Optimal Product Quality and Live Streaming Introduction Strategy for Brand Owners Considering Information Interaction and Deceptive Promotion

IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Cuihua Zhang, Xiangru Zhao, Henry Xu
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The information interaction features and deceptive promotion phenomena in live streaming e-commerce significantly influence consumers' purchase decisions, directly affecting brand owners' choices regarding their live streaming strategies. In light of this, the impacts of information interaction and deceptive promotion on the purchase behavior of strategic consumers are considered, and a two-period model of consumer utility and brand owner profit is constructed under nine optional sales scenarios. By optimizing the equilibrium solutions to models and conducting a comparative analysis, this study explores the impacts of factors such as informative degree, deceptive promotion degree, and penalty costs on the brand owner's optimal strategy of product quality and the selection of live streaming modes (including whether to provide live streaming, when to introduce it, and whether to conduct deceptive promotion during live streaming) under different scenarios. Moreover, the conditions in which the brand owner is more inclined to opt for deceptive promotion strategies are revealed. These findings provide optimal operational strategies for brand owners in live streaming sales while offering support for government and regulatory agencies seeking effective measures to combat deceptive promotion.

考虑信息交互和欺骗性促销的品牌商最优产品质量与直播导入策略
直播电商中的信息交互特征和欺骗性促销现象显著影响消费者的购买决策,直接影响品牌商的直播策略选择。鉴于此,本文考虑了信息互动和欺骗性促销对战略消费者购买行为的影响,构建了九种可选销售场景下消费者效用与品牌商利润的两期模型。本研究通过对模型的均衡解进行优化,并进行对比分析,探讨不同场景下,信息程度、虚假推广程度、处罚成本等因素对品牌商产品质量最优策略和直播模式选择(包括是否提供直播、何时引入直播、直播中是否进行虚假推广)的影响。此外,还揭示了品牌所有者更倾向于选择欺骗性促销策略的条件。这些研究结果为品牌商在直播销售中提供了最佳运营策略,同时为政府和监管机构寻求有效措施打击欺骗性促销提供了支持。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
18.20%
发文量
242
期刊介绍: Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.
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