遏制政治腐败措施的比较分析框架

Staffan Andersson, G. Martínez-Cousinou
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引用次数: 1

摘要

现有的关于控制政治腐败努力的案例研究通常缺乏一个理论框架,无法提供系统的实证研究和案例与国家之间的比较。这使得很难评估哪种预防和惩罚措施的组合最适合打击腐败。本文运用委托代理理论,构建了一个研究控制政治腐败不同措施的框架。我们的框架适合于定性和比较研究。作为一个实证应用的例子,我们展示了如何将这个框架应用于英国控制政治腐败的措施。我们在三个确定的风险领域这样做:议会、行政部门和政党。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Measures to Curb Political Corruption
Existing case studies of efforts to control political corruption typically lack a theoretical framework that can provide for systematic empirical research and comparisons between cases and countries. This makes it difficult to assess what combination of preventive and punitive measures that are best suited to work against corruption. By employing principal-agent theory, we develop a framework for the study of different measures to control political corruption. Our framework is suited for qualitative and comparative studies. As an example of an empirical application, we show how this framework can be applied empirically to the United Kingdom's measures to control political corruption. We do so in three identified risk areas: the Parliament, the executive and political parties.
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