More than Control: Partisan Differences in the Use of Statutory Constraints on the Bureaucracy

Matthew J. Denny
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Bureaucratic agencies have discretion when implementing laws. Because legislators and bureaucratic officials may have different policy preferences, legislators have developed a number of methods to control those officials. Previous research suggests that legislators who are ideologically aligned with the executive branch are more likely to grant the bureaucracy discretion in policy implementation because of their shared policy goals. This is referred to as the "Ally Principle". However, sometimes ideologically aligned legislators place significant constraints on bureaucratic agencies. Why do these legislators curb discretion from supposedly allied agencies? I argue that statutory constraints are a policy tool, and that Republican legislators use them in an effort to reduce the scope of government bureaucracy. I then test this theory using the text from twenty-four years of U.S. Congressional legislation. I find that while Democrats' behavior is consistent with the Ally Principle, Republican legislation displays strong evidence of a "reverse" Ally Principle.
超越控制:对官僚机构使用法定约束的党派差异
官僚机构在执行法律时有自由裁量权。由于立法者和官僚官员可能有不同的政策偏好,立法者制定了一些方法来控制这些官员。先前的研究表明,意识形态上与行政部门一致的立法者更有可能在政策实施中给予官僚机构自由裁量权,因为他们有共同的政策目标。这就是所谓的“盟友原则”。然而,有时意识形态一致的立法者对官僚机构施加了重大限制。为什么这些立法者要限制所谓联盟机构的自由裁量权?我认为,法定约束是一种政策工具,共和党立法者利用它们来缩小政府官僚主义的范围。然后,我用美国国会24年来的立法文本来检验这一理论。我发现,民主党的行为与盟友原则是一致的,而共和党的立法则有力地证明了“相反”的盟友原则。
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