Committee Design with Endogenous Participation

Volker Hahn
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

We analyze different committee designs in a model with the endogenous participation of experts who have private information about their own abilities. Each committee design involves a test of abilities whose accuracy influences experts' decisions to participate. We derive the following findings. First, higher wages continuously lower the quality of experts on the committee. Second, and as a consequence of this, optimal committees involve low wages. Third, an increase in transparency improves the quality of experts on the committee. Fourth, larger committees attract less able experts than smaller ones, unless the committee operates under full transparency.
具有内生参与的委员会设计
我们在一个模型中分析了不同的委员会设计,该模型中有关于自己能力的私人信息的专家的内生性参与。每个委员会的设计都涉及到一项能力测试,其准确性会影响专家参与的决定。我们得出以下结论。首先,较高的工资不断降低委员会专家的素质。其次,最优委员会的结果是低工资。第三,透明度的提高提高了委员会专家的质量。第四,除非委员会在完全透明的情况下运作,否则规模较大的委员会吸引的专家能力不如规模较小的委员会。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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