{"title":"The Effect of Disappointment Aversion on Risk Prevention","authors":"Yongjin Yin, Shengwang Meng","doi":"10.1002/mde.4423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4423","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We adopt three of well-established models of disappointment aversion to study the effect of disappointment aversion on risk prevention which involves self-insurance and self-protection. In self-insurance actions, we show that, in general, the disappointment-averse decision maker will exert more effort than the standard risk-averse decision maker, and the optimal efforts across these disappointment models are not identical. Moreover, under the <i>Gul model</i>, the disappointment-averse decision maker may exert less effort than the standard risk-averse decision maker in multiple loss states. In self-protection actions, we provide a set of sufficient conditions under which the disappointment-averse decision maker will exert more effort or less effort compared with the standard risk-averse decision maker for each of these disappointment aversion models.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"1108-1124"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143116613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Research on the Collaborative Mechanism of Value Creation in Public–Private Partnership Projects Under Dynamic Trust","authors":"Zehui Bu, Jicai Liu, Zujie Lu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4424","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Public–private partnership (PPP) is now focused on project value creation, with trust playing a crucial role. This study models trust evolution among stakeholders using evolutionary game theory and simulations, revealing that higher initial and sustained trust boosts project value. However, overreliance on trust can lead to deregulation and neglect of contracts, harming outcomes. Spillover effects and speculative behavior also threaten value creation. The study identifies an optimal incentive range for reputation gains, highlighting the need for balanced trust mechanisms, effective incentives, and penalties to ensure collaboration and project success.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"1125-1145"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143116614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Welfare-Reducing Integration Under Emission Taxes and Endogenous Competition Mode","authors":"Sumi Cho, Dong-Joon Lee, Sang-Ho Lee","doi":"10.1002/mde.4430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4430","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines asymmetric supply chain competition between integrated and non-integrated supply chains under emission taxes when firms choose competition mode in the final goods market endogenously. We find that higher emission taxes may lead the non-integrated downstream firm to adopt aggressive pricing to induce its upstream firm to lower prices, leveling competition with an integrated one. When the non-integrated chain integrates, however, quantity contracts become dominant strategies, which might distort welfare under lower emission taxes if both environmental damage and product substitutability are sufficiently high. Our finding indicates the welfare-reducing effects of government interventions post-integration when emission tax policy and endogenous competition mode are relevant.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"1224-1244"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143115131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Qian Long Kweh, Irene Wei Kiong Ting, Wen-Min Lu, Hanh Thi My Le
{"title":"Controlling Interest and Firm Efficiency: Comparing Family- and Nonfamily-Controlled Taiwanese Cultural and Creative Industry Firms","authors":"Qian Long Kweh, Irene Wei Kiong Ting, Wen-Min Lu, Hanh Thi My Le","doi":"10.1002/mde.4437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4437","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The study evaluates the efficiencies of Taiwanese cultural and creative firms, comparing family and nonfamily firms. A novel chance-constrained network data envelopment analysis model measured efficiency from 2005 to 2020. Key findings include the following: (1) Nonfamily firms are more efficient than family-controlled firms, and (2) a nonlinear relationship between controlling shareholdings and efficiency is present only in family-controlled firms. This study offers key insights for policymakers, management, highlighting the importance of R&D investment for enhancing firm efficiency, the strategic role of family control in early-stage efficiency improvements through R&D and the need for investors to adopt tailored strategies to optimize efficiency.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"1344-1357"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143115010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nana Zhang, Lei Yu, Keqi Liu, Zhifei Ye, Mengya Jia
{"title":"“Store Strategy”: A New Omni-Channel Strategy in Community Group Buying","authors":"Nana Zhang, Lei Yu, Keqi Liu, Zhifei Ye, Mengya Jia","doi":"10.1002/mde.4438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4438","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper explores a new omni-channel strategy—“store strategy”—in community group buying and investigates the impacts of the application of this strategy on the platform and community leader. Three models are developed: (1) The platform operates only in a single online channel. (2) The platform adopts a store strategy and delegates offline operations to a community leader. (3) The platform adopts a store strategy that includes self-establishing a store. After comparing different models, some interesting results are obtained as follows: (i) After the store strategy is adopted, the optimal online price remains unchanged, but new offline pricing varies, depending on the offline entry method. (ii) If the cost of the community leader operating the offline channel is low, the proportion of private consumers is particularly high. In this case, the store strategy that delegates operations to the community leader will achieve a win–win outcome. (iii) If the self-established cost is low and the proportion of private consumers is low, the store strategy with a self-establishing store will allow the platform to obtain higher profits, while greatly harming the community leader.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"1358-1372"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143115011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hua Wang, Yao Jin, Yan Zhao, Cuicui Wang, Yanle Xie
{"title":"Value-Added Service Strategies for Retailers Oriented to Uncertain Demand","authors":"Hua Wang, Yao Jin, Yan Zhao, Cuicui Wang, Yanle Xie","doi":"10.1002/mde.4427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4427","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Whereas retailers pursue providing value-added services (VAS) to capture additional markets and maximize profits, market demand uncertainty decreases retailers' incentives to provide VAS. Therefore, we analyze retailers' VAS provision strategies in the market demand uncertainty. We then investigate the VAS provision strategies and explore the impact of market demand uncertainty, competitive effects, and market loss effects on retailers' VAS provision strategies. We prove that when the market loss effect is high, the retailers provide VAS that even face lower consumer preferences. When the market loss effect is low, neither retailer offers VAS, even when consumer preferences are high. When the market loss effect and consumer preferences match each other, only one retailer offers VAS as an equilibrium strategy. The competition effect and market demand uncertainty exacerbate this result. Notably, the combination of VAS cost, competition effect, and market loss effect puts the retailer in a prisoner's dilemma under market demand uncertainty. Interestingly, the competition effect mitigates situations where retailers suffer from the prisoners' dilemma. Besides, the competition effect and market demand uncertainty exacerbate the difficulties of extracting optimal social welfare in different scenarios.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"1174-1190"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143114360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Nexus Between De-Globalization and OFDI From Emerging Economies: Moderating Roles of Institution and Government","authors":"Jinjuan Yang, Yan Zeng, Rui Li","doi":"10.1002/mde.4415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4415","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The recent wave of de-globalization has slowed the outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) process globally, with varying effects across countries. Using panel data from 25 emerging economies between 1980 and 2018, we examine the impact of de-globalization on OFDI. Our findings show that higher de-globalization pressure from developed countries drives emerging economies to invest more globally. Threshold regressions reveal that this positive effect is significant only when a minimum GDP threshold is met. Moreover, better institutional quality and increased government involvement strengthen the positive impact of de-globalization on OFDI.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"980-998"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143114362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Blockchain Adoption and Collaborative Emission Reduction in Vertical-Shareholding Supply Chain","authors":"Xue-Yan Wu, Xue Chi, Xujin Pu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4417","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study investigates the role of blockchain technology in collaborative emission reduction in vertical-shareholding supply chains. The collaborative emission reduction decisions of the manufacturer and retailer are examined for four scenarios of whether or not to adopt blockchain technology in the manufacturer- and retailer-led supply chain. The results show that under the manufacturer-led, they have incentive alignment to adopt blockchain technology when the unit cost of using blockchain technology is low and the retailer's misrepresentation factor is high, regardless of the manufacturer's shareholding ratio. However, under the retailer-led, their incentive alignment is closely related to the manufacturer's shareholding ratio.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"1012-1028"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143114273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yixuan Feng, Zhihan Zhang, Yashu Yao, Yao Chen, Jiaxu Liu
{"title":"To Share or Not? Hybrid e-Commerce Platform's Provision and Sharing Strategies of Consumer Credit Service","authors":"Yixuan Feng, Zhihan Zhang, Yashu Yao, Yao Chen, Jiaxu Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4411","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>As a new financial innovation, consumer credit services are increasingly embraced by e-commerce platforms. This paper presents a stylized model to determine when an e-commerce platform should launch credit services and whether to share them with third-party sellers. Our findings indicate that the platform benefits from launching credit services only when consumer preference outweighs the delinquency rate. Furthermore, service sharing can create a win-win scenario with moderate fees and high consumer preference. Contrary to common belief, sharing services with sellers can reduce consumer surplus, suggesting that widespread use of consumer credit services is not necessarily beneficial for consumers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"910-927"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143113421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cross-Ownership, Green Managerial Delegation, and Emission Taxation","authors":"Xubei Lian, Leonard F. S. Wang, Kai Zhang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4428","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper analyzes the effects of cross-ownership on green managerial delegation contracts in a Cournot duopoly market with emission tax policy. We show that higher cross-ownership will always exacerbate environmental degradation and diminish societal welfare, even with green managerial delegation. Compared with sales delegation, green managerial delegation under such ownership always yields higher environmental damage and lower social welfare. Compared to concurrent regulation, noncommitted emission taxation always leads to lower environmental damage and higher social welfare, although green managerial delegation will not be chosen in the latter. Our findings have important policy implications.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"1191-1205"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143113422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}