{"title":"The determination of the price of capital goods: A differential game approach","authors":"Marco Guerrazzi, Giuseppe Candido","doi":"10.1002/mde.4370","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4370","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we address the determinants of the price of newly installed productive capacity. Specifically, we develop a differential game in which a competitive producer of consumption goods deals with a seller of capital goods endowed with market power. From a theoretical perspective, we demonstrate that an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium requires the producer of consumption goods to be more impatient than the seller of capital goods. Thereafter, we show that our theoretical setting can replicate the countercyclical pattern of the relative price of capital goods as well as its negative relationship with the investment–output ratio.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"222-234"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4370","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cross-licensing or not: The optimal choices of competing ICT firms in a duopoly market","authors":"Yifan Liu, Minqiang Li, Haiyang Feng, Nan Feng","doi":"10.1002/mde.4352","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4352","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Cross-licensing, which grants each party the right to produce products using the other's patents, is a prevalent strategy for information and communications technology (ICT) firms to improve product quality and respond to intense competition. This study focuses on the cross-licensing choices of two competing ICT firms that engage in price competition with substitutable products of different quality levels. Using a game-theoretical model, we find that each firm will have a higher (lower) profit as its competitor's product quality improves in a price-sensitive (quality-sensitive) market. Signing a cross-licensing agreement is profitable for the two firms when their quality improvements are roughly symmetric or when customers are sensitive to the price difference but less sensitive to the quality difference. Furthermore, we examine the quality-to-price ratio, which reflects customer perceived value, and find that cross-licensing may achieve a win–win–win situation for both firms and customers when there is no significant difference in quality improvements between the two firms or when the competition intensity is moderate. The rationale behind these results hinges on the integration of the quality improvement effect and the quality differentiation effect. The results explain the observations of ICT firms' cross-licensing practices and provide managerial implications for ICT firms and policymakers.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"67-87"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yang Tong, Yina Li, Fei Ye, Ajay Kumar, Kim Hua Tan
{"title":"Contract preference of an online intermediary in the presence of online reviews and cross-channel spillover","authors":"Yang Tong, Yina Li, Fei Ye, Ajay Kumar, Kim Hua Tan","doi":"10.1002/mde.4320","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4320","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In e-commerce, online intermediaries give suppliers ready access to consumers and have thereby become an important distribution channel. They can operate as resellers (under a reselling contract) or marketplaces (under an agency contract) for suppliers. This study analyzes the most effective contract arrangement between an online intermediary and two competing suppliers. The suppliers receive online reviews of their products and also be affected by the spillover effect of the intermediary's channel on their own direct sales channels. The intermediary can offer a reselling contract to one supplier and an agency contract to the other or offer the same contract type to both suppliers. We find that when the cross-channel spillover is positive or only moderately negative, the intermediary offers different contract types if the difference in the review ratings of the two suppliers' products is considerable; otherwise, a reselling contract is offered to both. However, when the cross-channel spillover is highly negative, the intermediary may offer an agency contract to both suppliers. Our research provides practical guidance for intermediaries on the most effective contract strategies to use when collaborating with suppliers who receive varied online reviews, depending on the cross-channel spillover scenarios.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5867-5882"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pricing of medical services and channel selection strategies for pharmaceutical supply chain under the zero-markup drug policy","authors":"Shiyang Li, Yantao Li, Qianqian Kong, Xiaoyu Feng, Yuanxue Long, Nan Zhou","doi":"10.1002/mde.4357","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4357","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies the channel strategies of drug suppliers in the drug supply chain under the zero-plus drug pricing policy. With the popularity of e-commerce and online shopping, supply chain firms have begun considering expanding their business to online channels. In this paper, we construct a game model to explore the impact of the pharmaceutical supply chain's development of online channels on supply chain members. We conclude that under the zero profits policy, increasing the public hospital's public welfare level will increase the price of drugs, decrease the price of medical services, and reduce the overall cost of patients. In addition, the greater the sensitivity of medical services, the lower the likelihood that a drug supplier will open an online pharmacy, and the lower the level of public good, the greater the likelihood that a drug supplier will open an online pharmacy. In addition, under certain conditions, patients can receive a higher level of medical service and spend less on healthcare under a dual-channel strategy. Finally, under a dual-channel strategy, an appropriate profit-sharing mechanism can eliminate instability in the pharmaceutical supply chain.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5883-5898"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social identity in trusting artificial intelligence agents: Evidence from lab and online experiments","authors":"Yanqi Sun, Cheng Xu, Hao Xu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4361","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explores human trust in artificial intelligence (AI), focusing on the effects of social categorization (ingroup vs. outgroup) and AI human-likeness through two pre-registered studies involving 160 participants each. The first study, a lab experiment in China, and the second, an online experiment representative of the United States, both utilized a trust game to assess trust across four conditions: ingroup-humanoid AI, ingroup-non-humanoid AI, outgroup-humanoid AI, and outgroup-non-humanoid AI. Results indicated higher trust for ingroup and humanoid AIs, with statistical significance. Mixed-design ANOVA was used to analyze the data, revealing significant main effects and interactions. The second study also identified an emotional connection as a mediator in trust, suggesting significant design implications for AI in trust-critical sectors like healthcare and autonomous transportation.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5899-5916"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142579783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The impact of digital inclusive finance on regional capital aggregation","authors":"Tianxiang Sheng, Jiahui Teng","doi":"10.1002/mde.4363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4363","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Capital flow and aggregation are pivotal to regional coordinated development, and the innovations within the financial industry have introduced significant changes. This study examines the potential impact of digital inclusive finance on regional capital aggregation. By analyzing city data from China between 2011 and 2020, we find that the development of digital inclusive finance exhibits an inverted U-shaped effect on regional capital aggregation. During the initial stages of digital inclusive finance development, it promotes regional capital aggregation; however, beyond a certain threshold, there is a fostering of capital outflow. The impact mechanism reveals that digital inclusive finance exerts a nonlinear effect on the efficiency of regional capital allocation, thereby altering the regional capital aggregation level. Furthermore, enhancing human capital levels can accelerate this process, whereas increased government intervention may impede it. This study contributes to the theoretical research on factors influencing capital flow across regions and offers significant implications for utilizing digital inclusive finance to narrow the regional capital allocation gap and promote coordinated regional development.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"115-128"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142868673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Green or non-green product: A game-theoretic framework to make optimal decision in a two-level supply chain","authors":"Gayapada Santra, Tarun Maiti, Bibhas Chandra Giri","doi":"10.1002/mde.4335","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4335","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper aims to discuss the decisions made by the retailer and manufacturer in a supply chain about pricing, green level, and quality of a product. The centralized model and the manufacturer-led Stackelberg gaming model are developed for a conventional product and its environmentally friendly version. The two green models are subsequently compared with two non-green models. Finally, a comprehensive variation of the model is considered, accounting for both green and non-green products. The green-only supply chain generates higher profit than the one that uses non-green products. A revenue-sharing contract is also employed to coordinate the supply chain.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5825-5845"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Zhimin Guan, Tianyang Yu, Jingyang Dong, Jun Zhang
{"title":"Should brand-owners adopt blockchain to combat deceptive counterfeits when competing with copycats? Impact of consumers' anticipated regret","authors":"Zhimin Guan, Tianyang Yu, Jingyang Dong, Jun Zhang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4358","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4358","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Original products (sold by a brand-owner) are exposed to the dual challenge of imitation products (sold by a copycat) and deceptive counterfeit products (provided by a counterfeiter). In such cases, consumers face higher shopping risks and are more likely to experience post-purchase regret. Blockchain can prevent the infiltration of deceptive counterfeits and the occurrence of regret, but its adoption can also raise consumer privacy concern. Hence, considering the above factors, we focus on the brand-owner's blockchain adoption strategy. First, we define two types of regret: counterfeit-purchasing regret (CPR) and low-cost-effective regret (LCR). Second, we consider three scenarios: scenario <i>NR</i>: without blockchain and considering only CPR, scenario <i>NT</i>: without blockchain and considering only LCR, and Scenario <i>B</i>: with blockchain. Finally, we compare the equilibrium results under scenarios <i>NR</i> and <i>NT</i> with those under scenario <i>B</i>, respectively. We interestingly find that blockchain adoption benefits the brand-owner when (1) privacy concern is low or (2) privacy concern is moderate and the sensitivity factor of CPR is large or the sensitivity factor of LCR is small. Therefore, we advise brand-owners to intervene in consumers' sensitivity to regret in order to make blockchain adoption work in their favor.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5846-5866"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The impact of ESG on the cost efficiency of commercial banks—Evidence from Western European commercial banks","authors":"Lien-Wen Liang, Tsui-Jung Lin, Meng-Yun Chung","doi":"10.1002/mde.4360","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4360","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines the impact of Environmental (E), Social (S), and Governance (G) activities on the cost efficiency of commercial banks in Western Europe in 2010–2020. The stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method was employed to investigate the impact of E, S, G, and bank characteristic variables on cost efficiency. The findings reveal that commercial banks can improve their cost efficiency by conducting E, S, and G activities. Banks that implemented these practices tended to have relatively better cost efficiency than those that did not. <i>Overall, the results of this study are consistent with the stakeholder hypothesis and present the first evidence of the</i> interplay between cost efficiency and ESG activities in the banking industry in Western Europe.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5811-5824"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Endogenous coalition formation and free trade agreements","authors":"Vi Cao, Haifeng Fu, X. Henry Wang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4346","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4346","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies the endogenous formation of free trade agreements. There are four countries belonging to two types according to market demand and production technology. A unique strong Nash equilibrium exists for the coalition formation game. In equilibrium, two coalition structures may emerge: global free trade, wherein a single coalition encompassing all countries is established, or polarization, characterized by the formation of two symmetric agreements between the same type countries. The specific coalition structure that emerges in equilibrium depends on both the disparity in demand and the gap in unit cost of production between the two types of countries.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5781-5810"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}