European Journal of Political Economy最新文献_第4页

Re-election incentives and the adoption of early childhood development programmes: The case of the "Happy Child" Programme in Brazil 再次选举的奖励和儿童早期发展方案的采用：巴西“快乐儿童”方案的例子

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2024-10-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102616

Raquel Tebaldi, Franziska Gassmann, Bruno Martorano

引用次数: 0

What happens to renters? Increased financing costs and government support 租客怎么办？融资成本上升，政府支持力度加大

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102714

Hannah Loeffler

{"title":"What happens to renters? Increased financing costs and government support","authors":"Hannah Loeffler","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102714","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102714","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How does the recent hike in interest rates translate into housing markets and shape preferences for government intervention? Homeownership constitutes the most typical form of private wealth accumulation. Yet, with the decade long period of low interest rates ending in 2022, higher financing costs decreased the affordability of ownership substantially. This paper analyzes implications for the political behavior and demands of renters. More specifically, I argue that the effects of the affordability shock hinge upon the importance of asset ownership achieving financial security in a given economy. Using both cross-national survey data and a survey experiment in Germany and the UK, I show that where homeownership is more central to financial security, demand for broad redistribution decreases, whereas support for government intervention in housing markets increase. It appears that in low-ownership societies, citizens see redistribution as the government’s responsibility, whereas in high-ownership societies, they expect government policies to help them build wealth - allowing them to privately provide for themselves. These findings highlight how institutional differences shape preferences for government intervention.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102714"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147661745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Wage bargaining structure and political budget cycles: A policy game approach 工资谈判结构与政治预算周期：政策博弈方法

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2024-07-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102576

Hamzeh Arabzadeh

{"title":"Wage bargaining structure and political budget cycles: A policy game approach","authors":"Hamzeh Arabzadeh","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102576","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102576","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Utilizing a panel dataset from OECD countries, this study unveils new evidence suggesting that the centralization of wage bargaining plays a significant role in mitigating Political Budget Cycles. To explain this empirical finding, the paper introduces a political economy model based on a policy game framework, encompassing three key agents: (i) an opportunistic government that decides on the level of budget deficits with the objective of enhancing its reelection prospects, (ii) workers/voters who decide on their sectoral affiliations, and (iii) unions that independently negotiate wages with firms. In this model, the opportunistic government has an incentive to run a budget deficit to favor the median voter, who is affiliated with non-tradable sectors. The mechanism emerges from the impact of debt-financed public spending on relative prices, and consequently, on relative wages between non-tradable and tradable sectors. Wage centralization mitigates the political incentive of opportunistic governments by attenuating the responsiveness of sectoral wages to sectoral prices, thereby pushing down budget deficits towards a socially more optimal level.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102576"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141844077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Municipal electoral competition and the economic condition of households: Evidence from the slums of Kolkata 市政选举竞争与家庭经济状况：来自加尔各答贫民窟的证据

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102701

Indranil De , Vidhya Unnikrishnan

{"title":"Municipal electoral competition and the economic condition of households: Evidence from the slums of Kolkata","authors":"Indranil De , Vidhya Unnikrishnan","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102701","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102701","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The effect of political competition on growth and other economic outcomes has largely been examined in the context of developed countries and at macro level. We address these limitations by taking the case of a developing country – India<span> – and examining the effect of competition and fragmentation at the urban local body level (the lowest tier of urban governance) on slum's economic outcomes such as occupation, expenditure and inequality. For this purpose, we collected primary data in slums in the major metropolitan region of Kolkata in 2012 and 2021. Our empirical findings suggest that political clout, political competition and political alignment influence the choice of occupation in slum households. The positive effect of the political clout variable on some employment categories (private sector) and not others (skilled or semiskilled labour) highlight the close link between economic mobility and political connections, which can perpetuate socioeconomic inequality. Further, political competition reduces inequality. The results suggest the need for India to consider planned development rather than development through political incentives.</span></div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102701"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147661341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Lernaean Hydra of populism 民粹主义的勒纳海德拉

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-01-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102645

Anastasia Kafe , Vassilis Logothetis , Vassilis Sarantides

{"title":"The Lernaean Hydra of populism","authors":"Anastasia Kafe , Vassilis Logothetis , Vassilis Sarantides","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102645","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102645","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div><span><span>The Great Recession had a profound impact on Greece's political landscape, fueling the rise of various anti-establishment parties. This culminated in a coalition government between the radical left party SYRIZA and the far-right party ANEL in January 2015, with an unrealistic agenda to renegotiate Greece's </span>bailout<span> agreements in order to end austerity and reverse the severe economic downturn that had begun in 2010. Using survey data, we focus on those who voted for SYRIZA and ANEL in January 2015 and analyze their </span></span>voting behavior<span><span> in the September snap election. Between the two elections, the coalition's failure to secure a new bailout<span> agreement led to the imposition of capital controls to prevent excessive deposit outflows, which in turn led to a sharp economic decline in the third quarter of 2015, when Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras called the snap election. Our results show that a significant portion of SYRIZA voters, representing nearly 90% of the coalition's electoral base, affected by the economic stress shifted their support to ideologically similar anti-establishment parties. This indicates a strong likelihood of voters transitioning between anti-establishment parties, highlighting a persistent cycle of </span></span>populism<span> even within the context of a liberal democracy in the European Union.</span></span></div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102645"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147661744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Electoral democracy, corruption, and tax evasion 选举民主、腐败和逃税

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102722

Elvina Merkaj , Drini Imami

引用次数: 0

When does state capacity Work? Social fragmentation and public goods provision in rural Japan 国家容量什么时候起作用？日本农村的社会分裂与公共产品供给

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102795

Jiali Shen

引用次数: 0

Tax centralization, political connections, and corporate tax avoidance 税收集中、政治关系和企业避税

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102792

Yang Pan , Xihao Wu

引用次数: 0

Do fiscal rules undermine public investments? A review of empirical evidence 财政规则会损害公共投资吗？对经验证据的回顾

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102775

Sebastian Blesse , Luisa Dörr , Florian Dorn , Max Lay

{"title":"Do fiscal rules undermine public investments? A review of empirical evidence","authors":"Sebastian Blesse , Luisa Dörr , Florian Dorn , Max Lay","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102775","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102775","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Fiscal rules are a frequent policy measure to restrict deficit-taking among incumbent politicians. In times of increased and sustained investment needs to mitigate the consequences of climate change, and to promote the digital and structural transformation, fiscal rules have become subject to criticism for undermining public investments. We review 36 existing empirical studies examining the effect of fiscal rules on public investments. We also discuss whether more public investments typically come at the cost of higher deficits and whether the effect on public investments differs between rigid and more flexible fiscal rules. Overall, we do not find majoritarian evidence for a negative effect of fiscal rules on overall public investments. Among the papers finding a (significant) effect of fiscal rules on public investments, the number of those that estimate a negative relationship, however, surpass the ones finding a positive relationship. Rigid fiscal rules seem to deter public investments as compared to more flexible and investment-friendly rules which, by contrast, rather increase public investments. Existing evidence does not suggest that public investments come at the cost of higher public deficits in a majority of studies (except in case of flexible fiscal rules). The design of fiscal rules appears to be crucial for higher public investments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"91 ","pages":"Article 102775"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145791952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Assessing the joint risks of fiscal crises and climate change 评估财政危机和气候变化的共同风险

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102784

Jorge M. Uribe , Helena Chuliá

引用次数: 0