European Journal of Political Economy最新文献_第2页

Friend-shoring, near-shoring, and reshoring in factories America, Asia, and Europe amid rising geopolitical tensions 在地缘政治紧张局势不断加剧的情况下，美国、亚洲和欧洲的工厂在“朋友支持”、“近岸支持”和“回流支持”

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102804

Mitsuyo Ando , Kazunobu Hayakawa , Fukunari Kimura , Hiroshi Mukunoki

{"title":"Friend-shoring, near-shoring, and reshoring in factories America, Asia, and Europe amid rising geopolitical tensions","authors":"Mitsuyo Ando , Kazunobu Hayakawa , Fukunari Kimura , Hiroshi Mukunoki","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102804","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102804","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study empirically investigates changes in sourcing patterns across three major production hubs: Factory America, Factory Asia, and Factory Europe. Specifically, using international and intra-national trade data from 2015 to 2024, we examine four types of “shoring” strategies, i.e., political friend-shoring, economic friend-shoring, near-shoring, and reshoring, simultaneously. Our findings provide quantitative evidence of increasing reliance on political friend-shoring, weakening dependence on near-shoring, and recent progress in reshoring amid heightened geopolitical risks, whereas economic friend-shoring appears unattractive on average. Moreover, we show that greater product substitutability does not necessarily lead to more significant changes in sourcing. We also revealed a notable difference across regions in political friend-shoring. The degree of its dependence is consistently most substantial for Factory America, while political motivations remain relatively unattractive for Factory Asia, with some specific variations even within the same Factory.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102804"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145929237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Political budget cycles in federal systems: The case of India 联邦制度下的政治预算周期：以印度为例

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102811

Sourav Das , Patrick Hufschmidt , Fabian Mankat , Konstantinos Theocharopoulos

{"title":"Political budget cycles in federal systems: The case of India","authors":"Sourav Das , Patrick Hufschmidt , Fabian Mankat , Konstantinos Theocharopoulos","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102811","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102811","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines Political Budget Cycles in federal systems, focusing on how a central incumbent allocates discretionary transfers across states in response to electoral incentives. We develop a theoretical model predicting that average discretionary transfers increase during federal election periods. While swing states consistently receive higher transfers due to their electoral competitiveness, the election-period increase is larger for non-swing states. This occurs because non-swing states are targeted primarily during federal elections: allocating transfers to them in state elections is not advantageous for the federal incumbent, as it has little effect on the probability of winning those state elections. To test these predictions, we compile a panel dataset of Indian states from 2006 to 2022. Using fixed effects specifications, we find evidence consistent with the theoretical model: discretionary transfers are significantly higher in federal election periods, swing states receive more discretionary transfers in non-election periods, and the election-period increase in discretionary transfers is more pronounced for non-swing states.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102811"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146189045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Media narratives and public attitudes toward immigrants and muslims: Evidence from the charlie hebdo attack 媒体叙述和公众对移民和穆斯林的态度：来自查理周刊袭击的证据

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102812

Mamadou Sacko

{"title":"Media narratives and public attitudes toward immigrants and muslims: Evidence from the charlie hebdo attack","authors":"Mamadou Sacko","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102812","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102812","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the impact of the Charlie Hebdo attack on public attitudes toward Muslims and immigrants in Europe. Using the Unexpected Event During Survey Design methodology, we exploit the random timing of interviews in the European Social Survey to estimate causal effects. Our empirical strategy combines an event study design with region fixed effects, various matching approaches, and advanced machine learning estimators.</div><div>We find a significant but short-lived decline in positive attitudes toward immigrants and Muslims, concentrated in the first week after the attack and fading quickly thereafter. Yet, responses varied across countries: while attitudes deteriorated in the Czech Republic and Ireland, they remained stable or even improved in France and Germany.</div><div>To contextualize these heterogeneous reactions, we analyze contemporaneous media coverage of the attack in the four countries. Using Natural Language Processing tools, large language models and structural topic modeling, we examine media salience and framing as an indirect measure of public sentiment. The evidence shows that in countries with predominantly negative coverage (Czech Republic, Ireland), public attitudes shifted unfavorably, whereas in France and Germany, where narratives were more balanced or supportive, attitudes were more resilient. These findings highlight how terrorist violence can shape public opinion in the short run, while also highlighting the importance of media narratives as a mirror and amplifier of societal reactions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102812"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146078722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Land invasions and contemporary slavery 土地入侵和当代奴隶制

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102807

Gabriel Cepaluni , Jamil Civitarese , Michael T. Dorsch

引用次数: 0

Decomposing migration drivers: Push-pull effects of political, financial, and socioeconomic institutions versus network effects in OECD migration 分解移民驱动因素：政治、金融和社会经济制度的推拉效应与经合组织移民中的网络效应

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102810

Yun Wang

{"title":"Decomposing migration drivers: Push-pull effects of political, financial, and socioeconomic institutions versus network effects in OECD migration","authors":"Yun Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102810","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102810","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper explores the relative importance of key migration drivers and examines how institutional quality influences migration rates using a classical migration model and data from OECD countries over the period 1985–2015. Within a fixed-effects framework, we develop a novel analytical framework using comprehensive institutional quality indices constructed from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to capture both pushing and pulling effects. Our variance decomposition analysis reveals that network effects account for 43.73% of the total explained variance in general migration inflows, but only 11.29% for inflow workers and 2.35% for foreign students changing status. Pushing and pulling effects contribute 23.02% and 16.49%, respectively, to general migration inflows, while for inflow workers, pushing effects dominate, explaining 34.96% compared to 18.78% for pulling effects. Among foreign students changing status, these effects are more balanced, contributing 30.52% and 30.05%, respectively. A deeper analysis of institutional qualities shows that political quality dominates both pushing and pulling effects across most specifications, except for foreign students changing status, where 46.67% of the pulling-effects variance is explained by socioeconomic factors, compared to 40.68% for political factors. Additionally, geographical distance is the most significant factor in bilateral migration costs, contributing over 75% across all specifications. These findings help policymakers better understand the complex roles of networks, institutional qualities, migration costs, etc. in shaping migration patterns.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102810"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146189047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Redistributive promises, transfers to special interests, and the political economy of reform with limited state capacity 再分配承诺，向特殊利益集团转移，以及国家能力有限的改革的政治经济学

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102751

Sanjay Jain , Sumon Majumdar

{"title":"Redistributive promises, transfers to special interests, and the political economy of reform with limited state capacity","authors":"Sanjay Jain , Sumon Majumdar","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102751","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102751","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>An enduring question in political economy is why ‘potentially Pareto-improving’ economic reforms are often so politically difficult to adopt. One explanation might be that reform typically entails the creation of losers as well as winners. Hence, redistributive compensation from winners to losers is key, even when the limited state capacity of the government constrains its ability to implement tax-and-transfer policies. This paper examines, more specifically, how the presence of special interest groups on the one hand, and limited taxation capacity on the part of the state on the other, might affect the implementation of redistributive policies, and hence political support for reform. Voters recognize that the government, in compensating losers, has an incentive to misuse this redistributive mechanism to disproportionately steer compensation towards its supporters, or to other special interest groups. Hence, efficiency-enhancing reforms might not win popular support, especially in countries with low state capacity, where the need for reforms is often likely to be the most.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102751"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147661333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Reprint of: Presidential versus parliamentary: Political system and stock market volatility 转载：总统制与议会制：政治制度与股市波动

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102729

Yosef Bonaparte

引用次数: 0

Corruption and reforms: Are liberal democracies different? 腐败和改革：自由民主国家不同吗？

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102743

Jeffry Jacob , Thomas Osang , Luigi Manzetti

引用次数: 0

Strategic voting on tax policy: Direct vs representative democracy in the laboratory 税收政策的战略投票：实验室中的直接民主与代议制民主

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-03-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102661

Giuseppe Di Liddo , Michele G. Giuranno , Andrea Morone

{"title":"Strategic voting on tax policy: Direct vs representative democracy in the laboratory","authors":"Giuseppe Di Liddo , Michele G. Giuranno , Andrea Morone","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102661","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102661","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper aims to distinctly demonstrate the prevalence and impact of strategic voting within representative democratic systems as compared to direct democracy, focusing on tax policy decisions. Through a comparative analysis, we explore how the structure of the voting system influences the strategic behaviour of voters concerning their taxable income. Our findings indicate that representative democracy inherently encourages strategic voting more than direct democracy, primarily due to the delegation process and its interaction with local median voters. This study meticulously analyses how pivotal voters in both the wealthiest and poorest electoral districts demonstrate notable sincerity in their voting behaviour, contrasting sharply with the strategic tendencies of the “median of the medians.” Additionally, we observe that higher income tax rates significantly enhance resources available for redistribution, thus intensifying incentives for strategic voting. Conversely, greater benefits from public expenditures promote sincerity among voters. Furthermore, both electoral systems align with Meltzer and Richard's (1981) predictions. By highlighting these dynamics, our paper contributes to a better understanding of the implications of democratic structures on voter behaviour and fiscal policy outcomes, underscoring the critical influence of voting systems on strategic decision-making in taxation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102661"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147661353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Electoral corruption cycles: Separating perceptions and experiences across households and experts 选举腐败周期：区分家庭和专家之间的看法和经验

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102675

Lamar Crombach

引用次数: 0