Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal最新文献_第5页

Party Institutionalization and Legislative Organization: The Evolution of Agenda Power in the Polish Parliament 政党制度化与立法组织:波兰议会议程权力的演变

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2013-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1642432

Royce Carroll, M. Nalepa

{"title":"Party Institutionalization and Legislative Organization: The Evolution of Agenda Power in the Polish Parliament","authors":"Royce Carroll, M. Nalepa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1642432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1642432","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines conditions under which parties in parliamentary government establish dominance over the legislative process. We focus on two aspects of this dominance: negative agenda control and legislative success. We argue that the logic of organizing a legislature for majority control is conditional on features of institutionalized parties. To examine this question, we examine the evolution of the Polish Sejm, a case that emerged from a transition to democracy with a weak and fragile party system yet with strong formal legislative institutions that give influence to individual MPs and opposition parties. Using roll call votes and bills submitted during four terms of the Polish Sejm (1997-2011) in conjunction with interviews with MPs, we examine how changes in the party system have influenced the government’s use of legislative institutions to establish majoritarian control over the legislature. We argue that, in contrast to governments formed by the transitional parties that ultimately collapsed, governments led by more institutionalized parties were able to effectively delegate power to the their leadership to pursue collective party goals and to reduce the opposition’s legislative influence. With better-organized, more programmatic and more stable parties, governments can establish increasingly strong control over legislative institutions— even during periods of cabinet crisis.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124339740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 12

Why Do Members of Congress Support Agricultural Protection? 为什么国会议员支持农业保护?

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2013-06-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2280073

Marc F. Bellemare, Nicholas Carnes

{"title":"Why Do Members of Congress Support Agricultural Protection?","authors":"Marc F. Bellemare, Nicholas Carnes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2280073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2280073","url":null,"abstract":"It seems paradoxical that until recently, developed countries have continued subsidizing agriculture even though their agricultural sectors had been declining in relative importance since the middle of the 20th century. What drives support for agricultural protection—the broad array of subsidies to farmers and taxes and quotas imposed on agricultural imports—in developed countries? We answer this question by testing three competing hypotheses about what drives support for agricultural protection in the US: (i) legislator preferences, (ii) electoral incentives, or (iii) lobbying. Using data on the roll call votes of the members of the 106th through the 110th Congresses (1999-2009) and the scores given to each legislator by the Farm Bureau, our findings suggest electoral incentives explain a great deal of the variation in support for agricultural protection, but that legislator preferences and lobbying might play a role, too. Moreover, legislator preferences and electoral incentives appear to be substitutes for one another. Why does Congress support agricultural protection? Because many members have electoral incentives to—and because many of those who do not still have other personal or strategic interests at stake.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114560593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

Committee Design with Endogenous Participation 具有内生参与的委员会设计

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2013-06-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2289095

Volker Hahn

引用次数: 3

Primary Electorates vs. Party Elites: Who are the Polarizers? 初选选民与政党精英:谁是两极分化者?

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2013-05-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2262076

S. Masket, Boris Shor

引用次数: 1

A Spatial Model of Voting with Endogenous Proposals: Theory and Evidence from the Chilean Senate 具有内生提案的投票空间模型:来自智利参议院的理论和证据

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2013-03-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2255835

M. Triossi, P. Valdivieso, Benjamín Villena-Roldán

引用次数: 3

Congress (In-) Action: Resolving a Court Created Gordian Knot on Software Patents 国会行动:解决法院在软件专利上制造的死结

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2012-11-14 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2175978

C. Sheppard

引用次数: 0

Testing an Informational Theory of Legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives 检验立法信息理论:来自美国众议院的证据

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2012-10-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1990484

A. Ambrus, H. You, László Sándor

引用次数: 0

Contrasting Rule-Making in a Civil Administration with Rule-Making Under a Millitary Regime, in Nigeria 尼日利亚民事政府与军事政权下规则制定的对比

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2012-08-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2137931

O. Duru

{"title":"Contrasting Rule-Making in a Civil Administration with Rule-Making Under a Millitary Regime, in Nigeria","authors":"O. Duru","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2137931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2137931","url":null,"abstract":"Legislative power is simply the law making powers of a legislative body whose primary functions includes power to make new laws, alter existing ones, guard and repeal laws. The legislature has the constitutional prerogative to make laws and that power is reposed exclusively in such body even though it may be delegated to some agencies in the Executive department for operational conveniences but the ultimate legislative authority is vested on the legislature and within this context, it is able to maintain its control over all delegated legislative activities. Legislators are the authors of statutes and the ordinances are issued by the heads of the Executive under a specific constitutional power and subject to constitutional limitations which are severe. This paper contrasts the legislative powers of a Military Government with that of a Civilian Government. The paper argues that whereas the law-making powers of a civil legislature is limited by the doctrine of checks and balances; that of a military government is very extensive. The paper presents theoretical adumbrations on the nature of bills and degrees, while noting the differences in their manner of execution and enforcement. The paper concludes that military rule or dictatorial government is an aberration of all the well-known and well-tried norms of constitutional law and is thus undesirable in any body polity and accordingly submits that it is not possible to operate a constitution properly so-called under military rule or any dictatorship by whatever names it is called.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125237168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

How Do Committee Assignments Facilitate Majority Party Power? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in the Arkansas State Legislature 委员会分配如何促进多数党权力?来自阿肯色州立法机构随机实验的证据

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2012-08-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2130697

David E. Broockman, Daniel M. Butler

引用次数: 1

Examining Inequities in Campaign Money in State Legislative Elections 检视州立法选举中竞选资金的不公平

Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal Pub Date : 2012-08-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2129032

Greg Vonnahme

引用次数: 0