网络行业的最优连锁交叉所有制吗?

IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Domenico Buccella, Luciano Fanti, Luca Gori
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引用次数: 0

摘要

常识表明,在古诺双寡头模式中,非控制性、相互关联的交叉持股总是有利可图的。因此,最大的利润是通过互惠50%左右的所有权份额获得的,这允许垄断利润。通过对网络产业的分析,我们发现在网络效应和企业间产品兼容程度不同的情况下,交叉持股可能无利可图。特别是,交叉持股的最佳百分比值明显低于50% -甚至0% -总是存在的。因此,我们为无利可图的交叉持股提供了一个新的理由。这一结果向反垄断机构发出了政策警告。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Is Optimal Interlocking Cross-Ownership for the Network Industry?

Common wisdom suggests that noncontrolling, interlocking crossholdings is always profitable in a Cournot duopoly model. Therefore, the maximal profit is obtained by a reciprocal share of ownership of about 50%, which allows for the monopoly profit. By contrast, we analyze a network industry and show that crossholdings can be unprofitable under network effects and variable degree of product compatibility between firms. In particular, an optimal percentage value of crossholdings significantly less than 50%—or even 0%—always exist. Thus, we provide a new reason for unprofitable crossholdings. This result offers a policy warning to anti-trust agencies.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
18.20%
发文量
242
期刊介绍: Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.
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