Bonus Scheme, Managerial Delegation, and Quantity Competition

IF 2.5 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-23 DOI:10.1002/mde.4476

Chung-Hui Chou

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This note examines if owners would offer a bonus for each unit of output dependent on both firms' output levels in equilibrium and the impacts on market performances. The main contribution is showing that owners may lessen quantity competition more than the standard Cournot by adopting the relative quantity delegation in which they offer an incentive scheme based on profit plus a bonus for each unit of output that decreases in their own output levels but increases in rivals' ones. Consequently, contrary to conventional wisdom, output delegation increases profitability but reduces consumers' surplus.

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奖金制度、管理授权与数量竞争

本文考察了所有者是否会根据两家公司在均衡状态下的产出水平和对市场表现的影响，为每单位产出提供奖金。其主要贡献在于表明，通过采用相对数量授权，所有者可能比标准古诺更能减少数量竞争。在这种授权中，他们提供了一种基于利润和每单位产出奖金的激励方案，这种奖励使自己的产出水平下降，而使竞争对手的产出水平上升。因此，与传统观点相反，产出授权增加了盈利能力，但减少了消费者剩余。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Managerial and Decision Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

18.20%

发文量

242

期刊介绍： Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.