Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献

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Environmental Certification, Consumer Greenness, and Greenwashing
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4452
Theresa Wittreich
{"title":"Environmental Certification, Consumer Greenness, and Greenwashing","authors":"Theresa Wittreich","doi":"10.1002/mde.4452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4452","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper investigates the welfare effects of imperfect environmental certification and its efficacy as an environmental policy tool within a partially covered product market and price competition among firms. Using a game-theoretic model, I find that a truth-revealing certification mechanism – that emerges for a sufficiently precise certification mechanism or high certification fee – can enhance welfare while consistently outperforming a pooling mechanism. While greenwashing cannot benefit the economy in price competition, it may have different implications in quantity competition. The study highlights that a truth-revealing certification mechanism is crucial for effectively reducing environmental damage, offering valuable insights for policymakers.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2289-2313"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4452","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Governance Effect of Financial Reporting Inquiry Letters on Major Shareholder Expropriation: Evidence From Chinese Listed Companies
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4478
Shimin Sun, Jie Zhao, Meng Jiao, Yongheng Wang
{"title":"The Governance Effect of Financial Reporting Inquiry Letters on Major Shareholder Expropriation: Evidence From Chinese Listed Companies","authors":"Shimin Sun,&nbsp;Jie Zhao,&nbsp;Meng Jiao,&nbsp;Yongheng Wang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4478","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Utilizing Chinese A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2023 as samples, this article empirically tests the influence of financial reporting inquiry letters on major shareholder expropriation and its function mechanism and obtains the following four conclusions. First, financial reporting inquiry letters exert a temporary restraining effect on major shareholder expropriation, necessitating continuous issuance of letters by stock exchanges to reinforce this governance role. Second, the internal and external environment influences the governance effectiveness of financial reporting inquiry letters. The inhibitory effect of financial reporting inquiry letters on major shareholder expropriation is more pronounced for companies without relaxing short-selling controls, with higher marketization degrees, and with weaker exit threats from non-controlling large shareholders. Third, financial reporting inquiry letters can attract investor attention and increase litigation risk, thereby curbing major shareholder expropriation. Fourth, financial reporting inquiry letters have a deterrent effect on major shareholder expropriation in peer companies that have not gotten letters, but they cannot effectively impact companies in the same region that have not received letters. This article confirms the inhibitive influence of non-punitive supervision on major shareholder expropriation, providing empirical evidence regarding the governance of Type II agency issues in Chinese listed companies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2504-2523"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Impact of Technological Diversification on Innovation Performance: The Moderating Effects From an Agency Perspective 技术多元化对创新绩效的影响:基于代理视角的调节效应
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-31 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4495
Xinrui Zhan, Yunqing Liu, Xingxin Zhao
{"title":"The Impact of Technological Diversification on Innovation Performance: The Moderating Effects From an Agency Perspective","authors":"Xinrui Zhan,&nbsp;Yunqing Liu,&nbsp;Xingxin Zhao","doi":"10.1002/mde.4495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4495","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In the rapidly advancing digital era, technological diversification (TD) emerges as a pivotal strategy to enhance firms' innovation performance. This study explores the nonlinear dynamics of TD and innovation performance, positing an inverted U-shaped relationship and examining the moderating effects of governance mechanisms—management shareholding, board size, board meeting frequency, and analyst coverage—from the perspectives of incentive mechanism design, internal control, and external regulation. Using a comprehensive panel dataset of 11,036 firm-year observations from 1438 Chinese listed manufacturers (2012–2020), we employ Tobit regression to validate our hypotheses. Our findings confirm the inverted U-shaped relationship between TD and innovation performance, which is significantly moderated by governance mechanisms that mitigate agency costs. The results withstand a battery of robustness checks and address endogeneity concerns. By integrating agency theory into the analysis of TD, this study provides a novel perspective and actionable strategies for firms to optimize TD within sustainable boundaries, ultimately achieving long-term innovation growth.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 5","pages":"2726-2745"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144214200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Digital Transformation, Internationalisation and ESG Performance of Multinational Companies 跨国公司数字化转型、国际化与ESG绩效
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-29 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4496
Xin Xu, Meiya Sun
{"title":"Digital Transformation, Internationalisation and ESG Performance of Multinational Companies","authors":"Xin Xu,&nbsp;Meiya Sun","doi":"10.1002/mde.4496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4496","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines the impact and mechanism of digital transformation on the corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance of Chinese A-share listed multinational companies (MNCs) from 2011 to 2021. Corporate digital transformation can enhance ESG performance by reducing institutional distance, improving internal control quality and absorptive capacity. The level of internationalisation also has a positive impact on this relationship. The positive effect of digital transformation on the ESG performance of MNCs is more pronounced in non–high-tech industries and mature companies. This study offers theoretical support for improving MNCs' ESG performance and managing cross-border operational risks through digital transformation.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 5","pages":"2709-2725"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144214201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Compensating College Football Players for Their Name, Image, and Likeness Rights From Live College Football Broadcasts 补偿大学橄榄球运动员在大学橄榄球直播中的姓名、形象和肖像权
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-28 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4465
Stacey L. Brook
{"title":"Compensating College Football Players for Their Name, Image, and Likeness Rights From Live College Football Broadcasts","authors":"Stacey L. Brook","doi":"10.1002/mde.4465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4465","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Recently, the NCAA has allowed student athletes to be compensated by third parties for their name, image, and likeness rights (NIL) but not their NIL rights from televised broadcasts. Yet these rights have an economic value. A counterfactual model is employed to determine how university media rights revenues relate to television viewership, and then, the model is empirically estimated to determine the value of these NIL rights. The results show the median athletic department would pay about 5.4% of their football media rights revenue to the football participants, and the median football participant would be paid $4739 for their NIL rights.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2381-2387"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kill Two Birds With One Stone? China's Mixed Ownership Reform and Investment Efficiency 一石二鸟?中国混合所有制改革与投资效率
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-26 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4477
Liying Ren, Haomin Wu, Yangyang Liu
{"title":"Kill Two Birds With One Stone? China's Mixed Ownership Reform and Investment Efficiency","authors":"Liying Ren,&nbsp;Haomin Wu,&nbsp;Yangyang Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4477","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a major strategic step for the central government to implement the policy of strengthening and expanding SOEs and an important measure to support the development of the nonpublic economy. This has become the main direction of China's current reform and the focus of its governance. Mixed ownership reform is the key implementation path and main direction of SOE reform. Its fundamental purpose is to stimulate the vitality and competitiveness of these enterprises. Taking the sample of Chinese A-share-listed firms from 2004 to 2022, we aimed to explore the impact and mechanism of the mixed ownership reform of SOEs on the investment efficiency of SOEs and participating private enterprises (PEs). We found that the SOEs' mixed ownership reform provides a win–win situation for both SOEs and PEs. Specifically, the incorporation of non–state-owned capital owed by PEs prevents SOEs' overinvestment, which is denoted as the “direct effect.” Meanwhile, PEs' participation in the reform leads to a reduction in underinvestment, which is denoted as the “indirect effect.” Mechanism analysis indicated that for SOEs, the reform leads to a decreased level of government intervention and a reduced principal agency cost, showing the reform's “governance effect.” For PEs, participation in the reform leads to reduced financing constraints, demonstrating the reform's “resource effect.” This study not only enriches the relevant research on the consequences of mixed ownership reform at the microlevel but also provides valuable experience and reference for the economic reform of emerging markets and developing countries.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2474-2503"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143945014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information Acquisition Under Providers' Competition 供应商竞争下的信息获取
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-24 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4491
Youzi Zhai, Weili Xue, Jing Chen
{"title":"Information Acquisition Under Providers' Competition","authors":"Youzi Zhai,&nbsp;Weili Xue,&nbsp;Jing Chen","doi":"10.1002/mde.4491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4491","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper studies the strategic interactions between two competing information providers and two competing downstream firms. We find that when one provider sets a moderate price and the other a higher price, the firm with more private information tends to acquire additional information to extend its advantage. Conversely, the firm with less private information forgoes further acquisitions, weakening competition. Moreover, symmetric providers have incentives to set asymmetric prices due to heterogeneous firms' inclination to differentiate information sources. Although the competition between providers may increase the firms' information acquisition costs, it can simultaneously mitigate heightened competition between firms.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2662-2677"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bonus Scheme, Managerial Delegation, and Quantity Competition 奖金制度、管理授权与数量竞争
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-23 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4476
Chung-Hui Chou
{"title":"Bonus Scheme, Managerial Delegation, and Quantity Competition","authors":"Chung-Hui Chou","doi":"10.1002/mde.4476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4476","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This note examines if owners would offer a bonus for each unit of output dependent on both firms' output levels in equilibrium and the impacts on market performances. The main contribution is showing that owners may lessen quantity competition more than the standard Cournot by adopting the relative quantity delegation in which they offer an incentive scheme based on profit plus a bonus for each unit of output that decreases in their own output levels but increases in rivals' ones. Consequently, contrary to conventional wisdom, output delegation increases profitability but reduces consumers' surplus.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2468-2473"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143945024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to Improve the Efficiency of the New Energy Vehicle Industry: Multiple Paths From Configuration Perspective 如何提升新能源汽车产业效率:配置视角下的多重路径
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-22 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4490
Tian Zhang, Yaqin Fu, Jiang Hu
{"title":"How to Improve the Efficiency of the New Energy Vehicle Industry: Multiple Paths From Configuration Perspective","authors":"Tian Zhang,&nbsp;Yaqin Fu,&nbsp;Jiang Hu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4490","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines regional new energy vehicle (NEV) industry efficiency across 26 Chinese provinces, addressing the need for deeper insights into the spatiotemporal efficiency patterns and configurational pathways influencing NEV development. By employing data envelopment analysis (DEA) to measure efficiency, exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) to explore spatial clustering, and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to investigate configuration-based pathways, this research provides a nuanced understanding of how regional factors shape NEV efficiency. The analysis identifies four distinct configurational pathways: policy bolstering for technological innovation, organizational synergy, market dynamics and regulatory synergy, and structural deficiency type. These findings suggest that developed regions benefit from prioritizing organizational collaboration and technological support, while less-developed areas may improve efficiency through foundational policy enhancement and regulatory alignment. Furthermore, investing in human capital, technical innovation, and infrastructure can contribute to building a resilient NEV ecosystem. By integrating multiple analytical methods, this study sheds light on the complex interactions shaping NEV efficiency across regions and offers insights for policymakers to enhance the global competitiveness and sustainability of China's NEV industry.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2643-2661"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143945018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Release Strategy of Competing Retailers for Reserved Produce Under the Government's Emergency Reserves With Order Constraints 有订单约束的政府应急储备下竞争零售商储备农产品的投放策略
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-22 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4479
Ting Lei, Bin Dan, Yongqi Yuan, Yu Tian, Yu Ding
{"title":"Release Strategy of Competing Retailers for Reserved Produce Under the Government's Emergency Reserves With Order Constraints","authors":"Ting Lei,&nbsp;Bin Dan,&nbsp;Yongqi Yuan,&nbsp;Yu Tian,&nbsp;Yu Ding","doi":"10.1002/mde.4479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4479","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The government establishes an emergency reserve system and releases reserved produce through competing retailers in a fresh produce supply chain. We study the release strategy of competing retailers for reserved produce under the government's emergency reserves with order constraints. Our results reveal that competing retailers are willing to release reserved produce despite intensifying market competition. The release of reserved produce does not necessarily cannibalize supplies of fresh produce; however, the order constraints on reserved produce may instead reduce fresh produce supplies. It can also simultaneously improve or reduce supply chain performance and consumer surplus, bringing a “win-win” or “lose-lose” situation.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2524-2539"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143945019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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