Congressional Analytic Capacity, Party Polarization, and the Political Economy of Revolving Door Lobbying

Timothy Lapira, Herschel F. Thomas
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

We argue that the market for lobbying services is a function of two key features of modern American politics: (1) the decline in Congress’s analytic capacity and (2) the concentration of agenda setting powers to party leaders that has come with increased polarization in government. These trends have made the legislative process much more uncertain to external stakeholders. As a result, revolving door lobbyists’ strategic political process knowledge has increased their value relative to substantive, policy-oriented lobbyists. In a departure from previous work, our model does not rely on the assumption that revolving door lobbyists sell “access” to specific policymakers. Rather, revolving door lobbyists offer organized interests a form of political insurance against the perceived risk of chaotic, unpredictable government action (or inaction). We draw on our original data set of the career histories of more than 630 contract lobbyists. We find that revolving door lobbyists generate at least twice the revenue per year than those without government experience, especially with more senior positions Capitol Hill. These findings have important consequences for political reform: efforts to minimize the influence of lobbyists and special interests need to first look at how Congress itself has created a system that rewards those who spin through the revolving door.
国会分析能力、政党两极化与旋转门游说的政治经济学
我们认为,游说服务市场是现代美国政治的两个关键特征的一个功能:(1)国会分析能力的下降;(2)随着政府两极分化的加剧,议程设定权向政党领导人集中。这些趋势使立法程序对外部利益相关者来说更加不确定。因此,相对于实质性的、政策导向的游说者,旋转门游说者的战略政治过程知识增加了他们的价值。与之前的工作不同,我们的模型并不依赖于这样的假设:旋转门游说者向特定的政策制定者出售“准入”。相反,旋转门游说者为有组织的利益集团提供了一种政治保险,以防范混乱、不可预测的政府行动(或不作为)带来的风险。我们利用了630多名合同游说者的职业历史原始数据集。我们发现,旋转门游说者每年产生的收入至少是没有政府经验的游说者的两倍,尤其是在国会山担任更高级职位的游说者。这些发现对政治改革具有重要意义:要想尽量减少游说者和特殊利益集团的影响,首先需要看看国会本身是如何建立一个奖励那些通过旋转门转来转去的人的制度的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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