Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal最新文献_第4页

Tax Extenders 税收填充剂

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2014-04-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2433167

Victor Fleischer

{"title":"Tax Extenders","authors":"Victor Fleischer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2433167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2433167","url":null,"abstract":"In Tax Legislation in the Contemporary U.S. Congress, Michael Doran describes an equilibrium of gridlock punctuated by the occasional passage of strikingly clean, non-particularistic legislation. This Commentary explores how the mundane, unseemly, and largely unnoticed legislative ritual of extending tax breaks that are set to expire — through bills known as “tax extenders” — fits into the picture. Renewal of the tax extenders package is frequent and highly particularistic, and so at first glance seems to contradict Professor Doran’s narrative. But extenders may, in fact, enable the gridlock that Doran describes. The extenders package allows members of the tax-writing committees to shape tax policy in small, incremental ways, to raise campaign funds, and to quietly pay favors to well-connected industries — all without unduly disrupting the “standing on principle” that created gridlock in the first place. The practice of regularly renewing the extenders package is unfortunate and should be stopped. It distorts the budget process, encourages legislative rent seeking, and invites highly particularistic legislative provisions that are better characterized as windfalls and wasteful government spending rather than well-targeted tax incentives.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122883652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Does Winning Matter in Congress? Connecting Roll Call Success and Electoral Performance in the U.S. House of Representatives 在国会获胜重要吗?连接点名成功和选举表现在美国众议院

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2014-04-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2428194

Gregory Robinson

引用次数: 0

Dissent in Parliament as Reputation Building 在议会中持不同政见者建立声誉

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2014-03-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2317466

B. Schaufele

引用次数: 3

Majoritarianism, Majoritarian Tension, and the Reed Revolution 多数主义，多数主义张力，和里德革命

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2014-02-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2400715

Keith. Krehbiel

{"title":"Majoritarianism, Majoritarian Tension, and the Reed Revolution","authors":"Keith. Krehbiel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2400715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2400715","url":null,"abstract":"What fundamental forces account for procedural change in majoritarian voting institutions? I address this question by defining majoritarianism as a variable with two attributes: a numeric component that sets a threshold of assent among decision-makers, and a contextual component that defines the objects and stages of choice to which a given majority or supermajority threshold applies. Conceptualized as such, majoritarianism may be studied as a manipulable phenomenon that, in large part, defines the degree of consensus that a voting organization demands of itself in making decisions about rules, amendments, and law. Majoritarianism is often a central concern in institutional reforms that reallocate individual procedural rights to members. Majoritarian tension inevitably arises among decision-makers due to their simultaneous and conflicting desires for consensus (widespread endorsement of a decision), timeliness (rapid action), and wisdom (prudent, informed decision-making). Two broad empirical expectations based on the majoritarian-tension framework are assessed by revisiting of the extensively studied, so-called Reed Revolution in the late 19th Century House of Representatives. I suggest that this ostensibly critical event was both less significant and more bipartisan than any extant account suggests, and that my alternative interpretation is consistent with the fundamental forces of majoritarian tension.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117247676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

The Party System and Legislative Cohesion in the Early U.S. House of Representatives 美国早期众议院的政党制度与立法凝聚力

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2014-02-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2400558

F. Thames

引用次数: 0

Divided We Reform? Evidence from US Welfare Policies 我们分开改革?来自美国福利政策的证据

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2014-01-27 DOI: 10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2016.08.003

A. Bernecker

引用次数: 25

German MPs' Outside Jobs and Their Repercussions on Parliamentary Effort 德国国会议员的外部工作及其对议会努力的影响

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2013-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2387498

F. Arnold

引用次数: 5

The Dangers of Debt Limit Brinksmanship 债务上限边缘政策的危险

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2013-09-30 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2337107

B. Bartlett

引用次数: 0

Private Legislation as a Mechanism for Stability in the Rage of Party 私法作为一种党内稳定机制

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2013-09-07 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2322200

R. Tennyson

引用次数: 0

The Politics of Accountability: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ARRA 问责政治:2009年美国复苏与再投资法案

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2013-08-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2310667

Paul L. Posner, Timothy J. Conlan, Priscilla M. Regan

{"title":"The Politics of Accountability: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ARRA","authors":"Paul L. Posner, Timothy J. Conlan, Priscilla M. Regan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2310667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2310667","url":null,"abstract":"Accountability has become an iconic concept in public management -- never more so than in the implementation of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), or the Obama Administration's stimulus. With more than $800 billion and economic growth on the line, the Administration placed its fiscal and political fortunes on the line with this high stakes policy management initiative. A strong emphasis on accountability would help the Administration offer symbolic reassurance to a restive Congress and public, and evidence suggests that ex ante design and ex post audits were successful in warding off characteristic fraud and abuse that often plagues such urgent and highly visible national initiatives. However, such outcomes were achieved at the expense of high administrative costs and significant conflicts among newly emboldened networks of top political officials, program managers and audit officials, all acting under the glare of greater public transparency for spending and jobs. The complex structure of over 200 programs and the reliance on decentralized intergovernmental networks may have diffused blame for embarrassing implementation lapses, but this same structure deprived the President of valuable credit claiming opportunities for the largely successful economic outcomes flowing from one of the largest domestic spending initiatives in postwar history. Notwithstanding credible economic impact estimates by CBO, a confused and bewildered public refused to believe that the stimulus had a favorable impact on a struggling economy.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115021592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2