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in (a) time delays, (b) cost overruns, and (c) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings. (JEL D73, H11, H57, L26).","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116854326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Platforma eProcure – Dixhitalizmi I Sistemit Të Prokurimit Në Kosovë (eProcure Platform – Digitalization of Procurement System in Kosovo)","authors":"Taulant Kelmendi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3247619","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3247619","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Albanian Abstract:</b> Prokurimi nënkupton blerjen e mallrave, shërbimeve ose punëve nga një burim i jashtëm për një institucion publik, privat ose person fizik. Prokurimi tradicional si proces ka defekte në transparencë dhe mundëson ndërhyrje për të favorizuar një subjekt ose dëmtuar një tjetër. Platforma e Prokurimit Elektronik promovon një konkurrencë të drejtë dhe të hapur për bizneset që marrin pjesë në një proces prokurimi duke minimizuar mashtrimin dhe favorizimet. Ky sistem mundëson transaksione të sigurta ndërmjet institucioneve publike ose private dhe komunitetit kombëtar e ndërkombëtar të biznesit. Sistemi ofron përgatitje dhe administrim të sigurte, efikas e transparent të gjithë dokumenteve që lidhen me procesin e tenderimit, duke mënjanuar formën e dorëzimit të dokumentacionit fizik dhe duke siguruar një rrjedhë të sigurte të dhënave përgjatë procesit. Ky punim ka për objektiv të përshkruaj dixhitalizimi e prokurimit duke prodhuar efektet e veta pozitive në efikasitet, kursim kohe, transparencë, reduktim të administratës, ulje të korrupsionit, konkurrencë më të madhe dhe më të barabartë etj. Implementimi i kësaj platforme bëhet në harmoni me mundësit ligjore dhe teknike të vendit që është zgjedhur për tu zbatuar, përkatësisht legjislaturës dhe mundësive teknike të vendit tonë. <b>English Abstract:</b> English Abstract: Procurement means purchasing goods, services or works from an external source to a public, private or natural person. Traditional procurement as a process has defects in transparency and enables intervention to favor a subject or harm another. The Electronic Procurement Platform promotes fair and open competition for businesses participating in a procurement process by minimizing fraud and favoritism. This system enables secure transactions between public or private institutions and the national and international business community. The system provides secure, efficient and transparent preparation and administration of all documents related to the bidding process, avoiding the form of submission of physical documentation and ensuring a secure flow of data throughout the process. This paper aims to describe digitalization of procurement by producing its positive effects on efficiency, time saving, transparency, reduction of administration, reduction of corruption, greater and more equal competition. The implementation of this platform is in harmony with the legal and technical possibilities of the country that has been selected for implementation, namely the legislation and technical possibilities of our country.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132348156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Public Purchases in Romania, a Geopolitical Dynamic of Yesterday and Today Environment","authors":"Ionel Nuţă","doi":"10.26458/17310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26458/17310","url":null,"abstract":"This paper intends to briefly explain how the internal regulations concerning the Romanian public purchases have changed lately.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127816703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Incentive Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Risk Transfer: Evidence from Procurement","authors":"Meng Liu, Chungsang Lam","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3287195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3287195","url":null,"abstract":"Multi-attribute auctions, designed to address multi-dimensional preference, make a good case study where incentive provisions interact with competition. By studying \"Cost Time\" highway procurement that aims to incentivize timely project delivery, we show that awarding incentive contracts by bidding mechanisms can yield sub-optimal outcomes. Our theory demonstrates that bidders, facing high-powered incentives and production uncertainty, optimally skew their time bids while transferring production risk to buying agencies. This gaming behavior leads to adverse selection and efficiency loss, in that a less-efficient bidder can outbid the efficient bidder due to the misalignment between bidder types and the auction rule that determines winners. We estimate our model using data from the California Department of Transportation and find that 18% of auctions are allocated to inefficient bidders. Counterfactual analyses suggest that procurement schemes with lower incentives can yield less mis-allocation with lower production costs and less buyer budget pressure.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125969116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Border Effects in European Public Procurement","authors":"Benedikt Herz, Xosé-Luís Varela-Irimia","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2883076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2883076","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, we document border effects in the award of public contracts in the European single market. We use a dataset of 1.8 million contract awards, which we match to geolocations to estimate a gravity model of procurement flows between European NUTS3 region pairs. We find very sizable cross-national border effects for all types of goods and services, even after controlling for physical distance, currency, cultural differences and other variables. For example, ‘local’ bidders for IT services contracts are almost 250 times more likely to be awarded a contract than ‘foreign’ bidders. More surprisingly, we find substantial cross-regional border effects within countries. While we document that firms’ bidding decisions are subject to border effects, we cannot exclude a home bias of contracting authorities in the award of public contracts.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123891702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is Joint Cross-Border Public Procurement Legally Feasible or Simply Commercially Tolerated? - A Critical Assessment of the BBG-SKI JCBPP Feasibility Study","authors":"A. Sanchez-Graells","doi":"10.21552/EPPPL/2017/2/5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21552/EPPPL/2017/2/5","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a critical assessment of the Feasibility study concerning the actual implementation of a joint cross-border procurement procedure by public buyers from different Member States prepared by BBG-SKI for the European Commission. The paper submits that the study provides some interesting data and details about relevant case studies, but that it does not shed significant light on the doubts created by the rules on joint cross-border public procurement (JCBPP) in the 2014 EU Public Procurement Package, and that the main weakness of the study is its lack of a general legal analytical framework. \u0000In order to gain additional legal insights on the basis of the empirical data included in the BBG-SKI study, this paper proposes an analytical framework under which to assess the legal compliance of JCBPP structures. It then summarises each of the case studies included in the BBG-SKI study and offers a critical (re)assessment of the issues that would have required more information and/or which are insufficiently analysed in the BBG-SKI study. Based on this reorganised empirical evidence, the paper proceeds to a critical assessment of some of the outstanding legal barriers and challenges to JCBPP. It concludes by stressing some of the remaining uncertainties concerning legal development at Member State level, and calls on the European Commission to facilitate more detailed research leading to the adoption of future guidance on JCBPP under the 2014 EU Public Procurement Directives.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"231 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124141736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Application of the Analytical Method in the Study of the Institute of Public Control in the Field of Procurement for State and Municipal Needs","authors":"N. Mamedova, A. Baykova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2858211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2858211","url":null,"abstract":"This article illustrates the procedure and application of an analytical method for the study of the Institute of public control in the sphere of procurement for state and municipal needs as separate scientific problems of practical importance.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132416972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Oversight and Efficiency in Public Projects: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis","authors":"E. Calvo, Ruomeng Cui, J. C. Serpa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2876840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2876840","url":null,"abstract":"During the execution of a public project (e.g., the construction of a hospital), should regulators continually scrutinize the contractor’s operations? Or is this behavior obstructive? In this paper we explore the causal impact of government oversight on a project’s delay time and cost overrun. To this end, we collect a sample of 30,004 projects across 70 U.S. federal agencies and 5,557 private contractors. We exploit a regulatory bylaw in federal procurement. If a project’s estimated budget exceeds a pre-established cutoff, then the project’s operations are heavily scrutinized through evaluation teams, progress reports, and expenditure approval forms. If, conversely, a project’s budget is below this cutoff, these operational checks are waived. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that decreasing the intensity of oversight significantly decreases a project’s delay time and cost overrun. Further, our results indicate that the effectiveness of government oversight depends on (i) the contract type and (ii) the contractor’s experience.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130891366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Оценка Масштабов и Эффектов Централизации в России в 2014 Году (Assessment of the Extent and Effects of Centralization in Russia in 2014)","authors":"А. Malayrev, S. Belev","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2762277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2762277","url":null,"abstract":"Russian Abstract: В данной работе представлен анализ масштабов и специфики централизации закупок в России в 2014 году, а также предпринята попытка на примере отдельных позиций закупаемой номенклатуры оценить экономию от укрупнения размещаемого государственного заказа.English Abstract: This paper presents an analysis of the extent and specificity of procurement centralization in Russia in 2014, as well as an attempt by the example of the individual items purchased nomenclature evaluate the savings from consolidation hosted the state order.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114276184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How Open Are Public Procurement Markets?","authors":"P. Messerlin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2691492","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2691492","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses different sources of data to assess the relative level of openness of the public procurement markets of major trading nations, with a specific focus on the European Union (EU). The data reveal a picture that is very different from what is commonly argued to be the case by policymakers in the EU. The divergence between discourse and reality is in part a reflection of the absence of appropriate data on government sourcing patterns, suggesting greater effort is needed to both compile more accurate statistics and to take into account basic economic factors such as the size of economies.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127818922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}