The Relative Influence of Appropriation Subcommittees: Institutional Structure and Program Performance

Abstract

Unlike previous analyses that evaluate the influence of the authorization committees on government agency management, we examine the US congressional appropriation subcommittees to see how their structural characteristics affect the performance of the programs that they fund. Specifically, we look at whether the competition for resources and member workload within subcommittees affects the effectiveness and efficiency of the programs under their purview. As part of the Congressional budget process, appropriation subcommittees are annually allocated new budgets from which they must fund a set of government programs. We find that the level of resources in a subcommittee affects program performance. Greater subcommittee resources are negatively correlated with program performance. We also find that workload matters—programs in subcommittees with fewer issue areas and programs per member are more effective and efficient. A subcommittee's capacity to focus on management problems and issue areas leads to better program performance.