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An unconsidered leave? Inequality aversion and the brexit referendum
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102648
Joan Costa-Font , Frank Cowell
{"title":"An unconsidered leave? Inequality aversion and the brexit referendum","authors":"Joan Costa-Font ,&nbsp;Frank Cowell","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102648","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102648","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines a behavioural explanation for the Brexit referendum result, namely the role of an individual’s inequality aversion (IA). We study whether the referendum result was an “unconsidered Leave” out of people’s low aversion to inequality. We use a representative sample of the UK population fielded in 2017, and analyse the extent to which lottery-based individual IA estimates predict their Brexit vote. We consider alternative potential drivers of IA in both income and health domains; these include risk aversion, alongside socio-economic and demographic characteristics. A greater aversion to income inequality predicts a lower probability of voting for Leave, even when controlling for risk aversion and other drivers of the Brexit vote. However, this effect is only true among men, for whom an increase in income IA by one standard deviation decreases their likelihood of voting for leaving the EU by 5 percentage points which would have reduced the probability of a leave vote, resulting in an overall remain majority in our sample. However, the effect of health inequality aversion is not significantly different from zero.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102648"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143387915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political advertising and consumer sentiment: Evidence from U.S. presidential elections
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102647
Cody Couture, Ann L. Owen
{"title":"Political advertising and consumer sentiment: Evidence from U.S. presidential elections","authors":"Cody Couture,&nbsp;Ann L. Owen","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102647","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102647","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We merge panel survey data on consumer sentiment with data on U.S. political advertisements run from 2013 to 2020 and estimate dynamic panel data models predicting the effect of positive, negative, and contrasting ads on several measures of consumer sentiment. We find that political ads during Presidential election cycles have a significant impact. In particular, a higher intensity of positive political ads with an economic theme makes consumers more optimistic about their own current and future financial positions and the future state of the economy. Our findings also suggest that political ads impact sentiment through an emotional appeal rather than by providing information to viewers about economic fundamentals.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102647"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What drives abnormal returns of stock markets in wartime? Evidence from 17 invasions
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102643
Vincent Hoffmann , Luu Duc Toan Huynh , Mei Wang
{"title":"What drives abnormal returns of stock markets in wartime? Evidence from 17 invasions","authors":"Vincent Hoffmann ,&nbsp;Luu Duc Toan Huynh ,&nbsp;Mei Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102643","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102643","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the impact of contemporary invasions on stock markets within advanced and emerging economies. By studying various conflicts and their progression into wars, we aim to expose underlying patterns in stock market reactions. First, we conduct an event study to assess the stock market reactions to seventeen modern invasions from 2001 to 2022. We calculate cumulative abnormal returns for the respective stock market and each invasion. Furthermore, we introduce a regression model highlighting differences in stock market reactions between advanced and emerging countries. The regression model contributes to understanding the relationship between cumulative abnormal returns and each country’s geographic and economic characteristics. Invasions generally have a negative impact on stock markets, with emerging markets showing greater sensitivity and more negative reactions to invasions than advanced stock markets. Furthermore, the findings suggest that underlying drivers play a role in explaining abnormal returns during invasions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102643"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do party ties increase transfer receipts in cooperative federalism? – Evidence from Germany
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102630
Yannick Bury , Lars P. Feld , Ekkehard A. Köhler
{"title":"Do party ties increase transfer receipts in cooperative federalism? – Evidence from Germany","authors":"Yannick Bury ,&nbsp;Lars P. Feld ,&nbsp;Ekkehard A. Köhler","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102630","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102630","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Cooperative fiscal federalism needs multi-level consent to decide on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. We study how parliamentary representation of municipalities on the federal level influences the allocation of federal transfers to municipal governments under this type of federalism. Using a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we find that a directly elected member of the federal parliament, who belongs to the party that leads the federal government, induces higher infrastructure transfers from the federal government to a local jurisdiction. However, our results show that this effect only unfolds, if the parliamentarian's party is simultaneously leading the state government. Moreover, we identify party competition on the local level as a motive behind the strategic use of federal funds. Thus, our results suggest that federalism inherently entails restrictions on misusing intergovernmental transfers for political reasons.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102630"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143171618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Local connectivity and corruption: Micro evidence from China
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102652
Qijun Liu
{"title":"Local connectivity and corruption: Micro evidence from China","authors":"Qijun Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102652","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102652","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A sizable literature has shown that personal connections play an important role in corruption. Among such corruption activities, the most pervasive is corruption by native government workers through local networks. Yet, little is known about the effect of local connectivity on corruption. This paper studies how local connectivity affects corruption. The analysis is based on individual-level corruption practices from China (N = 57,270). Corruption is measured by rents extracted from a population. The results show that local connectivity reduces corruption: government officials serving at hometown are less corrupt in extracting fewer rents from the local population than government officials from outside the region. The effect was amplified by local network intensity but offset by ethnic diversity in a region. The findings reveal nuances for policy arrangements for control of corruption contingent on whether government officials are from the local population or from outside.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102652"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143444630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How social media can undermine democracy
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102634
Ronen Gradwohl , Yuval Heller , Arye Hillman
{"title":"How social media can undermine democracy","authors":"Ronen Gradwohl ,&nbsp;Yuval Heller ,&nbsp;Arye Hillman","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102634","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102634","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the influence a self-interested social-media platform can have on election outcomes. Using the framework of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, we explore the effect of additional information via private messages from the platform, modeled through Bayesian persuasion. We establish conditions under which the platform can sway the majority voting outcome, assuming voters vote sincerely. Additionally, we demonstrate that the information disseminated by the platform can sometimes be biased in the opposite direction of the platform’s interests.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102634"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Household expectations and dissent among policymakers
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102638
Moritz Grebe, Peter Tillmann
{"title":"Household expectations and dissent among policymakers","authors":"Moritz Grebe,&nbsp;Peter Tillmann","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102638","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102638","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies the impact of dissent in the ECB’s Governing Council on uncertainty surrounding households’ inflation expectations. We conduct a randomized controlled trial using the Bundesbank Online Panel Households. Participants are provided with alternative information treatments concerning the vote in the Council, e.g. unanimity and dissent, and are asked to submit probabilistic inflation expectations. The results show that the vote is informative. Households revise their subjective inflation forecast after receiving information about the vote. Information about unanimity or dissent causes a wider individual distribution of future inflation for those households that were relatively certain before the treatment. For the remaining 60% of households, this information reduces uncertainty. Information about dissent increases uncertainty more than information about a unanimous vote, though the difference is not statistically significant. A unanimous vote unambiguously reduces inflation uncertainty for households with anchored inflation expectations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102638"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The effect of terrorism on economic inequality in democracies and non-democracies
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102640
Daniel Meierrieks
{"title":"The effect of terrorism on economic inequality in democracies and non-democracies","authors":"Daniel Meierrieks","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102640","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102640","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the relationship between terrorism and economic inequality for 163 countries between 1980 and 2018. We provide robust evidence that more terrorist activity results in higher levels of income inequality, where this relationship is especially pronounced for democratic countries. As an extension, we also study the role of terrorism in wealth inequality, uncovering similar linkages. Our findings imply that democracies see lower levels of income inequality in the absence of terrorism but increases in inequality as terrorist activity grows, while inequality in non-democratic countries is not affected by terrorism. Exploring potential transmission channels, we show that terrorism does not have distributional consequence by damaging the economy. Rather, in democracies terrorism leads to lower levels of redistribution via taxation and transfers. This finding is consistent with our theoretical argument that terrorism elicits a policy response in the form of lower levels of redistribution especially from democratic governments due to their dependence on broad electoral support to stay in power.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102640"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fines for unequal societies
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102621
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci , Giovanni Immordino , Francesco F. Russo
{"title":"Fines for unequal societies","authors":"Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci ,&nbsp;Giovanni Immordino ,&nbsp;Francesco F. Russo","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102621","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102621","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>One fourth of the 196 countries we surveyed adopts some form of day fines — that is, fines that increase with the wealth of the offender — and does so for moderate, non-monetary violations. We offer a model of optimal deterrence with decreasing marginal utility of wealth and unequal wealth distribution that rationalizes this pattern. We show that uniform fines are optimal when harm from crime is low, non-monetary sanctions when it is high, and day fines in the intermediate region. The introduction of day fines reduces the (optimal) use of non-monetary sanctions and restores deterrence for the rich, as compared to uniform fines. The scope for day fines increases with wealth inequality and decreases with the cost of wealth verification.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102621"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Geopolitical Risks, Political Tensions and the European Economy
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102644
Jamel Saadaoui, Amélie Barbier-Gauchard, Jan-Egbert Sturm
{"title":"Geopolitical Risks, Political Tensions and the European Economy","authors":"Jamel Saadaoui,&nbsp;Amélie Barbier-Gauchard,&nbsp;Jan-Egbert Sturm","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102644","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102644","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102644"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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