Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献_第3页

How to address enterprise collusion in falsifying carbon emission data: A game theory analysis 如何解决企业串通伪造碳排放数据的问题：博弈论分析

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-06 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4380

Yong Sun, Xinqi Yang, Runtian Wu, Guangxiang Gong, Tianjie Lei

引用次数: 0

Carbon trading price and carbon performance of high energy-intensive enterprises 碳交易价格与高能耗企业的碳绩效

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-06 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4386

Yu Feng, Yutao Lei

{"title":"Carbon trading price and carbon performance of high energy-intensive enterprises","authors":"Yu Feng, Yutao Lei","doi":"10.1002/mde.4386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4386","url":null,"abstract":"Separating the relationship between the environment and the economy and simply discussing the impact of carbon pricing on corporate carbon emissions may lead to the “green paradox”. That is, environmental policies aimed at reducing emissions would result in an increase in carbon emissions. To remedy this shortcoming, scholars have proposed the concept of “carbon performance”. With the growing interest in carbon performance, this study investigates the relationship between carbon trading price and enterprise carbon performance, which is still unknown in the existing literature. Based on the panel data of high energy-intensive (HEIs) listed enterprises in China from 2013 to 2021, we find a positive and significant relationship between carbon trading price and carbon performance. In the components, we find that the carbon performance enhancement effect is stronger for high industry competition, state-owned enterprises and large-scale enterprises. In addition, to explore the impact of external influences on the relationship, we select financing constraints and environmental uncertainty as moderating variables. This research provides new insights to enhance the carbon performance of HEIs, as well as experiences and lessons for the construction of China's carbon emissions trading market.","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"489-501"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142860248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Clear the fog: Can public–private collaborative supervision promote the construction of a high-quality public health system? 拨开迷雾公私合作监督能否促进高质量公共卫生体系的建设？

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-05 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4349

Neng Shen, Jing Zhang, Yang Chun Cao, Lin Zhang, Guoping Zhang

{"title":"Clear the fog: Can public–private collaborative supervision promote the construction of a high-quality public health system?","authors":"Neng Shen, Jing Zhang, Yang Chun Cao, Lin Zhang, Guoping Zhang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4349","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4349","url":null,"abstract":"Approaches to stimulating the initiative of collaborative cooperation of multiple subjects and the enthusiasm of public–private collaborative supervision are important to ensure the high-quality development of the social public health system. This study constructs a four-agent evolutionary game model with a medical enterprise, health administrative department, medical institution, and the social public as the core subjects. Using MATLAB 2018b to conduct simulation analysis, the cooperation strategy and operation mechanism of multiple subjects in the social public health system under public–private collaborative supervision are revealed, and the evolutionary stability strategy of multiple subjects under different situations is further explored. The results show (1) three evolutionary stability points in the system, which all exist in a state of loose government supervision. (2) Increasing the penalty limit can effectively regulate the behavior of medical enterprises and medical institutions; however, it is not conducive to the performance efficiency of the government in the long run. (3) Government incentives can stimulate the enthusiasm of all subjects to participate in the social public health system but should be controlled within a reasonable range. Excessive financial incentives make it easy for medical enterprises and institutions to form policy dependence.","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"52-66"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Carbon differentials and dual channels: The choice and impact of optimal strategies for manufacturer market encroachment 碳差和双通道：制造商蚕食市场的最佳战略选择及其影响

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-05 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4378

Yan Tang, Yunpei Cheng

引用次数: 0

Low-carbon supplier selection in the presence of government subsidy 政府补贴下的低碳供应商选择

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4368

Yang Xia, Yang Hui, Huang Hongfu, Zhu Siyuan, Yu Qingling

{"title":"Low-carbon supplier selection in the presence of government subsidy","authors":"Yang Xia, Yang Hui, Huang Hongfu, Zhu Siyuan, Yu Qingling","doi":"10.1002/mde.4368","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4368","url":null,"abstract":"Given that the impact of consumers' environmental awareness and government subsidies on retailer sourcing has not been adequately examined in previous research, our study examines the impact of government subsidies on a retailer's low-carbon sourcing strategies. We define a parameter that characterizes the efficiency of government subsidies and build a game theoretical model that includes an ordinary supplier, a low-carbon supplier, and a retailer. The retailer's sourcing strategies include three options: only ordinary products (O), only low-carbon products (L), and both ordinary and low-carbon products (D). Our analysis shows the following results: First, when the retailer's environmental awareness exceeds a certain threshold, the retailer sources either low-carbon products or a combination of ordinary and low-carbon products. Otherwise, the retailer sources both ordinary and low-carbon products. Second, when the retailer's environmental awareness is relatively high, the government adopts a nonsubsidy policy regardless of the product's abatement level. However, when the retailer's environmental awareness is relatively low, the government's policy depends on the abatement level of the product: It provides a subsidy if the abatement level is low and no subsidy if the abatement level is high. Third, government subsidies to the retailer are not always an effective means of increasing social welfare. Our results have important implications for the design of effective government subsidy policies.","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"183-200"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142191047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Robust pricing and inventory decisions in ship-from-store omnichannel operations 从商店发货的全渠道运营中的稳健定价和库存决策

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4348

Yue Sun, Ruozhen Qiu, Minghe Sun

引用次数: 0

Harnessing the power of module markets for effective product recovery strategies 利用模块市场的力量制定有效的产品回收战略

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4375

Xuxin Lai, Li Zhou, Nengmin Wang, Tao Jia

引用次数: 0

Imported inputs and productivity: Unraveling the dynamics in India's manufacturing sector 进口投入与生产率：解读印度制造业的发展动态