{"title":"Strategic interdependence in sovereign lending","authors":"Jonas B. Bunte , Brandon J. Kinne","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102715","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102715","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Government-to-government loans are powerful instruments of influence, but how do creditor governments decide whom to lend to? We argue that these decisions are shaped by the lending behavior of third-party creditors, as governments strategically allocate loans to maximize their geopolitical influence. Specifically, creditors observe and respond to third-party lending patterns, using these signals to guide their own choices. Crucially, the identity of these third-party creditors matters: rather than engaging directly with rivals, creditors tend to specialize and cooperate within their partnerships. We introduce and empirically test network effects in sovereign lending, showing that lending follows a pattern of conditional preferential attachment. Creditors are more likely to extend loans to recipients supported by their political partners than to recipients supported by adversaries. Consequently, although lending competition is not easily visible in aggregate data, lending patterns reveal a fragmentation into politically aligned creditor blocs. Our inferential network models provide strong evidence of this dynamic, demonstrating that governments’ perceptions of a recipient’s strategic value are shaped by the actions of other lenders. By incorporating this strategic interdependence, our analysis significantly improves the prediction of which governments receive loans and from whom.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102715"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144522844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jan Fałkowski, Jacek Lewkowicz, Łukasz Hardt, Bartosz Słysz
{"title":"Do appointing institutions influence monetary policy? Evidence from voting patterns in the Polish Monetary Policy Council","authors":"Jan Fałkowski, Jacek Lewkowicz, Łukasz Hardt, Bartosz Słysz","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102721","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102721","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The main aim of the study is to analyse the extent to which the monetary-policy views of the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) members vary along institutional channels of appointment. To this end, we investigate the voting records of the Polish MPC over the period 1998–2022, taking advantage of the fact that in Poland all MPC members, except the chairman, are appointed in equal numbers by the President and the two houses of parliament (the Sejm and the Senate). We document that members appointed by the same institution are more likely to vote in the same way, than those appointed by different institutions. This pattern indicates that the appointing institution plays a role in shaping voting behaviour. In line with this, our results suggest that having separate appointing institutions promotes a diversity of views regarding the optimal level of interest rates. Appointees of the Sejm emerge as the most dovish and relatively often contribute to the winning coalition in close vote tallies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102721"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144522845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public investment on health and voter responses: Evidence from the mass vaccination during COVID-19","authors":"Masaki Takahashi , Reo Takaku , Toyo Ashida , Yoko Ibuka","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102718","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102718","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the effect of COVID-19 vaccination on political support by leveraging Japan’s age-based vaccination rollout, which prioritized people aged 65 and older. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, we found that vaccination increased favorable opinions of vaccination progress and infection control measures by 27.4% and 14.7%, respectively. These favorable opinions extended to positive perceptions of other infection control measures, ultimately fostering trust in the government. In addition, the effect of vaccination was heterogeneous: it was more pronounced among individuals with chronic diseases, women, those of lower socioeconomic status, and those with higher levels of interpersonal trust. In contrast, low trusters became more dissatisfied with how the Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics in 2021 were managed, without showing an increase in positive opinions of the government.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102718"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144571235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
K. Peren Arin , Kevin Devereux , Joel Methorst , Marcel Thum
{"title":"Flooding the vote: Heterogeneous voting responses to a natural disaster in Germany","authors":"K. Peren Arin , Kevin Devereux , Joel Methorst , Marcel Thum","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102694","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102694","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We present the first evidence of voter-level responses to a climatic disaster — the catastrophic German flooding of 2021, which serves as a natural experiment. Data on previous voting history reveals non-monotonic treatment effects: flood exposure <span><math><mrow><mi>i</mi><mi>n</mi><mi>c</mi><mi>r</mi><mi>e</mi><mi>a</mi><mi>s</mi><mi>e</mi><mi>d</mi></mrow></math></span> the likelihood of voting for the Green Party by four to five percentage points among previous non-Green voters, but <span><math><mrow><mi>d</mi><mi>e</mi><mi>c</mi><mi>r</mi><mi>e</mi><mi>a</mi><mi>s</mi><mi>e</mi><mi>d</mi></mrow></math></span> future Green voting for previous Green voters. Tracking migration also reveals heterogeneity. Movers-out of flood zones responded more strongly; classifying them in the control group – as geographic panels do – attenuates the treatment effect. Both factors rationalize past findings of null or small effects, emphasizing the importance of microdata.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102694"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144470144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The dynamics of revolutions","authors":"Moti Michaeli , Daniel Spiro","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102705","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102705","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the dynamics of revolutions by extending Kuran’s (1989) dynamic model of mass protests, allowing dissenters to choose not only whether to dissent but also how much. In the model, regimes may differ in how harshly they sanction small vs. large dissent; and societies may differ in how individuals perceive the cost of small vs. large deviations from their own ideological convictions. Such a generalization provides a typology of revolutions and predicts who is more likely to start a revolution: those whose ideology is close to the regime’s (moderates) or those far from it (extremists). It also provides predictions about the ideology they will express, how this will dynamically change during a revolution and about which policies may trigger a revolution and which may consolidate the regime’s strength. In particular, moderates are more likely to start a revolution if individuals are sensitive to even small deviations from their ideology. This sensitivity makes moderates voice their criticism despite only slightly disagreeing with the regime. Extremists, on the other hand, are silenced, because expressing their extreme views bears heavy sanctioning. This further implies that a popular policy may trigger or accelerate a revolution, because it indirectly spurs more people to become “moderate” hence speak their minds.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102705"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144489653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Googling ‘inflation’: Household inflation attention across the euro area","authors":"Christian Buelens","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102702","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102702","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the dynamics of household inflation attention in the euro area, using internet searches as a direct measure of inflation attention. It identifies different inflation attention-regimes dependent on the inflation context, aligning with the theory of rational inattention. Additionally, the paper finds that changes in monetary policy raise inflation attention in some euro area countries, indicating that households perceive a connection between monetary policy decisions and inflation. The analysis further reveals significant heterogeneity in inflation attention patterns across euro area countries, evident in three dimensions: (i) varying levels of structural inflation attention, seemingly linked to national inflation aversion; (ii) varying sensitivities of inflation attention to changes in inflation and inflation volatility, and differing thresholds at which the sensitivity of attention to inflation increases; (iii) asymmetric responses of national inflation attention to monetary policy announcements. Finally, the paper provides evidence of a structural increase in inflation attention after the post-pandemic inflation surge, along with a general decrease in attention thresholds. A better understanding of the factors driving inflation attention and its cross-country variation can help policymakers in a monetary union to enhance and better target their communication on inflation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102702"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144280217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Benjamin Lockwood , Francesco Porcelli , James Rockey
{"title":"In the grip of Whitehall? The effects of party control on local fiscal policy in England","authors":"Benjamin Lockwood , Francesco Porcelli , James Rockey","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102697","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102697","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper uses an instrumental variable approach based on close elections to evaluate the effects of political parties on local fiscal policy in England from 1998 to 2015. Our main finding is that when we condition on the central government grant, political control of the council by Labour or Conservative parties has no effect on total service expenditure, the composition of that expenditure, and the property tax rate (council tax per band D property). We find the same null results for capital expenditure, debt, and authorized debt limits. Using data on the distribution of income within local authorities, we find no evidence that this null result is being driven by homogeneous electorates rather than fiscal constraints. Thus, our results confirm the widely expressed belief that centrally imposed constraints on local government fiscal policy (rate-capping, and more recently, compulsory referenda, and the Prudential Code for borrowing) hold local government fiscal policy in a tight grip.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102697"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144470145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can the middle class benefit from more conservative redistribution?","authors":"Darong Dai","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102700","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102700","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>There is considerable evidence indicating that high-income earners are increasingly able to avoid or evade taxes, while the working poor at the bottom have a growing justification for demanding greater redistribution. We examine how enhanced external opportunities for top talent and rising redistributive motives from the bottom impact the benefits available to the middle class. The government maximizes a weighted social welfare function, with an exogenous welfare weight assigned to the lowest skill type. This objective is subject to the conventional government budget constraint, truth-telling constraints, and the participation constraint for the highest skill type (“top talent”). We conduct a comparative static analysis of the optimal income allocations in relation to the welfare weight of the lowest incomes and the reservation utility of top talent. We find that, all else being equal, the optimal income received by the middle class decreases as the welfare weight parameter increases, while it rises with the reservation utility of top talent.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102700"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144239483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Recovering history: Using the Nobel lectures to identify hidden women in economic thought","authors":"Darwyyn Deyo","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102703","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102703","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Women's historical contributions to the development of economic thought are often hidden or overlooked, demonstrating an example of the Matilda Effect. One way to identify more of these women is by identifying their work through the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences prize lectures. In this study, I identify citations in the prize lectures from 1969 to 2009, the year when Elinor Ostrom won the prize. These lectures represent a novel data source to identify a substantial sample of women in the history of economic thought. I identified 125 women as authors in 165 citations and 29 women as editors in 34 citations. In total, 163 unique women are acknowledged in 198 unique citations. I provide a descriptive analysis of scholars and citations, including publication type, longevity, and field. I also classify types of contributions within the discipline, from authorship, editorship, and manuscript support. I find that the Nobel lectures provide an important resource for identifying more women who made significant contributions to the development of economic thought, and I provide a public database that supports research on a credit attribution gap in the literature.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102703"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144322620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inequality, conspiracy theories, and redistribution","authors":"Daiki Kishishita","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102698","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102698","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Despite a rapid increase in inequality, redistribution does not necessarily expand. I address this paradox by emphasizing a novel effect of inequality on the acceptance of conspiracy theories. For this purpose, I develop an electoral competition model in which voters are divided into rich and poor. Each voter weighs the desire to maintain their self-image against the need for accurate beliefs, leading to varied endorsements of conspiracy theories. In the model, greater inequality leads the poor to believe more strongly in conspiracy theories. As a result, poor voters can seek more reforms to defeat conspiracies and lower income taxation. I show that greater inequality paradoxically reduces income taxation when the initial inequality is high and the distortion of taxation is large. In the shadow of prevalent conspiracy theories, democracy may fail to act as a protector against rising inequality.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102698"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144212552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}