{"title":"Tax Extenders","authors":"Victor Fleischer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2433167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2433167","url":null,"abstract":"In Tax Legislation in the Contemporary U.S. Congress, Michael Doran describes an equilibrium of gridlock punctuated by the occasional passage of strikingly clean, non-particularistic legislation. This Commentary explores how the mundane, unseemly, and largely unnoticed legislative ritual of extending tax breaks that are set to expire — through bills known as “tax extenders” — fits into the picture. Renewal of the tax extenders package is frequent and highly particularistic, and so at first glance seems to contradict Professor Doran’s narrative. But extenders may, in fact, enable the gridlock that Doran describes. The extenders package allows members of the tax-writing committees to shape tax policy in small, incremental ways, to raise campaign funds, and to quietly pay favors to well-connected industries — all without unduly disrupting the “standing on principle” that created gridlock in the first place. The practice of regularly renewing the extenders package is unfortunate and should be stopped. It distorts the budget process, encourages legislative rent seeking, and invites highly particularistic legislative provisions that are better characterized as windfalls and wasteful government spending rather than well-targeted tax incentives.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122883652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Winning Matter in Congress? Connecting Roll Call Success and Electoral Performance in the U.S. House of Representatives","authors":"Gregory Robinson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2428194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2428194","url":null,"abstract":"This paper offers a clarification of positive theories of roll call voting in the form of a Mayhewian apologia, drawing on Mayhew’s classic formulation of the electoral connection with a particular focus on its significance for our understanding of position taking, generally, and roll call voting in particular. The contention is that, as a subfield, the way we have tended to think about roll call voting is largely inconsistent with Mayhew’s conception of position taking. At the same time, the paper identifies a largely ignored empirical regularity — that, all else equal, winning more often on roll calls makes incumbents less likely to win reelection.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124954065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dissent in Parliament as Reputation Building","authors":"B. Schaufele","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2317466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2317466","url":null,"abstract":"Dissenting votes in parliamentary systems are overt displays of defiance by individual Members of Parliament (MPs) vis-a-vis their parties. Dissension is particularly surprising as in the vast majority of situations voting against one's party yields no change in legislative outcomes while still generating costs for MPs. This study examines the decisions of elected representatives who face conflicting incentives. A model is developed where MPs choose to dissent in an effort to build reputations with their local constituents. Using all 32,216 observations at MP-bill-vote level for the 39th Parliament of Canada, a reputation building hypothesis is specified and tested. I provide evidence that MPs whose previous election was competitive are 13 percent more likely to cast any dissenting vote and, for a one standard deviation decrease in expected margin of victory, 2.3 percent more likely to defect on any given vote, results which suggest that MPs are actively attempting to build reputations with their local constituents","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"83 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120841424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Majoritarianism, Majoritarian Tension, and the Reed Revolution","authors":"Keith. Krehbiel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2400715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2400715","url":null,"abstract":"What fundamental forces account for procedural change in majoritarian voting institutions? I address this question by defining majoritarianism as a variable with two attributes: a numeric component that sets a threshold of assent among decision-makers, and a contextual component that defines the objects and stages of choice to which a given majority or supermajority threshold applies. Conceptualized as such, majoritarianism may be studied as a manipulable phenomenon that, in large part, defines the degree of consensus that a voting organization demands of itself in making decisions about rules, amendments, and law. Majoritarianism is often a central concern in institutional reforms that reallocate individual procedural rights to members. Majoritarian tension inevitably arises among decision-makers due to their simultaneous and conflicting desires for consensus (widespread endorsement of a decision), timeliness (rapid action), and wisdom (prudent, informed decision-making). Two broad empirical expectations based on the majoritarian-tension framework are assessed by revisiting of the extensively studied, so-called Reed Revolution in the late 19th Century House of Representatives. I suggest that this ostensibly critical event was both less significant and more bipartisan than any extant account suggests, and that my alternative interpretation is consistent with the fundamental forces of majoritarian tension.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117247676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Party System and Legislative Cohesion in the Early U.S. House of Representatives","authors":"F. Thames","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2400558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2400558","url":null,"abstract":"Does variation in the party system explain variation in legislator cohesion? Exiting theory on the forces that drive legislative cohesion argues, in part, that legislators follow the party line in order to aid their reelection chances. If true, then variation in the competitiveness and institutionalization of the party should lead to variation in legislator cohesion. Using data from the U.S. House of Representatives during the \"First Party Systems,\" I show that U.S. House members differed in the levels of cohesion based on differences in the party system across their districts.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"139 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128616457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Divided We Reform? Evidence from US Welfare Policies","authors":"A. Bernecker","doi":"10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2016.08.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2016.08.003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"144 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"119806889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"German MPs' Outside Jobs and Their Repercussions on Parliamentary Effort","authors":"F. Arnold","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2387498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2387498","url":null,"abstract":"It is a longstanding debate whether members of parliament (MPs) should be allowed to follow sideline jobs in addition to their mandate. Critics claim that politicians already face binding time constraints and that moonlighting might lead to a neglect of inner-parliamentary duties. The purpose of this study is therefore to investigate whether politicians with more sideline jobs show less effort inside parliament. To address this question, I collected novel data on German members of parliament from 2009-2013. Using a selection on observables approach that controls for legislator ability, I find that higher outside earnings are associated with a significantly lower attendance rate as well as fewer speeches, oral contributions, interpellations and group initiatives. These results are robust to a variety of tests. My findings suggest that time caps on moonlighting along with stricter disclosure rules for outside activities might be necessary.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124168122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Dangers of Debt Limit Brinksmanship","authors":"B. Bartlett","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2337107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2337107","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the potential economic effects of a failure by Congress to raise the debt limit, leading to default on the national debt.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127311723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Private Legislation as a Mechanism for Stability in the Rage of Party","authors":"R. Tennyson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2322200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2322200","url":null,"abstract":"The instability of government in the quarter century following the Revolution has been the subject of considerable scholarship. This essay argues that one of the factors preventing this instability from tipping parliamentary government into full-scale inaction was the development of private legislative business and procedural rules introduced to protect this business. If this business could not get done because of political strife, the members and Lords who made up parliament most directly stood to lose. In short, the principal reason parliament never succumbed to the sharper edges of party rage in the quarter century after 1688 was it would have imposed substantial legislative costs on the members themselves. The need to preserve the private business of parliament kept members from ever descending too far into political vindictiveness.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129166245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paul L. Posner, Timothy J. Conlan, Priscilla M. Regan
{"title":"The Politics of Accountability: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ARRA","authors":"Paul L. Posner, Timothy J. Conlan, Priscilla M. Regan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2310667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2310667","url":null,"abstract":"Accountability has become an iconic concept in public management -- never more so than in the implementation of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), or the Obama Administration's stimulus. With more than $800 billion and economic growth on the line, the Administration placed its fiscal and political fortunes on the line with this high stakes policy management initiative. A strong emphasis on accountability would help the Administration offer symbolic reassurance to a restive Congress and public, and evidence suggests that ex ante design and ex post audits were successful in warding off characteristic fraud and abuse that often plagues such urgent and highly visible national initiatives. However, such outcomes were achieved at the expense of high administrative costs and significant conflicts among newly emboldened networks of top political officials, program managers and audit officials, all acting under the glare of greater public transparency for spending and jobs. The complex structure of over 200 programs and the reliance on decentralized intergovernmental networks may have diffused blame for embarrassing implementation lapses, but this same structure deprived the President of valuable credit claiming opportunities for the largely successful economic outcomes flowing from one of the largest domestic spending initiatives in postwar history. Notwithstanding credible economic impact estimates by CBO, a confused and bewildered public refused to believe that the stimulus had a favorable impact on a struggling economy.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115021592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}