More than Control: Partisan Differences in the Use of Statutory Constraints on the Bureaucracy

Abstract

Bureaucratic agencies have discretion when implementing laws. Because legislators and bureaucratic officials may have different policy preferences, legislators have developed a number of methods to control those officials. Previous research suggests that legislators who are ideologically aligned with the executive branch are more likely to grant the bureaucracy discretion in policy implementation because of their shared policy goals. This is referred to as the "Ally Principle". However, sometimes ideologically aligned legislators place significant constraints on bureaucratic agencies. Why do these legislators curb discretion from supposedly allied agencies? I argue that statutory constraints are a policy tool, and that Republican legislators use them in an effort to reduce the scope of government bureaucracy. I then test this theory using the text from twenty-four years of U.S. Congressional legislation. I find that while Democrats' behavior is consistent with the Ally Principle, Republican legislation displays strong evidence of a "reverse" Ally Principle.