European Journal of Political Economy最新文献_第9页

Will the real populists please stand up? A machine learning index of party populism 真正的民粹主义者能站出来吗？政党民粹主义的机器学习指数

IF 2 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102529

Andrea Celico , Martin Rode , Ignacio Rodriguez-Carreño

{"title":"Will the real populists please stand up? A machine learning index of party populism","authors":"Andrea Celico , Martin Rode , Ignacio Rodriguez-Carreño","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102529","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102529","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The existing literature on populism has seen numerous attempts to empirically quantify this somewhat ambiguous concept. Despite notable advances, continuous measures of populism with a clear theoretical background and a considerable coverage are still hard to come by. This paper proposes a novel approach to measuring party populism by combining several different expert-surveys via supervised machine learning techniques. Employing the random forest regression algorithm, we greatly expand the geographical and temporal coverage of two well-known populism indicators, which are based on the discursive and the ideational approach, respectively. The resulting multidimensional measures capture party-level populism on a continuous 0–10 scale, covering 1920 parties in 169 countries from 1970 to 2019. Our measures accurately replicate both definitions of populism, although the indicators may be more suitable for predicting populist outcomes in Western countries, as compared to non-Western ones.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000314/pdfft?md5=8fdc0e3f4b789cf3e020b431b7cdcc0f&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000314-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140274870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Governments manipulate official Statistics: Institutions matter 政府操纵官方统计数据：机构很重要

IF 2 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102523

Andre Briviba , Bruno Frey , Louis Moser , Sandro Bieri

引用次数: 0

Transitive delegation in social networks: Theory and experiment 社交网络中的传递委托：理论与实验

IF 2 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102531

Sang-Hyun Kim

引用次数: 0

Logistic hubs and support for radical-right populism: Evidence from Italy 物流枢纽与激进右翼民粹主义的支持：来自意大利的证据

IF 2 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102522

Liliana Cuccu , Nicola Pontarollo

{"title":"Logistic hubs and support for radical-right populism: Evidence from Italy","authors":"Liliana Cuccu , Nicola Pontarollo","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102522","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102522","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Increasing discontent and the associated growing support for populist parties have been attributed to several drivers, including globalization, technological change, and migration waves. We analyse a phenomenon that encompasses a mix of economic and cultural grievances — the logistic revolution. The Italian logistics industry is characterized by a heavy reliance on low-paying and precarious contracts, it employs a large number of foreign workers, and is dominated by multinational corporations. The construction of large logistic hubs can increase the feeling of economic insecurity and trigger cultural backlash against foreign workers and large corporations. This, in turn, can create a favourable environment for populist radical right-wing parties that portray themselves as protectors of traditional values and national identity, and as defenders of the working class against the perceived threats posed by globalization, immigration, and large corporations. Through an IV and a DiD approach, we provide evidence that the support for Lega, a populist radical-right party, grew in Italian municipalities where new logistic hubs have been built.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140088197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Subnational public debt sustainability in Mexico: Is the new fiscal rule working? 墨西哥国家以下各级公共债务的可持续性：新财政规则是否有效？

IF 2 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102512

Ernesto del Castillo , René Cabral

{"title":"Subnational public debt sustainability in Mexico: Is the new fiscal rule working?","authors":"Ernesto del Castillo , René Cabral","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102512","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In 1997, after a costly bailout, the central government of Mexico passed legislation intending to improve subnational finances through fiscal decentralization. As a result, many states rapidly began to accumulate debt during the following decade. Subnational public debt grew threefold between 1996 and 2006. The global financial crisis only aggravated the debt accumulation problem, which increased by 320% between 2006 and 2016. In response, a new law with a set of fiscal rules for subnational governments was enacted in 2016, namely, the Law of Fiscal Discipline (LDF) for states and municipalities. This study evaluates the impact of the fiscal rule alert system on the levels of debt accumulation across Mexican states. Using a quarterly panel dataset comprising the period 2013–2020 and employing difference-in-differences techniques, we observe a significant reduction of 4% in public debt between treated and untreated states and 5.8% in debt per capita. Moreover, we document that even after the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, the new fiscal rule effectively reduced the pace of subnational public debt in Mexico.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000144/pdfft?md5=26c7f9c854f74d5771c33a4730897c65&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000144-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140163857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Discretion and public procurement outcomes in Europe* 欧洲的自由裁量权和公共采购结果*

IF 2 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102525

Bernard Hoekman , Bedri Kamil Onur Taş

{"title":"Discretion and public procurement outcomes in Europe*","authors":"Bernard Hoekman , Bedri Kamil Onur Taş","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102525","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Public procurement regulations aim to ensure the state minimizes contract award prices by specifying the processes to be used in issuing calls for tenders and award of contracts. Cost minimization goals may be complemented by ancillary objectives such as supporting small firms or disadvantaged groups. Recent theory suggests procurement regulations and practices constraining the ability to exercise discretion in awarding contracts may increase average procurement costs. Using detailed data on procurement awards in 33 European countries, we find that restrictions on exercise of discretion are associated with higher average contract prices, and that increases in prices are greater in countries with above average government effectiveness. We also show that realizing price-reducing benefits from exercising greater discretion, where permitted by law, reduces the probability small firms win contracts and continue to do so. Our findings point to a tradeoff between the potential to lower prices by exercising discretion and policies that aim to increase the likelihood SMEs are awarded contracts.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000272/pdfft?md5=9df56d5c7bcbbeb2a3c68327ea06c820&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000272-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140121843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Why do voters elect criminal politicians? 选民为什么要选举犯罪的政客？

IF 2 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102527

Abhinav Khemka

{"title":"Why do voters elect criminal politicians?","authors":"Abhinav Khemka","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102527","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102527","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Voters across the world are often complicit in electing bad-quality legislators to political office. This problem is particularly salient in India, where candidates accused of criminality often succeed at the polls. Why do voters show a willingness to cast their ballots for candidates accused of wrongdoing? Using primary individual-level voter survey data from the Bihar 2020 state assembly elections, this paper examines whether ethnic voting can explain this surprising voter behavior. Contrary to voter preference theory, I find that voters exhibit a stronger negative response to candidates accused of criminality when they belong to their preferred ethnic party. Voter support for the non-ethnic falls by 89.2% for violent charges. Coethnicity further reduces electoral support by 67% for violent criminals. This pattern holds regardless of the voters’ level of news consumption, political knowledge, education status, and income. These findings suggest that the electoral success of criminal politicians could be attributed to other factors such as a lack of proper institutions or lower state capacity rather than the voters’ underlying ethnic preferences.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000296/pdfft?md5=6545c2047de44b1dbe88e3bc7312317f&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000296-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140182209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Social expenditure composition and inequality: A dynamic panel threshold analysis for OECD countries 社会支出构成与不平等：经合组织国家的动态面板阈值分析

IF 2 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102510

Pedro Bação, Joshua Duarte, Melissa Pereira, Marta Simoes

引用次数: 0

Procurement cartels and the fight against (outsider) bribing 采购卡特尔和打击（外部）贿赂

IF 2 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102506

Roberto Burguet, Elisabetta Iossa, Giancarlo Spagnolo

引用次数: 0

Empowering the next generation: The role of direct democracy in youth enfranchisement 赋予下一代权力：直接民主在青年选举权中的作用

IF 2 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102507

Anna Maria Koukal , Patricia Schafer , Reiner Eichenberger

{"title":"Empowering the next generation: The role of direct democracy in youth enfranchisement","authors":"Anna Maria Koukal , Patricia Schafer , Reiner Eichenberger","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102507","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102507","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>When are voters willing to enfranchise a new group? In this paper, we analyze whether and how the extent of direct democracy affects the willingness of the electorate to extend suffrage to young people. We exploit a new municipality-level dataset from two Swiss federal referendums that concerned lowering the voting age from 20 to 18. Based on a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) design, we demonstrate that support for lowering the voting age is lower within the context of direct democracy but that the negative effect disappears and even becomes positive if the youth population is already enfranchised at the local level at the time of the federal vote. This finding is consistent with the interpretation that voters react systematically to the expected power loss resulting from suffrage extensions, which is larger under a direct-democratic setting. However, once the new group is enfranchised on the local level, direct democracy can foster contact between the old and new electorate and can increase support for further suffrage extensions. In addition, we provide evidence of socio-demographic factors that affect the electorate’s willingness to lower the voting age.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000090/pdfft?md5=1c0967e193c224ef980805f96605c477&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000090-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139678517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0