Managerial and Decision Economics最新文献_第7页

The Bright Side of Price Guarantee for Retailers in a Decentralized Distribution Channel 分散分销渠道下零售商价格保证的光明面

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-03 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4515

Xiaoyang Lei, Donghui Yang, Siyu Gong

{"title":"The Bright Side of Price Guarantee for Retailers in a Decentralized Distribution Channel","authors":"Xiaoyang Lei, Donghui Yang, Siyu Gong","doi":"10.1002/mde.4515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4515","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Online retailers usually refund the price difference to consumers after a product price reduction, which is known as price guarantee. This paper delves into the implications of price guarantee within supply chains that integrate one manufacturer, one retailer, and consumers within two sale periods. Employing a game model, we first find that the presence of price guarantee always reduces wholesale prices but first reduces and then improves retail prices from the first sale period to the next period. This dynamic shift proves advantageous for both the manufacturer and the retailer, leading to higher total profits with price guarantee compared to scenarios without such guarantee. This outcome is attributed to the mitigation of the double marginalization effect in the initial period and the subsequent rise in retail prices during the latter period. We observe an initial decrease followed by an increase in profits of the manufacturer and the retailer in response to the degree of price guarantee. Concurrently, the dynamics of consumer surplus exhibit an initial increase, followed by a subsequent decrease with the extent of price guarantee. Our findings suggest that the retailer's optimal level of price guarantee is nonmonotonic with market shrinkage.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 5","pages":"3067-3086"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144214069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Optimal Design and Selection of Software Outsourcing Contracts in the Presence of Bilateral Moral Hazard 存在双边道德风险的软件外包合同优化设计与选择

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-27 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4499

Guofeng Tang, Xinxing Liu

{"title":"Optimal Design and Selection of Software Outsourcing Contracts in the Presence of Bilateral Moral Hazard","authors":"Guofeng Tang, Xinxing Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4499","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In the realm of software outsourcing, client participation throughout the software development lifecycle is of paramount importance in determining the success rate of projects. Effective collaboration between clients and software developers is crucial for improving project quality. However, the privacy surrounding their efforts often leads to bilateral moral hazard challenges. To address these complex issues, this study employs the Nash bargaining game theory to construct a theoretical analysis framework for the design and selection of performance-based contracts and time-and-materials contracts. The research finds that comparing the cost-efficiency parameters and effort elasticity coefficients of both clients and developers can reveal the relative magnitude of their respective effort levels. Furthermore, the reward coefficients in both types of contracts are closely related to the software developer's cost of fixing bugs, the client's sensitivity to bugs, and debugging time. Additionally, the reward coefficient in time-and-materials contracts is also influenced by the software developer's effort costs. Through comparative static analysis, the study further discovers that if clients are generally sensitive to software bugs, performance-based contracts exhibit better incentive effects than time-and-materials contracts; if clients are highly sensitive to software bugs, time-and-materials contracts are preferable to performance-based contracts.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 5","pages":"3016-3038"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144214277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Optimal Decision Analysis in Competing Supply Chains Considering Manufacturer's Misreporting Behavior and Blockchain Technology 考虑制造商误报行为和区块链技术的竞争供应链最优决策分析

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-26 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4497

Jun Zhao, Tao Li, Qi Tan, Bin Liu

{"title":"Optimal Decision Analysis in Competing Supply Chains Considering Manufacturer's Misreporting Behavior and Blockchain Technology","authors":"Jun Zhao, Tao Li, Qi Tan, Bin Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4497","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study investigates the impact of manufacturers' cost misreporting and blockchain technology on supply chain pricing, member performance, and coordination. We find that while manufacturers may not always have incentives to misreport their costs, when misreporting occurs, it intensifies the double marginalization effect, which negatively impacts both the retailer and the entire supply chain. Moreover, misreporting consistently benefits the rival manufacturer, regardless of whether it also misreports. We identify three possible equilibria in manufacturers' misreporting behavior: both misreporting, one misreporting, and neither misreporting. Additionally, the retailer's adoption of blockchain technology can improve supply chain performance, but its effectiveness depends on factors such as product substitutability and implementation costs. Interestingly, blockchain often leads to better outcomes for manufacturers compared to misreporting. Furthermore, cost-sharing agreements with manufacturers can make blockchain adoption more feasible. In the absence of blockchain, a two-part tariff contract can help effectively coordinate the supply chain. Overall, this study offers valuable insights into the practical application and regulation of blockchain technology in supply chains.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 5","pages":"3000-3015"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144214202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A Study on the Co-Opetition Game Between Low-Carbon Supply Chains Under Carbon Cap-and-Trade Policy 碳限额与交易政策下的低碳供应链合作竞争博弈研究

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-21 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4505

Fang Li, Yijing Yang, Wenmin Zhang, Jiajia Li

引用次数: 0

Are Quality Improvement and Store Brand Introduction Always Effective Strategies Under the Online Platform Case? 在线平台案例下，质量提升和门店品牌导入是否始终是有效策略？

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-20 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4503

Jie Wei, Kaili Wang

{"title":"Are Quality Improvement and Store Brand Introduction Always Effective Strategies Under the Online Platform Case?","authors":"Jie Wei, Kaili Wang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4503","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Recently, many platform operators (p-operators) have introduced store brands (SBs), which brings sales competition with suppliers' national brands (NBs) sold through these p-operators with reselling or agency-selling agreement. Confronting the encroachments of p-operators' SBs, many suppliers usually conduct quality improvement to maintain the high-end brand reputation of their NBs. We utilize the analytical model to investigate the effectiveness of quality improvement and SB introduction strategies in an online platform supply chain. Results reveal that the supplier always benefits from conducting quality improvement irrespective of the p-operator's SB introduction strategy. The p-operator always benefits from introducing SB if the supplier conducts quality improvement under reselling case, whereas this result cannot always hold under agency-selling case. Although SB introduction hurts the supplier's profit, conducting quality improvement could mitigate the negative effect of p-operator's SB on the supplier's profit. Counterintuitively, SB introduction may not necessarily decrease the NB's demand when the supplier conducts quality improvement. We also find that the supplier and p-operator have a chance to achieve Pareto optimality under agency-selling case, and the increased commission rate or/and brands substitutability would enlarge the chance of achieving Pareto optimality.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 5","pages":"2945-2967"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144214266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Evaluating Financial Efficiency of Microfinance Institutions: Evidence From India 评估小额信贷机构的金融效率：来自印度的证据

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-20 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4510

Ramjeevan Prasad Das, Manish Kumar Jha, Amit Prakash Jha

{"title":"Evaluating Financial Efficiency of Microfinance Institutions: Evidence From India","authors":"Ramjeevan Prasad Das, Manish Kumar Jha, Amit Prakash Jha","doi":"10.1002/mde.4510","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4510","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The present study uses the MIX Market database to evaluate the financial efficiency of 30 diverse microfinance institutions (MFIs) in India based on their legal status, such as banks, NBFIs, NGOs, and credit unions from 2015 to 2019, which is rare in the existing research. To enhance the reliability of our financial efficiency assessments, we employed an intricate econometric method using two-stage network data envelopment analysis (DEA) and bootstrap techniques. We additionally applied the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) to determine changes in efficiency over time in the Indian context. The research provides valuable insights into MFI performance using network data envelopment analysis, the Bootstrap model, and the Malmquist Productivity Index. The results yield that Bharat Financial, Rashtriya Seva Samiti, and Lok Biradri Trust are the most efficient institutions, and Annapurna Co-operative has the lowest efficiency of 0.6920 per overall average financial efficiency score, whereas Dhosa has the most significant overall MPI score. On average, these MFIs have a financial efficiency rate of 85.5%, with a mean efficiency score of 0.835 in stages 1 and 2 and 0.97544 total MPI. Hence, the MFIs are financially efficient and sustainable. These findings emphasize and provide invaluable insights to the government and industry practitioners in their policy-making to improve the essential role that MFIs play in promoting sustainable development and accomplishing the goal of poverty alleviation, contributing to the economic development and empowerment of poor people.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 5","pages":"2968-2985"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144214265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Should Both Platforms Be Kept Operational After a Merger of Two Social Media Businesses? 两家社交媒体公司合并后，这两个平台是否应该继续运营？

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-18 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4508

Soumya Kanta Mishra, Sumit Sarkar, Apratim Guha

引用次数: 0

Marketization as a Catalyst: Understanding the Impact of Digital Economies on Green Innovation in Mainland China 市场化作为催化剂：了解数字经济对中国大陆绿色创新的影响

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-16 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4509

Yunchen Cai, Muhammad Umair, Nawal Abdalla Adam, Ruilian Zhang, Sanjar Mirzaliev, Claudia Chang

{"title":"Marketization as a Catalyst: Understanding the Impact of Digital Economies on Green Innovation in Mainland China","authors":"Yunchen Cai, Muhammad Umair, Nawal Abdalla Adam, Ruilian Zhang, Sanjar Mirzaliev, Claudia Chang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4509","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Amid global environmental challenges, understanding how digital economies drive green innovation is critical, especially within China's market-based socialist framework. This study investigates how the digital economy and marketization jointly influence ecological innovation across 31 provinces in mainland China from 2011 to 2023. By integrating panel data analysis with a theoretical framework linking digital economic growth, marketization, and green innovation, this research uncovers key dynamics shaping sustainable development. Findings reveal that advancements in the digital economy significantly promote regional green innovations, with marketization serving as a vital conduit that amplifies this effect. Moreover, marketization exhibits dual impacts, both enhancing and moderating the sustainability outcomes driven by digital growth. These insights offer theoretical contributions by clarifying the causal mechanisms among digital economies, market forces, and innovation, while practically suggesting the need for a collaborative “enterprise-public-government” framework and robust market-driven innovation systems to foster green development.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 5","pages":"2895-2910"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144213761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Should Manufacturer Adopt Cross-Brand Trade-In Strategy in Cooperation With Recycling Platform? 厂商与回收平台合作是否应采取跨品牌折价策略？

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-16 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4514

Bin Zheng, Sijie Li, Wenli Xiao

引用次数: 0

Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Reform: Evidence From China 市场对公司治理改革的反应：来自中国的证据

IF 2.5 3区经济学

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-14 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4498

Haitian Wei, Rasidah Mohd-Rashid, Agung Masyad Fawzi, Chai-Aun Ooi, Haixuan Wei

引用次数: 0