Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献_第7页

Research on Knowledge Payment Product Supply Chain Governance Based on Blockchain: An Evolutionary Game Model

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-28 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4412

Lili Liu, Changxin Luo

{"title":"Research on Knowledge Payment Product Supply Chain Governance Based on Blockchain: An Evolutionary Game Model","authors":"Lili Liu, Changxin Luo","doi":"10.1002/mde.4412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4412","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Blockchain provides a new opportunity to govern the dilemmas in the knowledge payment product supply chain. This paper introduces blockchain into the evolutionary game to explore the behavioral strategies of knowledge providers, platforms, and consumers and to analyze in depth the influence of initial willingness and blockchain-related factors by the system dynamics. The analysis shows that (1) improving the tripartite initial willingness is conducive to accelerating the process of supply chain governance and making the system reach an ideal state: knowledge providers choose compliance creation, platforms adopt blockchain, and consumers buy authorized product; (2) there are specific thresholds for the blockchain adoption cost and the premium of product brought by blockchain, only when the cost and premium are lower than the thresholds, the system evolves towards the ideal state; (3) when blockchain is adopted, it can effectively inhibit knowledge providers' illegal creation behavior and consumers' piracy behavior by increasing the punishments of platforms on knowledge providers and consumers. The results provide guidance to implement effective governance and the orderly development of knowledge payment industry.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"928-946"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143120270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Advance and Spot Selling Strategy Under Quality Information Asymmetry

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-28 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4421

Pengfei Zhao, Qiang Guo

引用次数: 0

Bribery Transfer Among Foreign-Invested Firms in Vietnam

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-28 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4401

Thao Binh Thi Vuong, Thang Ngoc Bach, Ngoc Thi Bich Vu

{"title":"Bribery Transfer Among Foreign-Invested Firms in Vietnam","authors":"Thao Binh Thi Vuong, Thang Ngoc Bach, Ngoc Thi Bich Vu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4401","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Bribery in international business is an important field of study, but lack of research examines which types of firms are more likely to pursue bribery transfer, or subcontracting bribery-related transactions to the third party or intermediaries, instead of handling themselves. We conduct an empirical investigation into this issue using rich data from the PCI survey, which has been conducted annually in Vietnam during the period 2017–2020. The empirical results show that, in dealing with risks associated with bribery engagement, foreign-invested firms in Vietnam pursue two different types of risk self-controlling and risk transferring. Investors from OECD countries, subsidiaries of multi-national corporations, and firms with larger bribery amount are more likely to pursue risk transferring strategy by subcontracting bribery-related transactions to intermediaries, compared to the other firms' cohorts. Firms operating a longer time in Vietnam and bigger sized ones are more likely to follow risk self-controlling strategy by handling bribery-related transactions themselves. These results are robust while controlling for firms' legal status, year-fixed effects, and, especially, nonresponse and selection biases, which are inherent in the bribery decision process. This study thus contributes greatly to international business in emerging economies where foreign-invested firms exhibit heterogenous motives in dealing with risks associated with bribery-related transactions.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"734-754"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143120549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Effect of Technological Innovation, Servitisation and Human Capital Structure on Performance in Manufacturing Enterprises

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-28 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4413

Miao Ying, Shi Yue, Jing Hao

引用次数: 0

Joint Investment and Pricing Decisions in a Mobile Game Supply Chain Considering Risk Attitudes

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-23 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4410

Jiali Qu, Jiawei Zhang, Benyong Hu, Chao Meng

{"title":"Joint Investment and Pricing Decisions in a Mobile Game Supply Chain Considering Risk Attitudes","authors":"Jiali Qu, Jiawei Zhang, Benyong Hu, Chao Meng","doi":"10.1002/mde.4410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4410","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper studies the joint decision-making problem of investment and pricing in a mobile game supply chain with a game developer and a distribution platform with different risk attitudes. The investment here involves the mobile game's quality investment during the development process and promotion investment during the operation process. First, the mean–variance utility theory is used to describe the risk attitudes of the supply chain participants. On this basis, considering the mobile game's individualized operational characteristics with respect to production and sales, the supply chain's and its participants' decision-making models are established with the expected utility as an objective function. Second, the supply chain collaboration is modeled as a Stackelberg game. This paper obtains the optimal decisions of the participants and reveals the effects of the participants' risk attitudes on the optimal quality investment, promotion investment, and pricing policy. Finally, this paper further reveals the relationship between participants' risk attitudes and their expected profits. It is found that participants' risk attitudes will change the relationship between the expected profits under centralized decision-making and those under decentralized decision-making. These characteristics remain valid when a different demand format is employed or the supply chain members play a Nash game.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"891-909"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143118532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Agency mode selection and software competition in supply chains 供应链中的代理模式选择和软件竞争

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-22 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4385

Tinghai Ren, Nengmin Zeng, Dafei Wang, Kaifu Yuan

{"title":"Agency mode selection and software competition in supply chains","authors":"Tinghai Ren, Nengmin Zeng, Dafei Wang, Kaifu Yuan","doi":"10.1002/mde.4385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4385","url":null,"abstract":"<p>At present, many software developers work with downstream service providers to sell software and services. For political or economic reasons, foreign developers may be not allowed to sell software and services directly in the country of providers, but they can authorize their software to the providers for sale. In this study, we examine two types of IT supply chain (ITSC), namely, “Agenting Domestic Software” (Mode 1) and “Agenting Foreign Software” (Mode 2), each with a domestic developer/a foreign developer, a service provider, and client enterprises. In both modes, clients can either pay a high price to purchase software with accessorial pre-sale service from the provider, or firsthand acquire it from the domestic developer at a low price but without pre-sale service. We observe that in Mode 1, the domestic developer's market scale and the competition intensity of software have no effect on the domestic developer's decisions and profit; however, they have influences on the provider's decisions and profit. In Mode 2, the profits of ITSC members may increase with the intensity of software competition. When the domestic developer's market scale is small (large), and the domestic developer has (loses) the advantage of low extended-warranty-service (EWS) cost, Mode 1 (2) is more beneficial to the domestic developer than Mode 2 (1); however, the provider is more willing to choose Mode 2 (Mode 1). In other cases, either Mode 1 or Mode 2 may result in a win-win situation for the domestic developer and provider.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"469-488"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142861962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Optimizing Pricing Strategies for Product Lines and Value-Added Services: Accounting for Reference Prices and Network Effects

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-22 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4408

Wei Qi, Ziwei Li, Yongfeng Ma, Xuwang Liu

引用次数: 0

How Does AI Affect the Pay Gap Within Firms: Mechanism Analysis Based on Personnel Structure and Corporate Investment

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-20 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4400

Qiang Wu

引用次数: 0

Resilience in Cyclicality: Impact of Inventory Management Efficiency on Operational Profitability

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-15 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4406

Samuel Yeboah, Frode Kjærland, Irena Kustec

{"title":"Resilience in Cyclicality: Impact of Inventory Management Efficiency on Operational Profitability","authors":"Samuel Yeboah, Frode Kjærland, Irena Kustec","doi":"10.1002/mde.4406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4406","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The cyclical and non-cyclical nature of the consumer goods industry presents unique dynamics that require discernment in analyzing working capital (WC). These firms often deal with considerable inventory levels that create costs and liquidity challenges, particularly during economic downturns. This paper investigates the impact of inventory days (InvD) on operating margin (OM) in both demand-stable and demand-sensitive businesses. The empirical analysis employs system GMM regression with a sample of publicly traded US consumer goods firms from 2010 to 2022. The findings reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between InvD and OM among cyclical companies, indicating that these firms require a comparatively lower optimal inventory level (108 days) to maximize profitability at 3%. The results highlight the importance of strategic inventory management (IM) under varying economic and demand conditions and balancing the risks of stock-outs against the costs of overstocking to optimize profitability. This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of inventory dynamics on operating profit in stable and volatile markets. It estimates the optimal inventory level that enhances profitability and predicts the optimal inventory dynamics for maximum profit.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 2","pages":"832-842"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4406","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143115533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Influence of R&D Intensity on Supply Chain Transparency: Evidence From the Disclosure Substitution Perspective

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-15 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4402

Junqin Sun, Fangjun Wang, Chongchong Lyu, Yu Wang

引用次数: 0