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A four-party evolutionary game analysis of collaborative construction strategies for zero-carbon tourism cities 零碳旅游城市合作建设战略的四方进化博弈分析
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-13 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4305
Jing Wang, Weitao Liu, Zhaofeng Wang, Song Shi
{"title":"A four-party evolutionary game analysis of collaborative construction strategies for zero-carbon tourism cities","authors":"Jing Wang,&nbsp;Weitao Liu,&nbsp;Zhaofeng Wang,&nbsp;Song Shi","doi":"10.1002/mde.4305","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4305","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A four-party evolutionary game model for the collaborative construction strategies of zero-carbon tourism cities (ZCTCs) is established that considers the individual contributions of local governments, tourism enterprises, tourists and local residents to the overall carbon-neutralizing target. The evolutionary stability of the game players' strategies is then analyzed. The results show that there are three stable strategy combinations in the game system for ZCTC construction, which matches the construction modes of tourism cities at different levels of development. The initial value, costs, rewards, penalties, distribution coefficient, and reporting coefficient of the strategy selection affect the evolutionary paths of game players.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 7","pages":"5125-5145"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141614261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can enterprise digital transformation improve ESG performance? 企业数字化转型能否改善 ESG 业绩？
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-12 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4307
Ziming Liu, Zhao Chen, Ling Hu
{"title":"Can enterprise digital transformation improve ESG performance?","authors":"Ziming Liu,&nbsp;Zhao Chen,&nbsp;Ling Hu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4307","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4307","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Regarding China's A-share-listed companies as research samples, we construct an empirical model to test the impact of corporate digital transformation on ESG performance. We find that a corporate digital transformation improves its ESG performance. Moreover, the higher the quality of environmental information and the efficiency of external resource allocation, the greater the role of digital transformation on ESG performance. Finally, the ESG performance ameliorates the financing and green performance of enterprises. Our research shows a new perspective for study on the digital transformation and sustainable development of enterprises, meanwhile experience summary for improving China's ESG scoring system and governance.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 7","pages":"5088-5103"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141653324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sales promotion and supply chain finance for shopping days: Strategies of e-commerce platform and seller 购物日的销售促进和供应链融资：电子商务平台和卖家的策略
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-12 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4310
Yujie Zhang, Jianhu Cai, Xueshu Shan, Siqing Li, Yongyi Shou
{"title":"Sales promotion and supply chain finance for shopping days: Strategies of e-commerce platform and seller","authors":"Yujie Zhang,&nbsp;Jianhu Cai,&nbsp;Xueshu Shan,&nbsp;Siqing Li,&nbsp;Yongyi Shou","doi":"10.1002/mde.4310","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4310","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In shopping days, e-commerce platforms (ECPs) and their sellers cooperate to promote sales through price discount and marketing effort. Supply chain finance (SCF) has been offered by ECPs to fuel sellers' preparations for shopping days. An ECP-seller supply chain (PSSC) model is constructed to study the strategic interaction between the ECP and the seller. Given a price discount rate, we derive the ECP's optimal marketing effort level and feasible SCF service rule, as well as the seller's optimal supply quantity and financing decisions. Furthermore, we identify a price-discount-rate interval, in which the Pareto improvement of the PSSC can be achieved.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 7","pages":"5104-5124"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141614262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Decision-making for others: Ambiguity attitudes 为他人做决定：模糊态度
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-11 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4321
Antonio Carlos Mercer, Angela Cristiane Santos Póvoa, Wesley Pech
{"title":"Decision-making for others: Ambiguity attitudes","authors":"Antonio Carlos Mercer,&nbsp;Angela Cristiane Santos Póvoa,&nbsp;Wesley Pech","doi":"10.1002/mde.4321","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4321","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigated decision-making for others in ambiguous settings. In an online survey, subjects were asked to make decisions for themselves, and for other people. In Experiment 1, ambiguity was conveyed in numerical ranges. In Experiment 2, we used verbal probabilities expressions to convey uncertainty. Decisions encompass three degrees of ambiguity (low, moderate, and high). Consistent with previous literature findings, our results showed no significant differences between self-other decision-making on ambiguity. We build on the existing literature on ambiguity attitudes, emphasizing the use of verbal probability expressions to measure ambiguity, and provide novel evidence into decision-making for others.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 7","pages":"5077-5087"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141614264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Financing decisions of third-party remanufacturers with different co-opetition modes: The impact of blockchain adoption 不同合作竞争模式下第三方再制造商的融资决策：采用区块链的影响
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-10 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4311
Peng Ma, Junmei Li, Henry Xu, Mingjun Chen
{"title":"Financing decisions of third-party remanufacturers with different co-opetition modes: The impact of blockchain adoption","authors":"Peng Ma,&nbsp;Junmei Li,&nbsp;Henry Xu,&nbsp;Mingjun Chen","doi":"10.1002/mde.4311","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4311","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The third-party remanufacturer (TPR) can cooperate with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and remanufactured products are sold by the OEM (i.e., the cooperation mode). The TPR can also sell remanufactured products individually to compete with the OEM's new products (i.e., the competition mode). Considering the issue of false information in remanufacturing supply chains and the TPR's limited capital, we build game models with blockchain to explore the TPR's optimal financing strategies under different co-opetition mode selections. We find that a high blockchain usage prompts the TPR to finance from the OEM in the competition mode, while a low blockchain usage motivates the TPR to choose the cooperation mode and opt for a bank credit. Besides, we also find that the difference between the TPR's optimal profits of cooperation and competition modes increases with the interest rate.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 7","pages":"5054-5076"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141614263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Impact of policy interventions on low-carbon technology innovation diffusion in supply networks 政策干预对供应网络中低碳技术创新传播的影响
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-07 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4312
Zehao Wang, Yu Feng, Nana Yao, Ouwen Lin, Qiyuan Li, Bowen Liu
{"title":"Impact of policy interventions on low-carbon technology innovation diffusion in supply networks","authors":"Zehao Wang,&nbsp;Yu Feng,&nbsp;Nana Yao,&nbsp;Ouwen Lin,&nbsp;Qiyuan Li,&nbsp;Bowen Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4312","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4312","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The promotion of sustainability and innovation in the current dynamic landscape of global industry in the context of climate change has become imperative. This research paper explores the critical role of policy interventions in facilitating the diffusion of low-carbon technologies through intricate supply networks. As countries endeavor to meet environmental goals and transition to a more sustainable economy, it becomes critical to understand how policies can effectively shape the diffusion of these technologies through the supply chain. This study employs game theory and evolutionary game theory to investigate the intricate interactions within supply networks, with a particular focus on the nuanced effects of policy on the diffusion of low-carbon technology innovations. The findings suggest that dynamically adjusted policies have the potential to significantly increase the uptake of low-carbon technologies. In particular, an effective subsidy scheme not only promotes the diffusion of innovations, but also demonstrates the ability of government subsidies to be distributed efficiently. In addition, the implementation of dynamic carbon trading schemes is considered to be an important mechanism for promoting firms' decarbonization and stabilizing strategic decision-making processes within firms. This study highlights the significance of tailored dynamic policy frameworks in promoting the adoption of sustainable technologies in supply chains, thus making a significant contribution to the broader goal of achieving a sustainable future.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 7","pages":"5040-5053"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141574332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Channel selection strategy with consumer impulse purchase in livestream selling 直播销售中消费者冲动购买的渠道选择策略
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4299
Lidong Chen, Qingyun Xu, Yi He
{"title":"Channel selection strategy with consumer impulse purchase in livestream selling","authors":"Lidong Chen,&nbsp;Qingyun Xu,&nbsp;Yi He","doi":"10.1002/mde.4299","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4299","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Consumer impulsive purchasing is very common, especially in the livestream selling where they are influenced by policies such as low prices, limited time, and limited quantity. This behavior can increase a firm's sales, but it also leads to higher return rates. Considering consumer impulse purchase, this paper conducts an analytical model to investigate the conditions for a firm to introduce a livestream channel and whether the firm should adopt a low or moderate livestream price strategy when introducing a livestream channel. Our results show that, when return processing cost is small enough, the firm benefits from the livestream strategies as long as the streamer's fan effect is larger than a threshold. Specifically, a firm prefers to adopt the low livestream price strategy when cooperating with a large fan effect streamer and a moderate livestream price strategy with a small fan effect streamer. However, when return processing cost is large, the low livestream price strategy cannot be the dominant strategy. Furthermore, we make several extensions (i.e., different impulse utility on different livestream price, impact of positive impulse utility of low impulsive consumers, different online return rates of different types of consumers, the costs of introducing the livestream channel, and consumer return processing cost) to verify the robustness of the model, and the main conclusions remain unchanged. These results provide guidance for firms on the introduction of livestream channel and pricing decisions of different channels.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 7","pages":"5006-5019"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141549307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Field-based validation of penalty shooting recommendations: An experiment with elite youth football players 点球射门建议的实地验证：青少年精英足球运动员实验
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4283
Cornel Nesseler, Thadeu Gasparetto, Petr Parshakov
{"title":"Field-based validation of penalty shooting recommendations: An experiment with elite youth football players","authors":"Cornel Nesseler,&nbsp;Thadeu Gasparetto,&nbsp;Petr Parshakov","doi":"10.1002/mde.4283","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4283","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Research has suggested many ways in which professional football players can increase their penalty shooting success rate. We set up a field experiment testing these recommendations. We perform the experiment with one of the most successful youth academies in the world. All players are highly skilled, including prospective and current Brazilian youth national players. The players either decide themselves where to shoot or the coach tells them where to shoot. The coach does not reveal if the decision is based on a random allocation or his own choice. The algorithm randomly selects where players must shoot. The results from the experiment show that the best outcome is when players choose where they want to shoot. Coaches and random algorithm have a lower success rate, although following research-based recommendations. The findings are important as they show that researchers should test their recommendations in the field as they do not necessarily translate into real-life settings.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 7","pages":"4974-4982"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4283","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141549134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An exploration of omni-channel retail from a three-party evolutionary game perspective: Brand strength vs. platform stream 从三方进化博弈的角度探讨全渠道零售：品牌实力与平台流
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4304
Chuan Zhao, Ziyang Guo, Mingke He, Kun Wang
{"title":"An exploration of omni-channel retail from a three-party evolutionary game perspective: Brand strength vs. platform stream","authors":"Chuan Zhao,&nbsp;Ziyang Guo,&nbsp;Mingke He,&nbsp;Kun Wang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4304","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4304","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study builds a three-party evolutionary game to study the contributing factors of commission rate, productivity expansion, cooperation subsidy, brand strength, and platform stream. The proposed model investigates the diverse paths the three parties are motivated to pursue at different phases of omni-channel integration and further explores which party, the band owner with strong brand strength, or the platform with a mass consumer stream, dominates omni-channel negotiation regarding profit distribution arrangements.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 7","pages":"5020-5039"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141549308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Financing constraints of firms: Is there political favoritism in the economic resources given by the central government? 企业的融资限制：中央政府提供的经济资源是否存在政治偏袒？
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4296
Xiaoqian Liu, Javier Cifuentes-Faura, Ming Gao, Cunyi Yang
{"title":"Financing constraints of firms: Is there political favoritism in the economic resources given by the central government?","authors":"Xiaoqian Liu,&nbsp;Javier Cifuentes-Faura,&nbsp;Ming Gao,&nbsp;Cunyi Yang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4296","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4296","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Economic resources within the jurisdiction of local governments in China shape the external financing environment of enterprises. However, few studies have focused on China's unique political hierarchy, which results in differentiated access to economic resources for different levels of local governments and substantially affects local corporate financing constraints. This paper examines the impact of city political hierarchy on firm financing constraints among Chinese A-share listed firms from 2004 to 2019. We use the 200,000 population criterion for delineating the political hierarchy of cities in 1927 as the cutoff for fuzzy regression discontinuity design to identify causal effects. The results show that the greater a city's political rank is, the lower its financing constraints are. The mechanism suggests that the central government provides more financial and political resources to high-level cities, directly and indirectly influencing the financing constraints of firms. In addition, high-level cities' government preferences, bank loans, debt financing costs, and business credit are vital channels at the firm level. However, this effect varies depending on the ownership and size of the firm.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"45 7","pages":"4983-5005"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141680120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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