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European Journal of Political Economy最新文献

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How social media can undermine democracy 社交媒体如何破坏民主
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102634
Ronen Gradwohl , Yuval Heller , Arye Hillman
{"title":"How social media can undermine democracy","authors":"Ronen Gradwohl ,&nbsp;Yuval Heller ,&nbsp;Arye Hillman","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102634","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102634","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the influence a self-interested social-media platform can have on election outcomes. Using the framework of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, we explore the effect of additional information via private messages from the platform, modeled through Bayesian persuasion. We establish conditions under which the platform can sway the majority voting outcome, assuming voters vote sincerely. Additionally, we demonstrate that the information disseminated by the platform can sometimes be biased in the opposite direction of the platform’s interests.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102634"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Household expectations and dissent among policymakers 家庭期望和政策制定者的异议
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102638
Moritz Grebe, Peter Tillmann
{"title":"Household expectations and dissent among policymakers","authors":"Moritz Grebe,&nbsp;Peter Tillmann","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102638","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102638","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies the impact of dissent in the ECB’s Governing Council on uncertainty surrounding households’ inflation expectations. We conduct a randomized controlled trial using the Bundesbank Online Panel Households. Participants are provided with alternative information treatments concerning the vote in the Council, e.g. unanimity and dissent, and are asked to submit probabilistic inflation expectations. The results show that the vote is informative. Households revise their subjective inflation forecast after receiving information about the vote. Information about unanimity or dissent causes a wider individual distribution of future inflation for those households that were relatively certain before the treatment. For the remaining 60% of households, this information reduces uncertainty. Information about dissent increases uncertainty more than information about a unanimous vote, though the difference is not statistically significant. A unanimous vote unambiguously reduces inflation uncertainty for households with anchored inflation expectations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102638"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fines for unequal societies 对不平等社会的罚款
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102621
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci , Giovanni Immordino , Francesco F. Russo
{"title":"Fines for unequal societies","authors":"Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci ,&nbsp;Giovanni Immordino ,&nbsp;Francesco F. Russo","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102621","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102621","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>One fourth of the 196 countries we surveyed adopts some form of day fines — that is, fines that increase with the wealth of the offender — and does so for moderate, non-monetary violations. We offer a model of optimal deterrence with decreasing marginal utility of wealth and unequal wealth distribution that rationalizes this pattern. We show that uniform fines are optimal when harm from crime is low, non-monetary sanctions when it is high, and day fines in the intermediate region. The introduction of day fines reduces the (optimal) use of non-monetary sanctions and restores deterrence for the rich, as compared to uniform fines. The scope for day fines increases with wealth inequality and decreases with the cost of wealth verification.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102621"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Geopolitical Risks, Political Tensions and the European Economy 地缘政治风险、政治紧张局势和欧洲经济
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102644
Jamel Saadaoui, Amélie Barbier-Gauchard, Jan-Egbert Sturm
{"title":"Geopolitical Risks, Political Tensions and the European Economy","authors":"Jamel Saadaoui,&nbsp;Amélie Barbier-Gauchard,&nbsp;Jan-Egbert Sturm","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102644","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102644","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102644"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The effect of terrorism on economic inequality in democracies and non-democracies 恐怖主义对民主国家和非民主国家经济不平等的影响
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102640
Daniel Meierrieks
{"title":"The effect of terrorism on economic inequality in democracies and non-democracies","authors":"Daniel Meierrieks","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102640","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102640","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the relationship between terrorism and economic inequality for 163 countries between 1980 and 2018. We provide robust evidence that more terrorist activity results in higher levels of income inequality, where this relationship is especially pronounced for democratic countries. As an extension, we also study the role of terrorism in wealth inequality, uncovering similar linkages. Our findings imply that democracies see lower levels of income inequality in the absence of terrorism but increases in inequality as terrorist activity grows, while inequality in non-democratic countries is not affected by terrorism. Exploring potential transmission channels, we show that terrorism does not have distributional consequence by damaging the economy. Rather, in democracies terrorism leads to lower levels of redistribution via taxation and transfers. This finding is consistent with our theoretical argument that terrorism elicits a policy response in the form of lower levels of redistribution especially from democratic governments due to their dependence on broad electoral support to stay in power.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102640"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Online social media and populism in Europe 欧洲的网络社交媒体和民粹主义
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102619
Mihai Mutascu , Cristina Strango , Camelia Turcu
{"title":"Online social media and populism in Europe","authors":"Mihai Mutascu ,&nbsp;Cristina Strango ,&nbsp;Camelia Turcu","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102619","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102619","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the impact of social media (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and LinkedIn) on left-wing and right-wing populist voting patterns within the European Union 27 (EU-27). Our empirical analysis is based on an Ordered Probit model, over 2014–2020. We differentiate between politically oriented communication and general communication, through social media. We find that politically oriented communication on platforms like Facebook and LinkedIn contributes to the electoral success of right-wing parties. In contrast, active engagement of left-wing parties on social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn appears not to enhance their electoral success. This suggests that right-wing parties effectively leverage platforms like Facebook and LinkedIn to disseminate populist ideologies, while left-wing parties face challenges with their engagement strategies on these platforms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102619"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143171619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Climate activism favors pro-environmental consumption 气候行动主义倾向于环保消费
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102642
Marco A. Marini, Samuel Nocito
{"title":"Climate activism favors pro-environmental consumption","authors":"Marco A. Marini,&nbsp;Samuel Nocito","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102642","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102642","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate whether climate activism favors pro-environmental consumption by examining the impact of Fridays for Future (FFF) protests in Italy on second-hand automobile sales in rally-affected areas. Leveraging data on 10 million automobile transactions occurring before and after FFF mobilizations, we exploit rainfall on the day of the event as an exogenous source of attendance variation. Our findings reveal a reduction in both the total number of cars purchased and their average CO2 emissions, with an uptick in the market share of low-emission vehicles and a corresponding decrease in the market share of high-emission counterparts. We test for two potential mechanisms at work: one mediated by an increase in environmental awareness, the other induced by a rational anticipation of future stricter regulations. Empirical evidence suggests that the latter mechanism is generally more pronounced than the former. However, the first channel seems likely to be at work among individuals aged 18–25, a group that is potentially more involved in the FFF movement.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102642"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Third-party interest, resource value, and the likelihood of conflict 第三方利益、资源价值和冲突的可能性
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102635
Giacomo Battiston , Matteo Bizzarri , Riccardo Franceschin
{"title":"Third-party interest, resource value, and the likelihood of conflict","authors":"Giacomo Battiston ,&nbsp;Matteo Bizzarri ,&nbsp;Riccardo Franceschin","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102635","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102635","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Resource wealth induces predation incentives but also conflict-deterring third-party involvement. As a result, the relation between resource value and conflict probability is a priori unclear. This paper studies such relation with a theoretical framework involving a potential aggressor and a powerful third party. First, we show that, if the third party’s incentives to intervene are sufficiently strong, conflict probability is hump-shaped in the resource value. Second, we theoretically establish that resource value increases the third party’s incentive to side with the resource-rich defendant in case of intervention, providing another mechanism for stabilization when the resource value is high. Third, we explain how our theory relates to policy-relevant case studies involving conflict-ridden areas (including inter-state or civil conflicts) and powerful third parties.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102635"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Party selectors, voters, and the choice of productive representatives under different types of list proportional representation 在不同类型的名单比例代表制下，政党推选人、选民和生产代表的选择
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-11-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102618
Thomas Däubler , Lukáš Linek
{"title":"Party selectors, voters, and the choice of productive representatives under different types of list proportional representation","authors":"Thomas Däubler ,&nbsp;Lukáš Linek","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102618","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102618","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Do party selectors or voters choose more productive politicians? Selectors may promote quality candidates and have an informational advantage over voters, but quality need not be the key criterion for nominations, and voters may be sufficiently informed to correct inferior decisions. We empirically examine whether the type of principal responsible for the selection affects individual parliamentary work (attendance, bills, amendments, questions, speeches). Flexible-list proportional representation systems are both interesting and analytically useful in this context, since seats within parties are first allocated to candidates reaching a certain number of personal votes, while any remaining seats are awarded based on the pre-electoral list rank. This allows us to compare three types of elected candidates: selector-chosen, voter-chosen, and doubly-chosen representatives. Analysing data from the Czech Republic in the period between 2002 and 2021, we find that voters have a stronger preference for candidates with high formal education than selectors. We do not find differences in parliamentary behaviour between selector-chosen and voter-chosen types. The results speak against a potential trade-off between giving voters more influence on within-party seat allocation and the quality of chosen representatives.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102618"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142701407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Wealth inequality and mega events 财富不平等与大型活动
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-10-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102615
Denis Ivanov , Gaygysyz Ashyrov
{"title":"Wealth inequality and mega events","authors":"Denis Ivanov ,&nbsp;Gaygysyz Ashyrov","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102615","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102615","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Wealth inequality, both within and between countries, is on the rise, prompting various interventions to address this issue. In this context, some governments could perceive hosting mega events as an opportunity to generate economic and social benefits through directed long-lasting investments and to converge with other countries in the region. However, the impact of these costly events on wealth inequality could be detrimental, depending on the quality of existing distribution channels. This paper aims to understand the potential role of mega events in addressing wealth inequality. We empirically test the impact of sports mega events on wealth inequality across more than 120 countries. Utilizing panel data analysis on a comprehensive dataset dating back to 1900, we find that hosting mega events such as the Olympic Games, FIFA World Cups, and Universal Expositions is associated with an increase in the wealth shares of the top 1% and 10%, often at the expense of the bottom 50%. This effect is double in magnitude in non-democracies and non-OECD countries, as well as higher during the organization of FIFA World Cups. We propose two possible explanations for this phenomenon: episodes of extreme growth during the organization of mega events that disproportionately benefit the wealthiest individuals, and vested interests associated with the organization of such events. Our results remain statistically significant under various model specifications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102615"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142425746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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