Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal最新文献_第2页

Can Public and Private Sanctions Discipline Politicians? Evidence from the French Parliament 公共和私人制裁能惩戒政客吗?来自法国议会的证据

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2018-04-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3170990

L. Maxime, Benjamin Monnery

{"title":"Can Public and Private Sanctions Discipline Politicians? Evidence from the French Parliament","authors":"L. Maxime, Benjamin Monnery","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3170990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3170990","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the effects of sanctions on the behavior of deputies in the French National Assembly. In 2009, the Assembly introduced small monetary sanctions to prevent absenteeism in weekly standing committee meetings (held on wednesday mornings). Using a rich monthly panel dataset of parliamentary activity for the full 2007-2012 legislature, we study the reactions of deputies to (i) the mere eligibility to new sanctions, (ii) the actual experience of a salary cut, and (iii) the public exposure of sanctioned deputies in the media. First, our diff-in-diff estimates show very large disciplining effects of the policy in terms of committee attendance, and positive or null effects on other dimensions of parliamentary work. Second, exploiting the timing of exposure to actual sanctions (monthly salary cuts versus staggered media exposure), we find that deputies strongly increase their committee attendance both after the private experience of sanctions and after their public exposure. These results suggest that monetary and reputational incentives can effectively discipline politicians without crowding out intrinsic motivation. Abstract This paper investigates the effects of sanctions on the behavior of deputies in the French","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126976536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

More than Control: Partisan Differences in the Use of Statutory Constraints on the Bureaucracy 超越控制:对官僚机构使用法定约束的党派差异

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2018-03-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3154577

Matthew J. Denny

引用次数: 1

Constructing and Repairing Our Bridges: Statistical Considerations When Placing Agents into Legislative Preference Space 建造和修复我们的桥梁:将代理人置于立法偏好空间时的统计考虑

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2018-03-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3107266

K. Esterling

引用次数: 0

The Relative Influence of Appropriation Subcommittees: Institutional Structure and Program Performance 拨款小组委员会的相对影响:制度结构和项目绩效

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2018-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/pbaf.12169

S. Kasdin

引用次数: 0

Taming the European Parliament: How Member States Reformed Economic Governance in the EU 驯服欧洲议会:成员国如何改革欧盟经济治理

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2017-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3079621

Edoardo Bressanelli, Nicola Chelotti

{"title":"Taming the European Parliament: How Member States Reformed Economic Governance in the EU","authors":"Edoardo Bressanelli, Nicola Chelotti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3079621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3079621","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to assess the role of the European Parliament (EP) in the recent reforms of the EU’s economic governance. It shows that, despite the post-Lisbon communitarisation of the EMU policy-making, the impact of the EP was limited. Based on original interview data and a wealth of primary and secondary sources, it reveals that the EP was only able to produce limited ‘first-order changes’ (i.e., adjustments to the details of the policy regime), whereas it had almost no influence on the goals and instruments of the EMU. The paper argues that the limited influence of the EP can be explained by the dominant role member states (still) play in the EMU. They defined the ‘policy core’ of economic and budgetary policies (in terms of sound public finances and low inflation) before the upgrade of the EP’s powers with the Lisbon treaty, and using several strategies they defended it successfully in the post-Lisbon context. The paper reviews the key policies adopted by the EU to tackle the crisis – from the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact to legislation on the Banking Union – and identifies five strategies through which the Council (often in tandem with the Commission) successfully managed to curb the influence of the EP.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127071006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Enhanced Representation and Local Engagement: A Preliminary Review and Assessment of the Platforms Project 加强代表性和地方参与:平台计划的初步检讨和评估

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2017-08-25 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3026605

D. Guinn

引用次数: 0

In Defense of Majoritarianism 为多数主义辩护

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2017-03-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3377655

S. Winer

{"title":"In Defense of Majoritarianism","authors":"S. Winer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3377655","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3377655","url":null,"abstract":"The majoritarian parliamentary electoral system of Canada has been in existence in the same form since the founding of the modern state in 1867. In this short paper I offer a defense of Majoritarianism when the alternative is some form of Proportional Representation. While the individual arguments I employ are well known, the train of reasoning here is, to my knowledge, unusual in the current Canadian context. These remarks were prepared as an opening statement for a debate on electoral reform at a Faculty of Public Affairs conference in honor of Carleton University's 75th anniversary, March 3, 2017. The debate arose because of the Prime Minister's announced intention to replace the current system with some other during the election campaign that led to his victory in 2015. The debate occurred several months after the release of a lengthy report on electoral reform by a special all-party committee of the House of Commons. A few weeks before the debate, the Prime Minister announced (independently of the debate, of course) that his government would no longer pursue electoral reform, perhaps because it looked like he would not be able to avoid a referendum, a process which is hard to control. In any event, and especially in the light of recent attempts to change the electoral system both at the federal level and in some provinces, I think it is important for people to understand why the existing electoral system is a sensible one that likely will continue to serve us reasonably well.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131670180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Normative Construction of Legislative Intent 立法意图的规范建构

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2016-10-29 DOI: 10.5771/9783748925842-11

Ralf Poscher

{"title":"The Normative Construction of Legislative Intent","authors":"Ralf Poscher","doi":"10.5771/9783748925842-11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748925842-11","url":null,"abstract":"Legislative intent is not only important for the legitimacy of large parts of the law. More fundamentally it is also central to an analytical reconstruction of legal hermeneutics. As amongst others the work of Paul Grice and Donald Davidson has highlighted, non-natural signs acquire their meaning only through the communicative intentions that are connected to them. No meaning, no interpretation and no hermeneutics of linguistic expressions can exist without communicative intentions, be they factual or fictive. Central to communicative intentions is an intentional subject. For codified law, that means the legislature. Without a convincing reconstruction of legislative intent, the whole analytical reconstruction of legal hermeneutics fails to get off the ground. In modern legal systems, however, legislation is a collective process involving often several hundred individuals. In the more recent literature the thus raised issues of collective intentionality have often been addressed by pointing to reductive accounts in the theory of action and group agency. There is, however, little reason to be confident that the conditions of reductive accounts of collective intentionality, which have been designed for small sized groups, can be met by the legislature. The essay shows why this is the case even if we take the anaphoric character of the vote on legislation into account. The anaphoric analysis of the voting act, however, allows to reveal the linguistic structure of our legislative practices and the normative assumptions build into it. It then becomes apparent, how our talk of legislative intent relies on normative ascriptions of communicative intentions to individual legislators. It is via normative ascriptions of intentions – also ubiquitous in other areas of the law – that we arrive at the necessary overlap of communicative intentions for a reductive account of legislative intent. This normative construction of legislative intent has to be distinguished from legal construction as a practice to amend the law mainly in cases where legislative intent runs out.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115170241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Abandoning the Federal Role in Education: The Every Student Succeeds Act 放弃联邦政府在教育中的角色:《每个学生都成功法案》

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2016-10-05 DOI: 10.15779/Z38Z31NN9K

D. W. Black

{"title":"Abandoning the Federal Role in Education: The Every Student Succeeds Act","authors":"D. W. Black","doi":"10.15779/Z38Z31NN9K","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38Z31NN9K","url":null,"abstract":"Congress recently passed the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), redefining the role of the federal government in education. The ESSA attempted to appease popular sentiment against the No Child Left Behind Act’s (NCLB) overreliance on standardized testing and punitive sanctions. But in overturning those aspects of NCLB, Congress failed to devise a system that was any better. Congress simply stripped the federal government of regulatory power and vastly expanded state discretion. For the first time in fifty years, the federal government now lacks the ability to prompt improvements in student achievement or to demand equal resources for low-income students. Thus, the ESSA rests on a bold premise: states will abandon their historical tendencies by voluntarily providing low-income students with equal educational opportunities.Although the ESSA remains committed to equality on its face, it does the opposite in practice. First, the ESSA affords states wide latitude on student performance, accountability, and school reform. Wide state discretion opens the door to fifty disparate state systems, none of which guarantee equality. Second, the ESSA directly weakens two existing equity standards and leaves untouched a loophole that exempts eighty percent of school expenditures from equity analysis. Third, the ESSA leaves federal funding flat, eliminating the possibility that additional resources will offset the inequalities that the foregoing provisions permit. These changes to federal education law are so out of character that they beg the question of why the federal government is even involved in education at all. Although Congress is unlikely to repeal the ESSA just months after passing it, it is set to expire by its own terms after four years. This Article proposes that Congress cure the ESSA’s flaws by increasing the federal investment in education to: 1) create the leverage needed for states to accept federal prohibitions on unequal funding practices; and 2) meet the outstanding needs of low-income students.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133257573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 15

Congressional Analytic Capacity, Party Polarization, and the Political Economy of Revolving Door Lobbying 国会分析能力、政党两极化与旋转门游说的政治经济学

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2016-08-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2827615

Timothy Lapira, Herschel F. Thomas

{"title":"Congressional Analytic Capacity, Party Polarization, and the Political Economy of Revolving Door Lobbying","authors":"Timothy Lapira, Herschel F. Thomas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2827615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2827615","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that the market for lobbying services is a function of two key features of modern American politics: (1) the decline in Congress’s analytic capacity and (2) the concentration of agenda setting powers to party leaders that has come with increased polarization in government. These trends have made the legislative process much more uncertain to external stakeholders. As a result, revolving door lobbyists’ strategic political process knowledge has increased their value relative to substantive, policy-oriented lobbyists. In a departure from previous work, our model does not rely on the assumption that revolving door lobbyists sell “access” to specific policymakers. Rather, revolving door lobbyists offer organized interests a form of political insurance against the perceived risk of chaotic, unpredictable government action (or inaction). We draw on our original data set of the career histories of more than 630 contract lobbyists. We find that revolving door lobbyists generate at least twice the revenue per year than those without government experience, especially with more senior positions Capitol Hill. These findings have important consequences for political reform: efforts to minimize the influence of lobbyists and special interests need to first look at how Congress itself has created a system that rewards those who spin through the revolving door.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127979061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2