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Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献

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The impact of ESG on the cost efficiency of commercial banks—Evidence from Western European commercial banks 环境、社会和公司治理对商业银行成本效益的影响--来自西欧商业银行的证据
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-13 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4360
Lien-Wen Liang, Tsui-Jung Lin, Meng-Yun Chung
{"title":"The impact of ESG on the cost efficiency of commercial banks—Evidence from Western European commercial banks","authors":"Lien-Wen Liang,&nbsp;Tsui-Jung Lin,&nbsp;Meng-Yun Chung","doi":"10.1002/mde.4360","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4360","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines the impact of Environmental (E), Social (S), and Governance (G) activities on the cost efficiency of commercial banks in Western Europe in 2010–2020. The stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method was employed to investigate the impact of E, S, G, and bank characteristic variables on cost efficiency. The findings reveal that commercial banks can improve their cost efficiency by conducting E, S, and G activities. Banks that implemented these practices tended to have relatively better cost efficiency than those that did not. <i>Overall, the results of this study are consistent with the stakeholder hypothesis and present the first evidence of the</i> interplay between cost efficiency and ESG activities in the banking industry in Western Europe.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5811-5824"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous coalition formation and free trade agreements 内生联盟的形成与自由贸易协定
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-13 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4346
Vi Cao, Haifeng Fu, X. Henry Wang
{"title":"Endogenous coalition formation and free trade agreements","authors":"Vi Cao,&nbsp;Haifeng Fu,&nbsp;X. Henry Wang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4346","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4346","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies the endogenous formation of free trade agreements. There are four countries belonging to two types according to market demand and production technology. A unique strong Nash equilibrium exists for the coalition formation game. In equilibrium, two coalition structures may emerge: global free trade, wherein a single coalition encompassing all countries is established, or polarization, characterized by the formation of two symmetric agreements between the same type countries. The specific coalition structure that emerges in equilibrium depends on both the disparity in demand and the gap in unit cost of production between the two types of countries.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5781-5810"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Managerial decisions and team performance: Evidence from professional elite soccer 管理决策与球队表现：职业精英足球的证据
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4354
David Boto-García, Alessandro Bucciol, Luca Zarri
{"title":"Managerial decisions and team performance: Evidence from professional elite soccer","authors":"David Boto-García,&nbsp;Alessandro Bucciol,&nbsp;Luca Zarri","doi":"10.1002/mde.4354","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4354","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How do managerial decisions influence team performance? Using tournament data from four sources on 76 managers coaching 34 teams in 1580 matches covering 10 seasons of the Italian male soccer premier league, we provide field evidence on the impact of managerial perseverance in playing style and risk aversion on team performance. We document that managers' perseverance is positively related to team outcomes. Our core findings are robust to a battery of checks. By shedding light on key features of decision-making in a high-powered incentives industry with frequent feedback, our results help qualify the “managers matter” view advanced in prior research.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5767-5780"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4354","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142224849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Temporal distance in dual sourcing: A behavioural investigation 双重采购中的时间距离：行为调查
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4353
Alain Balaguer-Mercado, Samuel N. Kirshner, Chung-Li Tseng
{"title":"Temporal distance in dual sourcing: A behavioural investigation","authors":"Alain Balaguer-Mercado,&nbsp;Samuel N. Kirshner,&nbsp;Chung-Li Tseng","doi":"10.1002/mde.4353","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4353","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explored the influence of temporal distances on order allocation between a low-cost, less reliable supplier and a reliable, high-cost supplier. We posited that a far temporal distance increases the preference for the unreliable, low-cost supplier. We conducted a vignette-based experiment where participants placed orders between the suppliers with different reliability and cost levels. Our experiment showed that a longer lead time led to larger orders for the low-cost unreliable supplier. Our insights help explain how temporal distances inherent in supply chains can elicit differing evaluations of suppliers, altering ordering decisions.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5757-5766"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4353","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142224848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic demand information sharing in an e-commerce supply chain: The effect of the supplier's pricing timing 电子商务供应链中的战略需求信息共享：供应商定价时机的影响
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-10 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4350
Jingru Wang, Jiawu Peng, Kuanyun Zhu, Wenyan Zhuo
{"title":"Strategic demand information sharing in an e-commerce supply chain: The effect of the supplier's pricing timing","authors":"Jingru Wang,&nbsp;Jiawu Peng,&nbsp;Kuanyun Zhu,&nbsp;Wenyan Zhuo","doi":"10.1002/mde.4350","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4350","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper studies strategic demand information sharing on online retail platforms and explores how it is influenced by the wholesale pricing timing. The supplier sells the product under a wholesale price contract indirectly and by paying a proportional commission fee directly. We investigate both ex ante and ex post information sharing arrangements. Under each arrangement, the supplier needs to determine the sequence of the wholesale price setting and the information sharing stage. We find that (1) under ex ante information sharing, if the supplier sets the wholesale price before, the online platform always shares private information; otherwise, it prefers to share only when the commission fee is large. Interestingly, the online platform's information sharing incentive is independent of signal accuracy and market variability. (2) Under ex post information sharing, the online platform may manipulate the signal shared with the supplier. We characterize the conditions and influencing factors of truthful information sharing. (3) If the conditions for information sharing can be achieved, the supplier prefers to set the wholesale price later. Otherwise, the supplier sets the wholesale price before inducing the online platform to share information.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5740-5756"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141920116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does digital transformation increase corporate violations? 数字化转型是否会增加企业违规行为？
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-09 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4333
Wanwan Wang, Guoyiming Zhu, Shenwei Mo
{"title":"Does digital transformation increase corporate violations?","authors":"Wanwan Wang,&nbsp;Guoyiming Zhu,&nbsp;Shenwei Mo","doi":"10.1002/mde.4333","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4333","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines whether digital transformation influences corporate violations in China. Using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020, this paper finds that digital transformation increases the incidence of corporate violations. The results remain robust through endogeneity checks, the use of alternative measurements for digital transformation and corporate violations, and subsample analyses. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that the impact of digital transformation on corporate violations is more salient in non-state-owned enterprises, firms with lower institutional investors shareholding ratios, and firms with higher agency costs. Mechanism analyses indicate that digital transformation leads to corporate violations by increasing operational complexity and affecting information quality. Additional tests reveal that effective corporate governance helps reduce the occurrence of corporate violations resulting from digital transformation. This research deepens our understanding of the economic implications of corporate digital transformation and provides valuable insights for businesses undergoing this process.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5714-5739"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141921639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information disclosure strategies of live-streaming supply chains in the digi-economy era 数字经济时代直播供应链的信息披露策略
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-08 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4339
Xiaoyong Ma, Shuai Liu
{"title":"Information disclosure strategies of live-streaming supply chains in the digi-economy era","authors":"Xiaoyong Ma,&nbsp;Shuai Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4339","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4339","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Live e-commerce is one of the important forms of digital transformation of supply chain, which has become increasingly popular in recent years as a powerful tool for internet advertising, interaction, and merchandising. We propose two pricing models to examine the strategies of information disclosure and pricing within the live-streaming supply chain. One model revolves around the agency framework, wherein the manufacturer determines the price while the streamer decides the level of information disclosure. The other model pertains to a self-implementing framework, wherein the manufacturer determines both the level of information disclosure and the price. To evaluate the robustness of our findings, we extend our models to encompass three significant scenarios: (i) the platform involvement model, where a live-streaming support platform becomes part of the supply chain; (ii) the fixed price model, which externalizes the manufacturer's pricing decision; and (iii) the dual-channel operations model. Our analysis reveals that the cost associated with information disclosure impacts the streamer's profits in a nonlinear manner within the agency model. Interestingly, expanding the revenue-sharing parameter does not invariably favor the manufacturer. Moreover, we observe that none of the live-streaming sales models exhibits a clear advantage over the others. Additionally, we demonstrate that the platform's involvement limits the manufacturer's ability to utilize the agency model for live-streaming sales. In situations with fixed pricing, the manufacturer is advised to disclose more production information during live-streaming sales.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5696-5713"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4339","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141928652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Crowdsourcing solutions for innovation: An evolutionary examination of participant behavior strategy 众包创新解决方案：对参与者行为策略的进化研究
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-07 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4359
Lingling Wang, Sen Li, Haidong Zheng, Enjun Xia
{"title":"Crowdsourcing solutions for innovation: An evolutionary examination of participant behavior strategy","authors":"Lingling Wang,&nbsp;Sen Li,&nbsp;Haidong Zheng,&nbsp;Enjun Xia","doi":"10.1002/mde.4359","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4359","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite numerous enterprises embracing crowdsourcing to access several innovative solutions, the prevalence of information asymmetry among different participants has led to an increase in the submission of low-quality solutions and payment disputes. To improve the efficiency of crowdsourcing solutions for innovation, this study aims to employ an evolutionary game model to capture the dynamic interaction and decision-making process of the requesters, platforms, and solvers. Initially, we dissect the relevant factors influencing the behavioral decisions of participants to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model. Subsequently, we analyze five potential evolutionarily stable strategies and conditions. Ultimately, we simulate the dynamic evolution of participant decision-making behavior and the sensitivity of related parameters. The simulation results depict that the initial selection probabilities of populations bear no correlation to the system stability, which only influences the time required to reach equilibrium. The participant's behaviors are affected by price, loss, penalty, compensation, cost, and reputation recognition. Reward and punishment mechanisms help effectively mitigate the emergence of free-riding and collusion. These findings provide important implications for the sustainable development of crowdsourcing solutions for innovation.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5679-5695"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141932941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The calculating entrepreneur — The role of economic calculation in supporting alertness and creative destruction 精打细算的企业家--经济计算在支持警觉性和创造性破坏中的作用
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-07 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4341
Eduard Braun, Florian Follert
{"title":"The calculating entrepreneur — The role of economic calculation in supporting alertness and creative destruction","authors":"Eduard Braun,&nbsp;Florian Follert","doi":"10.1002/mde.4341","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4341","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We integrate the issue of economic calculation into the theory of the entrepreneur. In doing so, we fill a gap in the literature by demonstrating that retrospective economic calculation, i.e., financial accounting, dovetails with Kirzner's theory of the alert entrepreneur and that prospective calculation, i.e., the appraisal of investment objects, supports innovational activities by entrepreneurs and therefore facilitates creative destruction as emphasized by Schumpeter. Our integrative conceptualization of the calculating entrepreneur can lead to a better understanding of the role of economic calculation in the economy, thereby bringing theoretical economics and business administration closer together.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5668-5678"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4341","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141932940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Board attributes and tax avoidance: The moderating role of institutional ownership 董事会属性与避税：机构所有权的调节作用
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-05 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4338
Rizwan Ali, Mansoor Ahmed, Ali Amin, Ramiz ur Rehman
{"title":"Board attributes and tax avoidance: The moderating role of institutional ownership","authors":"Rizwan Ali,&nbsp;Mansoor Ahmed,&nbsp;Ali Amin,&nbsp;Ramiz ur Rehman","doi":"10.1002/mde.4338","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4338","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study investigates the influence of corporate board attributes, such as board size, board independence, board meeting frequency, female representation on board, and audit committee size, on tax avoidance. Moreover, the study also explores the moderating role of institutional ownership on these relationships. We use sample of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period 2013–2020. Using the framework of agency theory, we report that board size, board independence, board meetings, gender diversity, and audit committees are associated with lower tax avoidance, and the presence of institutional ownership further strengthens these relationship. To test the hypotheses, ordinary least squares regression analysis is applied and robustness is ensured through by employing Generalized method of moments estimation. Overall, our study offers novel insights into the positive implication of board attributes on tax avoidance, particularly within the framework of institutional ownership settings.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 8","pages":"5649-5667"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141932942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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