European Journal of Political Economy最新文献

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Geopolitical risks and business fluctuations in Europe: A sectorial analysis 欧洲地缘政治风险与商业波动:行业分析
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102585
Fredj Jawadi , Philippe Rozin , Yacouba Gnegne , Abdoulkarim Idi Cheffou
{"title":"Geopolitical risks and business fluctuations in Europe: A sectorial analysis","authors":"Fredj Jawadi ,&nbsp;Philippe Rozin ,&nbsp;Yacouba Gnegne ,&nbsp;Abdoulkarim Idi Cheffou","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102585","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102585","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Should Europe Really Worry about Geopolitical Risks? This study investigates the impact of geopolitical tensions and risks on the economies of the Euro area. In particular, we assess the reaction of key sectors (financial sector: stock market, exchange rate, inflation; energy sector: oil and gas; real sector: economic growth rate) with regard to geopolitical shocks over the period September 2003–March 2024. We measure the reaction of European economies to global geopolitical risks, as well as risks related to geopolitical events and threats. To this end, we adopted the ARDL model and bound tests to estimate the effects of geopolitical risks in the short and long terms. Our findings present two interesting results. First, geopolitical risks can reduce economic growth and provoke depreciation of the euro. Second, geopolitical tensions can increase inflation and put pressure on Brent oil and gas prices in Europe. The European stock market seems more resilient to geopolitical shocks, however. Finally, adverse geopolitical events are also associated with greater economic and political uncertainty in Europe.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000879/pdfft?md5=d75d54aea01038a4bd26409b73348ac7&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000879-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141783417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Predicting scandal 预测丑闻
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102588
Slade Mendenhall , Joshua Ingber
{"title":"Predicting scandal","authors":"Slade Mendenhall ,&nbsp;Joshua Ingber","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102588","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102588","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Despite its salience in modern politics, scandal has only recently been treated as a subject of inquiry in political economy. Most of the literature has focused on scandal’s effects on electoral outcomes, while a theoretical literature on endogenous scandal has offered predictions and hypotheses that remain largely untested. This paper uses an original dataset of U.S. Congressional scandals to test some of those predictions. Special place is given to the role of opposition research by political opponents and the strategic timing of scandal release. Despite persuasive theoretical arguments in the literature as to factors that might affect scandal, we find the only meaningfully significant predictor of scandal incidence to be election timing.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141783470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fiscal rules and economic cycles: Quality (always) Matters 财政规则与经济周期:质量(始终)很重要1
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102591
Leandro Andrián , Jorge Hirs-Garzon , Ivan Leonardo Urrea , Oscar Valencia
{"title":"Fiscal rules and economic cycles: Quality (always) Matters","authors":"Leandro Andrián ,&nbsp;Jorge Hirs-Garzon ,&nbsp;Ivan Leonardo Urrea ,&nbsp;Oscar Valencia","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102591","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102591","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper investigates the role of fiscal rules in managing public debt, particularly focusing on their efficacy during different phases of economic cycles. Analyzing Balance, Expenditure, and Debt Fiscal Rules, the study finds that their impact on debt reduction is significantly influenced by the quality of the fiscal framework and the economic cycle phase. Moreover, factors like legal basis, procedural framework, and political stability are identified as key to ensuring compliance with fiscal objectives. Our results suggest that fiscal rules are most effective in reducing debt during positive economic cycles, with the design and institutional support playing a crucial role. This has important policy implications, particularly in the context of the debt increase after the Covid-19 pandemic.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141852639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Black representation and the popular legitimacy of the Federal Reserve 黑人代表与美联储的大众合法性
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102583
Daniel McDowell , David A. Steinberg
{"title":"Black representation and the popular legitimacy of the Federal Reserve","authors":"Daniel McDowell ,&nbsp;David A. Steinberg","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102583","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102583","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The Federal Reserve has started paying closer attention to matters of race over the last decade. The central bank has increasingly emphasized the distinct economic challenges facing racial minorities, and its leadership has become more racially diverse. This paper applies theories of descriptive and substantive representation to understand how these shifts are likely to impact the popular legitimacy of the Federal Reserve. We hypothesize that greater Black descriptive and substantive representation improves Black Americans' confidence in the Federal Reserve. We also anticipate that political ideology moderates how white Americans respond to the increases in Black representation within the Federal Reserve, with white conservatives responding less favorably to these changes than more left-leaning whites. Analysis of data from two original survey experiments with separate samples of 3000 Americans, split evenly between Black and white respondents, supports our expectations. Information about substantive and descriptive representation at the Fed has a strong impact on Black Americans' perceptions of the institution. We also find that these changes at the Fed boost white liberals' views of the Fed but have little impact on white conservatives’ attitudes about the central bank.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141729136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information effects in public spending preferences: Evidence from survey experiment in Poland 公共支出偏好的信息效应:来自波兰调查实验的证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102558
Jakub Sawulski , Nikodem Szewczyk , Aneta Kiełczewska
{"title":"Information effects in public spending preferences: Evidence from survey experiment in Poland","authors":"Jakub Sawulski ,&nbsp;Nikodem Szewczyk ,&nbsp;Aneta Kiełczewska","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102558","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate whether the provision of information about the structure of public spending influences the public’s preferences in this regard. Using experimental data from a survey of 1800 Polish citizens, we uncover large misperceptions about the allocation of public spending. Respondents consistently underestimate the share of spending allocated to pensions, while overestimating the share allocated to environmental protection and public administration. However, when informed about the real structure of public spending, citizens express substantially different preferences for spending cuts or increases in some areas. The differences are particularly pronounced in those categories where beliefs about the size of spending are most distorted, with one exception — the treatment has minimal effect on the strong opposition to spending on public administration. In addition, we show that the provision of information improves the initially low assessment of government efficiency.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141605181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Electoral quotas and developmental outcomes: Evidence from India 选举配额与发展成果:印度的证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102581
Shampa Bhattacharjee, Arka Roy Chaudhuri
{"title":"Electoral quotas and developmental outcomes: Evidence from India","authors":"Shampa Bhattacharjee,&nbsp;Arka Roy Chaudhuri","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102581","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102581","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Electoral quotas for disadvantaged groups aim to promote social justice by ensuring that all groups, including those who are otherwise excluded, participate in the government’s policy-making process. In India, electoral quotas have been in existence since the first election in 1951. An important research question is to evaluate the effect of electoral quotas for disadvantaged groups on the developmental outcomes of these groups. In this paper, we study whether electoral quotas for erstwhile untouchable castes i.e. Scheduled Castes (SCs) in India, lead to better developmental outcomes for Scheduled Castes. We consider four important indicators of welfare: primary schooling, infant mortality, access to subsidized food grain and employment under a government workfare scheme. We find that SCs in districts with a higher proportion of SC-reserved seats fare worse in terms of education, child health, and access to subsidized food grains. However, the probability of getting employed in a large government workfare scheme is higher for SCs from districts with a higher proportion of SC-reserved seats. Our results suggest that politicians prioritize providing targetable goods such as workfare while under-providing broad-based public goods such as education and healthcare or public goods like subsidized food grains, which offer higher opportunities for rent extraction.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141629970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equilibrium communication in political scandals 政治丑闻中的均衡传播
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102580
Bence Hamrak , Gabor Simonovits , Ferenc Szucs
{"title":"Equilibrium communication in political scandals","authors":"Bence Hamrak ,&nbsp;Gabor Simonovits ,&nbsp;Ferenc Szucs","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102580","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We present a formal model in which elite communication and voters’ beliefs during a political scandal emerge as a communication equilibrium, determined by the severity of the accusations and the degree of media scrutiny. The prediction of our model is that incumbents’ use of denials can garner support even when they face the possibility of evidence showing their guilt. In contrast, public apologies increase approval – compared to denial – only when accusations are not very serious and are likely to be proved. Results from a large survey experiment corroborate these predictions. In order to explore how changes in the information environment shapes the communication equilibrium, we estimate the structural parameters of our model and conduct counterfactual simulations. We find that increasing media scrutiny leads to asymmetric effects on incumbent communication with politicians who are the best at covering up evidence actually benefiting from increased scrutiny.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S017626802400082X/pdfft?md5=e354367c65f542fc9ec264fdc35c4ba4&pid=1-s2.0-S017626802400082X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141593790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Wage bargaining structure and political budget cycles: A policy game approach 工资谈判结构与政治预算周期:政策博弈方法
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102576
Hamzeh Arabzadeh
{"title":"Wage bargaining structure and political budget cycles: A policy game approach","authors":"Hamzeh Arabzadeh","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102576","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141844077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Broadband internet and attitudes toward migrants: Evidence from Spain 宽带互联网和对移民的态度:来自西班牙的证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102579
Marta Golin , Alessio Romarri
{"title":"Broadband internet and attitudes toward migrants: Evidence from Spain","authors":"Marta Golin ,&nbsp;Alessio Romarri","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102579","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine the effect of broadband Internet penetration on attitudes toward immi-grants by combining survey data from Spain with information on the characteristics of the telephone infrastructure. To address endogeneity concerns, we use landlines penetration in 1996 as an instrument for broadband diffusion, and use data from both the pre- and post-Internet period to estimate a difference-in-difference instrumental variable model. We document a positive effect of broadband Internet on attitudes toward immigrants. Looking at mechanisms, broadband Internet is associated with better knowledge about immigration, reduced concerns about the labor market effects of immigration and lower support for Spain's right-wing party.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141481717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
(Mis-)Perceptions, information, and political polarization: A survey and a systematic literature review (错误)认知、信息和政治极化:调查与系统文献综述
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102578
Maria Marino , Roberto Iacono , Johanna Mollerstrom
{"title":"(Mis-)Perceptions, information, and political polarization: A survey and a systematic literature review","authors":"Maria Marino ,&nbsp;Roberto Iacono ,&nbsp;Johanna Mollerstrom","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102578","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Numerous studies have documented that misperceptions about society, e.g. related to inequality, are widespread among voters. Simultaneously, a separate body of literature demonstrates increasing political polarization. Against this background, it is intuitively appealing to hypothesize that information provision can be useful not only to correct misperceptions, but also to create a common ground that can bridge divisiveness. In a general population survey, conducted in the United States, we show that beliefs in the power of information to reduce polarization are indeed widespread. To investigate the empirical relationship between information provision and polarization, we conduct a systematic literature review. We focus on papers that study the effect of information treatments on redistributive policy preferences, exploiting the fact that they often investigate heterogeneities in the reaction to information treatment. Our review shows that while it is certainly possible for information to decrease polarization, the effect is frequently the opposite. The reason is that different groups react differently to truthful and accurate information, in ways that often reinforce existing preference.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000806/pdfft?md5=e0e6054182d19cb744526515050a45a2&pid=1-s2.0-S0176268024000806-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141540496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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