Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献

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ESG Enterprise Hybrid Risk Diversification Mechanism Based on Third-Party Guarantee 基于第三方担保的ESG企业混合风险分散机制
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-07-21 DOI: 10.1002/mde.70001
Jiaxin Zhuang, Yinglin Wang, Shengxu Shi
{"title":"ESG Enterprise Hybrid Risk Diversification Mechanism Based on Third-Party Guarantee","authors":"Jiaxin Zhuang,&nbsp;Yinglin Wang,&nbsp;Shengxu Shi","doi":"10.1002/mde.70001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70001","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>To alleviate the financial burden of supporting ESG disclosures, this study introduces third-party institutions and proposes two alternative models: GFSL (Guarantee First, Subsidy Later) and SFGL (Subsidy First, Guarantee Later). Using evolutionary game theory, it analyzes strategic decisions and compares models through numerical simulations. Results show that subsidy caps and premium levels must be balanced carefully. SFGL suits cases with minimal external influence, while FGS with dynamic incentives fits strong responders. For opportunistic enterprises, SFGL is preferred. This study offers theoretical insights and practical guidance for optimizing ESG subsidy strategies and advancing sustainable finance.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 7","pages":"4032-4055"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145012968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Relative Performance Evaluation and Executive Compensation: Adding Fuel to the Fire 相对绩效评估与高管薪酬:火上浇油
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-30 DOI: 10.1002/mde.70003
Werner Bönte, Dmitrii Galkin
{"title":"Relative Performance Evaluation and Executive Compensation: Adding Fuel to the Fire","authors":"Werner Bönte,&nbsp;Dmitrii Galkin","doi":"10.1002/mde.70003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70003","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this experimental study, we compare the effects of a compensation scheme based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) and a compensation scheme based on absolute performance evaluation (APE) on decision-making in a market game. To this end, we conduct an online experiment using the strategy method to obtain individual responses in a duopoly market with quantity competition. Our results point to a causal effect of the RPE-based compensation scheme on quantity decisions: subjects opt for higher quantities when incentivised by the RPE-based compensation scheme. While this observation is consistent with the theoretical predictions, our data imply that subjects deviate from payoff maximisation under both compensation schemes. Specifically, we find strong evidence that the RPE-based compensation system, in particular, increases the likelihood that subjects sacrifice their payoffs to reduce the competitors' payoffs (i.e., behave <i>over</i>-aggressively). Our results suggest that RPE-based remuneration structures, which are gaining traction in practice, may have unintended behavioural effects and can be detrimental to the profits of firms that use them.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 7","pages":"4070-4087"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.70003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145013202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Three-Stage Multi-Attribute Group Decision-Making Method Based on Interval-Valued Spherical Fuzzy Density Operator 基于区间值球面模糊密度算子的三阶段多属性群决策方法
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-25 DOI: 10.1002/mde.70000
Wenkun Zhou, Mei Hong
{"title":"Three-Stage Multi-Attribute Group Decision-Making Method Based on Interval-Valued Spherical Fuzzy Density Operator","authors":"Wenkun Zhou,&nbsp;Mei Hong","doi":"10.1002/mde.70000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70000","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The information aggregation operator in a fuzzy environment effectively reduces information errors and enhances the accuracy of decision-making. In this paper, considering the preference of decision makers (DMs) for dense distribution of evaluation information, we introduce density intermediate operators and propose interval-valued spherical fuzzy density intermediate operators, which include the interval-valued spherical fuzzy density weighted arithmetic average (IVSFDWAA) operator and the interval-valued spherical fuzzy density weighted geometric average (IVSFDWGA) operator, to achieve effective aggregation of information and study their related properties. In addition, the distance measure and entropy theory in the interval-valued spherical fuzzy environment are extended, and the weight of attributes is determined by comprehensive fuzzy information entropy. On this basis, a three-stage multi-attribute group decision-making method combining TOPSIS is proposed. Finally, an example is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method, and its sensitivity and comparative analysis are carried out.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 7","pages":"4011-4031"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145013251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Artificial Intelligence and Enterprise Technological Innovation: Evidence From China 人工智能与企业技术创新:来自中国的证据
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-24 DOI: 10.1002/mde.70002
Yang Zhang, Yuexian Chang, Xiaolei Zhang, Haoyu Zhou
{"title":"Artificial Intelligence and Enterprise Technological Innovation: Evidence From China","authors":"Yang Zhang,&nbsp;Yuexian Chang,&nbsp;Xiaolei Zhang,&nbsp;Haoyu Zhou","doi":"10.1002/mde.70002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70002","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper investigates the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on the technological innovation (TI) of enterprises and explores its mechanisms of action based on data from Chinese enterprises. This study finds that AI significantly promotes enterprise TI. The reliability of these conclusions is validated through instrumental variable regression and robustness tests. Key mechanisms through which AI enhances enterprise innovation include total factor productivity (TFP) improvement, human capital structure optimization, and digital transformation. The level of internal R&amp;D focus within enterprises plays a positive moderating role in the incentive effects of AI on TI. AI can not only enhance the quantity of technological innovation but also promote the diffusion of technology. Enterprises in the service industry exhibit stronger effects. Therefore, it is recommended that governments increase support for AI technologies, promote the integration of traditional industries, and improve talent training mechanisms. This would allow AI to play a more positive role in fostering enterprise TI and driving high-quality economic development.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 7","pages":"4056-4069"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145013183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quality Investment With Information Acquisition Transparency 信息获取透明的优质投资
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-12 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4567
Huan Cao, Yang Song, Xu Guan
{"title":"Quality Investment With Information Acquisition Transparency","authors":"Huan Cao,&nbsp;Yang Song,&nbsp;Xu Guan","doi":"10.1002/mde.4567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4567","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper investigates the interplay between a firm's product quality investment and subsequent product quality information acquisition. We consider two quality information acquisition scenarios: non-transparent acquisition scenario and transparent acquisition scenario, depending on whether the quality information acquired by the firm is observable to the public. We show that under the non-transparent acquisition scenario, the firm's equilibrium quality investment decision and quality information acquisition decision are strategic complements, and these decisions can significantly affect consumers' inferences on product's quality level. More importantly, we uncover that in comparison with the scenario where firm's quality information acquisition is transparent to the consumers, when the quality information acquisition is non-transparent to the consumers, the firm chooses a higher quality investment level and has more incentive to conduct the acquisition of precise quality information by incurring an extra cost after the quality investment decision-making, which eventually leads to an increase in consumer surplus but may result in a decrease in social welfare.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 7","pages":"3998-4010"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145013017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic Incentive Strategies for Principal-Agent Coopetition: A Stochastic Approach to Managing Risks and Performance 委托代理合作的动态激励策略:风险与绩效管理的随机方法
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-06 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4566
Lin Meng, George Xianzhi Yuan, Huiqi Wang
{"title":"Dynamic Incentive Strategies for Principal-Agent Coopetition: A Stochastic Approach to Managing Risks and Performance","authors":"Lin Meng,&nbsp;George Xianzhi Yuan,&nbsp;Huiqi Wang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4566","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study investigates principal-agent coopetition (PAC) by developing a comprehensive stochastic dynamical framework that captures the intricate interactions and associated risks between principals and agents in uncertain environments. The research emphasizes the importance of dynamic incentive strategies, focusing on key factors such as equity structure, driving capital, risk aversion degree, and task complexity. By defining and analyzing the dual risks of cooperation and competition within the PAC process, we introduce a novel performance evaluation metric, coordination at risks (CaR), to assess the effectiveness of these strategies. Through extensive numerical simulations, our results highlight the critical need to balance these risks to optimize PAC performance. The study provides actionable insights and practical guidelines for designing dynamic incentive mechanisms that not only align the interests of principals and agents but also mitigate potential risks, fostering sustainable cooperation and enhanced organizational performance in principal-agent relationships.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 7","pages":"3976-3997"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145012281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Impact of Oil Price Uncertainty on Working Capital Management: Evidence From India 油价不确定性对营运资本管理的影响:来自印度的证据
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4564
Bilal Wani, Nufazil Altaf
{"title":"The Impact of Oil Price Uncertainty on Working Capital Management: Evidence From India","authors":"Bilal Wani,&nbsp;Nufazil Altaf","doi":"10.1002/mde.4564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4564","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study explores the impact of oil price uncertainty on working capital management for 21,051 nonfinancial Indian firms throughout 2000–2023. This study is based on the panel data set of 154,550 firm-year observations over 23 years from 2000 to 2023. We have proceeded with a fixed effect panel data regression model and robustness analysis to arrive at the results. Using the working capital ratio and industrial-adjusted WCR as two measurements of working capital management, we find that working capital management is positively associated with oil price uncertainty. Moreover, the intensity of this impact is subject to firm heterogeneity. Financially constrained and publically listed firms are exposed to greater risk during times of uncertainty. Our findings suggest that such firms must hold greater short-term capital to mitigate the associated risks. The originality of our research can be summed up into two aspects: First, our study is the first in the literature that explicitly investigated the intricacies of oil price uncertainty on working capital management. Second, our research expands the existing literature by probing in-depth analysis at various firm-specific heterogeneity levels and is probably among the rare studies that leverage extensive datasets to provide a thorough view of the perspective.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 7","pages":"3948-3958"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145012022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Differential Game Analysis of Strategic Emerging Industry Convergence Cluster Innovation Strategy Considering Technology Integration Capabilities and Technology Heterogeneity 考虑技术集成能力和技术异质性的战略性新兴产业融合集群创新战略差异博弈分析
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4562
Siyu Chang, Bin Hu, Xianghao Yang
{"title":"Differential Game Analysis of Strategic Emerging Industry Convergence Cluster Innovation Strategy Considering Technology Integration Capabilities and Technology Heterogeneity","authors":"Siyu Chang,&nbsp;Bin Hu,&nbsp;Xianghao Yang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4562","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Driven by strategic direction, strategic emerging industry convergence clusters are a complex evolutionary process of increasing technological innovation levels and optimizing industrial structure through cross-sectoral organizational collaboration and cooperation among various stakeholders. Given the dynamic and long-term nature of this process, alongside factors such as technological heterogeneity and integration capabilities, we use a differential game approach to compare the optimal innovation strategies across three scenarios: centralized decision-making, Stackelberg leader–follower, and Nash noncooperative game models. This analysis explores how different innovation entities within strategic emerging industry clusters can coordinate and cooperate to achieve converged cluster development. The results indicate that (1) innovation levels in convergence clusters and the returns of individual actors are lowest under the Nash noncooperative game model, followed by the Stackelberg leader–follower model. The optimal strategy for convergence cluster development is centralized decision-making and collaborative development. (2) While technological heterogeneity inhibits the benefits of innovation entities, technological integration capabilities increase them. Additionally, the growth of convergence clusters is more strongly impacted by technical heterogeneity, with higher levels of heterogeneity having a negative impact on their development. (3) Under centralized decision-making, government subsidies have the strongest incentive effect; nevertheless, as compared to other characteristics, their influence on increasing convergence cluster returns is weaker. Findings here may provide theoretical support for enhancing innovation efficiency and promoting strategic emerging industry convergence clusters.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 7","pages":"3914-3934"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145012016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Tax Enforcement and Corporate Labor Income Share: Evidence From a Quasi-Natural Experiment in China 税收执法与企业劳动收入份额:来自中国准自然实验的证据
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4565
Jiacai Xiong, Linghong Chen, Dongwei Su, Kejing Chen
{"title":"Tax Enforcement and Corporate Labor Income Share: Evidence From a Quasi-Natural Experiment in China","authors":"Jiacai Xiong,&nbsp;Linghong Chen,&nbsp;Dongwei Su,&nbsp;Kejing Chen","doi":"10.1002/mde.4565","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4565","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines the effects of stricter tax enforcement on the labor income share of firms in China, using the merger of the State Tax Bureau (STB) and Local Tax Bureau (LTB) as a quasi-natural experiment. We employ a difference-in-differences (DID) approach and find that after the merger, tougher tax enforcement leads to a decrease in the labor income share of firms. This effect is particularly pronounced in firms that are highly reliant on labor or have lower tax transfer abilities. The mechanism tests indicate that stricter tax enforcement increases tax burdens, financing costs, and financing constraints, and decreases tax avoidance, leading to higher fixed assets investment and reduced human capital investment. These results are in line with the financing constraint channel. The findings remain robust when subjected to parallel trend testing, alternative variable measurements, and sample selection, excluding the impact of other policies and anticipation effect. Our findings can inform policymakers in their efforts to modernize and transform the tax governance system, reduce the income gap, and promote common prosperity.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 7","pages":"3959-3975"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145012018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Dynamic Trust Consensus Model in Large-Scale Group Decision: Managing Overconfidence and Non-Cooperative Behaviors 大规模群体决策中的动态信任共识模型:过度自信与非合作行为的管理
IF 2.7 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-02 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4560
Xia Liang, Ying Chen, Peide Liu, Zhengmin Liu
{"title":"A Dynamic Trust Consensus Model in Large-Scale Group Decision: Managing Overconfidence and Non-Cooperative Behaviors","authors":"Xia Liang,&nbsp;Ying Chen,&nbsp;Peide Liu,&nbsp;Zhengmin Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4560","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4560","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In this paper, we propose a dynamic trust consensus model, considering the closeness of the relationship and trust relationship between decision makers (DMs) in a social network. First, the propagation efficiency of indirect trust is proposed for obtaining a complete social trust network based on the closeness of relationships among DMs and the similarity of evaluations. The large-scale DMs are clustered into subgroups using the social-similarity index between DMs. In the consensus reaching process (CRP), this paper proposes a new way to identify overconfident and non-cooperative behaviors. For overconfident and inconsistent DMs, it is essential to not only adjust their evaluated values but also reduce their confidence levels in the feedback adjustment stage. This paper proposes a new dynamic trust approach to penalize DMs with overconfident or non-cooperative behaviors. Finally, an investment problem of a new energy project is used to test the feasibility of the proposed approach in this paper. The results of the comparative analysis illustrate the feasibility and innovation of the consensus decision-making method proposed in this paper.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 7","pages":"3875-3894"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2025-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145012495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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