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Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献

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Agency mode selection and software competition in supply chains 供应链中的代理模式选择和软件竞争
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-22 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4385
Tinghai Ren, Nengmin Zeng, Dafei Wang, Kaifu Yuan
{"title":"Agency mode selection and software competition in supply chains","authors":"Tinghai Ren,&nbsp;Nengmin Zeng,&nbsp;Dafei Wang,&nbsp;Kaifu Yuan","doi":"10.1002/mde.4385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4385","url":null,"abstract":"<p>At present, many software developers work with downstream service providers to sell software and services. For political or economic reasons, foreign developers may be not allowed to sell software and services directly in the country of providers, but they can authorize their software to the providers for sale. In this study, we examine two types of IT supply chain (ITSC), namely, “Agenting Domestic Software” (Mode 1) and “Agenting Foreign Software” (Mode 2), each with a domestic developer/a foreign developer, a service provider, and client enterprises. In both modes, clients can either pay a high price to purchase software with accessorial pre-sale service from the provider, or firsthand acquire it from the domestic developer at a low price but without pre-sale service. We observe that in Mode 1, the domestic developer's market scale and the competition intensity of software have no effect on the domestic developer's decisions and profit; however, they have influences on the provider's decisions and profit. In Mode 2, the profits of ITSC members may increase with the intensity of software competition. When the domestic developer's market scale is small (large), and the domestic developer has (loses) the advantage of low extended-warranty-service (EWS) cost, Mode 1 (2) is more beneficial to the domestic developer than Mode 2 (1); however, the provider is more willing to choose Mode 2 (Mode 1). In other cases, either Mode 1 or Mode 2 may result in a win-win situation for the domestic developer and provider.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"469-488"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142861962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and market quality in emerging economies 反海外腐败法》（FCPA）与新兴经济体的市场质量
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-11 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4399
Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, Makoto Yano
{"title":"Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and market quality in emerging economies","authors":"Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar,&nbsp;Makoto Yano","doi":"10.1002/mde.4399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4399","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In many emerging economies with antiquated laws, bribes paid to government officials reduce economic impediments and serve as a device to improve market competition, thereby contributing to the modernization of an economy. In this context, this paper uses a simple two-stage game theoretic model to investigate the effects of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) on such economies. We demonstrate, among others, that while an increase in fines under FCPA reduces overall corruption, it leads to a deterioration in the market quality in an emerging economy. In the presence of FCPA, an increase in the US firm's technological advantage unambiguously leads to a decrease in the market quality in an emerging economy.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"641-665"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142861284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Retailer information sharing under manufacturer encroachment and production cost reduction
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-10 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4395
Zhibao Li, Beifen Wang
{"title":"Retailer information sharing under manufacturer encroachment and production cost reduction","authors":"Zhibao Li,&nbsp;Beifen Wang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4395","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study investigates retailer's sharing decisions concerning ex ante information about demand when the encroaching manufacturer can reduce production cost. Equilibrium information sharing decisions with encroachment are quite different from that with no encroachment. The encroaching manufacturer's cost reduction efficiency is key to determine equilibrium results, and these thresholds regarding cost reduction efficiency depend on competition intensity between the encroaching manufacturer's direct channel and retailer channel. Furthermore, through investigating the encroachment decisions of the manufacturer, we prove that the equilibrium information sharing decisions under encroachment is robust in general.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"602-626"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142860806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Behavior in long-run projects and elicited time preferences 长期项目中的行为和激发的时间偏好
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4396
Zafer Akin, Abdullah Yavaş
{"title":"Behavior in long-run projects and elicited time preferences","authors":"Zafer Akin,&nbsp;Abdullah Yavaş","doi":"10.1002/mde.4396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4396","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate behavior in long-run projects and its relationship with experimentally elicited time preferences. Participants engage in a longitudinal project requiring sustained real effort, with their time preferences estimated through monetary outcomes. We observe a tendency to front-load real effort, with choices reflecting both present and future bias, the former being more prevalent and severe. We also find evidence of naive choice reversals. However, there is no support for the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model in monetary choices, and its predictions do not align with real effort allocation patterns. Nevertheless, discount rate and present bias parameters derived from monetary outcomes demonstrate predictive power over real effort allocation.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"627-640"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142860039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A configuration analysis of the driving path of corporate physical investments: Necessary condition analysis and qualitative comparative analysis based on fuzzy sets
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4397
Zhen Wang, Hongyan Zhao
{"title":"A configuration analysis of the driving path of corporate physical investments: Necessary condition analysis and qualitative comparative analysis based on fuzzy sets","authors":"Zhen Wang,&nbsp;Hongyan Zhao","doi":"10.1002/mde.4397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4397","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Corporate physical investments are an important foundation for sustainable economic development. This study investigates the causal relationships and complex mechanisms of the five antecedent conditions under the “Merger–Organization–Environment” (MOE) framework with corporate physical investments. These antecedent conditions include green mergers and acquisitions (M&amp;A), financing constraints, main business performance, corporate governance capacities, and government environmental concerns. Combining the necessary condition analysis and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, a sample of 40 heavily polluting listed enterprises in China's A-share market from 2016 to 2020 is used. The results found that (1) individual antecedent conditions do not constitute the necessary conditions for corporate physical investments; (2) there are four configurations that generate high corporate physical investments, i.e., proactive change-oriented type, main business focus-oriented type, performance-driven oriented type, and passive change-oriented type; and (3) there are four configurations that generate non-high corporate physical investments, i.e., performance-bound type, funding-bound type, M&amp;A-bound type, and strategically bound type. This demonstrates the asymmetry of the configurations that generate high and non-high corporate physical investments, which helps to formulate incentives for corporate physical investments from multiple perspectives.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"681-697"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142860016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Excess control of family board seats and corporate financing constraints
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4367
Yuqi Yang, Tianle Meng
{"title":"Excess control of family board seats and corporate financing constraints","authors":"Yuqi Yang,&nbsp;Tianle Meng","doi":"10.1002/mde.4367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4367","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the relationship between excess control of family board seats (ECFBS) and financing constraints (FCs) using 2008–2021 data for listed family firms in China. We find that ECFBS intensifies Type II agency problems, thereby worsens corporate FCs. We also investigate the impact of family firm founder characteristics, family owner characteristics, and external shareholder equity structure on the ECFBS and FCs. Our findings provide evidence of the encroachment effect of family control.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"166-182"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142860038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Financial hedging incentive contracts in global supply chains: A distributionally robust approach 全球供应链中的金融对冲激励合同：分布稳健的方法
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-02 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4398
Xiaoyi Li, Hui Yu, Caihong Sun
{"title":"Financial hedging incentive contracts in global supply chains: A distributionally robust approach","authors":"Xiaoyi Li,&nbsp;Hui Yu,&nbsp;Caihong Sun","doi":"10.1002/mde.4398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4398","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper developed a global supply chain with a supplier and a retailer in different countries. When exchange rate and demand risks are concentrated in retailer, a distributionally robust approach is used to formulate an optimized robust ordering strategy. Furthermore, the effect of financial hedging incentive contracts on the robust decisions and the profits of the global supply chain is explored. Our findings show that the correlation between exchange rate and demand does not affect the robust decisions of retailer. The effectiveness of financial hedging incentive contracts depends on the trade-off between transaction costs of financial hedging and the degree of supplier incentives and the growth rate of order quantity.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"698-712"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142860147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal financing strategies for low-carbon supply chains: A Stackelberg game perspective
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4394
Lei Wang, Lin Zhang, Xiaoli Zhang
{"title":"Optimal financing strategies for low-carbon supply chains: A Stackelberg game perspective","authors":"Lei Wang,&nbsp;Lin Zhang,&nbsp;Xiaoli Zhang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4394","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study constructs a Stackelberg game model between low-carbon manufacturers and capital-constrained retailers. Considering the manufacturer's financing model, the manufacturer's investment model, and the internal blended financing model, it studies the optimal wholesale price of manufacturers. This paper investigates the impact of consumers' low-carbon preference, the financing interest rate of manufacturers, investment ratio, investment return on carbon emission reduction investment, and supply chain pricing. The conditions for low-carbon supply chain participants to choose the best financing mode and the impact of different financing models on the performance of low-carbon supply chains were obtained.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"666-680"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142859897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Towards sustainable development: Institutions, perceptions, and innovation
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-23 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4391
Xiaoyang Zhao, Dangdang Cui, Chante Jian Ding
{"title":"Towards sustainable development: Institutions, perceptions, and innovation","authors":"Xiaoyang Zhao,&nbsp;Dangdang Cui,&nbsp;Chante Jian Ding","doi":"10.1002/mde.4391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4391","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study investigates the influence of the exogenous event of Chinese GIS (Government Inspection Supervision) on corporate environmental innovation. GIS significantly enhances green innovation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), according to difference-in-differences (DID) estimation. Moreover, executives' green perception significantly and positively moderates the constructive association between GIS and green innovation in SOEs. Additional analysis shows that inspection supervision encourages green innovation in SOEs by easing financial restrictions and boosting R&amp;D spending. This effect is more prominent in areas where the intensity of government pollution source regulation is weaker and in enterprises with poorer performance in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our research supports the conjecture that national governance can be a crucial determinant of green innovation, providing a valuable reference for accelerating China's green growth process and expanding the research perspective for the construction of governance systems in developing countries.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"560-572"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142862267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Navigating legal responsibilities in politically connected firms: Insights into the influence of directors' and officers' insurance on litigation risk 在政治关联公司中履行法律责任：董事和高管保险对诉讼风险影响的启示
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-19 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4390
Xiaojuan Zhang, Yizhen Guo, Tiancheng Chi
{"title":"Navigating legal responsibilities in politically connected firms: Insights into the influence of directors' and officers' insurance on litigation risk","authors":"Xiaojuan Zhang,&nbsp;Yizhen Guo,&nbsp;Tiancheng Chi","doi":"10.1002/mde.4390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4390","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study aims to investigate how directors' and officers' (D&amp;O) liability insurance, legal responsibilities, and firm political connections collectively influence corporate litigation risk. D&amp;O insurance is common, but its effectiveness in limiting litigation risk in diverse legal and political circumstances is questionable. The study employs a quantitative research approach, utilizing regression analysis and moderation techniques. Data are collected from a diverse sample of 411 individuals comprising directors, legal experts, government regulators, public company staff, and insurance providers. Regression models explore the relationships between D&amp;O insurance, legal responsibilities, political connections, and corporate litigation risk. The findings provide practical insights for stakeholders in corporate governance, informing strategies to enhance risk management and compliance frameworks. This study contributes to the existing literature by empirically examining the comprehensive influence of D&amp;O insurance, legal responsibilities, and political connections on corporate litigation risk. It integrates multiple variables and moderating effects to offer a nuanced understanding of corporate governance dynamics. Strategic adoption of D&amp;O insurance can effectively mitigate litigation risks associated with legal responsibilities, although caution is warranted regarding the exacerbating effects of firm political connections. By understanding these dynamics, firms can proactively enhance their governance practices and adapt to regulatory changes, thereby improving overall corporate resilience and sustainability.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"545-559"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142861692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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