游说政府拨款

ERN: Procurement (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-10-20 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3203661

Christian Cox

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引用次数: 4

摘要

本文研究了游说对政府合同分配的影响。我考虑游说如何影响合同总支出和公司之间的合同分配。我解决了一个包含这两种效应的新颖竞赛模型，然后使用一组联邦承包商对其进行结构估计。结果表明，游说每年使合同支出增加87亿美元(3.2%)。然而，它对观察到的合同分配和企业收入的影响相对较小。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Lobbying for Government Appropriations

This article investigates the effect of lobbying on government contract allocation. I consider how lobbying can affect both total contract spending and the distribution of contracts between firms. I solve a novel contest model which incorporates these two effects, and then structurally estimate it using a panel of federal contractors. The results suggest that lobbying increases contract spending by $8.7 billion (3.2%) per year. However, its effects on the observed contract distribution and firm revenues are relatively small.

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ERN: Procurement (Topic)

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