Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献

{"title":"Supply Chain Investment, Financing Schemes With the Uncertainty of Low-Carbon Technology Innovation: Carbon Asset Pledge vs. Sell–Buyback?","authors":"Jiawen Li,&nbsp;Xiaomin Xu,&nbsp;Shengzhong Huang,&nbsp;Hongyong Fu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4481","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Carbon emissions are recognized as major contributors to the greenhouse effect, accelerating global warming. Meanwhile, technology innovation is acknowledged as a key determinant influencing carbon emissions. Therefore, implementing low-carbon technology innovation (LCTI) becomes a critical approach to mitigating global warming. However, the uncertainty of LCTI and capital constraints hinder enterprises from adopting such innovations. Additionally, the constraints imposed by traditional financing channels exacerbate the predicament faced by enterprises. In this paper, we build a two-echelon supply chain model in the context of LCTI uncertainty, consisting of a retailer with sufficient capital and a manufacturer facing capital constraints, where traditional financing channels are restricted, to explore the strategies of LCTI investments, carbon asset financing, and product pricing. The research findings are as follows: Firstly, LCTI does not consistently result in higher expected profits for the manufacturer. This means that the manufacturer may lack the willingness to invest in such endeavors unless the probability coefficient of success in LCTI surpasses a certain threshold. Conversely, the retailer always benefits as a free rider from the manufacturer's investment in low-carbon technology. Secondly, both carbon asset pledge and sell–buyback financing can continuously increase the manufacturer's LCTI investments, but their impacts on the manufacturer's profits differ. Under pledge financing, higher LCTI investments imply greater profits for the manufacturer. In contrast, under sell–buyback financing, the impact may be either positive or negative, which depends on the fluctuation of carbon price. If carbon price escalates beyond a certain degree, sell–buyback financing may backfire. Yet, it also provides the opportunities for the manufacturer to maximize profits. Thirdly, improving LCTI investments can either benefit or harm the environment. This is contingent upon the relationship between the carbon emission ratio and the demand ratio. Win–win economic benefits and environmental performance can be achieved only when the carbon emission ratio is lower than the demand ratio. Finally, in the context of LCTI uncertainty, although carbon asset financing can enhance the manufacturer's LCTI investments and has the potential to improve the manufacturer's profits, it fails to prevent the retailer's free-riding behavior. An LCTI cost-sharing mechanism can limit such behavior and help the manufacturer and retailer reach a win–win outcome.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1888-1912"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pricing and Procurement Strategies for Substitute Products in Extreme Weather","authors":"Haonan Xu,&nbsp;Jiaguo Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4489","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Climate change is causing frequent extreme weather events, posing disruption risks to supply chains. A two-echelon supply chain comprising two suppliers and one retailer is constructed from a risk perspective. A game theory model is utilized to analyze all parties' optimal decisions and risk management measures under climate disturbances. The reactions of the retailer and suppliers, who sell vertically differentiated substitute products, are examined, and the changes in social welfare are observed. Our analysis exhibits that (1) the retailer mitigated the negative impact of risk disturbance through product differentiation and pricing strategies and even achieved higher profits than without extreme weather events; (2) there is a possibility that the sales volume will be higher in extreme weather, which is related to the antidisturbance ability of the supply chain; and (3) although extreme weather disturbs the supply, it may lead to a win–win relationship between retailer's profit and social welfare. The operational decisions derived from this study exhibit robustness in mitigating the adverse effects of extreme weather, enabling maximization of both retailers' profits and social welfare, thus contributing to the theoretical foundation for sustainable socioeconomic systems.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1871-1887"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Firm Performance on Artificial Intelligence Implementation","authors":"Cheng-Kui Huang,&nbsp;Jheng-Siang Lin","doi":"10.1002/mde.4486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4486","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In recent years, artificial intelligence (AI) has become a focal point in academic and business research. With breakthroughs in learning algorithms, AI applications in business operations are increasingly practical and impactful. AI offers tools for market analysis, decision-making support, and innovations in business models and processes, presenting a significant turning point for firms. Despite this, questions remain about whether AI implementation yields measurable business value or is merely a trend, challenging enterprises and managers. This study provides a significant contribution by empirically examining AI impact on firm-level performance through three key indicators: financial performance, productivity, and market value. Drawing on internal financial perspectives, this research reveals that while AI adoption enhances financial performance and market value, the advantages for AI first movers and better performers are not uniformly positive across all indicators. This nuanced analysis offers managers and stakeholders a deeper understanding of the tangible value of AI, guiding more informed implementation strategies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1856-1870"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Land Misallocation and Urban Green Innovation: From the Perspective of Asymmetrical Innovation Theory","authors":"Hengzhou Xu,&nbsp;Fenghui Sun,&nbsp;Shuangliang Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4485","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>As the conflict between economic growth and environmental pollution intensifies, green innovation is gradually recognized as a pivotal strategy for promoting sustainable urban development. The unique institution is an important asymmetric resource for innovation activities, so delving into China's land institutional context represents a significant direction for both the theoretical understanding and practical application research of innovation in China. The existing framework inadequately explores the nexus between land misallocation (LM) and urban green innovation (UGI) and fails to reveal the underlying transmission mechanism fully. To bridge this gap, this paper utilizes city-level data from China spanning 2007 to 2020, takes an asymmetric innovation perspective, and empirically tests the impact of two types of land misallocation, industrial LM and sectoral LM, on the relationship between UGI. The results reveal that LM has a significantly direct negative impact on UGI in China. The results are still robust after changing the sample size, substituting explanatory variables, replacing regression models, and running endogeneity tests. Additionally, the negative impact of LM exhibits heterogeneity within sectors and cities of different economic levels, administrative ranks, and dominant industries. The mechanism testing results indicate that LM affects UGI through structural, scale, and agglomeration effects. These conclusions enrich the literature on the impact of institutions on urban green innovation and provide valuable insights into the sustainable development of cities.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1835-1855"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Impact of Subsidies on Pricing Decisions in the Battery Swapping Supply Chain Under the “Vehicle and Battery Separation” Model","authors":"Chao Li,&nbsp;Kai Fu Yuan","doi":"10.1002/mde.4470","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4470","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>To explore the impact of various subsidies on the battery swapping industry under the “vehicle and battery separation” model, a supply chain comprising a battery manufacturer, a vehicle company, and a battery leasing company is constructed. Based on the no-subsidy model, decision-making models are developed for four scenarios that involve subsidizing different entities, including the customer, the battery manufacturer, the battery leasing company, and the vehicle company. Comparative analysis is then conducted. Results show that (1) subsidies do not invariably result in companies lowering prices for their products and services. Under various subsidy strategies, companies tend to adjust their pricing strategies for products and services according to the battery leasing time and the price sensitivity coefficient of battery swapping service. (2) Government subsidies to supply chain entities may not always effectively incentivize more companies to enter the battery swapping industry. Although direct subsidy to vehicle companies could encourage their participation, promoting the involvement of battery manufacturers and leasing companies through direct subsidies may have limited effectiveness. This limitation arises because the optimal profit among various strategies is influenced by factors such as the price sensitivity coefficient of battery swapping service and the battery swapping operating cost sharing ratio. (3) To advance the demand for battery-swapping vehicles, enhance consumer surplus, and maximize social welfare, the government may prioritize subsidizing vehicle companies. However, when aiming to boost the demand for battery swapping service, the government should consider the level of price sensitivity coefficient of battery swapping service. Specifically, when the price sensitivity coefficient of battery swapping service is low, continuing to subsidize vehicle companies may be advisable. Conversely, when the price sensitivity coefficient is high, it may be more effective to provide subsidies to consumers or battery manufacturers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1816-1834"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Exclusivity Under Different Vertical Structures in Online Platforms With Network Effects","authors":"Haijun Chen,&nbsp;Qi Xu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4472","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Securing exclusive premium content can enhance a platform's competitive edge, becoming a key factor in the success of online platform competition. This study examines exclusivity strategies under vertical separation and vertical integration, assessing their impacts on the endogenous quality and pricing decisions of competing platforms, as well as on consumer and overall welfare. Our findings reveal that the platform with exclusive premium content generally increase their quality and pricing, whereas the competitor tends to lower theirs. However, network effects moderate these price increases in vertical integration. Network effects play a crucial role, making premium content provider weighs the benefits of exclusivity against the potential for broader consumer engagement through nonexclusivity. Although exclusivity always reduces consumer surplus under vertical separation, it potentially aligns with consumer surplus in vertical integration. Additionally, our analysis of asymmetric market conditions reveals that premium content provider often forms exclusive agreement with the dominant platform, exacerbating quality and price disparities. Given these dynamics, we suggest that policymakers should rigorously evaluate the impacts of exclusivity on consumer surplus, offering crucial insights for antitrust authorities on the regulatory challenges in online platform markets.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1792-1815"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Evolutionary Game Analysis of Complex Networks in Enterprise Green Technology Innovation From a Prospect Theory Perspective","authors":"Wu Guancen,&nbsp;Chen Xuan,&nbsp;Niu Xing","doi":"10.1002/mde.4468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4468","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Green technological innovation in enterprises is a key driving force for achieving sustainable development and industrial transformation. However, how enterprises formulate effective innovation strategies by integrating subjective factors with objective market conditions within complex industrial networks remains an area requiring further exploration. This study aims to construct a complex network evolution model based on prospect theory and examines how subjective factors, such as reference points, risk preferences, and loss aversion, influence the adoption of green technology innovation in different network environments. It further explores how network characteristics, including topology, size, and node degree, affect the diffusion of innovation. Numerical analysis results indicate that in scale-free networks, lowering reference points for enterprise gains, reducing loss aversion, increasing risk preference, expanding network size, and raising average node degree generally promote higher adoption of green technology innovation. In small-world networks, the dependence on reference points is relatively lower, risk preference and average node degree demonstrate more complex impacts. Additionally, a moderate rewiring probability can enhance green technology innovation adoption in small-world networks. These findings provide new insights and practical implications for understanding the driving mechanisms of green technological innovation in enterprises. They further emphasize the importance of government interventions tailored to the specific characteristics of industrial networks to effectively facilitate the diffusion of green technological innovation.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1774-1791"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Privatization Versus Managerial Delegation: Revisiting Delegation in a Mixed Duopoly","authors":"Kojun Hamada,&nbsp;Hideya Kato","doi":"10.1002/mde.4488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4488","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study revisits the issue of managerial delegation in a mixed oligopoly by focusing on whether a private firm's managerial delegation can increase firm profit and social welfare. Unlike the previous research that has focused on the effect of privatization on social welfare, we examine the impact of managerial delegation by a private firm on profit and social welfare. Using a model in which the degrees of partial privatization and managerial delegation are endogenously determined in a mixed duopoly, we derive the equilibrium degrees and demonstrate the following results. First, partial privatization is always chosen instead of full privatization or nationalization and the equilibrium degree of privatization is not monotonic with the cost-efficiency parameter. Second, profit-maximizing behavior is never chosen as a managerial delegation strategy. When marginal cost does not rise sharply with production, the private firm's owner incentivizes its manager toward a higher production cost so that the manager chooses the firm's output level more aggressively. Third, managerial delegation necessarily increases social welfare, whereas whether it increases the private firm's profit depends on the cost-efficiency parameter. When marginal cost does not rise sharply with production, a managerial delegation strategically implemented by a private firm not only increases private benefits but also contributes to enhancing public interest.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1763-1773"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can Firms Favor Location Regulation?","authors":"Dang-Long Bui","doi":"10.1002/mde.4461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4461","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Government regulations are believed to confine targeted firms' economic power, leading to a decline (rise) in producer (consumer) surplus. This paper explores the implications of location regulation in a spatially discriminatory pricing model with homogeneous products and linear transportation costs. Contrary to conventional wisdom, location regulation benefits (harms) producers but harms (benefits) consumers when firms engage in quantity (price) competition. Next, under location regulation, Bertrand firms are less (more) dispersed than Cournot firms if the transport rate is high (low). I also extend the analysis by comparing location and price regulations, as well as considering product differentiation and quadratic transportation costs.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1749-1762"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pricing Strategy of Power Supply Chain Considering Intermittent Generation","authors":"Junhai Ma,&nbsp;Weihua Liang,&nbsp;Wenjing Qi","doi":"10.1002/mde.4446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4446","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The impact of weather conditions on renewable energy stability is profound, which amplifies the fragility and security risks of energy systems. The energy storage technology has effectively alleviated the problem of intermittent new energy generation, yet the safety of these systems is pivotal for further adoption of renewable energy. This article establishes Stackelberg and long-term games for power supplier and energy storage operator dealing with intermittent energy sources. We analyze how the investment in energy storage safety and power supplier scale expansion affect the decisions and profits of both parties in the game. We also visualize the complex phenomena that occur during the long-term dynamic game process. Results indicate that improved safety performance correlates with increased prices and profits for both energy storage operators and power suppliers. Additionally, enhanced safety accompany the profit margin reduction between these parties. When the probability of high production capacity of renewable energy increases, the electricity price of energy storage operator and power supplier shows a downward trend. In long-term dynamic games, the stability of electricity price for energy storage operators is higher than that of electricity suppliers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1735-1748"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}