Technology Licensing, Network Externalities and Social Welfare in Cournot Differentiated Duopoly

IF 2.5 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI:10.1002/mde.4528

Ke Yan, Leonard F. S. Wang, Longfei Gao

引用次数: 0

Abstract

The present paper establishes a horizontal differentiated-good Cournot duopoly with an inside patent-holding firm (licensor) under general network externalities to examine the superiority of fixed-fee licensing versus royalty licensing. We find that for the licensor, royalty licensing is superior to fixed-fee licensing if the network effect is weak and the degree of product differentiation is low. In addition, both consumer surplus and social welfare are higher under fixed-fee licensing in the presence of network externalities.

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古诺差异化双寡头的技术许可、网络外部性与社会福利

本文在一般网络外部性条件下，建立了一个具有内部专利持有企业（许可方）的横向差异化商品古诺双寡头垄断，以检验固定费用许可与特许权使用费许可的优越性。研究发现，对于许可方而言，在网络效应较弱、产品差异化程度较低的情况下，特许权使用费许可优于固定费用许可。此外，在存在网络外部性的情况下，固定费用许可下的消费者剩余和社会福利都更高。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Managerial and Decision Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

18.20%

发文量

242

期刊介绍： Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.