Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献

{"title":"Firm Performance on Artificial Intelligence Implementation","authors":"Cheng-Kui Huang,&nbsp;Jheng-Siang Lin","doi":"10.1002/mde.4486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4486","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In recent years, artificial intelligence (AI) has become a focal point in academic and business research. With breakthroughs in learning algorithms, AI applications in business operations are increasingly practical and impactful. AI offers tools for market analysis, decision-making support, and innovations in business models and processes, presenting a significant turning point for firms. Despite this, questions remain about whether AI implementation yields measurable business value or is merely a trend, challenging enterprises and managers. This study provides a significant contribution by empirically examining AI impact on firm-level performance through three key indicators: financial performance, productivity, and market value. Drawing on internal financial perspectives, this research reveals that while AI adoption enhances financial performance and market value, the advantages for AI first movers and better performers are not uniformly positive across all indicators. This nuanced analysis offers managers and stakeholders a deeper understanding of the tangible value of AI, guiding more informed implementation strategies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1856-1870"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Financial Superiority of Cooperation in Household Entrepreneurship: Insights From the Chinese Household Financial Survey","authors":"Yixiao Nai,&nbsp;Di Hu,&nbsp;Fei Jin,&nbsp;Beichen Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4484","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Teamwork is common in entrepreneurship, yet its impact on households remains underexplored. This study investigates the differences in household entrepreneurship outcomes between cooperative and solo ventures. The findings reveal that cooperative entrepreneurship significantly outperforms solo entrepreneurship in financial terms. Cooperative households, by substituting entrepreneurial resources, boost performance through resource sharing. Furthermore, cooperation enhances productivity in small-scale ventures and in regions with strong legal frameworks, driving greater entrepreneurial success. Importantly, the primary motivation for household cooperation often lies in overcoming resource constraints. This paper offers innovative insights and practical strategies to address the resource limitations faced by household enterprises.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2603-2628"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Land Misallocation and Urban Green Innovation: From the Perspective of Asymmetrical Innovation Theory","authors":"Hengzhou Xu,&nbsp;Fenghui Sun,&nbsp;Shuangliang Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4485","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>As the conflict between economic growth and environmental pollution intensifies, green innovation is gradually recognized as a pivotal strategy for promoting sustainable urban development. The unique institution is an important asymmetric resource for innovation activities, so delving into China's land institutional context represents a significant direction for both the theoretical understanding and practical application research of innovation in China. The existing framework inadequately explores the nexus between land misallocation (LM) and urban green innovation (UGI) and fails to reveal the underlying transmission mechanism fully. To bridge this gap, this paper utilizes city-level data from China spanning 2007 to 2020, takes an asymmetric innovation perspective, and empirically tests the impact of two types of land misallocation, industrial LM and sectoral LM, on the relationship between UGI. The results reveal that LM has a significantly direct negative impact on UGI in China. The results are still robust after changing the sample size, substituting explanatory variables, replacing regression models, and running endogeneity tests. Additionally, the negative impact of LM exhibits heterogeneity within sectors and cities of different economic levels, administrative ranks, and dominant industries. The mechanism testing results indicate that LM affects UGI through structural, scale, and agglomeration effects. These conclusions enrich the literature on the impact of institutions on urban green innovation and provide valuable insights into the sustainable development of cities.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1835-1855"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Impact of Subsidies on Pricing Decisions in the Battery Swapping Supply Chain Under the “Vehicle and Battery Separation” Model","authors":"Chao Li,&nbsp;Kai Fu Yuan","doi":"10.1002/mde.4470","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4470","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>To explore the impact of various subsidies on the battery swapping industry under the “vehicle and battery separation” model, a supply chain comprising a battery manufacturer, a vehicle company, and a battery leasing company is constructed. Based on the no-subsidy model, decision-making models are developed for four scenarios that involve subsidizing different entities, including the customer, the battery manufacturer, the battery leasing company, and the vehicle company. Comparative analysis is then conducted. Results show that (1) subsidies do not invariably result in companies lowering prices for their products and services. Under various subsidy strategies, companies tend to adjust their pricing strategies for products and services according to the battery leasing time and the price sensitivity coefficient of battery swapping service. (2) Government subsidies to supply chain entities may not always effectively incentivize more companies to enter the battery swapping industry. Although direct subsidy to vehicle companies could encourage their participation, promoting the involvement of battery manufacturers and leasing companies through direct subsidies may have limited effectiveness. This limitation arises because the optimal profit among various strategies is influenced by factors such as the price sensitivity coefficient of battery swapping service and the battery swapping operating cost sharing ratio. (3) To advance the demand for battery-swapping vehicles, enhance consumer surplus, and maximize social welfare, the government may prioritize subsidizing vehicle companies. However, when aiming to boost the demand for battery swapping service, the government should consider the level of price sensitivity coefficient of battery swapping service. Specifically, when the price sensitivity coefficient of battery swapping service is low, continuing to subsidize vehicle companies may be advisable. Conversely, when the price sensitivity coefficient is high, it may be more effective to provide subsidies to consumers or battery manufacturers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1816-1834"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Exclusivity Under Different Vertical Structures in Online Platforms With Network Effects","authors":"Haijun Chen,&nbsp;Qi Xu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4472","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Securing exclusive premium content can enhance a platform's competitive edge, becoming a key factor in the success of online platform competition. This study examines exclusivity strategies under vertical separation and vertical integration, assessing their impacts on the endogenous quality and pricing decisions of competing platforms, as well as on consumer and overall welfare. Our findings reveal that the platform with exclusive premium content generally increase their quality and pricing, whereas the competitor tends to lower theirs. However, network effects moderate these price increases in vertical integration. Network effects play a crucial role, making premium content provider weighs the benefits of exclusivity against the potential for broader consumer engagement through nonexclusivity. Although exclusivity always reduces consumer surplus under vertical separation, it potentially aligns with consumer surplus in vertical integration. Additionally, our analysis of asymmetric market conditions reveals that premium content provider often forms exclusive agreement with the dominant platform, exacerbating quality and price disparities. Given these dynamics, we suggest that policymakers should rigorously evaluate the impacts of exclusivity on consumer surplus, offering crucial insights for antitrust authorities on the regulatory challenges in online platform markets.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1792-1815"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Evolutionary Game Analysis of Complex Networks in Enterprise Green Technology Innovation From a Prospect Theory Perspective","authors":"Wu Guancen,&nbsp;Chen Xuan,&nbsp;Niu Xing","doi":"10.1002/mde.4468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4468","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Green technological innovation in enterprises is a key driving force for achieving sustainable development and industrial transformation. However, how enterprises formulate effective innovation strategies by integrating subjective factors with objective market conditions within complex industrial networks remains an area requiring further exploration. This study aims to construct a complex network evolution model based on prospect theory and examines how subjective factors, such as reference points, risk preferences, and loss aversion, influence the adoption of green technology innovation in different network environments. It further explores how network characteristics, including topology, size, and node degree, affect the diffusion of innovation. Numerical analysis results indicate that in scale-free networks, lowering reference points for enterprise gains, reducing loss aversion, increasing risk preference, expanding network size, and raising average node degree generally promote higher adoption of green technology innovation. In small-world networks, the dependence on reference points is relatively lower, risk preference and average node degree demonstrate more complex impacts. Additionally, a moderate rewiring probability can enhance green technology innovation adoption in small-world networks. These findings provide new insights and practical implications for understanding the driving mechanisms of green technological innovation in enterprises. They further emphasize the importance of government interventions tailored to the specific characteristics of industrial networks to effectively facilitate the diffusion of green technological innovation.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1774-1791"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Omnichannel Reconfiguration Capabilities in Franchising: A Meso-Foundations Analysis","authors":"Nabil Ghantous,&nbsp;Damien Chaney,&nbsp;Fabienne Chameroy,&nbsp;Sophie Jeanpert,&nbsp;Maryline Schultz","doi":"10.1002/mde.4474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4474","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>With the rise of digitalization, retailing and services organizations are increasingly shifting towards omnichannel strategies, seeking to offer seamless service experiences across multiple channels. While extant research highlights that organizations adopting omnichannel strategies must undergo deep transformation, there is a dearth of research on omnichannel reconfiguration in franchising. However, omnichannel reconfiguration could be more complex in decentralized networks such as franchised ones, marked by franchisee autonomy and a subtle balance that ensures collaborative entrepreneurship while avoiding intra-brand competition. This research addresses this gap by adopting a dynamic capabilities perspective and investigating the meso-foundations of omnichannel reconfiguration. Seven case studies with French franchise networks reveal three classes of meso-level reconfiguration capabilities, related to learning, change management, and governance capabilities. The case studies also uncover how the foundations and role of the three classes of capabilities vary in terms of how franchise networks sense omnichannel opportunities, seize them, and transform to leverage them.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2431-2447"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Privatization Versus Managerial Delegation: Revisiting Delegation in a Mixed Duopoly","authors":"Kojun Hamada,&nbsp;Hideya Kato","doi":"10.1002/mde.4488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4488","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study revisits the issue of managerial delegation in a mixed oligopoly by focusing on whether a private firm's managerial delegation can increase firm profit and social welfare. Unlike the previous research that has focused on the effect of privatization on social welfare, we examine the impact of managerial delegation by a private firm on profit and social welfare. Using a model in which the degrees of partial privatization and managerial delegation are endogenously determined in a mixed duopoly, we derive the equilibrium degrees and demonstrate the following results. First, partial privatization is always chosen instead of full privatization or nationalization and the equilibrium degree of privatization is not monotonic with the cost-efficiency parameter. Second, profit-maximizing behavior is never chosen as a managerial delegation strategy. When marginal cost does not rise sharply with production, the private firm's owner incentivizes its manager toward a higher production cost so that the manager chooses the firm's output level more aggressively. Third, managerial delegation necessarily increases social welfare, whereas whether it increases the private firm's profit depends on the cost-efficiency parameter. When marginal cost does not rise sharply with production, a managerial delegation strategically implemented by a private firm not only increases private benefits but also contributes to enhancing public interest.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1763-1773"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can Firms Favor Location Regulation?","authors":"Dang-Long Bui","doi":"10.1002/mde.4461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4461","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Government regulations are believed to confine targeted firms' economic power, leading to a decline (rise) in producer (consumer) surplus. This paper explores the implications of location regulation in a spatially discriminatory pricing model with homogeneous products and linear transportation costs. Contrary to conventional wisdom, location regulation benefits (harms) producers but harms (benefits) consumers when firms engage in quantity (price) competition. Next, under location regulation, Bertrand firms are less (more) dispersed than Cournot firms if the transport rate is high (low). I also extend the analysis by comparing location and price regulations, as well as considering product differentiation and quadratic transportation costs.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1749-1762"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pricing Strategy of Power Supply Chain Considering Intermittent Generation","authors":"Junhai Ma,&nbsp;Weihua Liang,&nbsp;Wenjing Qi","doi":"10.1002/mde.4446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4446","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The impact of weather conditions on renewable energy stability is profound, which amplifies the fragility and security risks of energy systems. The energy storage technology has effectively alleviated the problem of intermittent new energy generation, yet the safety of these systems is pivotal for further adoption of renewable energy. This article establishes Stackelberg and long-term games for power supplier and energy storage operator dealing with intermittent energy sources. We analyze how the investment in energy storage safety and power supplier scale expansion affect the decisions and profits of both parties in the game. We also visualize the complex phenomena that occur during the long-term dynamic game process. Results indicate that improved safety performance correlates with increased prices and profits for both energy storage operators and power suppliers. Additionally, enhanced safety accompany the profit margin reduction between these parties. When the probability of high production capacity of renewable energy increases, the electricity price of energy storage operator and power supplier shows a downward trend. In long-term dynamic games, the stability of electricity price for energy storage operators is higher than that of electricity suppliers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1735-1748"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}