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The Political Economy of Zero-Sum Thinking 零和思维的政治经济学
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22474
S. Nageeb Ali, Maximilian Mihm, Lucas Siga
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引用次数: 0
History's Masters The Effect of European Monarchs on State Performance 历史大师：欧洲君主对国家政绩的影响
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20830
Sebastian Ottinger, Nico Voigtländer
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引用次数: 0
Submission of Manuscripts to the Econometric Society Monograph Series 向计量经济学会专著系列提交手稿
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA931SUM
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引用次数: 0
Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 93 Iss. 1 《计量经济学》第93卷第1期
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA931FM
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引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Secretary 计量经济学会年度报告秘书报告
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA931SEC
{"title":"The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Secretary","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA931SEC","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA931SEC","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 1","pages":"303-318"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143111404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Persuasion Meets Delegation 说服与授权
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA17051
Anton Kolotilin, Andriy Zapechelnyuk
{"title":"Persuasion Meets Delegation","authors":"Anton Kolotilin,&nbsp;Andriy Zapechelnyuk","doi":"10.3982/ECTA17051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17051","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or discretion (the delegation problem). We study these two problems under standard single-crossing assumptions on the agent's marginal utility. We show that these problems are equivalent on the set of monotone stochastic mechanisms, implying, in particular, the equivalence of deterministic delegation and monotone partitional persuasion. We also show that the monotonicity restriction is superfluous for linear persuasion and linear delegation, implying their equivalence on the set of all stochastic mechanisms. Finally, using tools from the persuasion literature, we characterize optimal delegation mechanisms, thereby generalizing and extending existing results in the delegation literature.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 1","pages":"195-228"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA17051","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143111407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Minimum Wages, Efficiency, and Welfare 最低工资、效率和福利
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21466
David Berger, Kyle Herkenhoff, Simon Mongey
{"title":"Minimum Wages, Efficiency, and Welfare","authors":"David Berger,&nbsp;Kyle Herkenhoff,&nbsp;Simon Mongey","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21466","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many argue that minimum wages can prevent efficiency losses from monopsony power. We assess this argument in a general equilibrium model of oligopsonistic labor markets with heterogeneous workers and firms. We decompose welfare gains into an <i>efficiency</i> component that captures reductions in monopsony power and a <i>redistributive</i> component that captures the way minimum wages shift resources across people. The minimum wage that maximizes the efficiency component of welfare lies below $8.00 and yields gains worth less than 0.2% of lifetime consumption. When we add back in Utilitarian redistributive motives, the optimal minimum wage is $11 and redistribution accounts for 102.5% of the resulting welfare gains, implying offsetting efficiency losses of −2.5%. The reason a minimum wage struggles to deliver efficiency gains is that with realistic firm productivity dispersion, a minimum wage that eliminates monopsony power at one firm causes severe rationing at another. These results hold under an EITC and progressive labor income taxes calibrated to the U.S. economy.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 1","pages":"265-301"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143111194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society Annual Reports Econometrica Referees 2023–2024 计量经济学学会年度报告计量经济学评审2023-2024年
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA931REF
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引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors 2023–2024 计量经济学会年度报告编辑报告2023-2024
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA931EDS
{"title":"The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors 2023–2024","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA931EDS","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA931EDS","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 1","pages":"333-338"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143111396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Privacy-Preserving Signals 保护隐私的信号
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-11-21 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22017
Philipp Strack, Kai Hao Yang
{"title":"Privacy-Preserving Signals","authors":"Philipp Strack,&nbsp;Kai Hao Yang","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22017","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A signal is <i>privacy-preserving</i> with respect to a collection of <i>privacy sets</i> if the posterior probability assigned to every privacy set remains unchanged conditional on any signal realization. We characterize the privacy-preserving signals for arbitrary state space and arbitrary privacy sets. A signal is privacy-preserving if and only if it is a garbling of a <i>reordered quantile signal</i>. Furthermore, distributions of posterior means induced by privacy-preserving signals are exactly mean-preserving contractions of that induced by the <i>quantile signal</i>. We discuss the economic implications of our characterization for statistical discrimination, the revelation of sensitive information in auctions and price discrimination.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 6","pages":"1907-1938"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142685352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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