Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献

Manufacturer Choice of Selling Format in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-14 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4475

Haike Qiao, Bi Wang, Qin Su

{"title":"Manufacturer Choice of Selling Format in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain","authors":"Haike Qiao, Bi Wang, Qin Su","doi":"10.1002/mde.4475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4475","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study builds stylized models to discuss the interaction between product recovery and online selling format in a closed-loop supply chain, which comprises a manufacturer, online platforms, and customers. The manufacturer collects used products from customers, before choosing the product's selling format from the reseller only format, the marketplace only format, and both the reseller and marketplace formats. For each format, the optimal decisions (recovery rate, quantity, and price) are first obtained. Notably, we find that the marketplace format induces the manufacturer to improve the recovery rate. Furthermore, our results indicate that the manufacturer's choice of selling format depends on the saved cost of manufacturing a product using the collected products and the value fraction of customer preference for the marketplace relative to the reseller format. Specifically, if the value fraction is smaller but the saved cost is larger, using both the reseller and marketplace formats is preferred. And, we find that when the manufacturer changes from the reseller only format to both the reseller and marketplace formats, the selling price of the reseller platform decreases. Besides, we make some extensions to show the robustness of our assumptions and provide further guidelines for practitioners in the appendix.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2448-2467"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Selection of Live-Streaming Sales Methods for the Manufacturer and Streamer: The Role of the MCN Institution

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-10 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4480

Gaoke Wu, Wensheng Yang, Xinru Hou, Mengze Chen

{"title":"Selection of Live-Streaming Sales Methods for the Manufacturer and Streamer: The Role of the MCN Institution","authors":"Gaoke Wu, Wensheng Yang, Xinru Hou, Mengze Chen","doi":"10.1002/mde.4480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4480","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>To cater to consumer shopping habits and stimulate demand, manufacturers increasingly sell products through live streaming. However, challenges remain in selecting the most suitable live-streaming sales model. Additionally, it is also worth paying attention to whether the streamer chooses to sign with multi-channel network (MCN) institutions. Based on this, we have studied three live streaming sales methods: manufacturer-exclusive live streaming, unsigned streamer live streaming, and signed streamer live streaming. Firstly, the supply chain system involving the manufacturer, streamer, MCN institution, and live-streaming platform was constructed. Secondly, equilibrium results were obtained under different methods, and an analysis was conducted on the strategic choices and preferences of various parties regarding live-streaming sales methods. Finally, we further consider the manufacturer's strategy choices when facing streamers with different traffic levels and discuss the pure commission model in this research. The main findings are as follows: (i) The key to achieving the win-win situation for the manufacturer and streamer lies in the slot fee compensation coefficient, the sharing ratio charged by the MCN institution, and the streamer's salary. (ii) The MCN institution should appropriately reduce the sharing ratio to achieve cooperation with the manufacturer and streamer. (iii) The manufacturer will opt for the pure commission model only when the additional commission in this model is lower than the slot fee in the traditional commission model.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2540-2561"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Can Enterprise Digital Transformation Improve Resource Allocation Efficiency? Evidence From China

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-09 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4493

Zheng Duan, Yifan Zhang

{"title":"Can Enterprise Digital Transformation Improve Resource Allocation Efficiency? Evidence From China","authors":"Zheng Duan, Yifan Zhang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4493","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Digital transformation provides enterprises with the momentum for development. This study analyses a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2011 to 2021 to construct a digital transformation index and assess the resource allocation efficiency of the cities in which these companies operate. It empirically investigates the impact of digital transformation on resource allocation efficiency, while addressing issues of heterogeneity. The findings are as follows: (1) digital transformation enhances resource allocation efficiency; (2) it influences this efficiency by optimizing the structure of human capital, fostering enterprise innovation, and mitigating information asymmetries; and (3) the positive impact of digital transformation on resource allocation efficiency is more pronounced in regions with lower per capita income and smaller urban populations, as well as among high-tech, manufacturing, and state-owned enterprises in these areas. This study contributes to both theoretical and empirical research on resource allocation efficiency and offers a new perspective on digital transformation. It serves as a reference for policymakers in developing relevant digital policies based on regional contexts, provides a foundation for enterprises to expedite their digital transformation efforts, and establishes the groundwork for future research on the role of digital transformation in promoting development in both developed and developing countries.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2688-2704"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Is Blockchain Really Good for E-Platform? A Double-Edged Sword From Consumer Trust and Channel Cannibalization

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-07 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4482

Xiaoxi Zhu, Yu Chen, Minglun Ren, Wei Chu

{"title":"Is Blockchain Really Good for E-Platform? A Double-Edged Sword From Consumer Trust and Channel Cannibalization","authors":"Xiaoxi Zhu, Yu Chen, Minglun Ren, Wei Chu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4482","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The application of blockchain technology in e-platforms makes products more reliable and traceable, especially products from third-party retailers without brand authorization. However, this technology will also intensify the competition between authorized retailers and third-party retailers. On the other hand, as intermediaries, e-platforms' profits have also become elusive. We aim to investigate how blockchain technology impacts optimal pricing strategies and profit distribution in a dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer, one e-platform, and two e-tailers. By adopting a Stackelberg game framework, the results show that (1) the e-platforms may not necessarily benefit from blockchain; only when the commission rate and unit usage cost are both small (or large) enough can the platform achieve higher profit. (2) The application of blockchain can yield extra reputation benefits for third-party retailer, while the retail prices of both channels may also be higher. (3) The Pareto improvements show that when manufacturer sells products to official retailer and third-party retailer at different prices, the possibility of successful blockchain implementation increases. (4) When the third-party retailer shares blockchain usage cost, its optimal channel price rises and demand decreases. For the official retailer, changes in pricing depend on competitive intensity. The manufacturer tends to reduce wholesale price under the strategy, benefiting both e-tailers and enhancing product competitiveness and supply chain efficiency.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2562-2582"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Environmental Certification, Consumer Greenness, and Greenwashing

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4452

Theresa Wittreich

引用次数: 0

The Governance Effect of Financial Reporting Inquiry Letters on Major Shareholder Expropriation: Evidence From Chinese Listed Companies

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4478

Shimin Sun, Jie Zhao, Meng Jiao, Yongheng Wang

{"title":"The Governance Effect of Financial Reporting Inquiry Letters on Major Shareholder Expropriation: Evidence From Chinese Listed Companies","authors":"Shimin Sun, Jie Zhao, Meng Jiao, Yongheng Wang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4478","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Utilizing Chinese A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2023 as samples, this article empirically tests the influence of financial reporting inquiry letters on major shareholder expropriation and its function mechanism and obtains the following four conclusions. First, financial reporting inquiry letters exert a temporary restraining effect on major shareholder expropriation, necessitating continuous issuance of letters by stock exchanges to reinforce this governance role. Second, the internal and external environment influences the governance effectiveness of financial reporting inquiry letters. The inhibitory effect of financial reporting inquiry letters on major shareholder expropriation is more pronounced for companies without relaxing short-selling controls, with higher marketization degrees, and with weaker exit threats from non-controlling large shareholders. Third, financial reporting inquiry letters can attract investor attention and increase litigation risk, thereby curbing major shareholder expropriation. Fourth, financial reporting inquiry letters have a deterrent effect on major shareholder expropriation in peer companies that have not gotten letters, but they cannot effectively impact companies in the same region that have not received letters. This article confirms the inhibitive influence of non-punitive supervision on major shareholder expropriation, providing empirical evidence regarding the governance of Type II agency issues in Chinese listed companies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2504-2523"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Compensating College Football Players for Their Name, Image, and Likeness Rights From Live College Football Broadcasts 补偿大学橄榄球运动员在大学橄榄球直播中的姓名、形象和肖像权

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-28 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4465

Stacey L. Brook

引用次数: 0

Kill Two Birds With One Stone? China's Mixed Ownership Reform and Investment Efficiency 一石二鸟？中国混合所有制改革与投资效率

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-26 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4477

Liying Ren, Haomin Wu, Yangyang Liu

{"title":"Kill Two Birds With One Stone? China's Mixed Ownership Reform and Investment Efficiency","authors":"Liying Ren, Haomin Wu, Yangyang Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4477","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a major strategic step for the central government to implement the policy of strengthening and expanding SOEs and an important measure to support the development of the nonpublic economy. This has become the main direction of China's current reform and the focus of its governance. Mixed ownership reform is the key implementation path and main direction of SOE reform. Its fundamental purpose is to stimulate the vitality and competitiveness of these enterprises. Taking the sample of Chinese A-share-listed firms from 2004 to 2022, we aimed to explore the impact and mechanism of the mixed ownership reform of SOEs on the investment efficiency of SOEs and participating private enterprises (PEs). We found that the SOEs' mixed ownership reform provides a win–win situation for both SOEs and PEs. Specifically, the incorporation of non–state-owned capital owed by PEs prevents SOEs' overinvestment, which is denoted as the “direct effect.” Meanwhile, PEs' participation in the reform leads to a reduction in underinvestment, which is denoted as the “indirect effect.” Mechanism analysis indicated that for SOEs, the reform leads to a decreased level of government intervention and a reduced principal agency cost, showing the reform's “governance effect.” For PEs, participation in the reform leads to reduced financing constraints, demonstrating the reform's “resource effect.” This study not only enriches the relevant research on the consequences of mixed ownership reform at the microlevel but also provides valuable experience and reference for the economic reform of emerging markets and developing countries.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2474-2503"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143945014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Information Acquisition Under Providers' Competition

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-24 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4491

Youzi Zhai, Weili Xue, Jing Chen

引用次数: 0

Bonus Scheme, Managerial Delegation, and Quantity Competition 奖金制度、管理授权与数量竞争

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-23 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4476

Chung-Hui Chou

引用次数: 0