{"title":"Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees","authors":"Matias Iaryczower","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1008967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1008967","url":null,"abstract":"We consider strategic voting with incomplete information and partially common values in sequential committees. A proposal is considered against the status quo in one committee, and only upon its approval advances for consideration in a second committee. Committee members (i) are privately and imperfectly informed about an unobservable state of nature which is relevant to their payoffs, and (ii) have a publicly observable bias with which they evaluate information. We show that the tally of votes in the originating committee can aggregate and transmit relevant information for members of the second committee in equilibrium, provide conditions for the composition and size of committees under which this occurs, and characterize all three classes of voting equilibria with relevant informative voting.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130962437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Partisan Foundations of Legislative Particularism in Latin America","authors":"Andrés Mejía-Acosta, Aníbal Pérez Liñán, Sebastián Saiegh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1018099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1018099","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we argue that organizational practices within parties, more than national electoral rules, shape legislators' incentives to initiate particularistic (narrow in scope and distributive in nature) legislation. We test this argument using a new dataset which comprises 1,906 bills initiated by the lower chamber in Paraguay (1992-2003) and 5,175 bills initiated by congress in Ecuador (1979-2002). We estimate the propensity of legislators to initiate particularistic bills as a function of district magnitude, the existence of closed lists, seniority, the size of the party, reelection rules, and the internal procedures employed by the party to nominate candidates. Our hypothesis is supported by the analysis. Ecuador, a highly fragmented party system with \"amateur\" legislators, is usually cited as a case where we should expect most bills to be distributive. However, once we control for strong party leaders, we see that their presence offsets the impact of candidate-centered electoral rules. Paraguay, on the other hand, has a relatively weak president and a closed-list PR system. Thus, it is usually seen as a case where strong parties and few particularistic bills should prevail. However, in practice, the fragmentation of parties into competitive factions has encouraged the proliferation of particularistic bills.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114983794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Informational Value of Incumbency","authors":"Carmen Beviá, Humberto Llavador","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1002302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1002302","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes an argument that explains incumbency advantage without recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. For that purpose, we exploit the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters information about governing politicians not available from challengers. Because there are many reasons for high reelection rates different from incumbency status, we propose a measure of incumbency advantage that improves the use of pure reelection success. We also study the relationship between incumbency advantage and ideological and selection biases. An important implication of our analysis is that the literature linking incumbency and legislature irresponsibility most likely provides an overestimation of the latter.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131164274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beyond Parliament's Reach? The Role of the European Parliament in the CFSP","authors":"D. Thym","doi":"10.54648/eerr2006006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2006006","url":null,"abstract":"The European Parliament is confident of its democratic credentials. Portraying itself as the true embodiment of the citizens’ will it has been repeatedly empowered by national governments in consecutive Treaty reforms and successfully shifted the institutional balance in its favour in the day-to-day management of inter-institutional decision-making. Despite this remarkable success the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) continues to defy calls for enhanced parliamentarization. As early as 1986 when the Single European Act incorporated the previous practice of European Political Cooperation into the legal framework of the present European Union, the European Parliament (EP) “emphasis(ed) its consternation with the codification of the existing split between Community activities and Political Cooperation” and “deem(ed) necessary to be more closely involved in the development of Political Cooperation through adequate mechanisms.” Surprisingly at first sight, not much has changed until this day with the Parliament still being largely excluded from the course of CFSP which remains by far the most intergovernmental area of European decision-making.This article explores the role of the EP in the European Union’s CFSP with a view to conceptual reasons underlying the EP’s pervasive exclusion from decision-making in foreign and security policy. The constitutional status quo of the Treaty of Nice lays the starting-point for our survey, whose course not even the Constitutional Treaty would have altered substantially (section I). The EP’s budgetary powers are the only instrument through which it can exercise measurable influence on the course of CFSP – albeit with considerable drawbacks on its standing in the eyes of the Council lamenting about the EP’s reluctance to provide “adequate” financial resources (section II). A closer look at the living constitution of institutional activities in Brussels and Strasbourg reveals a reinforced activism of the MEPs in the foreign policy field, although its substantive contributions may not necessarily transcend the “virtual” world of parliamentary discourse and influence the actual decision-making in the Council (section III). The continued involvement of national parliaments in CFSP does not substantially alter the situation (section IV). Eventually, national constitutional arrangements confirm that the EP’s limited role in CFSP is not necessarily an atypical deviation from the orthodoxy of the Community method but follows an underlying constitutional rationale of executive prerogatives in foreign affairs (section V).","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122824224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Changes are Likely to the Legislative Process and Other Functions of Parliament from MMP?","authors":"Sir Geoffrey Palmer QC","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3952197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3952197","url":null,"abstract":"A speech delivered to the seminar “MMP: Managing the Political/Public Sector Interface” on 24 March 1994. The speech argues that the introduction of MMP is likely to increase the importance of Parliament in New Zealand’s system of government, with the potential for the House of Representatives to make and unmake governments, and for the executive to become more accountable to parliamentary opinion on legislative matters.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126576288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From TV to Parliament: Populism and Communication in the Romanian 2012 Elections","authors":"Sergiu Gherghina, S. Soare","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2370006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2370006","url":null,"abstract":"Since the early 90s populism has been a regular component of Romanian politics. Over time, several populist parties gained representation, but their success was on the short-term. In 2012, the combination of charismatic leadership and intense mediatisation – primarily through leader’s business, a TV station – guaranteed the electoral success of a newly emerged populist party. In the absence of organizational and ideological roots, the party evolved around the figure of its leader, thus developing in an illustrative case of Caesaro-partism. Due to the resilience of its features such a model may prove feasible for medium or long-term electoral performances.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133523147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Shifting the Gaze on the Representation of Women in Parliament in the Pacific","authors":"D. Zetlin, S. Palmieri","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2440315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2440315","url":null,"abstract":"The low representation of women in Pacific Island parliaments has been a cause of much concern and little scholarly research. Representation in the independent Pacific Island countries is extremely low but the inclusion of the French overseas territories shows a much more varied picture, with French Polynesia now second only to Rwanda for the percentage of women in its parliament. The assumptions of the literature on women’s representation have been challenged by the emergence of countries in Africa and Central and Latin America at the top of the league table. As of August 2014 the only Western countries still in the top ten of the Inter Parliamentary Union' league table are Sweden and Finland. It is timely then to consider whether women’s successes in the South are attributable to similar or different factors from those tried and tested in the Western scholarship. In particular, it is relevant to ask whether there are better indicators to explain the varied pattern of women’s representation in the Pacific. This paper draws on the analysis of women’s representation in Western democracies before comparing Africa and the Pacific Island countries. This paper is part of a broader study that draws comparisons between the progress of women’s representation in Africa and the Pacific.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127696658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}