分散分销渠道下零售商价格保证的光明面

IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Xiaoyang Lei, Donghui Yang, Siyu Gong
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引用次数: 0

摘要

网上零售商通常在产品降价后将差价退还给消费者,这被称为价格保证。本文探讨了在两个销售周期内整合一个制造商、一个零售商和消费者的供应链中价格保证的含义。利用博弈模型,我们首先发现价格保证的存在总是降低批发价格,但从第一个销售周期到下一个销售周期,零售价格先降低后提高。事实证明,这种动态转变对制造商和零售商都是有利的,与没有价格保证的情况相比,有价格保证的情况下总利润更高。这一结果归因于最初阶段的双重边缘化效应得到缓解,以及随后后期零售价格的上涨。我们观察到,由于价格保证的程度,制造商和零售商的利润首先下降,然后增加。同时,消费者剩余的动态表现为初始增加,随后随着价格保证的程度而下降。我们的研究结果表明,零售商的最优价格保证水平是非单调的,市场萎缩。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Bright Side of Price Guarantee for Retailers in a Decentralized Distribution Channel

Online retailers usually refund the price difference to consumers after a product price reduction, which is known as price guarantee. This paper delves into the implications of price guarantee within supply chains that integrate one manufacturer, one retailer, and consumers within two sale periods. Employing a game model, we first find that the presence of price guarantee always reduces wholesale prices but first reduces and then improves retail prices from the first sale period to the next period. This dynamic shift proves advantageous for both the manufacturer and the retailer, leading to higher total profits with price guarantee compared to scenarios without such guarantee. This outcome is attributed to the mitigation of the double marginalization effect in the initial period and the subsequent rise in retail prices during the latter period. We observe an initial decrease followed by an increase in profits of the manufacturer and the retailer in response to the degree of price guarantee. Concurrently, the dynamics of consumer surplus exhibit an initial increase, followed by a subsequent decrease with the extent of price guarantee. Our findings suggest that the retailer's optimal level of price guarantee is nonmonotonic with market shrinkage.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
18.20%
发文量
242
期刊介绍: Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.
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