Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Pricing Considering Quality: A Strategy Analysis of Payment Forms
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4445
Lei Fang, Yanlin Li, Kannan Govindan
{"title":"Pricing Considering Quality: A Strategy Analysis of Payment Forms","authors":"Lei Fang,&nbsp;Yanlin Li,&nbsp;Kannan Govindan","doi":"10.1002/mde.4445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4445","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We analyze three business models for electric vehicle power battery use: (1) pure selling strategy, (2) pure leasing strategy, and (3) innovative hybrid strategy where both the selling and leasing services are provided by one monopoly firm simultaneously. The firm decides the power battery quality. We demonstrate that the relative profitability of the monopoly firm's different strategies hinges on the customer's psychological cost and the leasing product's supply–demand ratio. Counterintuitively, for the monopoly firm, when product quality is endogenous, the hybrid strategy is not always more profitable than the pure selling strategy, which differs from the previous studies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1721-1734"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143564875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Organization Capital and Corporate Financialization: Evidence From China 组织资本与企业金融化:来自中国的证据
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-26 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4473
Yingying Qin, Yishan Zhang, Yu-en Lin, Jingbo Hu
{"title":"Organization Capital and Corporate Financialization: Evidence From China","authors":"Yingying Qin,&nbsp;Yishan Zhang,&nbsp;Yu-en Lin,&nbsp;Jingbo Hu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4473","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper investigates the impact of organization capital on corporate financialization. Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2014 to 2020, we find that organization capital is positively related to corporate financialization. After a series of robustness tests and endogeneity tests, the conclusion still holds. We further find that agency theory is the potential channel driving our findings. Precautionary savings theory, executive overconfidence theory and resource-based theory do not hold in our study. Furthermore, we find that the positive effect of organization capital on corporate financialization is stronger when firms are hit by severe external natural disasters shocks.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1701-1720"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Eco-Labels and Sales Mode Selection Strategies for E-Commerce Platform Supply Chain
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-25 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4433
Fengmin Yao, Bing Li, Yang Lv, Xu-dong Qin
{"title":"Eco-Labels and Sales Mode Selection Strategies for E-Commerce Platform Supply Chain","authors":"Fengmin Yao,&nbsp;Bing Li,&nbsp;Yang Lv,&nbsp;Xu-dong Qin","doi":"10.1002/mde.4433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4433","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The E-commerce platform supply chain (EPSC) is maturing as a result of the platform economy's growth, and an increasing number of eco-friendly producers are joining E-commerce platforms to increase the sales of their eco-friendly goods. However, without an information disclosure mechanism, customers find it challenging to completely comprehend or grasp the green information on items. Eco-labels, as a green declaration symbol, can effectively reduce the information asymmetry between consumers and manufacturers. This paper establishes four game models for the EPSC under industry and government labels, considering the reselling and agency selling modes. The effects of consumers' green perceptions, eco-label credibility, and R&amp;D cost coefficient on the operation of EPSC, consumer surplus, environmental quality improvement, and social welfare were analyzed. We find that the enhancement of consumers' green perceptions and eco-label credibility are beneficial for improving the product's greenness, increasing the profit of the E-commerce platform, consumer surplus, environmental quality improvement, and social welfare, but it may not necessarily be beneficial for the manufacturer and the overall profitability of EPSC. Additionally, the profitability of the E-commerce platform, consumer surplus, environmental quality improvement, and social welfare are more susceptible to shifts in consumers' green perceptions, whereas increasing the eco-label credibility is more beneficial to the revenues of the manufacturer and EPSC. From the perspective of pursuing profits, the industry label is often chosen by the manufacturer, whereas the E-commerce platform tends to choose the government label. Whether the optimal sales mode selection strategy of the manufacturer under the eco-label is beneficial to the E-commerce platform also depends on the size of unit production cost, commission rate, and consumers' green perceptions (eco-label credibility). Moreover, EPSC benefits most from the reselling mode under the industry label, whereas consumer surplus, environmental quality, and social welfare are better served by the reselling mode under the government label. Conversely, the manufacturer is more likely to decide to resell the product under the government label when the R&amp;D for green products is highly challenging.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"1278-1296"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143119271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Marketization of Data Elements and Enterprise Green Governance Performance: A Quasi-Natural Experiment Based on Data Trading Platforms
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-25 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4471
Weilong Wang, Deheng Xiao
{"title":"Marketization of Data Elements and Enterprise Green Governance Performance: A Quasi-Natural Experiment Based on Data Trading Platforms","authors":"Weilong Wang,&nbsp;Deheng Xiao","doi":"10.1002/mde.4471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4471","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Green corporate governance not only contributes to the sustainable development of enterprises but also promotes the overall environmental improvement of society, achieving a win–win situation for both the economy and the environment. With the development and progress of society, data factors have become a key motivator for corporate green governance, and the promotion of marketization of data elements (MDE) is of great significance in releasing data factor dividends and strengthening the green development system. It is particularly important to clarify the correlation between enterprise green governance performance (GGP) and data factor marketization as a necessary path for the sustainable development of Chinese enterprises. Using data from listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2010 to 2022, as well as the creation of a data trading platform as a quasi-natural experiment for building data factor markets, this research investigates the impacts of MDE on GGP. We found that MDE significantly contributes to GGP. After going through several robustness tests, this conclusion holds up. The mechanism verifies that data factor marketization promotes GGP by enhancing firms' innovation capability, optimizing data utilization, and alleviating firms' financing constraints. Through heterogeneity analysis, this paper explores how enhancing human capital level, developing high-tech firms, and developing digital finance can further contribute to the promotional effect of data factor marketization on firms' GGP. Finally, the analysis of economic consequences finds that data factor marketization not only enhances the GGP of enterprises but also brings about economic effects and enhances the value of enterprises. This paper effectively identifies the green governance effect of data factor marketization from the GGP perspective, which offers crucial policy recommendations for advancing GGP in the era of big data.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1686-1700"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Digital Content Provision Under Virtual Tipping
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4432
Wenche Wang
{"title":"Digital Content Provision Under Virtual Tipping","authors":"Wenche Wang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4432","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The proliferation of digital technology has introduced innovative engagement features between content producers and viewers. Virtual tipping, a novel form of revenue generation, allows viewers to award producers with virtual currency in real-time. In this paper, we develop a model where content producers generate revenue from both advertisements and virtual tips, aiming to explore how virtual tipping influences the differentiation of digital content. Unlike previous models, we assume that content producers make prior product decisions before entering the platform and can adjust their content in response to platform incentives and viewer demand. Content producers face a trade-off between expanding market coverage for higher advertisement revenue and prioritizing viewer satisfaction for increased virtual tipping. We derive a platform-streamer contract involving two incentive devices: a share of virtual tipping revenue and mediated search. Our results suggest that virtual tipping reduces content differentiation, except in cases where differentiation is already minimal. Consequently, virtual tipping encourages both the platform and content producers to prioritize viewer satisfaction, which can be welfare improving. However, the integration of mediated search amplifies virtual tipping's downward force on differentiation, which may counteract the welfare gains.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"1265-1277"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143116467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strengthened Through Collaborations: Convergence of Interfirm and Intrafirm Knowledge Exchange for Improving Informal Economy SMEs' Sustainability Performance
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-18 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4435
Ayodotun Stephen Ibidunni, Obaloluwa Obed Oyewo, Ranti Falana, Edwin Okoro
{"title":"Strengthened Through Collaborations: Convergence of Interfirm and Intrafirm Knowledge Exchange for Improving Informal Economy SMEs' Sustainability Performance","authors":"Ayodotun Stephen Ibidunni,&nbsp;Obaloluwa Obed Oyewo,&nbsp;Ranti Falana,&nbsp;Edwin Okoro","doi":"10.1002/mde.4435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4435","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The role of knowledge exchange (KE) between and across firms has been widely studied. However, KE dimensions that reflect a sequence of interfirm and intrafirm KE among SMEs in emerging economies remain scantily examined in the literature. We fill this gap by investigating the direct and direct effects of KE dimensions on the SMEs sustainable performance (SP). Our analysis of 264 SME owner/owner-managers, using the PLS-SEM, showed that although there is no direct relationship between knowledge exchange from business collaboration (KEBC) and knowledge exchange during training (KET), KEBC and KET impact on the SP dimensions. Also, KET mediates the relationship between KEBC and SP. Our study arises among the few investigations that have given credence to developing economy informal SMEs' role in the sustainability discourse.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"1315-1329"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143116157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Loss Aversion, Moral Hazard, and Stochastic Contracts 损失规避、道德风险和随机合约
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-18 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4459
Hoa Ho
{"title":"Loss Aversion, Moral Hazard, and Stochastic Contracts","authors":"Hoa Ho","doi":"10.1002/mde.4459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4459","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I examine whether stochastic contracts benefit the principal under moral hazard and loss aversion. Incorporating the agent's expectation-based loss aversion and allowing for stochastic contracts, I find that stochastic contracts reduce the principal's cost as compared with deterministic contracts. The optimal stochastic contract pays a high wage not only when good signals are realized but also with a positive probability after the realization of bad signals. The findings have an important implication for designing contracts for loss-averse agents: the principal should insure the agent against wage uncertainty by employing stochastic contracts that increase the probability of a high wage.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1677-1685"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4459","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Efficiency Assessment of Mutual Fund With Risk and Negative Data: An Improved Two-Stage Network SBM Model
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-16 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4464
Xiao Shi, Zhuo Pei, Xinle Liu
{"title":"Efficiency Assessment of Mutual Fund With Risk and Negative Data: An Improved Two-Stage Network SBM Model","authors":"Xiao Shi,&nbsp;Zhuo Pei,&nbsp;Xinle Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4464","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper innovatively proposes an improved two-stage network SBM model, which could handle negative data and incorporates the CVaR indicator representing risks in efficiency evaluation. The proposed approach is utilized to evaluate and analyze the overall efficiency and two subsystems' efficiencies of 29 mutual funds in China from 2018 to 2022. Empirical results demonstrate that both operational management efficiency and portfolio management efficiency significantly impact overall efficiency. Funds exhibiting excellent performance in operational management subsystem are more likely to achieve outstanding overall performance. Based on the empirical results, some policy recommendations are proposed.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1645-1660"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evaluating Causal Effects of Increasing Block Pricing Policy on Residential Electricity Consumption in China
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-16 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4466
Zheng Fang, Thai-Ha Le, Jiang Yu, Manyi Fan
{"title":"Evaluating Causal Effects of Increasing Block Pricing Policy on Residential Electricity Consumption in China","authors":"Zheng Fang,&nbsp;Thai-Ha Le,&nbsp;Jiang Yu,&nbsp;Manyi Fan","doi":"10.1002/mde.4466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4466","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using two waves of the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), a nationally representative longitudinal household-level survey, this paper investigates how residential electricity consumption is affected by the increasing block pricing (IBP) policy nationwide. The results from the difference-in-differences approach suggest that the IBP policy is effective in reducing households' electricity consumption, and the reduction size is about 43 and 120 kWh for households affected by the second and third block pricing, respectively. Compared to rural households, urban households are found to be less impacted by the IBP policy. Besides, there are heterogeneous effects across various income groups, though the trend of the treatment effects is inconsistent. The findings are proved to be robust to different study samples and different model specifications.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1661-1676"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pricing Power Conflict and Cooperation Strategies of Competing Two-Sided Platforms: Impact of the Differentiated Value-Added Services and Cross-Network Effects 相互竞争的双面平台的定价权冲突与合作策略:差异化增值服务和跨网络效应的影响
IF 2.5 3区 经济学
Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-16 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4460
Huabao Zeng, Tong Shu, Yue Yu, Jinhong Li, Shouyang Wang
{"title":"Pricing Power Conflict and Cooperation Strategies of Competing Two-Sided Platforms: Impact of the Differentiated Value-Added Services and Cross-Network Effects","authors":"Huabao Zeng,&nbsp;Tong Shu,&nbsp;Yue Yu,&nbsp;Jinhong Li,&nbsp;Shouyang Wang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4460","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Since pricing power plays a pivot role in platforms' pricing strategies and services investment, thereby influencing the competitive landscape between the two platforms. This study investigates the pricing power preferences within a two-sided manufacturing platform ecosystem, where a large-scale platform (platform <i>L</i>) competes with a small-specialized platform (platform <i>R</i>) for bilateral users through differentiated value-added services (VAS) level. Both platforms exhibit cross-network externality and engage in pricing power competition. Three endogenous pricing power modes are available, including horizontal Nash (mode B), platform <i>L</i>-price-leader Stackelberg (mode L), and platform <i>R</i>-price-leader Stackelberg (mode R). The optimal solutions under each mode and characterize the equilibrium evolution of pricing power preferences are derived. Findings reveal that at the low VAS level stage for platform <i>L</i>, mode R realizes equilibrium when the hassle cost is low; mode L realizes equilibrium when the hassle cost is high. At the high VAS level stage for platform <i>L</i>, mode L realizes equilibrium when the hassle cost is high; mode R realizes equilibrium only when the hassle cost is low and cross-network externality is in a high range. Notably, competing platforms will trap into the pricing power conflict when both platforms strategically second moves in announcing prices. Therefore, this study proposes two feasible strategies for platform cooperation: joint revenue and VAS cost-sharing and transfer payment. These strategies can reach a “win–win” outcome when sharing ratios are moderate or payment meets suitable thresholds. This study not only enhances the theory of two-sided markets but also provides strategic guidance for platform competition and cooperation.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1628-1644"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信