Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献

{"title":"Hometown Folks in the Right Places: Political Connections and Corporate ESG","authors":"Guanfei Meng,&nbsp;Shiqiang Sun,&nbsp;Jianglong Li","doi":"10.1002/mde.70124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70124","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines whether, how, and under what conditions political connections shape firms' environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance in China. Exploiting the “locality avoidance” rule, we construct hometown-based ties between municipal leaders and listed-firm executives that generate plausibly exogenous variation in political connections, and combine this with an instrumental-variable strategy based on pre-appointment executive composition and tenure-based dynamics tests. We find that hometown ties significantly raise ESG performance, with the largest gains in corporate governance, and do not increase greenwashing. Moreover, firm-level evidence—higher environmental investment, lower carbon intensity, greater charitable donations, and higher green total factor productivity—indicates substantive rather than cosmetic ESG improvements. Bureaucratic promotion pressure and clan-based regional culture amplify the effectiveness of hometown connections by strengthening officials' incentives and informal leverage over same-origin executives. Further analyses show that connected firms receive fewer environmental penalties and, among high-ESG firms, enjoy lower taxes and better access to short-term bank loans, while city-level ESG is associated with higher environmental and infrastructure spending and lower unemployment, aligning with cadre promotion criteria. Finally, the ESG gains from political connections are more pronounced in markets with stronger competition and among smaller, non-SOEs firms. Our results imply that political connections can transmit sustainability policies rather than solely facilitate rent extraction in specific institutional and competitive environments.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"47 7","pages":"1751-1766"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148862266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"R&D Organization and Corporate Social Responsibility Specialization","authors":"Quan Dong,&nbsp;Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz,&nbsp;Amagoia Sagasta","doi":"10.1002/mde.70122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70122","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we examine whether the scope of corporate social responsibility (CSR) should be broad or narrow. A broad scope covers both production and R&amp;D investment decisions, while a narrow scope applies only to production decisions. We show that both firms' choices and the government's preferences depend on the level of CSR concern and on the way firms organize their R&amp;D activities. When firms do not cooperate in R&amp;D investment, they choose a broad CSR scope, which is consistent with the government's preference. If firms cooperate through a research joint venture (RJV) in which they fully share their technological knowledge, they adopt a narrow CSR scope when their level of social concern is sufficiently high; otherwise, they choose a broad scope. Moreover, when the level of social concern is high, the government has an incentive to discourage the formation of an RJV, as it prefers firms not to cooperate and to adopt a broad CSR scope. However, when the level of social concern is intermediate, encouraging an RJV may lead firms to adopt a narrow CSR scope, which yields higher welfare than the alternative equilibrium under noncooperation.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"47 7","pages":"1767-1789"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.70122","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148862359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Impression Management in Climate Disclosures and Corporate Credit Availability","authors":"Xin Yan,&nbsp;Jintao Zhang","doi":"10.1002/mde.70123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70123","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Recent research has shown that increased sustainability disclosure is associated with greater use of corporate impression management. However, the specific benefits of these practices for firms remain unclear. This study empirically examines the effects of impression management strategies in environmental disclosure on the credit availability of climate-risk-exposed firms. The findings suggest that climate-risk-exposed firms gain improved access to credit by increasing the use of visual elements or reducing textual readability in lengthy climate disclosures. Increased use of visual elements helps create a favorable image of firms' responses to climate risks, whereas reduced textual readability helps obscure unfavorable climate performance. Empirical analyses based on environmental, social, and governance ratings support this mechanism. Further analysis shows that the effect of visual strategies in lengthy climate disclosures on credit availability is stronger among firms facing greater financing constraints and among those without violations.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"47 7","pages":"1693-1710"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148862337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Horizontal Partial Cross Ownership and Vertical Bargaining in a Bilateral Oligopoly","authors":"Yucong Ye,&nbsp;Zili Wang","doi":"10.1002/mde.70126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70126","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines the effects of horizontal partial cross ownership (PCO) in a vertical bargaining framework. We show that downstream PCO operates through two opposing mechanisms. The horizontal concentration effect raises prices, whereas the vertical mitigation effect lowers prices by enhancing buyer power and mitigating double marginalization. When the vertical mitigation effect prevails, downstream PCO yields pro-competitive outcomes and improves welfare. In contrast, upstream PCO erodes downstream firms’ bargaining leverage, dampening these pro-competitive benefits and leading to anti-competitive outcomes once it exceeds a critical threshold. Under upstream monopoly, downstream PCO has no impact on wholesale pricing, leaving only the anti-competitive horizontal concentration effect.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"47 7","pages":"1790-1799"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148862414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Obvious Versus Subliminal Advertising for Digital Content Creators","authors":"Xin Wu,&nbsp;Jian Liu,&nbsp;Chunlin Luo,&nbsp;Yang Yang","doi":"10.1002/mde.70096","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70096","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Content monetization on digital platforms, such as YouTube and TikTok, primarily relies on advertising and video views. Content creators typically employ two advertising strategies: obvious advertising and subliminal advertising. The former is a traditional and easily recognizable advertisement, whereas the latter is subtly integrated into the video content, and thus less perceptible to viewers. This study develops a game-theoretical model in which creators strategically choose advertising strategies and the amount of advertising, while user viewing behavior is affected by both advertising and content quality. We examine the impact of market factors (such as the user satiation rates, creators' unit advertising revenue, and the cost of producing subliminal advertising) on video content creation and explore the ensuing implications for creator payoff and user surplus. Our analysis yields several novel insights. First, contrary to the conventional view that excessive advertising is primarily associated with low-quality content, we find that high-quality videos may also carry substantial advertising. Moreover, creators may reduce the amount of advertising even when higher unit advertising revenue is attainable, reflecting a strategic trade-off between advertising and overall monetization. Second, subliminal advertising has a dual effect on content creation. While its heightened concealment may encourage creators to produce more high-quality videos, it can also redirect effort toward advertising design rather than content improvement. Third, under certain conditions, higher unit advertising revenue benefits both the creator payoff and user surplus, indicating that profitability and user welfare are not necessarily in conflict. Finally, when the cost of designing subliminal advertising is moderate, competition among creators leads to excessive subliminal advertising and reduces creator payoff, consistent with the Tragedy of the Commons. In this case, obvious advertising dominates; otherwise, subliminal advertising is preferred. These insights offer actionable guidance for creators in choosing advertising strategies and determining the amount of advertising to balance monetization incentives and user experience on digital platforms.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"47 7","pages":"1825-1839"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148862449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Employment Effects of Digital Transformation: From the Perspective of Backward Spillovers in the Industrial Chain","authors":"Hanwen Wang,&nbsp;Cong Wang,&nbsp;Qinian Wang,&nbsp;Rui Bao","doi":"10.1002/mde.70101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70101","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>There have been studies focusing on the impact of enterprises' digital transformation (DT) on their own development but rarely exploring the employment effects of DT from the perspective of the industrial chain. This paper explores the employment effects of DT from the perspective of backward spillovers in the industrial chain. Using the data of listed companies from 2007 to 2022, the paper constructs the “upstream-downstream-year” dataset to study the impact of the degree of DT of downstream enterprises on the employment of upstream enterprises. It is found that the DT of downstream enterprises has a significant creation effect on the employment scale of upstream enterprises. In terms of the mechanism, the DT of downstream enterprises affects the employment of upstream enterprises through the reverse effect, spillover effect, and synergistic effect. When the upstream companies have low customer concentration or are in highly competitive markets, and when the downstream enterprise is larger in scale, the employment effects of DT in downstream firms on upstream firms will be more significant. Further analysis shows that the DT of downstream firms can significantly increase the employment compensation of upstream firms and shift their employment structure toward medium- and high-skilled labor.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"47 6","pages":"1307-1320"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2026-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148695923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Common Institutional Ownership and Corporate Information Disclosure Violations: Evidence From China","authors":"Hui Wei,&nbsp;Meilin Wang,&nbsp;Yanze Li,&nbsp;Yongji Chen","doi":"10.1002/mde.70111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70111","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Common institutional ownership (CIO), as an emerging shareholding model, has attracted much attention for its governance effect on firms. Based on the sample data of Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2023, we demonstrate that CIO exerts a synergistic governance effect and inhibits corporate information disclosure violations. Mechanism tests show that CIO reduces the pressure on capital market performance and alleviates the two types of agency problems, thereby having a dampening effect on corporate disclosure violations. Moreover, this inhibitory effect is more significant in companies with higher equity balance, in non-state-owned enterprises, and in firms with higher capital intensity. The research conclusions provide new clues and basis for preventing and governing corporate information disclosure violations.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"47 6","pages":"1525-1546"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2026-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148696236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Textual Tone of Annual Reports and Market Attention: Evidence From Chinese Listed Companies","authors":"Yanyan Li","doi":"10.1002/mde.70100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70100","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines how the textual tone of annual reports shapes market attention and investigates the moderating effect of firm profitability, firm size, and Tobin's Q. Based on a comprehensive sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2022, we find that a positive tone in annual reports significantly increases market attention. Moreover, firm profit strengthens this relationship, whereas firm size and Tobin's Q weaken it. These results suggest that the credibility and effectiveness of a positive tone are enhanced when corroborated by strong financial performance. Our findings remain robust to alternative variable measurements, endogeneity tests, and multiple sample specifications. This research contributes to signaling theory and impression management literature by identifying a critical boundary condition for the efficacy of tonal strategies, with important implications for investors, regulators, and corporate disclosure practices.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"47 6","pages":"1321-1335"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2026-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148696249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Navigating New Trade Barriers: Data-Factor-Driven Digital Resilience for High Quality Development in Cross-Border E-Commerce Amid Policy Tightening","authors":"Kai Shan,&nbsp;Qiang Wang,&nbsp;Sohaib Mustafa,&nbsp;Jing Zhang,&nbsp;Tongtong Chen,&nbsp;Guolang Chen","doi":"10.1002/mde.70112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70112","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) is projected to reach a $2.5 trillion global market by 2025; however, tightening de minimis policies, which exempt low-value imports from duties, threatens its growth by introducing compliance costs and trade frictions. From a data factor-empowered digitalization perspective, this study examines the challenges posed by such regulatory shifts and the moderating role of digitalization in sustaining CBEC resilience, using a fixed effects panel regression across 50 countries (2015–2024). Drawing on institutional theory and the resource-based view, we test eight hypotheses to assess how de minimis tightening, tariffs, nontariff measures (NTMs), and customs complexity impact CBEC performance, and whether digitalization mitigates these effects. Results reveal that a 10% de minimis reduction correlates with a 14% export decline, NTMs by 5.5% per full coverage, with tariffs marginally negative, although customs complexity shows no effect. Data factor driven digitalization significantly mitigates de minimis, tariff, and NTM impacts, but falls short in customs, highlighting procedural limitations. These findings extend trade theory by quantifying data enabled digitalization in multicountry contexts, critiquing prior case-specific analyses and contribute to the high quality CBEC development under policy tightening. Practically, urge policymakers to balance revenue-driven reforms with SME-friendly digital exemptions, while firms should invest in compliance technologies to preserve $500 billion in potential CBEC losses by 2030.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"47 6","pages":"1483-1503"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2026-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148696526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimization and Coordination of Carbon Emission Reduction Investment Under Various Emission Regulations","authors":"Huixiao Yang,&nbsp;Yifan Yang,&nbsp;Jian Cao,&nbsp;Chenqi Jiang","doi":"10.1002/mde.70104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70104","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Motivated by the imperative of industrial decarbonization, this study investigates how different regulatory frameworks—Carbon Cap, Carbon Tax, and Cap-and-Trade—impact a manufacturer's carbon abatement investment and supply chain coordination. Distinct from prior literature assuming frictionless markets, we explicitly model the “bid-ask spread” in permit trading and introduce endogenous contract negotiation to resolve vertical investment inefficiencies. Our analysis yields five critical findings. First, under cap-and-trade policies with asymmetric trading prices and moderate quotas, the manufacturer optimally exhausts its allocated permits without engaging in trading, effectively treating the policy as a rigid cap. Second, we identify a unique optimal abatement level that maximizes manufacturer profit; notably, the retailer derives no incremental benefit from increases in the manufacturer's permit allocation. Third, contrary to standard intuition, we demonstrate that in markets with environmentally conscious consumers, increasing regulatory stringency can inadvertently suppress the manufacturer's emission reduction efforts. Fourth, comparing instruments reveals that cap-and-trade policies induce higher abatement levels than carbon taxes when both tax rates and assigned quotas are at their respective extremes (either very low or very high). Finally, regarding coordination, we show that perfect supply chain coordination is achievable under specific regulatory conditions if the manufacturer commits to an emission reduction level prior to negotiating order quantities and wholesale prices. These findings highlight the critical role of market frictions and bargaining power in designing effective carbon policies and operational strategies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"47 6","pages":"1377-1403"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2026-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148696424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}