Jan Fałkowski, Jacek Lewkowicz, Łukasz Hardt, Bartosz Słysz
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
The main aim of the study is to analyse the extent to which the monetary-policy views of the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) members vary along institutional channels of appointment. To this end, we investigate the voting records of the Polish MPC over the period 1998–2022, taking advantage of the fact that in Poland all MPC members, except the chairman, are appointed in equal numbers by the President and the two houses of parliament (the Sejm and the Senate). We document that members appointed by the same institution are more likely to vote in the same way, than those appointed by different institutions. This pattern indicates that the appointing institution plays a role in shaping voting behaviour. In line with this, our results suggest that having separate appointing institutions promotes a diversity of views regarding the optimal level of interest rates. Appointees of the Sejm emerge as the most dovish and relatively often contribute to the winning coalition in close vote tallies.
期刊介绍:
The aim of the European Journal of Political Economy is to disseminate original theoretical and empirical research on economic phenomena within a scope that encompasses collective decision making, political behavior, and the role of institutions. Contributions are invited from the international community of researchers. Manuscripts must be published in English. Starting 2008, the European Journal of Political Economy is indexed in the Social Sciences Citation Index published by Thomson Scientific (formerly ISI).