{"title":"Kin-based institutions and state capacity","authors":"Roberto Ezcurra","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102676","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102676","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the relationship between kin-based institutions and state capacity. The results show that the intensity of kinship networks is a strong predictor of present-day state capacity, both across and within countries. Societies historically characterized by more intensive kinship systems tend to have weaker states today. This finding holds after accounting for various variables that may be correlated with both kinship network intensity and state capacity, including a broad range of geographic, historical, and contemporary factors. The results are also robust when employing an instrumental variable approach that exploits plausibly exogenous variation in historical exposure to the marriage laws of the medieval Catholic Church. Additionally, the analysis reveals that societies with intensive kin-based institutions typically exhibit lower political centralization. Given the essential role of political centralization in establishing state capacity, this finding helps explain the negative association between kinship intensity and state capacity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"88 ","pages":"Article 102676"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144105203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Spend on what? Insights on military spending efficiency","authors":"Dimitrios Dimitriou , Eleftherios Goulas , Christos Kallandranis","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102696","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102696","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates the role of military sector efficiency on the economic growth-defence spending relationship in 135 countries from 1992 to 2020. Efficiency stems from capital intensity of the military sector and the existence of technological externalities and economies of scale associated with armaments exports. Our findings indicate that a higher level of efficiency can moderate or eliminate the adverse effects of military burden on economic growth. Introducing alliance participation, we highlight the ‘protective’ role of NATO for its member-states with lower efficiency levels, while SCO seems to be less supportive.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"88 ","pages":"Article 102696"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144072065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social media campaigning and voter behavior–evidence for the German federal election 2021","authors":"Abeer Ibtisam Aziz, Ivo Bischoff","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102685","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102685","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze the relationship between party campaigning on social media and the voting intentions voiced by respondents in a large representative survey in the German federal election campaign in 2021. We argue that online campaigns spread through the online and offline networks of the initial recipients – thereby influencing substantial parts of the electorate. We exploit inter-temporal, inter-regional, and inter-party differences in the intensity of campaigning by parties and candidates on Facebook and Twitter. In addition, we control for the respondents' choice in the previous federal election and a number of other personal characteristics. Using a multinomial logit model with alternative-specific constants, we find the probability of a respondent's intention to vote for a party to increase in the state-specific campaigning activities on social media of this party the days before. While the literature suggests that especially populist right-wing parties will benefit from campaigning on social media, we find the marginal impact to be significantly higher for Christian democrats, Social Democrats, and Greens than for the right-wing “Alternative für Deutschland”.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"88 ","pages":"Article 102685"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143943605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Capital vs. labour: The effect of income sources on attitudes toward the top 1 percent","authors":"Oscar Barrera-Rodríguez , Emmanuel Chávez","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102684","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102684","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We conduct a randomized online survey to study how information on the share of top earners' income derived from capital and labour affects attitudes toward top earners. Our findings re-veal that: (i) At the baseline, respondents tend to overestimate the income of the top 1 percent, have no clear priors on their capital vs. labor shares, and want them to pay a higher income tax rate than the current one; (ii) quantitative information on top earners’ income sources leads people to have more unfavorable views toward the rich; (iii) individuals most responsive to our treatments vote for left-wing candidates and have egalitarian notions of justice.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"88 ","pages":"Article 102684"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143932156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assessing the efficacy of China's anti-corruption drive: Insights from consumer expenditure patterns","authors":"Zhengang Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102680","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102680","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the economic impact of China's President Xi Jinping's Eight Regulations of Austerity and the coordinated anti-corruption campaign. Specifically, I analyze the effects of this campaign on household expenditure patterns in China using a triple differences approach. I compare the expenditures of households with government employees to those without, both before and after the anti-corruption reform, across commodities likely to be subject to corruption versus those unlikely to be affected. The findings demonstrate that, in the post-reform period, government-affiliated families allocate relatively more expenditure towards goods they likely obtained illegally through bribes previously. Conversely, expenditure patterns for goods less susceptible to corruption do not show a relative increase in the post-reform period. These expenditure shifts are most pronounced among families of low-level officials, with the majority of the increase observed among non-Chinese Communist Party member government employees and those outside Xi Jinping's power base. This suggests that individuals with the strongest party ties were able to circumvent the effects of the anti-corruption campaign.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"88 ","pages":"Article 102680"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144123504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Heterogeneity of institutions and model uncertainty in the income inequality nexus","authors":"Pinar Deniz , Thanasis Stengos","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102670","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102670","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study revisits the drivers of income inequality with political institutions at the core. We take a multidimensional institutional approach by defining political institutions in terms of governance, political freedom, political fragmentation and political scale. We carry out an extensive empirical analysis of the role of political institutions by decomposing it into distinct elements and providing available proxies for each dimension. Considering the difficulty and the lack of consensus and clarity regarding model selection in the literature, we follow a model averaging methodology to deal with the issue of model uncertainty and model specification that impacts the role of institutions. We combine an analysis of club convergence, a clustering mechanism according to the long term income trajectories of the countries, with Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) to determine the most important variables that affect inequality out of a large set of potential determinants for each homogeneous country clusters in terms of their development path. Our results show that drivers of income inequality do not act the same irrespective of different economic development patterns and that there is no “one size fits all” policy prescription that links political institutions and income inequality.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"87 ","pages":"Article 102670"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143838383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political parties’ ideological bias and convergence in economic outcome","authors":"Zeeshan Hashim , Jan Fidrmuc , Sugata Ghosh","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102669","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102669","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In democracies, policies are jointly shaped by voters' preferences and politicians' (or parties’) ideological biases. We explore the relative importance of the latter on some key economic outcomes – growth rate, inflation and inequality – in a broad sample of 71 democracies from 1995 to 2019. We find evidence that both left-wing and right-wing governments deliver convergent outcomes as regards growth, inflation and inequality. The same applies to the policy outcome of economic freedom. This indicates that consolidated democracies maintain continuity in economic policies, and a change in government from one political ideology to another with a different ideology does not significantly alter economic policy outcomes. However, we find <em>divergence</em> in hybrid regimes; inequality and economic freedom are reduced under leftist governments, and economic freedom is enhanced by rightist governments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"87 ","pages":"Article 102669"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143768069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Presidential versus parliamentary: Political system and stock market volatility","authors":"Yosef Bonaparte","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102674","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102674","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We utilize panel data from 60 countries to analyze whether the political system -presidential versus parliamentary-impacts stock market volatility. Our findings show that presidential systems exhibit lower volatility compared to parliamentary systems. We identify two main factors underlying this result: political stability and coalition dependence. Specifically, presidential systems demonstrate greater political stability and less coalition dependence, which contribute to reduced stock market volatility. Additionally, we show that the lower stock market volatility in presidential systems does not come at the cost of stock market performance. In fact, some evidence suggests that presidential systems positively enhance stock market performance. Our results are statistically significant and robust, accounting for subsamples and employing various specifications and econometric models, including a global portfolio that establishes each country's Beta. Collectively, our study highlights the significant role of political systems in the study of law and finance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"87 ","pages":"Article 102674"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143900082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How central bank independence shapes monetary policy communication: A Large Language Model application","authors":"Lauren Leek , Simeon Bischl","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102668","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102668","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Although central bank communication is a core monetary policy and accountability tool for central banks, little is known about what shapes it. This paper develops and tests a theory regarding a previously unconsidered variable: central bank independence (CBI). We argue that increases in CBI alter the pressures central banks face, compelling them to address these pressures to maintain their reputation. We fine-tune and validate a Large Language Model (Google’s Gemini) to develop novel textual indices of policy pressures regarding monetary policy communication of central banks in speeches of 100 central banks from 1997 to 2023. Employing a staggered difference-in-differences and an instrumental variable approach, we find robust evidence that an increase in independence decreases the narrow focus on price stability and increases financial pressures discussed in monetary policy communication. These results are not, as generally is assumed, confounded by general changes in communication over time or singular events, in particular, the Global Financial Crisis.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"87 ","pages":"Article 102668"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143886683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social welfare and the group size paradox","authors":"Paul Pecorino","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102673","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102673","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Tullock (1967) argues that the welfare costs of tariffs and monopoly extend beyond traditional deadweight loss measures to include both resources devoted to obtaining the transfer and resources spent resisting the transfer. This includes resources spent lobbying the government for the implementation of a favorable policy. Olson (1965) argues that lobbying activity frequently provides a nonexcludable good to an interest group and therefore may be subject to a free-rider problem. I use a Tullock (1980) style contest to analyze how the free-rider problem, the extent of the deadweight loss and bias in the policy process interact in determining the social loss resulting from lobbying activity. For plausible parameter values, an increase in the ability of the group potentially subject to the transfer to overcome the free-rider problem worsens social welfare by increasing expenditure in the transfer-seeking game even as it makes the distortion inducing transfer less likely. There are also plausible parameter values under which an increase in the bias of the policy process towards the group seeking the transfer raises social welfare by reducing expenditures in the transfer seeking game even as it makes the distortion inducing transfer more likely.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"87 ","pages":"Article 102673"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143758963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}