Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献

{"title":"How to Achieve Cooperative Emission Reduction in Low-Carbon Service Supply Chains: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Study","authors":"Yingying Xu,&nbsp;Jinshi Wang,&nbsp;Ao Cheng,&nbsp;Lijing Wang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4453","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In a low-carbon service supply chain, consisting of a carbon-dependent manufacturer and a low-carbon service company, a dual contract for revenue sharing and guaranteed carbon reduction promotes sustainable collaboration and emission reduction. However, adjusting contract terms and collaborative relationships when negative cooperative behavior occurs or a collaboration impasse arises remains underexplored. Thus, we constructed an evolutionary game model to analyze cooperative behaviors between carbon-dependent manufacturers and low-carbon service companies. Through stability analysis, we identify conditions for active commitment. Importantly, potential negative strategies may hinder optimal cooperative emission reduction, leading to a cooperative deadlock. Numerical simulations reveal the following: (1) Higher guaranteed carbon reduction targets or moderate liquidated deposit can prevent negative behaviors. (2) Changing the allocation ratio of carbon trading revenue or government subsidies helps the chain move towards cooperation. (3) Service innovation facilitates positive cooperation; however, low-carbon service companies must possess the capability to translate their level of service innovation into carbon reduction performance. Furthermore, the mechanisms through which utilitarian and exploratory service innovations influence cooperative decision-making differ. (4) When supply chain members find themselves in a decision-making impasse, in addition to moderately increasing the carbon reduction guarantee amount or the penalties for failing to meet carbon reduction targets, enhancing the distribution ratio of carbon trading revenues for carbon-dependent manufacturers, increasing the allocation of government subsidies, and implementing service innovations can also help break the deadlock. (5) Combined carbon trading policies and government subsidies effectively promote sustainability compared to singular adoption. These findings impact cooperative emission reduction in low-carbon service supply chains and policy formulation. The conclusions of this paper have implications for the maintenance of cooperative emission reduction relationships among members in the operation of low-carbon service supply chains and the formulation of policies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1602-1627"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Research on the Conditions and Operational Strategies of the Retailer's Participation in Omnichannel Returns Cooperation","authors":"Yanyan Zheng,&nbsp;Jin Zhang,&nbsp;Tieshan Wang,&nbsp;Nengmin Wang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4456","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In the context of online retailing, many e-commerce platforms have begun to explore omnichannel returns cooperation modes that are practical and satisfy consumers' offline channel preferences in response to the rising online return rate and the growth of consumer preference for returning products to physical stores. The purpose of this paper is to investigate what conditions the offline retailer will choose to participate in an omnichannel returns cooperation strategy and how the cooperation brings value to both sides of the alliance. Based on the consideration of consumers' differentiated purchase and return modes and whether the retailer participates in omnichannel returns cooperation, this paper first derives the consumer utility functions for the buy online and return online (BORO) mode, the buy offline and return offline (BS) mode, and the buy online and return in store (BORS) mode before and after the omnichannel returns cooperation. This paper then constructs profit expressions for an online e-commerce platform and offline retailer before and after omnichannel returns cooperation and further explores the conditions and value of the offline retailer's willingness to participate in omnichannel returns cooperation. According to the study, the following interesting and important conclusions have been drawn. First, the participation of the offline brick-and-mortar retailer in an omnichannel returns strategy can introduce a new channel, which can help facilitate the integration of online and offline channels. Second, when the proportion of the online-type consumer is low, the larger the critical point of composite return cross-selling benefit required by the offline brick-and-mortar retailer, the lower the equilibrium price caused by their participation in omnichannel returns cooperation. Third, when the proportion of online-type consumer exceeds a certain threshold and the online return cost of consumers is less than the offline return cost can the brick-and-mortar retailer enhance the return service experience to attract consumers and thus further increase profits. In the analyses of retail operations, these findings can offer guidance for the implementation of omnichannel returns and the development of appropriate operational plans for the physical business. The conclusions can provide directional suggestions for brick-and-mortar retailers to conduct omnichannel return practices and help formulate reasonable strategies for new retail operations.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1584-1601"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Service Guarantee Decision of Online Service Providers and Market Implications","authors":"Aijun Lu,&nbsp;Fuzan Chen,&nbsp;Harris Wu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4441","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Online services face quality uncertainties. To address user concerns, Online Service Providers (OSPs) sometimes provide service guarantees, compensating users if quality falls below a predefined threshold. This paper analyzes how OSPs use service guarantees to navigate market competition and enhance revenue through game theory and queuing theory models. Key findings include the following: offering guarantees enable OSPs to increase prices; in monopolistic markets, guarantees are offered only if the service guarantee strength is sufficient, whereas in competitive markets, decisions depend on relative strengths and competitor actions. Surprisingly, slower response times under service guarantees can boost profits, especially when resource costs are high.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"1405-1419"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4441","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143113984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Outsourcing Strategy Selection of Original Brand Manufacturers in the Fashion Industry Under the Influence of Brand Spillover","authors":"Bing Jiang,&nbsp;Zhou Fang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4454","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Outsourcing strategy plays an essential role in manufacturing production. Compared to traditional manufacturing industries, brand spillover behavior from contract manufacturers is more prominent in the fashion industry's outsourcing practices. Therefore, we have developed a model for original brand manufacturers (OBM) to choose an outsourcing strategy under the influence of various factors: OBM can outsource production to a competing manufacturer (CM), a non-competing manufacturer (NCM), or produce internally. If CM is the only contractor for OBM, it will enhance its brand power through brand spillover. If NCM is the only contractor for OBM, there are quality control issues. In summary, we consider three outsourcing strategies for the OBM: outsourcing production to CM, outsourcing to NCM, or establishing internal production, which correspond to strategies C, N, and F, respectively. We find that the brand spillover has a greater impact on OBM than expected. It affects OBM's production planning by influencing market demand, resulting in the profit of strategy C always being lower than strategy N. This forces OBM to face quality control issues. On this basis, we discuss blockchain technology that enables OBM to address quality control issues while dealing with brand spillovers. Interestingly, blockchain technology does not always bring benefits and can only solve problems under specific conditions. In addition, we also prove that the dual-source strategy, that is, OBM outsources production to CM and NCM simultaneously, is better than the C and N strategies, but whether it is better than the F strategies depends on the investment cost.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1571-1583"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Incentive Contract, Equity Pooling, and Optimal Securitization Design","authors":"Yuqian Zhang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4455","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines the optimal security design and financing structure for investment funds, considering investors with heterogeneous risk preferences. The private equity (PE) fund serves as an information intermediary that plays a crucial role in aligning incentives and facilitating financing activities. To address the potential misalignment between incentive structures and financing requirements, we develop an integrated framework that incorporates both internal moral hazard and external financing decisions. Our analysis demonstrates that optimal equity incentives effectively align the interests of fund manager and PE fund, thereby enhancing fund performance. The results indicate that the optimal financing mechanism comprises a “waterfall” structure consisting of equity, senior bonds, and junior bonds. Furthermore, we find that pooling equity and issuing asset-backed securities substantially reduce financing costs, although these costs increase with the size of the financing gap. The dual information asymmetry framework offers novel insights into structured financing and corporate growth strategies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1558-1570"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Green Technology Investment and Production Decisions Considering Stochastic Demand and Firms' Decision Preferences Under Cap-and-Trade Regulation","authors":"Chenchong Ding,&nbsp;Shuai Jin","doi":"10.1002/mde.4449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4449","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper investigates how finite rational firms optimally respond to market potential under cap-and-trade regulation, considering stochastic demand. Using the mean–variance model framework, we develop an optimization model for green technology investment and production by finite rational firms with different decision-making preferences. The main results indicate: (1) Under stable demand, firms investing in green technology gain more profits and consumer surplus, however, the effectiveness of carbon emission reduction depends on the market potential size. (2) Under stochastic demand, optimal decisions resulting from firms' varying decision preferences systematically deviate from those of risk-neutral firms and often demonstrate firms' risk-averse tendencies that lean towards conservatism. As external factors change, there can even be a reversal in technology investment with an increase in demand uncertainty that amplifies this systematic deviation. (3) Taking firms with different decision-making preferences as the starting point, this study further analyses the distortion effect of the firm's risk attitude on the optimal technology investment and production decisions, enriching the related research on the joint decision-making risk model of clean production. And it is more pertinent to the complex situation firms face in the real situation with decision-making. (4) This study provides a theoretical basis and practical reference for the finite rational firms facing green technology investment choices. Considering the risk-averse characteristics of firms, this study suggests that the government should establish a risk-sharing mechanism to weaken the deviation of stochastic demand from the optimal decision-making of firms or implement certain subsidy policies to protect the profit level of firms.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1535-1557"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143564968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Information-Sharing Strategies Based on Trust Risks Under a Governmental Incentive Mechanism","authors":"Xiao Fu,&nbsp;Shuxuan Niu,&nbsp;Guanghua Han","doi":"10.1002/mde.4442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4442","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Due to swift shifts in market demand and variable production capacities within the chip industry, trust risks between upstream and downstream entities can readily develop, leading to challenges in information sharing. To tackle this challenge, this paper develops a two-level evolutionary game model between vehicle manufacturers and chip suppliers. It examines the effects of government rewards and penalties, trust risks, and spillover benefits from information sharing on the strategic decisions of both parties. Furthermore, the paper investigates system evolution strategies under three distinct government policies: forced, fair, and favored. The findings show that as trust risks escalate, both entities in the supply chain tend to withhold information due to concerns over losing their unique competitive advantages. However, enhancing spillover benefits through information sharing positively impacts the mitigation of trust risks. Numerical simulations demonstrate that while a government-forced policy with increased penalties may boost information sharing in the short term, it proves less effective over the long term. Conversely, preferred rewards and subsidies under equitable policies can significantly boost one party's readiness to share information, thus enhancing cooperation between the two parties. The paper also offers countermeasures and recommendations. For instance, it suggests that upstream and downstream enterprises should not only foster mutual trust but also vigilantly track government policy directions to develop effective information-sharing strategies. Furthermore, government industrial policies should fully consider the actual market conditions to alleviate trust risks between upstream and downstream entities and promote information sharing among enterprises.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1501-1519"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143564774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Design of Reward Tiers in Crowdfunding: Eschewing Acknowledgments and Prioritizing Promotion","authors":"Liangchen Fan,&nbsp;Jin Qin,&nbsp;Yao Yao","doi":"10.1002/mde.4450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4450","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study investigates how reward tier design impacts crowdfunding performance. We innovatively categorize reward tiers into three utilitarian types—basic, promotional, and one-dollar—and we consider hedonic acknowledgments of types public and personal. By analyzing data from 2471 Kickstarter projects (with 20,183 tiers), we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the number of promotional tiers and fundraising performance. In contrast, offering more basic tiers or having a one-dollar tier hinders fundraising. Counterintuitively, neither public nor personal acknowledgments in reward tiers are positively related to the fundraising performance. These new insights provide guidance for practice in crowdfunding.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 3","pages":"1520-1534"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143564775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Carbon Transition Risk, Emissions Trading Schemes, and Firm Performance: International Evidence","authors":"Van Thi Thuy Vu,&nbsp;Khanh Hoang,&nbsp;Toan Luu Duc Huynh","doi":"10.1002/mde.4434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4434","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study investigates the impact of carbon transition risk and emissions trading schemes (ETSs) on the firm performance using a sample of 401,692 firm-quarter observations from 64 countries and territories during the 2010–2019 period. Using the Paris Agreement 2015 as the quasi-natural experiment, our difference-in-differences analysis provides robust evidence of carbon transition risk enhancing heavy polluter firms' performance in countries that implemented ETS, but it is not the case for their counterparts. Our findings suggest the importance of ETS implementation in the sustainable development and demonstrate strong heterogeneity in the impact of carbon transition risk on corporate outcomes.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"1297-1314"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143110560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Platform or Third-Party Service Provider? An Analysis of Logistics Mode Selection Strategy for Manufacturers in E-Commerce Supply Chains","authors":"Ting Chen,&nbsp;Xiuyi Zhang,&nbsp;Fu Jia","doi":"10.1002/mde.4419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4419","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In recent years, the rise of e-commerce has led to the dominance of some platforms in the market. Both these platforms and third-party logistics providers are now offering online logistics services. Under this context, the brand manufacturers face challenges of deciding whether to outsource their logistics needs to third-party logistics service providers (LSPs), rely on the e-commerce platform itself, or establish collaborative partnerships with them. The combination between the decision to outsource or cooperate and the choice of service providers yields four typical scenarios: outsourcing to the platform without cooperation (Case PB), outsourcing to the platform with cooperation (Case P), outsourcing to the LSP without cooperation (Case LB), and outsourcing to the LSP with cooperation (Case L). This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to investigate the manufacturer's optimal selection of logistics mode. We examine the economic and environmental performances of four logistics modes, with a particular emphasis on the mutual benefits and costs shared between manufacturers and their logistics partners. Our results reveal that collaboration in sustainable logistics improvement leads to higher sustainability levels, augmented logistics fees, and increased sales volumes compared to noncollaborative strategies. Additionally, we find that outsourcing to the e-commerce platform generally results in higher profits and superior environmental performance for manufacturers, contingent upon the sustainability enhancement being sufficiently effective. Empirical evidence from surveys and interviews with industry experts supports our theoretical findings, underscoring the critical role of collaboration in achieving both economic and environmental sustainability within the supply chain. This study contributes to the literature on logistics outsourcing by evaluating manufacturers' strategic decisions in selecting logistics modes and accentuates the importance of cooperation in advancing sustainable logistics practices.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"1040-1061"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143120669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}