European Journal of Political Economy最新文献

Central bank independence and fiscal rule under populist leader's regime 民粹主义领导人政权下的央行独立性和财政统治

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-07-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102728

Hoyong Jung

{"title":"Central bank independence and fiscal rule under populist leader's regime","authors":"Hoyong Jung","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102728","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102728","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the relationship between fiscal rules, populist leadership, and central bank independence. It posits that populist leaders, driven by the desire to stimulate economic activity and gain public approval through short-term expansionary policies, are more inclined to undermine central bank independence when they are constrained by fiscal rules. The findings reveal that fiscal constraints significantly increase the likelihood of weakened central bank independence under populist leadership, a result that remains robust across various model specifications. These effects are particularly pronounced in political contexts where populist leaders exert greater authority and encounter stronger incentives to prioritize monetary policy over fiscal measures. Moreover, the adverse impact on central bank independence is exacerbated when fiscal rules impose stricter constraints on short-term expenditures, with reduced independence primarily reflected in shifts in central bank policies. These results highlight the importance of political dynamics in fiscal and monetary institutions and emphasize the need for complementary measures to stabilize macroeconomic conditions through coordinated fiscal rules and central bank independence.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102728"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144680360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Can term limits reduce political sabotage? Evidence from negative campaigning in gubernatorial races 任期限制能减少政治破坏吗？州长竞选中负面竞选的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-07-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102724

Yizhaq Minchuk , Ohad Raveh

引用次数: 0

The “German Vote” and its consequences: (Un)reliable parties in multilateral bargaining under private information “德国投票”及其后果：私人信息下多边谈判中不可靠的各方

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-07-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102719

David Piazolo

{"title":"The “German Vote” and its consequences: (Un)reliable parties in multilateral bargaining under private information","authors":"David Piazolo","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102719","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102719","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper theoretically investigates the strategic implications of varying <em>reliability</em> of bargaining partners under unanimous and non-unanimous voting. In a sequential two-period model, three players (one proposer, two responders) bargain over the distribution of a pie. One responder has private information about his valuation of finding an agreement, implying signaling values that differ substantially between voting rules and are affected by the other responder’s <em>reliability</em>. The other responder is of a non-strategic “robot” type, who is unreliable in the sense that in the first period, he may vote “no” after announcing a “yes”-vote. Under unanimity rule, the responder with private information benefits from voting “no” because this signals that he requires a larger compensation in a future period. In contrast, under majority rule, voting “no” is unattractive due to the <em>fear of being excluded</em> from a future coalition. Under both voting rules, one responder becoming less reliable negatively affects the other responder’s willingness to vote “yes”, making efficient agreements increasingly difficult to achieve. Under majority rule, the presence of unreliable parties can lead to more parties being included in the winning coalition, as demonstrated by an extension of the model. However, some of these insights are contingent on the specific assumptions of the model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102719"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144605727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Democratic engagement in the shadow of authoritarian repression: Evidence from Chile (2019–2023) 专制镇压阴影下的民主参与：来自智利的证据（2019-2023）

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-07-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102704

Armando N.G.L. Martins

{"title":"Democratic engagement in the shadow of authoritarian repression: Evidence from Chile (2019–2023)","authors":"Armando N.G.L. Martins","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102704","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102704","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article analyzes the long-term effects of authoritarian repression on democratic engagement (protests and voting) in Chile, focusing on the 2019–2020 <em>Estallido Social</em> protests and the 2020–2023 constitutional plebiscite process. It uses measures such as the location of military bases before 1970 and the number of victims during Pinochet’s regime to capture the intensity of past repression. The study also examines indicators of contemporary political behavior linked to the legacy of this repression, including public demonstrations, NGO activity, memorial sites, and social media engagement. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates suggest that exposure to political violence continues to shape civic and electoral behavior even after three decades after the end of the dictatorship. Moreover, municipalities more affected by dictatorship-era violence were more likely to protest but less likely to participate in the constitutional plebiscite. These areas did not consistently oppose incumbent politicians or favor independent candidates. Overall, the findings suggest that historical repression can contribute to greater reaction on the streets to political violence and lower levels of electoral engagement in contemporary democracies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102704"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144597521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Strategic interdependence in sovereign lending 主权贷款中的战略相互依赖

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-07-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102715

Jonas B. Bunte , Brandon J. Kinne

{"title":"Strategic interdependence in sovereign lending","authors":"Jonas B. Bunte , Brandon J. Kinne","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102715","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102715","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Government-to-government loans are powerful instruments of influence, but how do creditor governments decide whom to lend to? We argue that these decisions are shaped by the lending behavior of third-party creditors, as governments strategically allocate loans to maximize their geopolitical influence. Specifically, creditors observe and respond to third-party lending patterns, using these signals to guide their own choices. Crucially, the identity of these third-party creditors matters: rather than engaging directly with rivals, creditors tend to specialize and cooperate within their partnerships. We introduce and empirically test network effects in sovereign lending, showing that lending follows a pattern of conditional preferential attachment. Creditors are more likely to extend loans to recipients supported by their political partners than to recipients supported by adversaries. Consequently, although lending competition is not easily visible in aggregate data, lending patterns reveal a fragmentation into politically aligned creditor blocs. Our inferential network models provide strong evidence of this dynamic, demonstrating that governments’ perceptions of a recipient’s strategic value are shaped by the actions of other lenders. By incorporating this strategic interdependence, our analysis significantly improves the prediction of which governments receive loans and from whom.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102715"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144522844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Do appointing institutions influence monetary policy? Evidence from voting patterns in the Polish Monetary Policy Council 任命机构会影响货币政策吗？来自波兰货币政策委员会投票模式的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-07-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102721

Jan Fałkowski, Jacek Lewkowicz, Łukasz Hardt, Bartosz Słysz

引用次数: 0

Public investment on health and voter responses: Evidence from the mass vaccination during COVID-19 公共卫生投资与选民反应：来自COVID-19期间大规模疫苗接种的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-06-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102718

Masaki Takahashi , Reo Takaku , Toyo Ashida , Yoko Ibuka

引用次数: 0

Flooding the vote: Heterogeneous voting responses to a natural disaster in Germany 投票泛滥：德国自然灾害引发的不同投票反应

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-06-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102694

K. Peren Arin , Kevin Devereux , Joel Methorst , Marcel Thum

引用次数: 0

The dynamics of revolutions 革命的动力

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-06-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102705

Moti Michaeli , Daniel Spiro

{"title":"The dynamics of revolutions","authors":"Moti Michaeli , Daniel Spiro","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102705","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102705","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the dynamics of revolutions by extending Kuran’s (1989) dynamic model of mass protests, allowing dissenters to choose not only whether to dissent but also how much. In the model, regimes may differ in how harshly they sanction small vs. large dissent; and societies may differ in how individuals perceive the cost of small vs. large deviations from their own ideological convictions. Such a generalization provides a typology of revolutions and predicts who is more likely to start a revolution: those whose ideology is close to the regime’s (moderates) or those far from it (extremists). It also provides predictions about the ideology they will express, how this will dynamically change during a revolution and about which policies may trigger a revolution and which may consolidate the regime’s strength. In particular, moderates are more likely to start a revolution if individuals are sensitive to even small deviations from their ideology. This sensitivity makes moderates voice their criticism despite only slightly disagreeing with the regime. Extremists, on the other hand, are silenced, because expressing their extreme views bears heavy sanctioning. This further implies that a popular policy may trigger or accelerate a revolution, because it indirectly spurs more people to become “moderate” hence speak their minds.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102705"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144489653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Googling ‘inflation’: Household inflation attention across the euro area 谷歌“通胀”：整个欧元区的家庭通胀关注

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-06-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102702

Christian Buelens

{"title":"Googling ‘inflation’: Household inflation attention across the euro area","authors":"Christian Buelens","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102702","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102702","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the dynamics of household inflation attention in the euro area, using internet searches as a direct measure of inflation attention. It identifies different inflation attention-regimes dependent on the inflation context, aligning with the theory of rational inattention. Additionally, the paper finds that changes in monetary policy raise inflation attention in some euro area countries, indicating that households perceive a connection between monetary policy decisions and inflation. The analysis further reveals significant heterogeneity in inflation attention patterns across euro area countries, evident in three dimensions: (i) varying levels of structural inflation attention, seemingly linked to national inflation aversion; (ii) varying sensitivities of inflation attention to changes in inflation and inflation volatility, and differing thresholds at which the sensitivity of attention to inflation increases; (iii) asymmetric responses of national inflation attention to monetary policy announcements. Finally, the paper provides evidence of a structural increase in inflation attention after the post-pandemic inflation surge, along with a general decrease in attention thresholds. A better understanding of the factors driving inflation attention and its cross-country variation can help policymakers in a monetary union to enhance and better target their communication on inflation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102702"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144280217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0