Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Kill Two Birds With One Stone? China's Mixed Ownership Reform and Investment Efficiency 一石二鸟?中国混合所有制改革与投资效率
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-26 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4477
Liying Ren, Haomin Wu, Yangyang Liu
{"title":"Kill Two Birds With One Stone? China's Mixed Ownership Reform and Investment Efficiency","authors":"Liying Ren,&nbsp;Haomin Wu,&nbsp;Yangyang Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4477","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a major strategic step for the central government to implement the policy of strengthening and expanding SOEs and an important measure to support the development of the nonpublic economy. This has become the main direction of China's current reform and the focus of its governance. Mixed ownership reform is the key implementation path and main direction of SOE reform. Its fundamental purpose is to stimulate the vitality and competitiveness of these enterprises. Taking the sample of Chinese A-share-listed firms from 2004 to 2022, we aimed to explore the impact and mechanism of the mixed ownership reform of SOEs on the investment efficiency of SOEs and participating private enterprises (PEs). We found that the SOEs' mixed ownership reform provides a win–win situation for both SOEs and PEs. Specifically, the incorporation of non–state-owned capital owed by PEs prevents SOEs' overinvestment, which is denoted as the “direct effect.” Meanwhile, PEs' participation in the reform leads to a reduction in underinvestment, which is denoted as the “indirect effect.” Mechanism analysis indicated that for SOEs, the reform leads to a decreased level of government intervention and a reduced principal agency cost, showing the reform's “governance effect.” For PEs, participation in the reform leads to reduced financing constraints, demonstrating the reform's “resource effect.” This study not only enriches the relevant research on the consequences of mixed ownership reform at the microlevel but also provides valuable experience and reference for the economic reform of emerging markets and developing countries.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2474-2503"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143945014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information Acquisition Under Providers' Competition
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-24 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4491
Youzi Zhai, Weili Xue, Jing Chen
{"title":"Information Acquisition Under Providers' Competition","authors":"Youzi Zhai,&nbsp;Weili Xue,&nbsp;Jing Chen","doi":"10.1002/mde.4491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4491","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper studies the strategic interactions between two competing information providers and two competing downstream firms. We find that when one provider sets a moderate price and the other a higher price, the firm with more private information tends to acquire additional information to extend its advantage. Conversely, the firm with less private information forgoes further acquisitions, weakening competition. Moreover, symmetric providers have incentives to set asymmetric prices due to heterogeneous firms' inclination to differentiate information sources. Although the competition between providers may increase the firms' information acquisition costs, it can simultaneously mitigate heightened competition between firms.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2662-2677"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bonus Scheme, Managerial Delegation, and Quantity Competition 奖金制度、管理授权与数量竞争
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-23 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4476
Chung-Hui Chou
{"title":"Bonus Scheme, Managerial Delegation, and Quantity Competition","authors":"Chung-Hui Chou","doi":"10.1002/mde.4476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4476","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This note examines if owners would offer a bonus for each unit of output dependent on both firms' output levels in equilibrium and the impacts on market performances. The main contribution is showing that owners may lessen quantity competition more than the standard Cournot by adopting the relative quantity delegation in which they offer an incentive scheme based on profit plus a bonus for each unit of output that decreases in their own output levels but increases in rivals' ones. Consequently, contrary to conventional wisdom, output delegation increases profitability but reduces consumers' surplus.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2468-2473"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143945024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to Improve the Efficiency of the New Energy Vehicle Industry: Multiple Paths From Configuration Perspective 如何提升新能源汽车产业效率:配置视角下的多重路径
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-22 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4490
Tian Zhang, Yaqin Fu, Jiang Hu
{"title":"How to Improve the Efficiency of the New Energy Vehicle Industry: Multiple Paths From Configuration Perspective","authors":"Tian Zhang,&nbsp;Yaqin Fu,&nbsp;Jiang Hu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4490","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines regional new energy vehicle (NEV) industry efficiency across 26 Chinese provinces, addressing the need for deeper insights into the spatiotemporal efficiency patterns and configurational pathways influencing NEV development. By employing data envelopment analysis (DEA) to measure efficiency, exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) to explore spatial clustering, and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to investigate configuration-based pathways, this research provides a nuanced understanding of how regional factors shape NEV efficiency. The analysis identifies four distinct configurational pathways: policy bolstering for technological innovation, organizational synergy, market dynamics and regulatory synergy, and structural deficiency type. These findings suggest that developed regions benefit from prioritizing organizational collaboration and technological support, while less-developed areas may improve efficiency through foundational policy enhancement and regulatory alignment. Furthermore, investing in human capital, technical innovation, and infrastructure can contribute to building a resilient NEV ecosystem. By integrating multiple analytical methods, this study sheds light on the complex interactions shaping NEV efficiency across regions and offers insights for policymakers to enhance the global competitiveness and sustainability of China's NEV industry.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2643-2661"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143945018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Release Strategy of Competing Retailers for Reserved Produce Under the Government's Emergency Reserves With Order Constraints 有订单约束的政府应急储备下竞争零售商储备农产品的投放策略
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-22 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4479
Ting Lei, Bin Dan, Yongqi Yuan, Yu Tian, Yu Ding
{"title":"Release Strategy of Competing Retailers for Reserved Produce Under the Government's Emergency Reserves With Order Constraints","authors":"Ting Lei,&nbsp;Bin Dan,&nbsp;Yongqi Yuan,&nbsp;Yu Tian,&nbsp;Yu Ding","doi":"10.1002/mde.4479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4479","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The government establishes an emergency reserve system and releases reserved produce through competing retailers in a fresh produce supply chain. We study the release strategy of competing retailers for reserved produce under the government's emergency reserves with order constraints. Our results reveal that competing retailers are willing to release reserved produce despite intensifying market competition. The release of reserved produce does not necessarily cannibalize supplies of fresh produce; however, the order constraints on reserved produce may instead reduce fresh produce supplies. It can also simultaneously improve or reduce supply chain performance and consumer surplus, bringing a “win-win” or “lose-lose” situation.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2524-2539"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143945019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal Recovery Mode for New Energy Vehicle Battery Recycling Under Government Policies 政府政策下新能源汽车电池优化回收模式研究
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-22 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4487
Wenqi Wu, Ming Li, George Q. Huang
{"title":"Optimal Recovery Mode for New Energy Vehicle Battery Recycling Under Government Policies","authors":"Wenqi Wu,&nbsp;Ming Li,&nbsp;George Q. Huang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4487","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The choice of spent new energy vehicle (NEV) battery recovery mode is crucial to improve recovery performance. This paper examines the decision-making rules for the closed-loop supply chain of NEV batteries under the intervention of government policies. It also compares the performance of the supply chain across various recovery modes and the effects of different policies. Results indicate that (1) in terms of total revenue and recovery rate, the battery producer recovery mode, mixed recovery mode involving automobile manufacturer and professional recycler, is more effective. (2) The optimal solution for the decision variable is influenced by government policies, and this influence remains consistent across different recovery modes. (3) The positive impact of the deposit-return system is linked to the relationship between the deposit amount and the reward scale. If the refund constitutes too small a proportion of the deposit, both total revenue and recovery rate will decline. Reducing recycling channel costs and enhancing purchasers' environmental awareness can increase the battery recycling ratio and higher total revenue.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2629-2642"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4487","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143945011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Productive and Unproductive Effort Choices in Groups and Sharing: An Experimental Study 群体和分享中的生产性和非生产性努力选择:一项实验研究
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-21 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4492
Mürüvvet Büyükboyacı, Emin Karagözoğlu, Serkan Küçükşenel
{"title":"Productive and Unproductive Effort Choices in Groups and Sharing: An Experimental Study","authors":"Mürüvvet Büyükboyacı,&nbsp;Emin Karagözoğlu,&nbsp;Serkan Küçükşenel","doi":"10.1002/mde.4492","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4492","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Agents in collaborative relationships (e.g., business partnership and co-authorship) frequently need to decide on the allocation of limited resources (e.g., time and money) to productive activities that increase the size of the joint surplus and unproductive, promotional activities that do not affect the size of the surplus but increase their (individual) likelihood of capturing a greater control/share of the surplus. Using a laboratory experiment, we first analyze the effect of the opportunity cost of unproductive investment on subjects' resource allocation decisions in the first stage. Second, we study whether (i) the opportunity cost of unproductive investment and (ii) the identity of the decision-maker (human or computer) affect subjects' distributive decisions in the second stage. Three main insights emerge from our experiment: First, we find that subjects choose productive and unproductive investments equally likely both in low and high opportunity cost treatments. Second, subjects give less to their matched pairs if they choose unproductive investment in human treatment but not in computer treatment that suggests that subjects punish (by giving less) their matched pairs for allocating more resources to unproductive, promotional activities, a behavior that is not present when the allocation decision is made by a computer.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2678-2687"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4492","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Impact of Green Finance on Enterprise Environmental Strategies: Source Prevention or End-Of-Pipe Treatment? 绿色金融对企业环境战略的影响:源头预防还是末端治理?
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-18 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4483
Lin Wang, Yuning Li, Huixiang Zeng
{"title":"The Impact of Green Finance on Enterprise Environmental Strategies: Source Prevention or End-Of-Pipe Treatment?","authors":"Lin Wang,&nbsp;Yuning Li,&nbsp;Huixiang Zeng","doi":"10.1002/mde.4483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4483","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Based on the quasinatural experiment of China's green finance reform and innovation pilot zones (GFRIs), the impact of GFRIs on the environmental strategies of heavy-polluting enterprises is discussed. The results show that after the implementation of GFRIs, heavy-polluting enterprises are more inclined to end-of-pipe treatment than source prevention. Alleviating financing restrictions and enhancing external attention are potential channels for GFRIs to induce enterprises to adopt end-of-pipe treatment. Additionally, we explore the governance boundaries of GFRIs for heterogeneous characteristics of enterprises and the market environment. The findings enrich the research related to the economic consequences of GFRIs and provide empirical evidence to formulate the next step of pilot expansion.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2583-2602"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Supply Chain Investment, Financing Schemes With the Uncertainty of Low-Carbon Technology Innovation: Carbon Asset Pledge vs. Sell–Buyback? 低碳技术创新不确定性下的供应链投融资方案:碳资产质押vs售回?
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-16 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4481
Jiawen Li, Xiaomin Xu, Shengzhong Huang, Hongyong Fu
{"title":"Supply Chain Investment, Financing Schemes With the Uncertainty of Low-Carbon Technology Innovation: Carbon Asset Pledge vs. Sell–Buyback?","authors":"Jiawen Li,&nbsp;Xiaomin Xu,&nbsp;Shengzhong Huang,&nbsp;Hongyong Fu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4481","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Carbon emissions are recognized as major contributors to the greenhouse effect, accelerating global warming. Meanwhile, technology innovation is acknowledged as a key determinant influencing carbon emissions. Therefore, implementing low-carbon technology innovation (LCTI) becomes a critical approach to mitigating global warming. However, the uncertainty of LCTI and capital constraints hinder enterprises from adopting such innovations. Additionally, the constraints imposed by traditional financing channels exacerbate the predicament faced by enterprises. In this paper, we build a two-echelon supply chain model in the context of LCTI uncertainty, consisting of a retailer with sufficient capital and a manufacturer facing capital constraints, where traditional financing channels are restricted, to explore the strategies of LCTI investments, carbon asset financing, and product pricing. The research findings are as follows: Firstly, LCTI does not consistently result in higher expected profits for the manufacturer. This means that the manufacturer may lack the willingness to invest in such endeavors unless the probability coefficient of success in LCTI surpasses a certain threshold. Conversely, the retailer always benefits as a free rider from the manufacturer's investment in low-carbon technology. Secondly, both carbon asset pledge and sell–buyback financing can continuously increase the manufacturer's LCTI investments, but their impacts on the manufacturer's profits differ. Under pledge financing, higher LCTI investments imply greater profits for the manufacturer. In contrast, under sell–buyback financing, the impact may be either positive or negative, which depends on the fluctuation of carbon price. If carbon price escalates beyond a certain degree, sell–buyback financing may backfire. Yet, it also provides the opportunities for the manufacturer to maximize profits. Thirdly, improving LCTI investments can either benefit or harm the environment. This is contingent upon the relationship between the carbon emission ratio and the demand ratio. Win–win economic benefits and environmental performance can be achieved only when the carbon emission ratio is lower than the demand ratio. Finally, in the context of LCTI uncertainty, although carbon asset financing can enhance the manufacturer's LCTI investments and has the potential to improve the manufacturer's profits, it fails to prevent the retailer's free-riding behavior. An LCTI cost-sharing mechanism can limit such behavior and help the manufacturer and retailer reach a win–win outcome.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1888-1912"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pricing and Procurement Strategies for Substitute Products in Extreme Weather 极端天气下替代产品的定价与采购策略
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-15 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4489
Haonan Xu, Jiaguo Liu
{"title":"Pricing and Procurement Strategies for Substitute Products in Extreme Weather","authors":"Haonan Xu,&nbsp;Jiaguo Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4489","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Climate change is causing frequent extreme weather events, posing disruption risks to supply chains. A two-echelon supply chain comprising two suppliers and one retailer is constructed from a risk perspective. A game theory model is utilized to analyze all parties' optimal decisions and risk management measures under climate disturbances. The reactions of the retailer and suppliers, who sell vertically differentiated substitute products, are examined, and the changes in social welfare are observed. Our analysis exhibits that (1) the retailer mitigated the negative impact of risk disturbance through product differentiation and pricing strategies and even achieved higher profits than without extreme weather events; (2) there is a possibility that the sales volume will be higher in extreme weather, which is related to the antidisturbance ability of the supply chain; and (3) although extreme weather disturbs the supply, it may lead to a win–win relationship between retailer's profit and social welfare. The operational decisions derived from this study exhibit robustness in mitigating the adverse effects of extreme weather, enabling maximization of both retailers' profits and social welfare, thus contributing to the theoretical foundation for sustainable socioeconomic systems.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1871-1887"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信