紧跟潮流，离开泰坦尼克号：一项关于两级投票中投票率的实验研究

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102646

Yoichi Hizen , Kazuya Kikuchi , Yukio Koriyama , Takehito Masuda

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引用次数: 0

摘要

当选民由多个群体（如州）组成时，我们通过实验研究了两级选举中的选民投票率。根据“赢者通吃”或“比例规则”，分组内的投票被汇总，并将分组级别的决定结合起来决定获胜者。我们观察到，与理论预测相比，少数阵营的投票率显著低于（泰坦尼克号效应），多数阵营的投票率显著高于（行为从众效应），且比例规则下的投票率比赢者通吃规则下的投票率更强。因此，选民福利的分配变得比理论预测的更加不平等，而且这种福利效应在比例规则下比在赢家通吃规则下更强。

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Jumping on the bandwagon and off the Titanic: An experimental study of turnout in two-tier voting

We experimentally study voter turnout in two-tier elections when the electorate consists of multiple groups, such as states. Votes are aggregated within the groups by the winner-take-all rule or the proportional rule, and the group-level decisions are combined to determine the winner. We observe that, compared with the theoretical prediction, turnout is significantly lower in the minority camp (the Titanic effect) and significantly higher in the majority camp (the behavioral bandwagon effect), and these effects are stronger under the proportional rule than under the winner-take-all rule. As a result, the distribution of voter welfare becomes more unequal than theoretically predicted, and this welfare effect is stronger under the proportional rule than under the winner-take-all rule.

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来源期刊

European Journal of Political Economy Multiple-

CiteScore

3.40

自引率

10.00%

发文量

106

期刊介绍： The aim of the European Journal of Political Economy is to disseminate original theoretical and empirical research on economic phenomena within a scope that encompasses collective decision making, political behavior, and the role of institutions. Contributions are invited from the international community of researchers. Manuscripts must be published in English. Starting 2008, the European Journal of Political Economy is indexed in the Social Sciences Citation Index published by Thomson Scientific (formerly ISI).