{"title":"网络行业的最优连锁交叉所有制吗?","authors":"Domenico Buccella, Luciano Fanti, Luca Gori","doi":"10.1002/mde.4540","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n <p>Common wisdom suggests that noncontrolling, interlocking crossholdings is always profitable in a Cournot duopoly model. Therefore, the maximal profit is obtained by a reciprocal share of ownership of about 50%, which allows for the monopoly profit. By contrast, we analyze a network industry and show that crossholdings can be unprofitable under network effects and variable degree of product compatibility between firms. In particular, an optimal percentage value of crossholdings significantly less than 50%—or even 0%—always exist. Thus, we provide a new reason for unprofitable crossholdings. This result offers a policy warning to anti-trust agencies.</p>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 6","pages":"3520-3526"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Is Optimal Interlocking Cross-Ownership for the Network Industry?\",\"authors\":\"Domenico Buccella, Luciano Fanti, Luca Gori\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/mde.4540\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div>\\n \\n <p>Common wisdom suggests that noncontrolling, interlocking crossholdings is always profitable in a Cournot duopoly model. Therefore, the maximal profit is obtained by a reciprocal share of ownership of about 50%, which allows for the monopoly profit. By contrast, we analyze a network industry and show that crossholdings can be unprofitable under network effects and variable degree of product compatibility between firms. In particular, an optimal percentage value of crossholdings significantly less than 50%—or even 0%—always exist. Thus, we provide a new reason for unprofitable crossholdings. This result offers a policy warning to anti-trust agencies.</p>\\n </div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":18186,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Managerial and Decision Economics\",\"volume\":\"46 6\",\"pages\":\"3520-3526\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-04-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Managerial and Decision Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.4540\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Managerial and Decision Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.4540","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Is Optimal Interlocking Cross-Ownership for the Network Industry?
Common wisdom suggests that noncontrolling, interlocking crossholdings is always profitable in a Cournot duopoly model. Therefore, the maximal profit is obtained by a reciprocal share of ownership of about 50%, which allows for the monopoly profit. By contrast, we analyze a network industry and show that crossholdings can be unprofitable under network effects and variable degree of product compatibility between firms. In particular, an optimal percentage value of crossholdings significantly less than 50%—or even 0%—always exist. Thus, we provide a new reason for unprofitable crossholdings. This result offers a policy warning to anti-trust agencies.
期刊介绍:
Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.