Tax Extenders

Victor Fleischer
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

In Tax Legislation in the Contemporary U.S. Congress, Michael Doran describes an equilibrium of gridlock punctuated by the occasional passage of strikingly clean, non-particularistic legislation. This Commentary explores how the mundane, unseemly, and largely unnoticed legislative ritual of extending tax breaks that are set to expire — through bills known as “tax extenders” — fits into the picture. Renewal of the tax extenders package is frequent and highly particularistic, and so at first glance seems to contradict Professor Doran’s narrative. But extenders may, in fact, enable the gridlock that Doran describes. The extenders package allows members of the tax-writing committees to shape tax policy in small, incremental ways, to raise campaign funds, and to quietly pay favors to well-connected industries — all without unduly disrupting the “standing on principle” that created gridlock in the first place. The practice of regularly renewing the extenders package is unfortunate and should be stopped. It distorts the budget process, encourages legislative rent seeking, and invites highly particularistic legislative provisions that are better characterized as windfalls and wasteful government spending rather than well-targeted tax incentives.
税收填充剂
在《当代美国国会的税收立法》一书中,迈克尔•多兰(Michael Doran)描述了一种僵局的平衡,这种僵局被偶尔通过的非常清晰、非特定的立法所打断。这篇评论探讨了延长即将到期的税收减免的世俗的、不体面的、基本上不被注意的立法仪式——通过被称为“增税者”的法案——是如何适应这种情况的。增税者一揽子计划的更新是频繁的,而且非常特殊,所以乍一看似乎与多兰教授的叙述相矛盾。但实际上,扩展器可能会导致多兰所描述的僵局。扩展者方案允许税收起草委员会的成员以小的、增量的方式制定税收政策,筹集竞选资金,并悄悄地向关系良好的行业提供好处——所有这些都不会过度破坏最初造成僵局的“坚持原则”。定期更新扩展程序包的做法是不幸的,应该停止。它扭曲了预算程序,鼓励立法寻租,并招致高度特殊的立法条款,这些条款更适合被描述为意外之财和浪费的政府支出,而不是目标明确的税收激励。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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