European Journal of Political Economy最新文献_第3页

Political connections and participation in global value chains: Evidence from MENA firms 政治关系和参与全球价值链：来自中东和北非地区公司的证据

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-08-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102742

Nora Aboushady , Chahir Zaki

引用次数: 0

Greasing or Grinding? Regulatory context and the productivity effects of corruption: Evidence from Vietnamese SMEs 上油还是研磨？监管环境和腐败对生产率的影响：来自越南中小企业的证据

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-08-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102727

Chiara Tomasi , Quoc Thai Le , Thi Ngoc Lan Nguyen

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The effect of increased women's legislative representation on women's well-being 增加妇女立法代表对妇女福利的影响

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-08-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102735

Robin Grier , Kevin Grier , Florence Muhoza

引用次数: 0

Leaders and institutions as joint determinants of economic growth 领导人和制度是经济增长的共同决定因素

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-08-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102726

Xiangyu Shi

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Central bank independence and fiscal rule under populist leader's regime 民粹主义领导人政权下的央行独立性和财政统治

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-07-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102728

Hoyong Jung

{"title":"Central bank independence and fiscal rule under populist leader's regime","authors":"Hoyong Jung","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102728","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102728","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the relationship between fiscal rules, populist leadership, and central bank independence. It posits that populist leaders, driven by the desire to stimulate economic activity and gain public approval through short-term expansionary policies, are more inclined to undermine central bank independence when they are constrained by fiscal rules. The findings reveal that fiscal constraints significantly increase the likelihood of weakened central bank independence under populist leadership, a result that remains robust across various model specifications. These effects are particularly pronounced in political contexts where populist leaders exert greater authority and encounter stronger incentives to prioritize monetary policy over fiscal measures. Moreover, the adverse impact on central bank independence is exacerbated when fiscal rules impose stricter constraints on short-term expenditures, with reduced independence primarily reflected in shifts in central bank policies. These results highlight the importance of political dynamics in fiscal and monetary institutions and emphasize the need for complementary measures to stabilize macroeconomic conditions through coordinated fiscal rules and central bank independence.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102728"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144680360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Short-term rental bans and the hotel industry: Evidence from New York city 短期租赁禁令和酒店业：来自纽约市的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-07-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102725

Sebastian C. Anastasi , Alexander Marsella , Vitor Melo , E. Frank Stephenson , Gary A. Wagner

引用次数: 0

The OPEC/MENA/Arab nexus and the missing democratic transition 欧佩克/中东和北非/阿拉伯的关系和缺失的民主转型

IF 2.4 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-07-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102731

Martin Paldam

引用次数: 0

Can term limits reduce political sabotage? Evidence from negative campaigning in gubernatorial races 任期限制能减少政治破坏吗？州长竞选中负面竞选的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-07-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102724

Yizhaq Minchuk , Ohad Raveh

引用次数: 0

The “German Vote” and its consequences: (Un)reliable parties in multilateral bargaining under private information “德国投票”及其后果：私人信息下多边谈判中不可靠的各方

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-07-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102719

David Piazolo

{"title":"The “German Vote” and its consequences: (Un)reliable parties in multilateral bargaining under private information","authors":"David Piazolo","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102719","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102719","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper theoretically investigates the strategic implications of varying <em>reliability</em> of bargaining partners under unanimous and non-unanimous voting. In a sequential two-period model, three players (one proposer, two responders) bargain over the distribution of a pie. One responder has private information about his valuation of finding an agreement, implying signaling values that differ substantially between voting rules and are affected by the other responder’s <em>reliability</em>. The other responder is of a non-strategic “robot” type, who is unreliable in the sense that in the first period, he may vote “no” after announcing a “yes”-vote. Under unanimity rule, the responder with private information benefits from voting “no” because this signals that he requires a larger compensation in a future period. In contrast, under majority rule, voting “no” is unattractive due to the <em>fear of being excluded</em> from a future coalition. Under both voting rules, one responder becoming less reliable negatively affects the other responder’s willingness to vote “yes”, making efficient agreements increasingly difficult to achieve. Under majority rule, the presence of unreliable parties can lead to more parties being included in the winning coalition, as demonstrated by an extension of the model. However, some of these insights are contingent on the specific assumptions of the model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102719"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144605727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Democratic engagement in the shadow of authoritarian repression: Evidence from Chile (2019–2023) 专制镇压阴影下的民主参与：来自智利的证据（2019-2023）

IF 2.3 3区经济学

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2025-07-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102704

Armando N.G.L. Martins

{"title":"Democratic engagement in the shadow of authoritarian repression: Evidence from Chile (2019–2023)","authors":"Armando N.G.L. Martins","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102704","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102704","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article analyzes the long-term effects of authoritarian repression on democratic engagement (protests and voting) in Chile, focusing on the 2019–2020 <em>Estallido Social</em> protests and the 2020–2023 constitutional plebiscite process. It uses measures such as the location of military bases before 1970 and the number of victims during Pinochet’s regime to capture the intensity of past repression. The study also examines indicators of contemporary political behavior linked to the legacy of this repression, including public demonstrations, NGO activity, memorial sites, and social media engagement. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates suggest that exposure to political violence continues to shape civic and electoral behavior even after three decades after the end of the dictatorship. Moreover, municipalities more affected by dictatorship-era violence were more likely to protest but less likely to participate in the constitutional plebiscite. These areas did not consistently oppose incumbent politicians or favor independent candidates. Overall, the findings suggest that historical repression can contribute to greater reaction on the streets to political violence and lower levels of electoral engagement in contemporary democracies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102704"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144597521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0