European Journal of Political Economy最新文献_第8页

Trust in a national anti-corruption agency: A survey experiment among citizens and experts 对国家反腐败机构的信任：公民和专家调查实验

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102592

Benjamin Monnery, Alexandre Chirat

{"title":"Trust in a national anti-corruption agency: A survey experiment among citizens and experts","authors":"Benjamin Monnery, Alexandre Chirat","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102592","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102592","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Are anti-corruption agencies able to secure public trust, promote public integrity and fight political corruption in the eyes of the general public? The paper investigates this question by focusing on France, which became a leader in the fight against corruption after the launch in 2013 of the High Authority for the Transparency in Public Life (HATVP). We run a survey experiment among 3000 citizens and 33 experts to collect their prior beliefs about political corruption, and then evaluate the impact of granting information about the track record of the national agency on citizens' perceptions of its effectiveness and legitimacy. The paper provides four main results. First, as expected, information provision has meaningful and positive impacts on citizens’ perceptions of the HATVP, political transparency, and representative democracy. Second, while most beneficial impacts are broad-based, treatment effects are as large or even larger among the most poorly informed and distrustful citizens. Third, the experiment points toward the existence of a modest “integrity paradox”, i.e., an increase in the salience or perceived severity of corruption when citizens are better informed about the anti-corruption agency. Fourth, information provision reduces the divergence of opinions between the average citizen and experts about the effectiveness of the HATVP and the dynamics of political integrity.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102592"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141847992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Political instability and economic growth: Causation and transmission 政治不稳定与经济增长：因果关系与传导

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102586

Maximilian W. Dirks, Torsten Schmidt

引用次数: 0

Political uncertainty and revenue sharing in international contracting 政治不确定性与国际承包中的收入分享

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102587

Yi Zhang , Hein Roelfsema , Chun Liu

引用次数: 0

Geopolitical risks and business fluctuations in Europe: A sectorial analysis 欧洲地缘政治风险与商业波动：行业分析

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102585

Fredj Jawadi , Philippe Rozin , Yacouba Gnegne , Abdoulkarim Idi Cheffou

{"title":"Geopolitical risks and business fluctuations in Europe: A sectorial analysis","authors":"Fredj Jawadi , Philippe Rozin , Yacouba Gnegne , Abdoulkarim Idi Cheffou","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102585","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102585","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Should Europe Really Worry about Geopolitical Risks? This study investigates the impact of geopolitical tensions and risks on the economies of the Euro area. In particular, we assess the reaction of key sectors (financial sector: stock market, exchange rate, inflation; energy sector: oil and gas; real sector: economic growth rate) with regard to geopolitical shocks over the period September 2003–March 2024. We measure the reaction of European economies to global geopolitical risks, as well as risks related to geopolitical events and threats. To this end, we adopted the ARDL model and bound tests to estimate the effects of geopolitical risks in the short and long terms. Our findings present two interesting results. First, geopolitical risks can reduce economic growth and provoke depreciation of the euro. Second, geopolitical tensions can increase inflation and put pressure on Brent oil and gas prices in Europe. The European stock market seems more resilient to geopolitical shocks, however. Finally, adverse geopolitical events are also associated with greater economic and political uncertainty in Europe.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102585"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000879/pdfft?md5=d75d54aea01038a4bd26409b73348ac7&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000879-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141783417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Predicting scandal 预测丑闻

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102588

Slade Mendenhall , Joshua Ingber

引用次数: 0

Fiscal rules and economic cycles: Quality (always) Matters 财政规则与经济周期：质量（始终）很重要1

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102591

Leandro Andrián , Jorge Hirs-Garzon , Ivan Leonardo Urrea , Oscar Valencia

引用次数: 0

Black representation and the popular legitimacy of the Federal Reserve 黑人代表与美联储的大众合法性

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102583

Daniel McDowell , David A. Steinberg

{"title":"Black representation and the popular legitimacy of the Federal Reserve","authors":"Daniel McDowell , David A. Steinberg","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102583","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102583","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The Federal Reserve has started paying closer attention to matters of race over the last decade. The central bank has increasingly emphasized the distinct economic challenges facing racial minorities, and its leadership has become more racially diverse. This paper applies theories of descriptive and substantive representation to understand how these shifts are likely to impact the popular legitimacy of the Federal Reserve. We hypothesize that greater Black descriptive and substantive representation improves Black Americans' confidence in the Federal Reserve. We also anticipate that political ideology moderates how white Americans respond to the increases in Black representation within the Federal Reserve, with white conservatives responding less favorably to these changes than more left-leaning whites. Analysis of data from two original survey experiments with separate samples of 3000 Americans, split evenly between Black and white respondents, supports our expectations. Information about substantive and descriptive representation at the Fed has a strong impact on Black Americans' perceptions of the institution. We also find that these changes at the Fed boost white liberals' views of the Fed but have little impact on white conservatives’ attitudes about the central bank.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102583"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141729136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Information effects in public spending preferences: Evidence from survey experiment in Poland 公共支出偏好的信息效应：来自波兰调查实验的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102558

Jakub Sawulski , Nikodem Szewczyk , Aneta Kiełczewska

引用次数: 0

Electoral quotas and developmental outcomes: Evidence from India 选举配额与发展成果：印度的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102581

Shampa Bhattacharjee, Arka Roy Chaudhuri

{"title":"Electoral quotas and developmental outcomes: Evidence from India","authors":"Shampa Bhattacharjee, Arka Roy Chaudhuri","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102581","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102581","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Electoral quotas for disadvantaged groups aim to promote social justice by ensuring that all groups, including those who are otherwise excluded, participate in the government’s policy-making process. In India, electoral quotas have been in existence since the first election in 1951. An important research question is to evaluate the effect of electoral quotas for disadvantaged groups on the developmental outcomes of these groups. In this paper, we study whether electoral quotas for erstwhile untouchable castes i.e. Scheduled Castes (SCs) in India, lead to better developmental outcomes for Scheduled Castes. We consider four important indicators of welfare: primary schooling, infant mortality, access to subsidized food grain and employment under a government workfare scheme. We find that SCs in districts with a higher proportion of SC-reserved seats fare worse in terms of education, child health, and access to subsidized food grains. However, the probability of getting employed in a large government workfare scheme is higher for SCs from districts with a higher proportion of SC-reserved seats. Our results suggest that politicians prioritize providing targetable goods such as workfare while under-providing broad-based public goods such as education and healthcare or public goods like subsidized food grains, which offer higher opportunities for rent extraction.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102581"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141629970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Equilibrium communication in political scandals 政治丑闻中的均衡传播

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102580

Bence Hamrak , Gabor Simonovits , Ferenc Szucs

{"title":"Equilibrium communication in political scandals","authors":"Bence Hamrak , Gabor Simonovits , Ferenc Szucs","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102580","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We present a formal model in which elite communication and voters’ beliefs during a political scandal emerge as a communication equilibrium, determined by the severity of the accusations and the degree of media scrutiny. The prediction of our model is that incumbents’ use of denials can garner support even when they face the possibility of evidence showing their guilt. In contrast, public apologies increase approval – compared to denial – only when accusations are not very serious and are likely to be proved. Results from a large survey experiment corroborate these predictions. In order to explore how changes in the information environment shapes the communication equilibrium, we estimate the structural parameters of our model and conduct counterfactual simulations. We find that increasing media scrutiny leads to asymmetric effects on incumbent communication with politicians who are the best at covering up evidence actually benefiting from increased scrutiny.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102580"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S017626802400082X/pdfft?md5=e354367c65f542fc9ec264fdc35c4ba4&pid=1-s2.0-S017626802400082X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141593790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0