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Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal最新文献

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Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points 货币政策委员会，投票行为和理想点
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2016-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2815818
S. Eijffinger, R. Mahieu, Louis Raes
{"title":"Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points","authors":"S. Eijffinger, R. Mahieu, Louis Raes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2815818","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2815818","url":null,"abstract":"While not obvious at first sight, in many modern economies, the position of a monetary authority is similar to the position of the highest-level court (Goodhart (2002)). For example, both bodies are expected to operate independently even though there are crosscountry differences in what independence entails. In the United Kingdom, the highest court is the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (in short: Law Lords). There is a consensus among legal scholars that the powers of Law Lords with respect to the legislature are less wide ranging in the United Kingdom than the United States’ counterpart, the supreme court (Goodhart and Meade (2004), p.11). In economic jargon one says that the Supreme Court has goal independence whereas the Law Lords have instrument independence.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115583029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Parliamentary Budget Office and Parliamentary Oversight of the Extractive Industries in South Africa 南非议会预算办公室和议会对采掘业的监督
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2016-06-29 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2802169
Usman W. Chohan
{"title":"The Parliamentary Budget Office and Parliamentary Oversight of the Extractive Industries in South Africa","authors":"Usman W. Chohan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2802169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2802169","url":null,"abstract":"This article focuses on the importance of parliamentary oversight of the extractive industries in the South African context, and examines the potential of the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) towards serving the South African parliament vis-a-vis oversight of extractive resources. It points to the merits of strong oversight, and the importance of independent and nonpartisan analysis by the PBO in achieving this fiscal objective in South Africa. Finally, it applies two methods, a process approach and a discipline approach, to specify the benefits of the PBO to parliamentary oversight of the extractive industries.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124664250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Proportional Payoffs in Legislative Bargaining with Weighted Voting: A Characterization 加权投票立法议价中的比例收益:一个表征
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2016-03-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2741119
M. Montero
{"title":"Proportional Payoffs in Legislative Bargaining with Weighted Voting: A Characterization","authors":"M. Montero","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2741119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2741119","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that Snyder et al.'s (2005) result, that payoffs are proportional to weights in large replicated games, does not necessarily extend to the smaller games that arise in applications. Departures from proportionality may be substantial and may arise even in seemingly well-behaved games.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127102437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
El potencial político de la felicidad: fundamentos científicos y de aplicación gubernamental (The Political Potential of Happiness: Scientific and Governmental Grounds) 幸福的政治潜力:科学与政府应用的基础
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2015-12-01 DOI: 10.11565/PYS.V29I3.96
Pablo Beytía
{"title":"El potencial político de la felicidad: fundamentos científicos y de aplicación gubernamental (The Political Potential of Happiness: Scientific and Governmental Grounds)","authors":"Pablo Beytía","doi":"10.11565/PYS.V29I3.96","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11565/PYS.V29I3.96","url":null,"abstract":"Este articulo explora la posibilidad de utilizar los hallazgos cientificos sobre la felicidad en las politicas publicas. Parte discutiendo los fundamentos conceptuales, epistemologicos y metodologicos de la emergente ciencia de la felicidad, para luego proponer una forma especifica de aplicacion politica de estos descubrimientos cientificos. Posteriormente, se argumenta que es deseable que los Estados nacionales consideren la felicidad de la poblacion en la orientacion de sus politicas publicas, ya que ello permite redefinir democraticamente el progreso social y establecer una mediacion entre los polos tradicionales de conduccion politica.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"369 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123486984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Wealth, Officeholding, and Elite Ideology in Antebellum Georgia 战前格鲁吉亚的财富、公职和精英意识形态
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2015-09-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2484037
Jason Poulos
{"title":"Wealth, Officeholding, and Elite Ideology in Antebellum Georgia","authors":"Jason Poulos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2484037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2484037","url":null,"abstract":"Does personal wealth translate into political power, and does it influence the ideology of officeholders? This paper investigates the role of personal wealth in politics using the 1805 Georgia land lottery as a natural experiment. Matching lottery records to a roster of officeholders and roll call votes, I estimate the effects of winning a land lot prize on ex-post officeholding, and on votes in favor of slavery legislation and state banking policy for participants who served in the state legislature. I find that lottery wealth significantly reduces legislators' support for slavery legislation, and find no evidence that wealth effects officeholding nor legislators' support for banking policy. I use property tax records to show that the treatment effect on support for slavery legislation varies systematically according legislators' pretreatment wealth. The results demonstrate that wealth can influence policy, but not in the direction anticipated by economic elite theories of American politics.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115612089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Politics of the Budget Process in the Indonesian Parliament (DPR) 印尼议会预算过程中的政治
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2015-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2589972
J. Seifert
{"title":"The Politics of the Budget Process in the Indonesian Parliament (DPR)","authors":"J. Seifert","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2589972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2589972","url":null,"abstract":"Inside DPR a special budget committee, Badan Anggaran (Banggar) 1 , has the responsibility over the budget. This committee works in parallel to the regular standing committees 1-11 which cover the sectoral policies from foreign affairs (committee 1) to banking and finance (committee 11). In the 2009-14 term Banggar had 84 members out of which one served as a chair and three as vice-chairs. Unlike in the standing committees the sessions of Banggar are not public unless specified otherwise. Formal record-keeping is required only for public meetings.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126583162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting 信息游说与立法投票
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2015-02-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2406119
Keith E. Schnakenberg
{"title":"Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting","authors":"Keith E. Schnakenberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2406119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2406119","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I analyze a model of interest group influence on legislative voting through information transmission. The model shows how interest groups may manipulate voting coalitions to their advantage by crafting different messages to target different winning coalitions. Furthermore, if access to legislators is costly, the interest groups prefer to coordinate with allied legislators by providing them with information that helps them to persuade less sympathetic legislators. The model reconciles informational theories of lobbying with empirical evidence suggesting that interest groups predominantly lobby those who already agree with them. The model also makes new predictions about the welfare effects of interest group influence: from an ex ante perspective, informational lobbying negatively effects the welfare of legislators. The results highlight the need for more theories of persuasion that take collective choice institutions into account.The appendices for this paper are available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2612162","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116823397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 89
The Implosion of the Federal Budget Process: Triggers, Commissions, Cliffs, Sequesters, Debt Ceilings, and Shutdown 联邦预算程序的内爆:触发、委员会、悬崖、自动减支、债务上限和政府关闭
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2014-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/PBAF.12049
R. Meyers
{"title":"The Implosion of the Federal Budget Process: Triggers, Commissions, Cliffs, Sequesters, Debt Ceilings, and Shutdown","authors":"R. Meyers","doi":"10.1111/PBAF.12049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PBAF.12049","url":null,"abstract":"Budgeting in the federal government recently imploded. The competing parties played repeated games of chicken in which they set short‐term budget deadlines and established automatic procedures in hopes of outmaneuvering their opponents. They went to the brink of defaulting on the government's debt, and then shut down the government. This article recounts the history of this implosion and discusses what might have caused it. Budgeting's decline was certainly driven by partisan conflict. Yet budgeting's decline was also due to a dumbing down of aspirations for the process. Ironically, budget hawks contributed substantially to this when they endorsed “action‐forcing mechanisms” that they hoped would constitute “credible commitments” to adopt sustainable budgetary policies. Even if their aspirations were partially realized, their logic was flawed and the collateral damage was substantial.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125743772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
How Lame are Lame Ducks? 跛脚鸭有多跛?
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2014-09-30 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2510878
C. Koopman, M. Mitchell, Emily Washington
{"title":"How Lame are Lame Ducks?","authors":"C. Koopman, M. Mitchell, Emily Washington","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2510878","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2510878","url":null,"abstract":"A lame duck session of Congress occurs when legislators meet after an election has been held but before the next Congress has taken office. Lame duck sessions are often criticized by the victorious party in the election, and a common critique is that the lame duck members — undisciplined by electoral constraints — vote irresponsibly. There are subtle but statistically significant differences between voting patterns in regular and lame duck sessions, as revealed by analysis of over 50,000 House and Senate roll call votes.During a lame duck session, members are slightly less likely to side with their own parties and less likely to vote at all. These patterns persist in very lame duck sessions — those that take place following the loss of majority status within a single house. In these sessions, however, a new pattern emerges: House members become more likely to cast bipartisan votes and Senators become less likely to do so. Beyond these voting patterns, it is difficult to say whether members vote more or less “responsibly” during lame duck sessions of Congress. Our analysis supports the primary findings of the existing literature on lame ducks. Past studies have found lame duck legislators to be less likely to indulge most special interests, but others suggest they may be more likely to indulge one particular special interest: their next employers. In this study, we explain how incentives change for lame duck legislators, briefly review past research on lame ducks, and present our statistical findings that support and add to the existing literature.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114426491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Field Experimental Work on Political Institutions 政治制度的实地实验工作
Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2014-05-12 DOI: 10.1146/ANNUREV-POLISCI-072012-174350
C. Grose
{"title":"Field Experimental Work on Political Institutions","authors":"C. Grose","doi":"10.1146/ANNUREV-POLISCI-072012-174350","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/ANNUREV-POLISCI-072012-174350","url":null,"abstract":"A nascent but growing research area examines political institutions through the use of field experiments. I consider why field experimentation has been used infrequently in the study of political institutions and note that some research questions are not amenable to field experimentation. I review areas of research inquiry where field experimentation has enhanced scholarly knowledge about political institutions and representation. These areas include the study of race, representation, and bias in legislatures and courts; and policy responsiveness and legislative accountability. I synthesize this research by examining puzzles that emerge between the field experimental and observational work. I conclude with suggestions for promising research avenues, including the use of field experiments to study the bureaucracy. The discipline's understanding of political institutions could be improved with a greater emphasis on field experimental work.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132502076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 73
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