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Female political representation and budget forecast errors 女性政治代表性与预算预测误差
IF 2.4 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-10-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102766
Marco Alberto De Benedetto , Pasquale Giacobbe , Andrea Mosca
{"title":"Female political representation and budget forecast errors","authors":"Marco Alberto De Benedetto ,&nbsp;Pasquale Giacobbe ,&nbsp;Andrea Mosca","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102766","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102766","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines how female representation in municipal executive boards — the primary budgetary decision-making bodies in Italian local governments — affects both the accuracy and bias of budget forecasts. We exploit Law 56/2014, which mandated gender quotas in municipalities with more than 3000 residents, to identify causal effects. Using an instrumental variable approach, we find that a one–percentage-point increase in the share of female aldermen reduces expenditure and revenue forecast errors by 0.5 and 0.4 percent, respectively, and systematically mitigates the prevailing optimistic bias in projections, particularly in pre-election years. Mechanism analyses highlight two main channels: (i) higher levels of technical competence and (ii) lower scope for political manipulation, with the strongest effects observed in social spending and in regions with weaker accountability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102766"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145266740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Aid, Reform, and Interest groups 援助、改革和利益集团
IF 2.4 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-09-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102750
Jac C. Heckelman, Bonnie Wilson
{"title":"Aid, Reform, and Interest groups","authors":"Jac C. Heckelman,&nbsp;Bonnie Wilson","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102750","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102750","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Employing a political economy perspective, we seek to understand the seeming failure of aid to promote institutional reform. À la Stigler’s theory of regulatory capture, we suppose that institutions are determined via a process of exchange and that special interest groups may capture institutions. We interpret grants of aid as a shock to the market for institutions and hypothesize that the impact of aid on institutional reform is conditional on the influence of groups. Based on a panel of 92 aid-receiving nations, we find evidence consistent with a political economy perspective and our hypothesis. In particular, we find that aid has had a positive impact on reform in countries with especially low levels of market-orientation in institutions and middling to large numbers of groups, and that aid has been associated with back-sliding on reform in many countries with high levels of market-orientation in institutions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102750"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145158695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Threshold of shadows: Unveiling organised crime in Italian municipal public procurement 阴影的门槛：揭露意大利市政公共采购中的有组织犯罪
IF 2.4 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-09-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102752
Stefania Fontana , Giorgio d’Agostino
{"title":"Threshold of shadows: Unveiling organised crime in Italian municipal public procurement","authors":"Stefania Fontana ,&nbsp;Giorgio d’Agostino","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102752","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102752","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the complicity of local public buyers in enabling the diversion of resources to organised crime through the manipulation of contract values in public works and services. Exploiting a discontinuity in anti-mafia screening procedures, we analyse a comprehensive dataset of public procurement contracts issued by Italian municipalities spanning from 2007 to 2019. Bunching estimators reveal a distinct pattern of contract value manipulation occurring just below the anti-mafia screening threshold of €150,000, with a heightened concentration observed in public works projects and provinces characterised by a higher prevalence of mafia influence. Our empirical analysis further shows that bunching is significantly more pronounced in municipalities that are later dissolved for mafia infiltration. Contracts below the threshold are also more likely to involve limited competition and to be awarded to firms with financial traits consistent with the hypothesis of mafia infiltration. By following the full procurement chain – from the design of the contract, to how competition is shaped, to who ultimately wins – we provide new evidence of collusion risks in local procurement, and highlight the importance of enhanced safeguards to counter corruption and organised crime within public procurement processes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102752"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145221251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stock returns of federal reserve officials 美联储官员的股票回报
IF 2.4 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-09-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102739
Cody Couture , Abhiprerna Smit
{"title":"Stock returns of federal reserve officials","authors":"Cody Couture ,&nbsp;Abhiprerna Smit","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102739","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102739","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the trading behavior of members of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). First, we calculate the financial market returns of FOMC members relative to the overall market and examine if there is any evidence of abnormal returns. Second, we test whether FOMC members exhibit evidence of market timing around monetary policy announcements. We do not find any evidence that FOMC officials select securities that earn abnormal returns. However, our results regarding market timing are mixed. Though we do not find any evidence of security selection or portfolio rebalancing with respect to monetary policy decisions, we do find that stock sales by FOMC officials are typically succeeded by negative returns in the overall stock market.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102739"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145158694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Physical vs. institutional public goods provision: Evidence from China 物质与制度的公共产品供给：来自中国的证据
IF 2.4 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-09-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102737
Linghui Han
{"title":"Physical vs. institutional public goods provision: Evidence from China","authors":"Linghui Han","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102737","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102737","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper argues that political and market concentration levels explain why developing economies often underinvest in institutional infrastructure and legal capacity. Economic growth challenges this equilibrium, incentivizing rulers to invest in institutional infrastructure complementary to physical infrastructure. Rulers jointly invest to expand market entry and size only if they can secure higher rents and preserve institutions favoring concentration. The theoretical model predicts that physical infrastructure investment grows faster than institutional investment as market concentration rises. Using provincial coal reserve shares as an instrument for market concentration, a difference-in-differences analysis of Chinese data from 1997 to 2006 shows that the fiscal expenditure ratio of physical to institutional infrastructure increased 78% faster in provinces within the top market concentration quartile in 2000—the year before China joined the WTO.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102737"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145060696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The impact of income inequality on public environmental expenditure with green consumers 收入不平等对绿色消费者公共环境支出的影响
IF 2.4 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-09-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102746
Lesly Cassin , Paolo Melindi-Ghidi , Fabien Prieur
{"title":"The impact of income inequality on public environmental expenditure with green consumers","authors":"Lesly Cassin ,&nbsp;Paolo Melindi-Ghidi ,&nbsp;Fabien Prieur","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102746","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102746","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article analyzes the impact of income inequality on environmental policy in the presence of green consumers. We first perform an empirical analysis using a panel of European countries over the period 1995–2021. The results show a negative relationship between inequality and public environmental expenditure, which is weaker with higher inequality. We also find a negative correlation between environmental expenditure and green consumption, that highlights the substitutable nature of the relationship between the two variables. We next develop a model with two main ingredients: citizens with different income capacities have access to two commodities that differ in terms of environmental impact, and they vote on the environmental policy. In equilibrium, the population is divided into two groups, conventional <em>vs</em> green consumers. An increase in inequality raises the marginal cost of policy through size and composition effects. The higher the equilibrium tax, the larger the overall effect. This provides us with an explanation of the main empirical result.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102746"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145109720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Effects of IMF-supported programs on gender inequality 国际货币基金组织支持的项目对性别不平等的影响
IF 2.4 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-09-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102740
Theo S. Eicher , Reina Kawai Eskimez , Monique Newiak
{"title":"Effects of IMF-supported programs on gender inequality","authors":"Theo S. Eicher ,&nbsp;Reina Kawai Eskimez ,&nbsp;Monique Newiak","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102740","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102740","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Macroeconomic volatility often entails policies that may disproportionately impact vulnerable populations. Some economies address weak economic fundamentals with IMF-supported reform programs, which have been shown to impact gender inequality. To accurately evaluate program effects, however, requires well-matched counterfactuals: How would gender disparities have evolved in the country in the absence of the program? We analyze 125 IMF-supported programs (1994–2022) using custom-tailored control groups that match each IMF-supported program country's gender/economic trends, including fiscal spending, debt, and reserves. For most countries, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that IMF-supported programs have no effect on gender inequality, as the observed gender outcomes were not statistically significantly different from those in controls with similar fiscal spending, debt, and reserves trajectories but no programs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102740"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145050167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do as I say, not as I do? Economists policymakers and fiscal consolidation 照我说的做，别照我做的做？经济学家、政策制定者和财政整顿
IF 2.4 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-09-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102754
Nicola Nones
{"title":"Do as I say, not as I do? Economists policymakers and fiscal consolidation","authors":"Nicola Nones","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102754","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102754","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Do individual policy-makers matter for fiscal policy and, if so, under which conditions do they matter the most? Does a formal training in economics lead policymakers to implement a distinct set of fiscal policies? Do economists-turned-policymakers follow through with what they presumably teach in their classroom? This article aims to answer these questions with respect to fiscal consolidation (austerity) by analyzing a sample of Western and European countries between 1978 and 2019. By focusing on a subset of fiscal policies that are weakly orthogonal to the business cycle, I abstract from the most contentious debates in macroeconomics which revolve around the ‘best’ fiscal response to economic shocks (the infamous austerity vs stimulus debate). As such, I investigate the effects of economists on fiscal policy in a most-likely-case approach, i.e. when economic theory is by and large in agreement on what the best course of action is. Across a variety of specifications, modeling choices, estimators, and temporal and spatial sub-samples, I find no evidence that either the Head of the Executive or the Finance Minister's formal education in economics is (unconditionally) associated with fiscal consolidation policy. Nevertheless, the analysis reveals some political and institutional conditions under which economists-turned-Heads of Government are indeed more likely to implement fiscal consolidation. Governments led by economists are more likely to implement fiscal consolidation when the government is less fractionalized, when they are supported by a parliamentary majority, and when there are fewer institutional constraints on the executive.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102754"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145106345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Baumol’s migrants: Productive and unproductive entrepreneurship and between-MSA migration 鲍莫尔的移民：生产性和非生产性企业家精神以及msa之间的移民
IF 2.4 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-09-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102733
Justin T. Callais , Vincent Geloso , Alicia Plemmons , Gary A. Wagner
{"title":"Baumol’s migrants: Productive and unproductive entrepreneurship and between-MSA migration","authors":"Justin T. Callais ,&nbsp;Vincent Geloso ,&nbsp;Alicia Plemmons ,&nbsp;Gary A. Wagner","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102733","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102733","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>William Baumol proposes that there are two types of entrepreneurship: productive or unproductive. Productive entrepreneurship, characterized by innovation and efficient resource allocation, fosters economic growth and can act as a potent magnet for migration. Conversely, unproductive entrepreneurship, which often involves rent-seeking and regulatory circumvention, deters migration and potentially provokes out-migration. To test this link from the types of entrepreneurship and migration, we use a new index of entrepreneurship (productive and unproductive) in conjunction with a dataset covering migration to and from Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) from 2005 to 2019. Our analysis reveals that regions high in productive entrepreneurship experience significant net in-migration, while those dominated by unproductive entrepreneurship see the opposite effect.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102733"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145020212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Businessperson candidates and their employees: How do businessperson candidates use their firms to get elected? 商人候选人和他们的雇员：商人候选人如何利用他们的公司来当选？
IF 2.4 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-09-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102753
Songkhun Nillasithanukroh
{"title":"Businessperson candidates and their employees: How do businessperson candidates use their firms to get elected?","authors":"Songkhun Nillasithanukroh","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102753","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102753","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Businessperson politicians perform well in elections worldwide. What electoral strategy do they employ to win votes? This article highlights private sector employment as an underexplored resource in distributive politics. I argue businessperson politicians leverage their firms to mobilize employees as campaign workers, exchanging jobs for electoral support and services. Using list experiments in Thailand, I find evidence of this exchange: 36.5 % of employees voted for their employer, 27.0 % attended employer's campaign rallies, 17.5 % persuaded acquaintances to support their employer, 18.2 % distributed short-term benefits to voters, and 8.5 % distributed long-term benefits. I also provide evidence that businessperson politicians use private employment to circumvent restrictions limiting use of public resources for electoral gains by showing employees hired within two months before election were more likely to provide services than those hired outside this period, suggesting these hires were intentionally brought to support campaign activities during election season.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102753"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145020213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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