European Journal of Political Economy最新文献_第9页

Equilibrium communication in political scandals 政治丑闻中的均衡传播

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102580

Bence Hamrak , Gabor Simonovits , Ferenc Szucs

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引用次数: 0

Broadband internet and attitudes toward migrants: Evidence from Spain 宽带互联网和对移民的态度：来自西班牙的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102579

Marta Golin , Alessio Romarri

引用次数: 0

(Mis-)Perceptions, information, and political polarization: A survey and a systematic literature review (错误）认知、信息和政治极化：调查与系统文献综述

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102578

Maria Marino , Roberto Iacono , Johanna Mollerstrom

{"title":"(Mis-)Perceptions, information, and political polarization: A survey and a systematic literature review","authors":"Maria Marino , Roberto Iacono , Johanna Mollerstrom","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102578","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Numerous studies have documented that misperceptions about society, e.g. related to inequality, are widespread among voters. Simultaneously, a separate body of literature demonstrates increasing political polarization. Against this background, it is intuitively appealing to hypothesize that information provision can be useful not only to correct misperceptions, but also to create a common ground that can bridge divisiveness. In a general population survey, conducted in the United States, we show that beliefs in the power of information to reduce polarization are indeed widespread. To investigate the empirical relationship between information provision and polarization, we conduct a systematic literature review. We focus on papers that study the effect of information treatments on redistributive policy preferences, exploiting the fact that they often investigate heterogeneities in the reaction to information treatment. Our review shows that while it is certainly possible for information to decrease polarization, the effect is frequently the opposite. The reason is that different groups react differently to truthful and accurate information, in ways that often reinforce existing preference.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102578"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000806/pdfft?md5=e0e6054182d19cb744526515050a45a2&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000806-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141540496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Geopolitical shocks and commodity market dynamics: New evidence from the Russia-Ukraine conflict 地缘政治冲击与商品市场动态：俄罗斯-乌克兰冲突的新证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-06-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102574

Joshua Aizenman , Robert Lindahl , David Stenvall , Gazi Salah Uddin

引用次数: 0

Economic sanctions and sovereign debt default 经济制裁和主权债务违约

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102571

Ablam Estel Apeti , Eyah Denise Edoh

{"title":"Economic sanctions and sovereign debt default","authors":"Ablam Estel Apeti , Eyah Denise Edoh","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102571","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102571","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper analyzes the effect of US economic sanctions on sovereign debt default across 118 developing countries from 1980 to 2018. We use entropy balancing method, and provide robust evidence that US sanctions increase sovereign debt default in the targeted states. This finding withstands several robustness tests, including alternative specifications and databases, and alternative estimation methods. The results also reveal some heterogeneity depending on the type of sanctions (for example, trade versus financial sanctions), on whether they are imposed unilaterally or multilaterally, on the severity of the sanctions, on the geographical distance from the United States, the time since sanctions were imposed, and some structural characteristics. In addition, we find that the development of cryptocurrencies reduces the effect of sanctions, and that failed sanctions have a greater effect on default. The compositon effect based on the type of debt in default shows that the effect of US sanctions is only observed on the default on external debt and not on that of internal debt. Next, we identify three main channels through which sanctions trigger sovereign risk; namely economic growth contraction, the occurrence of banking crisis and reduced access to international financial market. Finally, we explore the effect of other sanctions, notably those of the European Union and the United Nations, and find that these sanctions also raise the probability of sovereign debt default.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102571"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142150210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Voters’ influence on local tax policy 选民对地方税收政策的影响

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-06-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102575

Maarten Allers , Harm Rienks

{"title":"Voters’ influence on local tax policy","authors":"Maarten Allers , Harm Rienks","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102575","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102575","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a well-functioning democracy, citizens can influence public policy through voting. By voting prospectively, voters may aim to select politicians that make policies in line with their preferences, and, by voting retrospectively, they may reward or punish politicians for their performance. To what extent voters actually influence policy is unclear, especially in local government, where many impediments to policy responsiveness may exist. Moreover, voters may realize that their influence on public policy is negligible and vote expressively instead of instrumentally. We investigate a key area in public policy, tax policy, using panel data on municipalities in the Netherlands in the period 1998–2021. We find that changes in the political color of the municipal council on average do not lead to changes in tax levels or tax distribution. However, incumbents that lower taxes fare better at the polls than incumbents that moderately increase taxes. Interestingly, strong tax increases do not lead to more severe electoral punishment, and punishment does not seem to differ between left-wing and right-wing incumbents. Our results suggest that expressive voting plays an important role. People may vote left-wing and express their identity as charitable persons, and then punish incumbents who actually raise taxes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102575"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000776/pdfft?md5=e7334e8a13c17d9a337919da03a8f46f&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000776-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141413186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Corrigendum to “Defector politicians and economic growth: Evidence from India” [Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 79 (2023) 102442] 变节政治家与经济增长：来自印度的证据》[《欧洲政治经济学杂志》79 (2023) 102442] 更正

IF 2 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-06-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102570

Karan Makkar

引用次数: 0

Direct elections and trust in state and political institutions: Evidence from Indonesia's election reform 直接选举与对国家和政治机构的信任：印度尼西亚选举改革的证据

IF 2 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102572

Ridho Al Izzati , Teguh Dartanto , Daniel Suryadarma , Asep Suryahadi

{"title":"Direct elections and trust in state and political institutions: Evidence from Indonesia's election reform","authors":"Ridho Al Izzati , Teguh Dartanto , Daniel Suryadarma , Asep Suryahadi","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102572","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>People's trust in state and political institutions is a key foundation of a well-functioning economy. The question of whether direct elections affect trust remains open, especially in developing countries, due to a scarcity of studies with robust identification strategies. We estimate the impact of direct elections on people's trust in state and political institutions, using a major political reform in Indonesia as the source of exogenous variation. Pre-2005, regents, mayors, and governors were elected by the local legislative assembly. Starting in 2005, they must compete in an open election where voters directly choose their preferred leader. The historically and institutionally driven staggered implementation of these local direct elections enables us to identify the causal impact of the reform. We find that direct elections increase trust in all state and political institutions, except for the police and political parties. We find that trust only increased in districts where the elections were held with no or low hostility, implying that trust is strongly influenced by political situations during direct elections. We find that elections did not really improve well-being or satisfaction, implying that the absence of election hostility is a stronger explanation for the higher trust.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102572"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000740/pdfft?md5=79ee49900a3d5f9ead08fdf82569bba2&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000740-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141291719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Anti-corruption campaign in China: An empirical investigation 中国的反腐败运动：实证调查

IF 2 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102559

Li Yang , Branko Milanovic , Yaoqi Lin

{"title":"Anti-corruption campaign in China: An empirical investigation","authors":"Li Yang , Branko Milanovic , Yaoqi Lin","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102559","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102559","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We create a database of officials who have been found guilty of corruption in China in the period 2012-21 with their personal characteristics and the amount of embezzled funds. We use it to investigate the correlates of corruption, estimate the effects of corruption on inequality, and find the expected increase in officials' income due to corruption and the gain in income distribution ranking. We find that the amount of corruption is positively associated with education, administrative (hierarchical) level of the official, and years of membership in the Communist Party. The sample of corrupt officials belongs to the upper income ranges of Chinese income distribution even without corruption. But corruption allows them to accede to an even higher position in income distribution. While only one-half of the corrupt officials would be in the top 5 percent of China's urban distribution without illegal incomes, practically all are in the top 5 percent when corrupt income is included.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102559"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000612/pdfft?md5=7743b348fce514c5d6a11363554145ca&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000612-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141231181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Geopolitical risk and stock prices 地缘政治风险与股票价格

IF 2 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102553

Hakan Yilmazkuday

{"title":"Geopolitical risk and stock prices","authors":"Hakan Yilmazkuday","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102553","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102553","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper investigates the effects of global geopolitical risk on stock prices of 29 economies by using the local projections method for the monthly period between 1985M1-2023M9. The results show that a positive unit shock of global geopolitical risk (normalized to one standard deviation) reduces stock prices (normalized to one standard deviation) in a statistically significant way by 0.80 in Latvia, 0.71 in China, 0.62 in the Euro Area, 0.50 in Sweden, 0.42 in the United Kingdom, 0.39 in the United States, 0.38 in Switzerland, 0.34 in Israel, 0.28 in Canada, and 0.21 in Denmark in a year following the shock, whereas it increases those only in Iceland by 0.28 that can be used to hedge against any geopolitical risk. Subsample analyses further suggest that the negative effects of the same shock exist in several economies (including the United States, China and Euro Area) during the first half of the sample period that coincides with the geopolitical events that the United States is involved with, whereas they only exist in Russia, Poland, Euro Area and the United Kingdom for the second half of the sample period, suggesting that the Russo–Ukrainian War has mostly affected the stock prices in these nearby economies. It is implied that the geographical location of geopolitical events as well as the countries involved are important indicators to understand the effects of any global geopolitical risk on stock prices.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 102553"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141133253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0