Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献_第2页

The Impact of Enterprise Digital Transformation on ESG Performance: Evidence from China 企业数字化转型对ESG绩效的影响：来自中国的证据

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-06 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4525

Hong Zhang, Jiehua Liu, He Jiang

引用次数: 0

Coordination of Risk-Averse Behaviors in a Green Supply Chain-to-Chain Competition 绿色供应链竞争中风险规避行为的协调

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-06 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4523

Zhen Chen, Kaveh Khalilpour, Rui Zhao

引用次数: 0

A Temporally Contingent View of Dynamic Managerial Capabilities 动态管理能力的时间偶然性观点

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4513

Andreas Engelen, Oliver Schilke, Verena Rieger, Michael Engels

{"title":"A Temporally Contingent View of Dynamic Managerial Capabilities","authors":"Andreas Engelen, Oliver Schilke, Verena Rieger, Michael Engels","doi":"10.1002/mde.4513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4513","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article contributes to research on dynamic managerial capabilities, which examines managerial impact on firms' strategic change. Specifically, we study the role of managerial social capital—a key underpinning of dynamic managerial capabilities—in organizations' strategic change. We propose a temporally contingent account that elucidates how the fitness of dynamic managerial capabilities unfolds across life cycle stages and varying degrees of change pressures. We start by testing our theoretical model using data on 20,593 individuals in 5522 new ventures over a period of 5 years. A key insight from our quantitative analysis is that dynamic managerial capabilities are particularly valuable during convergent periods, when both external pressures to accomplish strategic change and inertial forces are increasing. Our subsequent interpretivist study, aimed at elaborating the mechanisms underlying the social capital-funding effect, reveals that the types of resources and strategic changes spurred by social capital differ markedly across time. Overall, our paper enriches dynamic capabilities scholarship by highlighting that the effects of these capabilities are substantially time-variant.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 5","pages":"3123-3141"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144214145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Legitimacy Building in Entrepreneurial Ecosystems—A Process Perspective for Sustainable Entrepreneurs 创业生态系统中的合法性构建——可持续企业家的过程视角

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-03 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4518

Felix Toepler, Vivek Velamuri

引用次数: 0

Does the National Big Data Comprehensive Experimental Zone Pilot Policy Effectively Promote the ESG Performance of Firms? Evidence From Listed Firms in China 国家大数据综合试验区试点政策能否有效提升企业ESG绩效？来自中国上市公司的证据

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-03 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4521

Jun Li, Ying Wang, Shizhi Liang, Peng Zhou, Ao Zhang

{"title":"Does the National Big Data Comprehensive Experimental Zone Pilot Policy Effectively Promote the ESG Performance of Firms? Evidence From Listed Firms in China","authors":"Jun Li, Ying Wang, Shizhi Liang, Peng Zhou, Ao Zhang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4521","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Enhancing firms' ESG performance has become an important issue for promoting sustainable economic development. Nowadays, the application of big data technology may have a significant impact on firms' ESG performance, but research in this area remains relatively insufficient. Based on the quasi-natural experiment of the national big data comprehensive experimental zone pilot policy (NBDCEZs) in China, this study employs panel data from 1383 Chinese nonfinancial listed firms from 2009 to 2022. We utilize the difference-in-differences (DID) method to explore the impact of big data development on ESG performance. The results indicate that the implementation of the NBDCEZs has a significant positive effect on enhancing firms' ESG performance. The mechanism analysis suggests that the policy effectively improves firms' ESG performance by strengthening information disclosure quality and alleviating financing constraints. Additionally, the heterogeneity analysis finds that the positive effects of big data development are more pronounced in state-owned firms, firms with higher financial risk, and regions with lower levels of informatization. This study provides insights for policymakers and business decision-makers on promoting sustainable development in the era of the digital economy.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 5","pages":"3106-3122"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144214068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Bright Side of Price Guarantee for Retailers in a Decentralized Distribution Channel 分散分销渠道下零售商价格保证的光明面

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-03 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4515

Xiaoyang Lei, Donghui Yang, Siyu Gong

{"title":"The Bright Side of Price Guarantee for Retailers in a Decentralized Distribution Channel","authors":"Xiaoyang Lei, Donghui Yang, Siyu Gong","doi":"10.1002/mde.4515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4515","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Online retailers usually refund the price difference to consumers after a product price reduction, which is known as price guarantee. This paper delves into the implications of price guarantee within supply chains that integrate one manufacturer, one retailer, and consumers within two sale periods. Employing a game model, we first find that the presence of price guarantee always reduces wholesale prices but first reduces and then improves retail prices from the first sale period to the next period. This dynamic shift proves advantageous for both the manufacturer and the retailer, leading to higher total profits with price guarantee compared to scenarios without such guarantee. This outcome is attributed to the mitigation of the double marginalization effect in the initial period and the subsequent rise in retail prices during the latter period. We observe an initial decrease followed by an increase in profits of the manufacturer and the retailer in response to the degree of price guarantee. Concurrently, the dynamics of consumer surplus exhibit an initial increase, followed by a subsequent decrease with the extent of price guarantee. Our findings suggest that the retailer's optimal level of price guarantee is nonmonotonic with market shrinkage.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 5","pages":"3067-3086"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144214069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Optimal Design and Selection of Software Outsourcing Contracts in the Presence of Bilateral Moral Hazard 存在双边道德风险的软件外包合同优化设计与选择

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-27 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4499

Guofeng Tang, Xinxing Liu

{"title":"Optimal Design and Selection of Software Outsourcing Contracts in the Presence of Bilateral Moral Hazard","authors":"Guofeng Tang, Xinxing Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4499","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In the realm of software outsourcing, client participation throughout the software development lifecycle is of paramount importance in determining the success rate of projects. Effective collaboration between clients and software developers is crucial for improving project quality. However, the privacy surrounding their efforts often leads to bilateral moral hazard challenges. To address these complex issues, this study employs the Nash bargaining game theory to construct a theoretical analysis framework for the design and selection of performance-based contracts and time-and-materials contracts. The research finds that comparing the cost-efficiency parameters and effort elasticity coefficients of both clients and developers can reveal the relative magnitude of their respective effort levels. Furthermore, the reward coefficients in both types of contracts are closely related to the software developer's cost of fixing bugs, the client's sensitivity to bugs, and debugging time. Additionally, the reward coefficient in time-and-materials contracts is also influenced by the software developer's effort costs. Through comparative static analysis, the study further discovers that if clients are generally sensitive to software bugs, performance-based contracts exhibit better incentive effects than time-and-materials contracts; if clients are highly sensitive to software bugs, time-and-materials contracts are preferable to performance-based contracts.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 5","pages":"3016-3038"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144214277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Optimal Decision Analysis in Competing Supply Chains Considering Manufacturer's Misreporting Behavior and Blockchain Technology 考虑制造商误报行为和区块链技术的竞争供应链最优决策分析

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-26 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4497

Jun Zhao, Tao Li, Qi Tan, Bin Liu

{"title":"Optimal Decision Analysis in Competing Supply Chains Considering Manufacturer's Misreporting Behavior and Blockchain Technology","authors":"Jun Zhao, Tao Li, Qi Tan, Bin Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4497","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study investigates the impact of manufacturers' cost misreporting and blockchain technology on supply chain pricing, member performance, and coordination. We find that while manufacturers may not always have incentives to misreport their costs, when misreporting occurs, it intensifies the double marginalization effect, which negatively impacts both the retailer and the entire supply chain. Moreover, misreporting consistently benefits the rival manufacturer, regardless of whether it also misreports. We identify three possible equilibria in manufacturers' misreporting behavior: both misreporting, one misreporting, and neither misreporting. Additionally, the retailer's adoption of blockchain technology can improve supply chain performance, but its effectiveness depends on factors such as product substitutability and implementation costs. Interestingly, blockchain often leads to better outcomes for manufacturers compared to misreporting. Furthermore, cost-sharing agreements with manufacturers can make blockchain adoption more feasible. In the absence of blockchain, a two-part tariff contract can help effectively coordinate the supply chain. Overall, this study offers valuable insights into the practical application and regulation of blockchain technology in supply chains.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 5","pages":"3000-3015"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144214202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A Study on the Co-Opetition Game Between Low-Carbon Supply Chains Under Carbon Cap-and-Trade Policy 碳限额与交易政策下的低碳供应链合作竞争博弈研究

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-21 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4505

Fang Li, Yijing Yang, Wenmin Zhang, Jiajia Li

引用次数: 0

Are Quality Improvement and Store Brand Introduction Always Effective Strategies Under the Online Platform Case? 在线平台案例下，质量提升和门店品牌导入是否始终是有效策略？

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-20 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4503

Jie Wei, Kaili Wang

{"title":"Are Quality Improvement and Store Brand Introduction Always Effective Strategies Under the Online Platform Case?","authors":"Jie Wei, Kaili Wang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4503","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Recently, many platform operators (p-operators) have introduced store brands (SBs), which brings sales competition with suppliers' national brands (NBs) sold through these p-operators with reselling or agency-selling agreement. Confronting the encroachments of p-operators' SBs, many suppliers usually conduct quality improvement to maintain the high-end brand reputation of their NBs. We utilize the analytical model to investigate the effectiveness of quality improvement and SB introduction strategies in an online platform supply chain. Results reveal that the supplier always benefits from conducting quality improvement irrespective of the p-operator's SB introduction strategy. The p-operator always benefits from introducing SB if the supplier conducts quality improvement under reselling case, whereas this result cannot always hold under agency-selling case. Although SB introduction hurts the supplier's profit, conducting quality improvement could mitigate the negative effect of p-operator's SB on the supplier's profit. Counterintuitively, SB introduction may not necessarily decrease the NB's demand when the supplier conducts quality improvement. We also find that the supplier and p-operator have a chance to achieve Pareto optimality under agency-selling case, and the increased commission rate or/and brands substitutability would enlarge the chance of achieving Pareto optimality.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 5","pages":"2945-2967"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144214266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0