{"title":"Procurement cartels and the fight against (outsider) bribing","authors":"Roberto Burguet, Elisabetta Iossa, Giancarlo Spagnolo","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102506","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102506","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139890344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anna Maria Koukal , Patricia Schafer , Reiner Eichenberger
{"title":"Empowering the next generation: The role of direct democracy in youth enfranchisement","authors":"Anna Maria Koukal , Patricia Schafer , Reiner Eichenberger","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102507","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102507","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>When are voters willing to enfranchise a new group? In this paper, we analyze whether and how the extent of direct democracy affects the willingness of the electorate to extend suffrage to young people. We exploit a new municipality-level dataset from two Swiss federal referendums that concerned lowering the voting age from 20 to 18. Based on a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) design, we demonstrate that support for lowering the voting age is lower within the context of direct democracy but that the negative effect disappears and even becomes positive if the youth population is already enfranchised at the local level at the time of the federal vote. This finding is consistent with the interpretation that voters react systematically to the expected power loss resulting from suffrage extensions, which is larger under a direct-democratic setting. However, once the new group is enfranchised on the local level, direct democracy can foster contact between the old and new electorate and can increase support for further suffrage extensions. In addition, we provide evidence of socio-demographic factors that affect the electorate’s willingness to lower the voting age.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000090/pdfft?md5=1c0967e193c224ef980805f96605c477&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000090-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139678517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Procurement cartels and the fight against (outsider) bribing","authors":"Roberto Burguet , Elisabetta Iossa , Giancarlo Spagnolo","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102506","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102506","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. Cooperation among long-run (honest) firms alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest bureaucrats, generating a trade-off between collusion and corruption.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139830242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"District versus at-large voting: Why district voting results in worse policy for minorities","authors":"Donald Wittman","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102502","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102502","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>By making use of voting-rights acts, minorities have forced cities to convert from at-large elections to district elections when there is racially polarized voting and the minority percentage on the city council is significantly below the percentage of the minority population. The voting-rights acts also provide for the creation of majority/minority districts so that minorities are more likely to be elected to city councils. This article undertakes a detailed theoretical analysis of both district and at-large elections and shows that minorities are likely to be better off when there are at-large elections. In at-large voting systems, winning council candidates represent the median over <em>all</em> voters. In contrast, when there are district elections, each council member represents the interests of the median voter in their district. City council policy is then determined by the median council member, whose district represents few if any minorities. Various complications, such as non-voting, are considered with surprising results.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000041/pdfft?md5=38a894aa1e7efb930cb26fd9679a5637&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000041-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139588360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Transition to broader-based politics: The role of suffrage extension in early 20th century Japan","authors":"Shuhei Kainuma","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102499","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102499","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The period of modern industrialisation is commonly characterised by gradual democratisation through enfranchisement and intra-elite competition between traditional landlords and emerging capitalists. This raises the question of whether the redistribution of de jure political power via suffrage expansion can catalyse the transition of intra-elite power structures, as reflected in political representation. This study explores the impact of suffrage extension, induced by the wartime tax increase in Japan during the mid-1900s, on the occupational composition of the House of Representatives. Employing a difference-in-differences approach, I demonstrate that the expansion of the electorate led to a significant decline in the seat shares of agricultural landlords, who initially constituted the dominant occupational group in the House. In consideration of the historical context, the overall findings suggest that suffrage extension likely played a crucial role in diversifying House politics away from a landlord-centred system.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000016/pdfft?md5=8618d8cec2f335c3478f9036d0363249&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000016-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139517380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is Populism reversible? Evidence from Italian local elections during the pandemic","authors":"Massimo Bordignon , Federico Franzoni , Matteo Gamalerio","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102480","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102480","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the effect of economic insecurity on electoral outcomes using data on municipal elections in Italy. We implement a difference-in-differences approach that exploits exogenous variation across municipalities in the share of inactive workers due to the economic lockdown introduced by the central government to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic. We show that lockdown-induced economic insecurity positively affected the electoral performance of progressive and left-wing parties, while it negatively affected conservative and far-right parties. Conversely, we find no effect for the populist Five Star Movement, local independent parties (i.e., Civic Lists), and electoral turnout. We provide evidence that extraordinary economic measures introduced by the central government to compensate workers for the economic insecurity can explain this shift in partisanship toward the left and the increasing support for pro-EU parties, away from euro-skeptic and populist forces.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268023001246/pdfft?md5=bd28152baf11c8f031ce8c97a5d929c1&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268023001246-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135614195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social trust and the support for universal basic income","authors":"Michele Gubello","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102495","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102495","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper presents a theoretical model showing how political mistrust affects people’s preferences for Universal Basic Income (UBI) when its implementation involves a reduction in spending for other public services (<em>welfare retrenchment</em>). The model shows that individuals with lower levels of political mistrust are more likely to endorse UBI, reflecting their trust in the government’s ability to manage public resources and avoid wasteful retrenchment of other public services. The model also shows that generalised mistrust – characterised by agents’ expectations of their fellow citizens’ misbehaviour that can reduce the government’s fiscal capacity – does not significantly influence preferences for UBI when it involves a partial retrenchment of other public services. This result is driven by the agents’ perception that their fellow citizens’ misbehaviour would occur irrespective of the UBI implementation. The empirical analysis with 265 European regions from the European Social Survey (ESS) confirms the predictions of the model.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138513677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Early warning models for systemic banking crises: Can political indicators improve prediction?","authors":"Tran Huynh , Silke Uebelmesser","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102484","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102484","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study provides a novel attempt to assess whether an early warning system (EWS) for systemic banking crises can produce better predictions when political indicators are used alongside traditional macro-financial indicators. Based on a dataset covering 32 advanced economies for the period 1975–2017, we show that the inclusion of political indicators significantly improves the predictive performance of the model. Our results suggest several channels, related to the role of constitutions and policy predictability, through which the political environment could affect the stability of a banking system. In particular, we find that majority governments, left-wing governments, and a longer time in office of the executive party are negatively correlated with systemic risk. This is robust to a large number of different specifications. Furthermore, we find that long-established institutional systems and plurality electoral systems (compared to proportional representation systems) are associated with a lower likelihood of crises. At the same time, crises are more likely when the incumbent government represents a nationalist platform.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268023001283/pdfft?md5=b6b229a4387e7f3351927c93c582c645&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268023001283-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139588533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ana Herrero-Alcalde , Javier Martín-Román , José Manuel Tránchez-Martín , Ignacio Moral-Arce
{"title":"Fiscal rules to the test: The impact of the Spanish expenditure rule","authors":"Ana Herrero-Alcalde , Javier Martín-Román , José Manuel Tránchez-Martín , Ignacio Moral-Arce","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102501","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102501","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Despite the large spread of fiscal rules around the world, there is still not enough evidence of their effectiveness in ensuring fiscal sustainability. Furthermore, there is little evidence of the impact of expenditure rules in countries’ fiscal performance. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the Spanish expenditure rule that has been in force since 2012 in controlling the growth of public expenditure. We use a synthetic control methodology to analyze the impact of the rule on the evolution of current and primary expenditure within Spanish public administrations (2001–2018), avoiding the potential endogeneity problems of traditional econometric approaches. Overall, we find that the expenditure rule has largely improved budget sustainability by limiting both current and primary expenditure. These results are robust to different levels of government.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S017626802400003X/pdfft?md5=6be16f9f4f5368848e96274e05cb3b3c&pid=1-s2.0-S017626802400003X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139678518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dominance and technology war","authors":"Kai A. Konrad","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102493","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102493","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Three regimes of technology leadership are compared. Firstly, technological innovation in a unipolar world with one dominant country that can sell its technology to a set of small countries. Secondly, competition for leadership between two large countries, with small countries that are independent. Thirdly, a decoupled world in which all small countries are allied with one or the other big country. Small nations fare best when they are independent and large nations engage in leadership competition. Great power nations prefer unipolar leadership. If there are two big nations, they prefer a decoupled world that is partitioned into zones of influence, compared to competing with each other.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268023001374/pdfft?md5=ed5fe2911b1b12e15c849abef5e43a5a&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268023001374-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138513665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}