{"title":"货币政策委员会,投票行为和理想点","authors":"S. Eijffinger, R. Mahieu, Louis Raes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2815818","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"While not obvious at first sight, in many modern economies, the position of a monetary authority is similar to the position of the highest-level court (Goodhart (2002)). For example, both bodies are expected to operate independently even though there are crosscountry differences in what independence entails. In the United Kingdom, the highest court is the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (in short: Law Lords). There is a consensus among legal scholars that the powers of Law Lords with respect to the legislature are less wide ranging in the United Kingdom than the United States’ counterpart, the supreme court (Goodhart and Meade (2004), p.11). In economic jargon one says that the Supreme Court has goal independence whereas the Law Lords have instrument independence.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points\",\"authors\":\"S. Eijffinger, R. Mahieu, Louis Raes\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2815818\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"While not obvious at first sight, in many modern economies, the position of a monetary authority is similar to the position of the highest-level court (Goodhart (2002)). For example, both bodies are expected to operate independently even though there are crosscountry differences in what independence entails. In the United Kingdom, the highest court is the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (in short: Law Lords). There is a consensus among legal scholars that the powers of Law Lords with respect to the legislature are less wide ranging in the United Kingdom than the United States’ counterpart, the supreme court (Goodhart and Meade (2004), p.11). In economic jargon one says that the Supreme Court has goal independence whereas the Law Lords have instrument independence.\",\"PeriodicalId\":125020,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal\",\"volume\":\"11 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2815818\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2815818","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
虽然乍一看并不明显,但在许多现代经济体中,货币当局的地位类似于最高法院的地位(Goodhart(2002))。例如,两个机构都被期望独立运作,尽管在独立所需要的条件上存在跨国差异。在英国,最高法院是上议院的上诉委员会(简称:上议院)。法律学者之间有一种共识,即英国的上议院议员在立法机关方面的权力范围不如美国的最高法院(Goodhart and Meade(2004),第11页)。用经济学术语来说,最高法院具有目标独立性,而上议院具有工具独立性。
Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points
While not obvious at first sight, in many modern economies, the position of a monetary authority is similar to the position of the highest-level court (Goodhart (2002)). For example, both bodies are expected to operate independently even though there are crosscountry differences in what independence entails. In the United Kingdom, the highest court is the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (in short: Law Lords). There is a consensus among legal scholars that the powers of Law Lords with respect to the legislature are less wide ranging in the United Kingdom than the United States’ counterpart, the supreme court (Goodhart and Meade (2004), p.11). In economic jargon one says that the Supreme Court has goal independence whereas the Law Lords have instrument independence.