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Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal最新文献

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Redistribution, Pork and Elections 再分配、猪肉和选举
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2009-07-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1468143
John D. Huber, Michael M. Ting
{"title":"Redistribution, Pork and Elections","authors":"John D. Huber, Michael M. Ting","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1468143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1468143","url":null,"abstract":"Why might citizens vote against redistributive policies from which they would seem to benefit? Many scholars focus on \"wedge\" issues such as religion or race, but another explanation might be geographically-based patronage or pork. We examine the tension between redistribution and patronage with a model that combines partisan elections across multiple districts with legislation in spatial and divide-the-dollar environments. The model yields a unique equilibrium that describes the circumstances under which poor voters support right-wing parties that favor low taxes and redistribution, and under which rich voters support left-wing parties that favor high taxes and redistribution. The model suggests that one reason standard tax and transfer models of redistribution often do not capture empirical reality is that redistributive transfers are a less efficient tool for attracting votes than are more targeted policy programs. The model also underlines the central importance of party discipline during legislative bargaining in shaping the importance of redistribution in voter behavior, and it describes why right-wing parties should have an advantage over left-wing ones in majoritarian systems.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133894229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 22
Constituency Size and Support for Trade Liberalization: An Analysis of Foreign Economic Policy Preferences in Congress 选区规模与对贸易自由化的支持:国会对外经济政策偏好的分析
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2009-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1085593
Sean D. Ehrlich
{"title":"Constituency Size and Support for Trade Liberalization: An Analysis of Foreign Economic Policy Preferences in Congress","authors":"Sean D. Ehrlich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1085593","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1085593","url":null,"abstract":"Studies of the political economy of trade frequently rely on the assumption that the larger a policy-maker's constituency, the more supportive of free trade that policymaker will be. Large constituencies are supposed to yield concern for the national interest and provide insulation from particularistic, protectionist interests. This assumption, though, has rarely been directly tested. This article does so by leveraging the variation in district size within the U.S. Congress. This article statistically examines a data-set of roll-call votes on trade legislation from 1994 to the 2004 to determine the effect of constituency size and alternative explanations for legislative preferences on foreign economic policy and finds no evidence of the effect of constituency size.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129447131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 29
A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Measures to Curb Political Corruption 遏制政治腐败措施的比较分析框架
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2009-03-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1366035
Staffan Andersson, G. Martínez-Cousinou
{"title":"A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Measures to Curb Political Corruption","authors":"Staffan Andersson, G. Martínez-Cousinou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1366035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1366035","url":null,"abstract":"Existing case studies of efforts to control political corruption typically lack a theoretical framework that can provide for systematic empirical research and comparisons between cases and countries. This makes it difficult to assess what combination of preventive and punitive measures that are best suited to work against corruption. By employing principal-agent theory, we develop a framework for the study of different measures to control political corruption. Our framework is suited for qualitative and comparative studies. As an example of an empirical application, we show how this framework can be applied empirically to the United Kingdom's measures to control political corruption. We do so in three identified risk areas: the Parliament, the executive and political parties.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"125 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131709474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Generous Legislators? A Description of Vote Trading Agreements (Theory and Experiments) 慷慨的立法者?选票交易协议描述(理论与实验)
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2009-03-01 DOI: 10.1561/100.00010034
Rafael Hortala-Vallve
{"title":"Generous Legislators? A Description of Vote Trading Agreements (Theory and Experiments)","authors":"Rafael Hortala-Vallve","doi":"10.1561/100.00010034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00010034","url":null,"abstract":"Legislators trade influence to attain approval of their most preferred bills. The classical example is found in pork barrel politics with concentrated benefits and diffuse costs where logrolling agreements involving two (or more) legislators can load costs onto legislators excluded from the winning coalition. As Ferejohn et al (1987) show, the cheapest of these outcomes is the only agenda independent one. We model the bargaining game amongst legislators and show that this outcome can be supported by some specification of legislator preferences, but we shed light on a different outcome that has so far been overlooked in the literature: we may observe that legislators most affected by logrolling agreements (those who bear costs with no benefit) may break such coalitions. Specifically, in equilibrium some legislators ‘generously’ offer their support for some bills that are not to their benefit, and obtain NOTHING in exchange. We report evidence from experimental tests in which our theory predicts 2/3 of the subjects’ behaviour.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124882359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Will the Rudd Federal Labor Government Abolish Key Legal Protections for Certain Exploited Vulnerable Workers? 陆克文联邦工党政府会废除对某些受剥削弱势工人的关键法律保护吗?
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2009-01-15 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1328167
M. Rawling
{"title":"Will the Rudd Federal Labor Government Abolish Key Legal Protections for Certain Exploited Vulnerable Workers?","authors":"M. Rawling","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1328167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1328167","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the potential loss of legal protections for certain outworkers as a result of recently enacted (or foreshadowed) federal legislative provisions. The article begins with an overview of existing legal protections under State and Territory laws for independent contractor outworkers labouring in industries outside the textile clothing and footwear sector - protections which survived the Howard government's federal takeover of labour law. The article then examines how the proposed further centralization of labour law under the Rudd federal Labor government may lead to the abolition of these existing legal protections. In particular, the article focuses upon the threats posed by provisions of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Transition to Forward with Fairness) Act 2008 (Cth) and the Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth). The article concludes by setting out the necessary steps to avoid the unjust obliteration of key legal protections for these exploited vulnerable workers.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123931259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
State Parties and Taxes: A Comment on Reed in the Context of Close Legislatures 缔约国与税收:密切立法机构背景下的里德评析
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2009-01-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1144057
Patrick L. Warren
{"title":"State Parties and Taxes: A Comment on Reed in the Context of Close Legislatures","authors":"Patrick L. Warren","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1144057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1144057","url":null,"abstract":"This note empirically analyzes how partisan control of a state's legislature alters the growth of the state's tax burden. Using two related empirical strategies, one based on instrumental variables using closely controlled legislatures and one based on regression discontinuity, I find large effects of partisan control, between two and four times as large as similar estimates by Reed (2006). Compared to Republican control, Democratic control of the legislature causes tax burden growth of more than a full percent point over a 5-year period, on a mean tax burden of about 10.7 percentage points. This difference is strong evidence for partisan divergence in this context.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125912302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Whistleblower Laws: International Best Practice 举报人法:国际最佳实践
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2008-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1326766
P. Latimer, A. Brown
{"title":"Whistleblower Laws: International Best Practice","authors":"P. Latimer, A. Brown","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1326766","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1326766","url":null,"abstract":"Since the 1990s many public law jurisdictions around the world have enacted, or are committed to enacting, legislation to protect public interest whistleblowers. Whistleblower protection has also been passed in corporate law, workplace relations law, consumer law and financial regulation. This paper provides an analysis of this legislation, and identifies several emerging issues for consideration. We identify a strong case for greater consistency in the legal thresholds and operational requirements imposed by whistleblower protection legislation, including recommendations for common tests and processes covering both the public and private sectors. In large part, the prospect for accelerating the transition towards more effective, less 'symbolic' regimes depends on a clearer consensus regarding the public importance of employee disclosures and the organisational advantages of open, proactive approaches to disclosure management.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133761109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 25
Comparing Nominate and Ideal: Points of Difference and Monte Carlo Tests 比较提名与理想:差点与蒙特卡罗检验
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2008-09-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1276007
Royce Carroll, Jeffrey B. Lewis, James Lo, K. Poole, H. Rosenthal
{"title":"Comparing Nominate and Ideal: Points of Difference and Monte Carlo Tests","authors":"Royce Carroll, Jeffrey B. Lewis, James Lo, K. Poole, H. Rosenthal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1276007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1276007","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical models of spatial voting allow legislators' locations in an abstract policy or ideological space to be inferred from their roll call votes. Over the past 25 years, these models have provided new insights about the US Congress and legislative behavior more generally (see, for example, Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). There are now a number of alternative models, estimators, and software that researchers can use to recover latent issue or ideological spaces from voting data. While these different estimators usually produce substantively similar estimates, important differences also arise. In this paper, we investigate the sources of observed differences between two leading methods, NOMINATE and IDEAL. Considering data from the 1994 to 1997 Supreme Court and the 109th Senate, we demonstrate that while some observed differences in the estimates produced by each model stem from fundamental differences in their underlying behavioral assumptions, others arise from arbitrary differences in implementation. Using Monte Carlo experiments, we find that neither model has a clear advantage over the other in the recovery of legislator locations or roll call midpoints in either large or small legislatures.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129455366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 72
War and Taxes 战争与税收
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2008-06-06 DOI: 10.5860/choice.46-2779
Steven A. Bank, K. Stark, J. J. Thorndike
{"title":"War and Taxes","authors":"Steven A. Bank, K. Stark, J. J. Thorndike","doi":"10.5860/choice.46-2779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.46-2779","url":null,"abstract":"The history of America?s tax system can be written largely as a history of America?s wars. During World War II, Americans were urged to ration food, raise money, and accept higher taxes. After September 11, we were given tax cuts and asked to shop. Has the United States broken a noble tradition of fiscal sacrifice with the current, unprecedented wartime tax cuts, or are they the mark of new economic, and social forces at work? War and Taxes weighs the question by considering six conflicts that span the American Revolution to the present war in Iraq.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"25 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114035753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 53
Roadmap to Gridlock: The Failure of Long-Range Metropolitan Transportation Planning 交通堵塞路线图:长期都市交通规划的失败
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2008-05-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1291783
R. O'toole
{"title":"Roadmap to Gridlock: The Failure of Long-Range Metropolitan Transportation Planning","authors":"R. O'toole","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1291783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1291783","url":null,"abstract":"Federal law requires metropolitan planning organizations in urban areas of more than 50,000 people to write long-range (20- to 30-year) metropolitan transportation plans and to revise or update those plans every 4 to 5 years. A review of plans for more than 75 of the nation's largest metropolitan areas reveals that virtually all of them fail to follow standard planning methods. As a result, taxpayers and travelers have little assurance that the plans make effective use of available resources to reduce congestion, maximize mobility, and provide safe transportation facilities. Nearly half the plans reviewed here are not cost effective in meeting transportation goals. These plans rely heavily on behavioral tools such as land-use regulation, subsidies to dense or mixed-use developments, and construction of expensive rail transit lines. Nearly 40 years of experience with such tools has shown that they are expensive but provide negligible transportation benefits. Long-range transportation planning necessarily depends on uncertain forecasts. Planners also set qualitative goals such as \"vibrant communities\" and quantifiable but incomparable goals such as \"protecting historic resources.\" Such vagaries result in a politicized process that cannot hope to find the most effective transportation solutions. Thus, long-range planning has contributed to, rather than prevented, the hextupling of congestion American urban areas have suffered since 1982. Ideally, the federal government should not be in the business of funding local transportation and dictating local transportation policies. At the least, Congress should repeal long-range transportation planning requirements in the next reauthorization of federal surface transportation funding. Instead, metropolitan transportation organizations should focus planning on the short term (5 years), and concentrate on quantifiable factors that are directly related to transportation, including safety and congestion relief.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126265247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
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