Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献

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Tail Dependence of Liquidity and Volatility in Carbon Futures Market: Evidence From EU ETS 碳期货市场流动性和波动性的尾部依赖性:来自EU ETS的证据
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-28 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4545
Xiaohan Cai, Bo Yan
{"title":"Tail Dependence of Liquidity and Volatility in Carbon Futures Market: Evidence From EU ETS","authors":"Xiaohan Cai,&nbsp;Bo Yan","doi":"10.1002/mde.4545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4545","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study constructs liquidity and volatility indicators based on the four phases of EU ETS and analyses tail dependence using Copula models. The results indicate strong tail dependence between liquidity and volatility in the fourth phase. The Amihud illiquidity ratio combined with the stochastic volatility model identifies high volatility risks during liquidity scarcity, while the Gibbs measure combined with the stochastic volatility model identifies low volatility risks. The robustness of the results is tested by classifying different periods based on structural breaks and assessing tail dependence, and by applying machine learning algorithms to remove outliers before measuring tail dependence.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 6","pages":"3538-3570"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144768010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
User-Generated Content, Social Media Bias, and Slant Regulation 用户生成内容、社交媒体偏见和倾斜监管
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-27 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4546
Jun Hu
{"title":"User-Generated Content, Social Media Bias, and Slant Regulation","authors":"Jun Hu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4546","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4546","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines the impact of regulatory policies on mitigating media bias in a duopolistic media market where traditional and online formats coexist. The findings demonstrate that introducing a welfare-maximizing unbiased media outlet reduces media bias and lowers subscription fees, as long as the data source is accurate, whereas a profit-maximizing unbiased media outlet fails to achieve the same outcome. These insights contribute to ongoing policy discussions on fact-checking, fact-reporting, and policies regulating social media.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 6","pages":"3527-3537"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144768086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is Optimal Interlocking Cross-Ownership for the Network Industry? 网络行业的最优连锁交叉所有制吗?
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-24 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4540
Domenico Buccella, Luciano Fanti, Luca Gori
{"title":"Is Optimal Interlocking Cross-Ownership for the Network Industry?","authors":"Domenico Buccella,&nbsp;Luciano Fanti,&nbsp;Luca Gori","doi":"10.1002/mde.4540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4540","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Common wisdom suggests that noncontrolling, interlocking crossholdings is always profitable in a Cournot duopoly model. Therefore, the maximal profit is obtained by a reciprocal share of ownership of about 50%, which allows for the monopoly profit. By contrast, we analyze a network industry and show that crossholdings can be unprofitable under network effects and variable degree of product compatibility between firms. In particular, an optimal percentage value of crossholdings significantly less than 50%—or even 0%—always exist. Thus, we provide a new reason for unprofitable crossholdings. This result offers a policy warning to anti-trust agencies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 6","pages":"3520-3526"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144767922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Advance Selling Without Disclosing the Regular Price? The Role of Anticipated Regret 提前销售而不披露常规价格?预期后悔的作用
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-23 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4537
Guohao Li, Qihuan Chu
{"title":"Advance Selling Without Disclosing the Regular Price? The Role of Anticipated Regret","authors":"Guohao Li,&nbsp;Qihuan Chu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4537","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>When a seller introduces an innovative product, some consumers may anticipate regret and factor it into their decision-making due to uncertain valuation. Motivated by current realities, we analyze the profitability of advance deposit selling strategies, both with and without disclosing the regular price. Using an analytical model incorporating consumers' anticipated regret, this study investigates (i) the optimal selling strategy and profits under consumer regret and (ii) whether a profit-maximizing seller should disclose the regular price in advance. The principal results are the following: (i) For the pre-disclosure strategy, sellers may miss opportunities for higher profits by ignoring consumers' inaction regret. Pre-sales-only strategies are optimal when action regret surpasses a certain threshold; the optimal deposit and the pre-sale price decrease (increase) in tandem with action (inaction) regret. (ii) When sellers do not disclose a regular price in advance, contrary to the pre-disclosure strategy, we find that they should pay more attention to action regret behavior, which can cause them to suffer more profit loss. An effective and interesting way to mitigate the adverse impact of action regret on financial gains is to provide a reservation guarantee: reduce both the deposit and the uncertainty of the regular price. Our paper calls for careful assessments of anticipated regrets. In particular, the seller should give weight to the (action) inaction regret behavior when implementing the (non-) pre-disclosure strategy, respectively.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 6","pages":"3504-3519"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144767942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Value Effect of Public Data Access—A Perspective Based on Manufacturing Firms' Markup 公共数据访问的价值效应——基于制造业企业加价的视角
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-22 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4542
Shuangyan Li, Dan Wang, Jun Wen
{"title":"Value Effect of Public Data Access—A Perspective Based on Manufacturing Firms' Markup","authors":"Shuangyan Li,&nbsp;Dan Wang,&nbsp;Jun Wen","doi":"10.1002/mde.4542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4542","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The government's sharing of data resources is an essential initiative to release the economic value of data factors. However, it is a question to empirically test whether the public can effectively utilize public data to create economic benefits. Based on this, we explore the value-creation effect of public data access at the micro level from the perspective of manufacturing firms' markup. Using a sample of Chinese A-share manufacturing firms from 2009 to 2023, we view launching a city-level public data platform as a quasi-natural experiment and employ the double difference model. We find that public data access significantly improves the markup of manufacturing firms, contributing to value creation at the firm level. The finding remains consistent after robustness tests such as the parallel trend, placebo, and PSM-DID tests. Mechanistic analysis suggests that public data access facilitates manufacturing firms' markup by encouraging firm innovation and alleviating financing constraints. Further, moderating effect tests suggest that excellent data processing capabilities, high-level internal governance, and a transparent urban information environment reinforce the value-creating effects of public data access.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 6","pages":"3486-3503"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144768111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Impact of Tech-Enabled Financial Disruptions and Internet Plus Initiative on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Performance in China: Evidence From a PVAR Approach 科技驱动的金融中断和互联网+倡议对中国环境、社会和治理(ESG)绩效的影响:来自PVAR方法的证据
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4527
Edward Idemudia Agboare, Luo Guang, Atta Ullah, Huma Iftikhar
{"title":"Impact of Tech-Enabled Financial Disruptions and Internet Plus Initiative on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Performance in China: Evidence From a PVAR Approach","authors":"Edward Idemudia Agboare,&nbsp;Luo Guang,&nbsp;Atta Ullah,&nbsp;Huma Iftikhar","doi":"10.1002/mde.4527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4527","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Technological advancements have become an integral part of traditional industries but have also raised the question of how these modern technologies would impact sustainable practices, ethical innovation, and transparency. This study examines the impact of tech-enabled financial disruptions on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance using a panel vector autoregression (PVAR) approach to analyze 122 A-listed Chinese financial institutions (5856 quarterly observations) from 2012 to 2023. We examined the dynamic interactions across tech-enabled financial disruptions, Internet Plus, and ESG metrics, providing insights into immediate and delayed effects. The findings reveal that tech-enabled financial disruptions boost ESG performance. However, Internet Plus implementation and its interaction with tech-enabled financial disruptions initially pose challenges but ultimately promote ESG performance as institutions adapt. These results underscore the importance of phased policy rollouts and strategic adaptation to maximize ESG advantages through tech-enabled financial disruptions. Recognizing the critical role of tech-enabled financial disruptions in enhancing ESG performance, this study suggests tailored frameworks that are capable of aligning tech-enabled financial disruptions with broader sustainable development goals for 2030. It also encourages financial institutions to integrate ESG strategies with digitalization from its onset.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 6","pages":"3467-3485"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144767996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Who Will Pay for the “Mine Toxic Land”?—A Dynamic Game and Simulation Study of Negative Externality Governance in Rare Earth Mines Based on Prospect Theory 谁来为“地雷有毒土地”买单?——基于前景理论的稀土矿山负外部性治理动态博弈与仿真研究
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-16 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4543
Xiang Guo, Ligang Xu, Rongfu Liu, Zhengfang Zhong
{"title":"Who Will Pay for the “Mine Toxic Land”?—A Dynamic Game and Simulation Study of Negative Externality Governance in Rare Earth Mines Based on Prospect Theory","authors":"Xiang Guo,&nbsp;Ligang Xu,&nbsp;Rongfu Liu,&nbsp;Zhengfang Zhong","doi":"10.1002/mde.4543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4543","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The contradiction between economic development and the negative externalities generated by the extraction of ionic rare earth elements, such as resource depletion and environmental pollution, is becoming increasingly prominent. Based on prospect theory, this paper utilizes the perceived value of game players to construct a perceived benefit matrix that differs from the traditional benefit matrix and a tripartite game model. On the basis of the game analysis of the evolution of static reward and punishment mechanisms, three dynamic mechanisms, namely, dynamic reward, dynamic punishment, and dynamic reward and punishment, are successively introduced for analysis. The study demonstrated that under the static reward and punishment mechanism, the three-party evolutionary game is not asymptotically stable. After the introduction of the dynamic mechanism, the evolutionary game becomes asymptotically stable, and all players in the tripartite game show a positive willingness to govern. Furthermore, varying value sensitivity coefficients result in a relatively stable perceived value of governance behaviors in rare earth mine development enterprises. With different value sensitivity coefficients, the perceived value of governance behaviors by rare earth product development enterprises remains relatively stable, while the perceived value of governance behaviors by the government and rare earth product application enterprises is more variable.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 6","pages":"3448-3466"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144767836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Contracting Institutions and R&D Collaboration Between Nonrivals in Competitive Industry Equilibrium 竞争产业均衡中的契约制度与非竞争企业的研发合作
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-13 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4536
Travis Ng
{"title":"Contracting Institutions and R&D Collaboration Between Nonrivals in Competitive Industry Equilibrium","authors":"Travis Ng","doi":"10.1002/mde.4536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4536","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a duopoly model, one firm has the option to collaborate in R&amp;D with a third party. Although collaboration can expedite innovation, the third party may unintentionally leak the innovation to the rival firm. Engaging in R&amp;D collaboration can make the rival firm anticipate a free ride, which weakens its incentives for R&amp;D spending. The firm can take legal action against the third party in case of information leakage. Strengthening contracting institutions improves the likelihood of success in such cases. In a competitive industry equilibrium, strengthening contracting institutions only sometimes increases R&amp;D collaboration, industry R&amp;D spending, and the innovation rate.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 6","pages":"3414-3427"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4536","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144767395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Narrative Disclosure Tone and Bank Risk: The Role of Economic Policy Uncertainty 叙事披露基调与银行风险:经济政策不确定性的作用
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-13 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4539
Acheampong Albert, Ngozi Ibeji, Freeman Owusu, Thuy Nguyen
{"title":"Narrative Disclosure Tone and Bank Risk: The Role of Economic Policy Uncertainty","authors":"Acheampong Albert,&nbsp;Ngozi Ibeji,&nbsp;Freeman Owusu,&nbsp;Thuy Nguyen","doi":"10.1002/mde.4539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4539","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines the impact of narrative disclosure tone (NDT) on bank riskiness, particularly in the context of heightened economic policy uncertainty (EPU). Utilizing data from 114 banks across 2052 bank-year observations between 2005 and 2022, our findings reveal a significant positive relationship between NDT and various measures of bank risk, including credit, liquidity, operational, and market risks. The results demonstrate that a negative tone in narrative disclosures heightens perceived and actual risk, with this effect being further amplified during periods of high EPU. Our study highlights the strategic importance of narrative disclosures in managing stakeholder perceptions and highlights the need for banks to carefully consider their communication strategies in volatile economic environments. These findings offer practical insights for banking institutions, regulators, and investors in understanding the complex dynamics between narrative tone, economic uncertainty, and financial risk.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 6","pages":"3428-3447"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4539","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144767580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Green Bonds: Greenwashing or Genuinely Green? A Study Based on Stock Mispricing 绿色债券:洗白还是真正的绿色?基于股票错误定价的研究
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-07 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4534
Pengfei Ge, Chuxiong Tang, Yuhui Chen, Yichao Liu, Rui Zhu
{"title":"Green Bonds: Greenwashing or Genuinely Green? A Study Based on Stock Mispricing","authors":"Pengfei Ge,&nbsp;Chuxiong Tang,&nbsp;Yuhui Chen,&nbsp;Yichao Liu,&nbsp;Rui Zhu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4534","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The proposal of carbon neutrality has led to a significant growth in green bonds (GBs), sparking in turn widespread attention on whether these bonds are issued for genuinely green objectives or for greenwashing intentions. The extant research has not fully explored the greenwashing issue concerning GBs, particularly due to the controversies in the methods for identifying such practices. Following the outbreak of COVID-19, the global markets have seen a slowdown in the issuance of GBs, whereas China has experienced a surge in its GB market, emerging as the world's foremost issuer of GBs. In light of this economic reality and to address the research gap, this study draws on Chinese GBs as research objects and examines for the first time the issue of greenwashing in GBs through the lens of stock mispricing (SM). The results reveal that the issuance of GBs by companies significantly exacerbates SM, indicating the presence of greenwashing in Chinese GBs. Notably, the greenwashing issue is more pronounced when firms that issue GBs have political connections with the government and experience low financial risks. These findings not only enrich studies on greenwashing in GBs but also offer valuable insights for investors and regulators.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 6","pages":"3396-3413"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144767493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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