Environmental Certification, Consumer Greenness, and Greenwashing

IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Theresa Wittreich
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper investigates the welfare effects of imperfect environmental certification and its efficacy as an environmental policy tool within a partially covered product market and price competition among firms. Using a game-theoretic model, I find that a truth-revealing certification mechanism – that emerges for a sufficiently precise certification mechanism or high certification fee – can enhance welfare while consistently outperforming a pooling mechanism. While greenwashing cannot benefit the economy in price competition, it may have different implications in quantity competition. The study highlights that a truth-revealing certification mechanism is crucial for effectively reducing environmental damage, offering valuable insights for policymakers.

环境认证、消费者绿色和洗绿
本文研究了不完善的环境认证的福利效应及其作为环境政策工具在部分覆盖的产品市场和企业之间的价格竞争中的有效性。使用博弈论模型,我发现一个揭示真相的认证机制——在足够精确的认证机制或高认证费用的情况下出现——可以提高福利,同时始终优于池化机制。虽然洗绿不能在价格竞争中使经济受益,但它可能在数量竞争中产生不同的影响。该研究强调,揭示真相的认证机制对于有效减少环境破坏至关重要,为政策制定者提供了有价值的见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
18.20%
发文量
242
期刊介绍: Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.
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