Econometrica最新文献

{"title":"Comparative Statics With Linear Objectives: Normality, Complementarity, and Ranking Multi-Prior Beliefs","authors":"Paweł Dziewulski,&nbsp;John K.-H. Quah","doi":"10.3982/ECTA19738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19738","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We formulate an order over constraint sets , called the <i>parallelogram order</i>, which guarantees that argmin{<i>p</i> ⋅ <i>x</i>:<i>x</i> ∈ <i>A</i>} increases in the product order as <i>A</i> increases in the parallelogram order, for any vector . Using this result, we characterize the utility/production functions that lead to normal demand as well as the closely related class of production functions with marginal costs that increase with factor prices. By generalizing the concept of supermodularity, we also characterize the class of production functions for which factors are complements. In the context of decision-making under uncertainty, our new set order leads to natural generalizations of first-order stochastic dominance in multi-prior models.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA19738","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Econometric Society Annual Reports. Report of the Secretary","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA921SEC","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA921SEC","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wealth Inequality in a Low Rate Environment","authors":"Matthieu Gomez,&nbsp;Émilien Gouin-Bonenfant","doi":"10.3982/ECTA19092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19092","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the effect of interest rates on wealth inequality. While lower rates decrease the growth rate of rentiers, they also increase the growth rate of entrepreneurs by making it cheaper to raise capital. To understand which effect dominates, we derive a sufficient statistic for the effect of interest rates on the Pareto exponent of the wealth distribution: it depends on the lifetime equity and debt issuance rate of individuals in the right tail of the wealth distribution. We estimate this sufficient statistic using new data on the trajectory of top fortunes in the U.S. Overall, we find that the secular decline in interest rates (or more generally of required rates of returns) can account for about 40% of the rise in Pareto inequality; that is, the degree to which the super rich pulled ahead relative to the rich.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Submission of Manuscripts to the Econometric Society Monograph Series","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA921SUM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA921SUM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can Restorative Justice Conferencing Reduce Recidivism? Evidence From the Make-it-Right Program","authors":"Yotam Shem-Tov,&nbsp;Steven Raphael,&nbsp;Alissa Skog","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20996","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20996","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies the effect of a restorative justice intervention targeted at 143 youth ages 13 to 17 facing felony charges of medium severity (e.g., burglary, assault). Eligible youths were randomly assigned to participate in the Make-it-Right (MIR) restorative justice program or a control group where they faced standard criminal prosecution. We estimate the effects of MIR on the likelihood that a youth will be rearrested in the four years following randomization. Assignment to MIR reduces the probability of a rearrest within six months by 19 percentage points, a 44 percent reduction relative to the control group. Moreover, the reduction in recidivism persists even four years after randomization. Thus, our estimates show that restorative justice conferencing can reduce recidivism among youth charged with relatively serious offenses and can be an effective alternative to traditional criminal justice practices.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Comment on: “Expected Uncertain Utility”","authors":"Simon Grant,&nbsp;Sh. L. Liu,&nbsp;Jingni Yang","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21843","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21843","url":null,"abstract":"<p><span>In an innovative paper, replete</span> with many important results and insights, <span>Gul and Pesendorfer</span> (<span>2014</span>) (hereafter, GP) proposed a novel model for choice under uncertainty. They considered a setting of purely subjective uncertainty in which the objects of choice are acts that, for each state of nature , deliver a monetary prize <i>x</i> from a set of final prizes , with . We denote the set of acts by , and the decision-maker's preference relation defined over by a weak order ≿.</p><p>In GP's model, the decision-maker (hereafter, DM) has a prior <i>μ</i> defined over , a <i>σ</i>-algebra of what they referred to as <i>ideal events</i>. GP interpreted any ideal event <i>E</i> (in ) as one for which the DM can precisely quantify that event's uncertainty by assigning it the probability . An event is deemed ideal by the DM if both it and its complement together satisfy a version of <span>Savage</span> (<span>1954</span>)'s sure thing principle.</p><p>Unfortunately, GP's characterization fails on two accounts, as their axioms neither ensure</p><p>In this note, we show that strengthening one of GP's axioms, along with a slight modification of their continuity axiom, provides a characterization of EUU maximization. But first, we present in Section 2 an example of an EUU functional involving a state-dependent interval utility and show that the preferences generated by this example, despite satisfying all of GP's axioms, cannot be represented by an EUU function of the form in (2).</p><p>Let the state space be endowed with the Lebesgue measure <i>μ</i>. Let denote the set of measurable events with respect to <i>μ</i>. Following GP, is the (interval) envelope of an act <i>f</i>, with (respectively, ) denoting the lower (respectively, upper) envelope.</p><p>We show that ≿ satisfies GP's Axioms A1–A6 which we list here for the convenience of the reader. To state them, we employ the following notation: for any pair of acts <i>f</i> and <i>g</i> and any event , <i>fCg</i> denotes the act that agrees with <i>f</i> on <i>C</i> and with <i>g</i> on the complement of <i>C</i>. We also require the following definitions.</p><p>An event <i>E</i> is <i>ideal</i> if implies for all acts <i>f</i>, <i>g</i>, <i>h</i>, and . An event <i>A</i> is <i>null</i> if for all acts <i>f</i>, <i>g</i>, and <i>h</i>. An event <i>D</i> is <i>diffuse</i> if for every non-null ideal event <i>E</i>. Let (respectively, , ) be the set of all ideal (respectively, null, diffuse) events. Let denote the set of <i>ideal simple</i> acts.¹</p><p>As in GP, we say an event <i>E</i> is <i>left</i> (respectively, <i>right</i>) ideal if implies (respectively, implies ). Let and be the collection of left and right ideal sets, respectively. GP's Lemma B0 establishes .</p><p>In line with GP's use of notation, events <i>E</i>, , , et cetera, denote ideal events while events <i>D</i>, , denote diffuse events. The following are GP's six Axiom","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21843","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139655335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 92 Iss. 1","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA921FM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA921FM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"“Near” Weighted Utilitarian Characterizations of Pareto Optima","authors":"Yeon-Koo Che,&nbsp;Jinwoo Kim,&nbsp;Fuhito Kojima,&nbsp;Christopher Thomas Ryan","doi":"10.3982/ECTA18930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18930","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We give two characterizations of Pareto optimality via “near” weighted utilitarian welfare maximization. One characterization sequentially maximizes utilitarian welfare functions using a finite sequence of nonnegative and eventually positive welfare weights. The other maximizes a utilitarian welfare function with a certain class of positive hyperreal weights. The social welfare ordering represented by these “near” weighted utilitarian welfare criteria is characterized by the standard axioms for weighted utilitarianism under a suitable weakening of the continuity axiom.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Tail Risk in Production Networks","authors":"Ian Dew-Becker","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21064","DOIUrl":"10.3982/ECTA21064","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>This paper describes the response of the economy to large shocks in a nonlinear production network. A sector's <i>tail centrality</i> measures how a large negative shock transmits to GDP, that is, the systemic risk of the sector. Tail centrality is theoretically and empirically very different from local centrality measures such as sales share—in a benchmark case, it is measured as a sector's average downstream closeness to final production. It also measures how large differences in sector productivity can generate cross-country income differences. The paper also uses the results to analyze the determinants of total tail risk in the economy. Increases in interconnectedness can simultaneously reduce the sensitivity of the economy to small shocks while increasing the sensitivity to large shocks. Tail risk is related to <i>conditional granularity</i>, where some sectors become highly influential following negative shocks.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21064","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138546358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Anatomy of Sorting—Evidence From Danish Data","authors":"Rasmus Lentz,&nbsp;Suphanit Piyapromdee,&nbsp;Jean-Marc Robin","doi":"10.3982/ECTA16425","DOIUrl":"10.3982/ECTA16425","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>In this paper, we formulate and estimate a flexible model of job mobility and wages with two-sided heterogeneity. The analysis extends the finite mixture approach of Bonhomme, Lamadon, and Manresa (2019) and Abowd, McKinney, and Schmutte (2019) to develop a new Classification Expectation-Maximization algorithm that ensures both worker and firm latent-type identification using wage and mobility variations in the data. Workers receive job offers in worker-type segmented labor markets. Offers are accepted according to a logit form that compares the value of the current job with that of the new job. In combination with flexibly estimated layoff and job finding rates, the analysis quantifies the four different sources of sorting: job preferences, segmentation, layoffs, and job finding. Job preferences are identified through job-to-job moves in a revealed preference argument. They are in the model structurally independent of the identified job wages, possibly as a reflection of the presence of amenities. We find evidence of a strong pecuniary motive in job preferences. While the correlation between preferences and current job wages is positive, the net present value of the future earnings stream given the current job correlates much more strongly with preferences for it. This is more so for short- than long-tenure workers. In the analysis, we distinguish between type sorting and wage sorting. Type sorting is quantified by means of the mutual information index. Wage sorting is captured through correlation between identified wage types. While layoffs are less important than the other channels, we find all channels to contribute substantially to sorting. As workers age, job arrival processes are the key determinant of wage sorting, whereas the role of job preferences dictate type sorting. Over the life cycle, job preferences intensify, type sorting increases, and pecuniary considerations wane.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA16425","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138546362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}